Arunangshu Chakraborty v. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority & Ors.

by the respondent no. 1 KMDA in the year 1987. It is submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that from the copy of the said brochure, it appears that the respondent no. 1 KMDA had decided the mode of selection of beneficiary for the purpose of allotment of land and also decided the eligibility criteria for getting allotment from the respondent no. 1 KMDA. It is submitted that on comparative study of the relevant clauses of ‘mode of selection of beneficiary’ and relevant clauses of the eligibility for getting allotment vis-à-vis the application dated 12.05.2008 as submitted by the respondent no. 6, it would reveal that the respondent no. 6’s application for allotment of land was not in accordance with the prescribed form as has been annexed to the said brochure. It is further argued that the respondent no. 1 KMDA itself violated the mode of selection of beneficiary while allotting the aforementioned land to the respondent no. 6 without making any finding regarding eligibility of the members of the said society of which the respondent no. 6 is the chief promoter.

#9. It is thus submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that the aforementioned procedural illegality is apparent on the face of the record and the same is violative of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India since such an action tantamounts to indirect discrimination. In this regard, Mr. Chakraborty places his reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani & Ors. reported in 2024 INSC 894.

#10. In his next fold of submission Mr. Chakraborty contended that for the sake of argument even if it is admitted that the procedure as mentioned in the brochure of 1987 as referred to above is not applicable in case of allotment of land which is involved in the instant writ petition, even then it would reveal that the respondent no. 1 KMDA made a complete departure from the procedure of allotment of land violating the salutary principle that where the statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner.

#11. It is further submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that in the affidavit-in- opposition of the respondent no. 1 KMDA, no plausible explanation has been given even for non-compliance of the procedure as prescribed in the brochure of 1987 while allotting the land to the said society through respondent no. 6 which suggests mala fide on the part of the respondent no. 1 and its instrumentalities in allotting the said land in favour of the said society of which respondent no. 6 is the promoter. For strengthening his contention, Mr. Chakraborty places his reliance upon the judgment as passed in the case of Dipak Babaria & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in (2014) 3 SCC

#12. Drawing attention to the copy of the affidavit-in-opposition of the private respondent nos. 5 and 6 as available at page nos. 96 to 125 of the paper-book it is submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that though a case has been made out on behalf of the private respondent nos. 5 and 6 that at that material time there existed a Chairman/ Authorities’ quota under which the said Committee recommended the allotment of plots of land or flats however, no such materials could be placed in the instant writ petition showing the existence of any quota as wrongly allotted. It is further submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that for the sake of argument even it is accepted that such quota existed at the time of such allotment however, allotment of land under the said allotted quota as a special case smacks of arbitrariness as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dipak Babaria (Supra).

#13. It is further submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that the procedure of registration of housing cooperative society and allotment of land etc. as have been urged by the private respondent nos. 5 and 6 in their affidavit-in- opposition are contrary to the provisions of West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act of 2006’ in short). It is further submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that in the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent nos. 5 and 6 though a case has been made out that the aforementioned allotment of land was done in accordance with the provisions of the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979 (the ‘said Act of 1979’ in short) however, no materials have been placed before this court that such allotment has been made under the said Act of 1979 as wrongly claimed by the private respondent nos. 5 and 6.

#14. In his next limb of submission, Mr. Chakraborty further contended that the respondent no. 1 KMDA is basically a statutory agent of the State Government however, by no stretch of imagination it may be presumed that the respondent no. 1 KMDA has got any power of distribution/ allotment of land in as much as the preamble of the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act of 1972’ in short) clearly postulates that the KMDA was established for the formulation and execution of plans for the development of Kolkata Metropolitan area and for coordination and supervision of the execution of such plans. It is thus submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that from the preamble of the said Act of 1972 it would thus reveal that the respondent no. 1 KMDA has got no power to allot and/or distribute land over which it carried out the development for which the said authority was established.

#15. Placing reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of The Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union Vs. The Delhi Improvement Trust reported in AIR 1957 SC 344 it is further argued by Mr. Chakraborty that simply because the KMDA was entrusted in the formulation and execution of plans for the development of Kolkata Metropolitan area including the land wherein the aforementioned two plots of land are situated, it does not mean that ownership of the said property is passed to them. It is further submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that in absence of any vesting in favour of the KMDA in respect of the aforementioned two plots of land, the KMDA has no right, title and interest to execute a registered deed of lease in favour of the private respondent no. 6.

#16. Placing reliance upon the judgment as passed by the Honb’le Supreme Court in the case of Tata Steel Ltd. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. reported in (2015) 15 SCC 55 it is argued by Mr. Chakraborty that it is trite that the Government is not bound by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, when it seeks to transfer any land vested in it or any interest therein. It is thus submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that when the Government transfers land or any interest therein to any person, such a transaction is not governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and thus, the rights and obligations flowing from such transfer either a piece to land or an interest therein by the Government cannot be determined on the basis of the rights and obligations specified under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It is thus contended by Mr. Chakraborty that by execution of registered deed of lease dated 23.10.2009 in favour of the respondent no. 6 by the KMDA no right, title and interest over the said two plots of land passed either in favour of the private respondent no. 6 or in favour of the aforementioned society and, therefore, there cannot be any difficulty to issue a writ of mandamus against the respondent authorities to cancel the allotment of Plot Nos. 8 and 9 in the aforementioned development project as well as the certificate of possession as has been issued by the KMDA authorities.

#17. In his next limb of submission, Mr. Chakraborty places his reliance upon the judgment as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Vs. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society, Jaipur & Ors. reported in (2013) 5 SCC 427. It is argued by Mr. Chakraborty that in view of the proposition of law as enunciated in the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation (Supra) any encumbrance created by the owner or any transfer of the land in question which has been made after the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would be deemed to be void and would not be binding on the Government. It is thus submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that in view of such there cannot be any difficulty in coming to a logical conclusion that the registered deed of lease dated 23.10.2009 as has been executed by the KMDA (as lessor) in favour of the respondent no. 6 (as lessee) is void ab-initio and thus no right, title and interest passed either in favour of the private respondent no. 6 or any of the members of the said cooperative society.

#18. Placing his reliance upon the judgment as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. reported in (2011) 5 SCC 29 it is further argued by Mr. Chakraborty that since the KMDA allotted the aforementioned two plots of land in favour of the private respondent no. 6 without maintaining a sound, transparent, discernible and well defined policy and in view of the fact such policy was never known to the public by publication in the official gazette or by adopting any other recognized mode of publication, there cannot be any difficulty to hold that such allotment was discriminatory and arbitrary with a sole intention to give some undue benefit to a class of person or persons.

#19. It is further agued by Mr. Chakraborty that in the judgment as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Humanity and Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported (2011) 6 SCC 125 the Hon’ble Supreme Court followed the same legal principle regarding the action of the State in giving largesse to any person according to the sweet will and whims of the political entities and/or officers of the State. Placing reliance upon the judgment as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Saroj Screens Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Ghanshyam & Ors. reported in (2012) 11 SCC 434 it is argued by Mr. Chakraborty that since the KMDA was holding the aforementioned two plots of land directly as a trustee of the public, the alienation as made by the said trust in favour of the private respondent no. 6 without holding any auction or by inviting the bids would amount to breach of trust and thus appropriate relief/ reliefs may be granted to the writ petitioner in terms of the prayer made in the instant writ petition.

#20. Placing his reliance upon the judgment as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of B.K. Srinivasan & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. reported in (1987) 1 SCC 658 it is further argued by Mr. Chakraborty that the alleged policy adopted by the KMDA is basically in the nature of the subordinate legislation and, therefore, the same ought to have been published or promulgated in a manner known to law. It is further submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that from the chronology of events as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs it would reveal that the allotment of the aforementioned two plots of land in favour of the private respondent no. 6 vis- à-vis the execution and registration of deed of lease dated 23.10.2009 in favour of the private respondent no. 6 as well as the issuance of certificate of possession also in favour of the private respondent no. 6 have been done in a clandestine manner which by no stretch of imagination can be said to be reasonable. In this regard, Mr. Chakraborty places his reliance upon the judgment as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in 2026 INSC 80.

#21. At this juncture, Mr. Chakraborty draws our attention to the affidavit-in- opposition as filed by the respondent no. 1 KMDA as available at page nos. 57 to 94 of the paper-book. It is submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that from internal page no. 3 (page no. 59 of the paper-book) of the said opposition of the KMDA it reveals that it is the specific case of the KMDA that it generally does allotment of land and flat of any nature through a committee which is known as ‘Land and Flat Committee’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Committee’ in short) and the recommendations of the said committee are ratified by the main authorities itself. It is submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that the mode of recommendation as made by the said Committee and the modalities of distribution of land as reveals from the said affidavit-in-opposition are contrary to the rules of equality and proportionality without having any semblance of fairness which amounts to discrimination. In support of such contention, Mr. Chakraborty places his reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Dr. Rao V.B.J. Chelikani & Ors. reported in 2024 INSC 894.

#22. Placing reliance upon the judgment as passed in the case of Gunendra Chandra Dey Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 1996 SCC OnLine Cal 113: (1996) 1 Cal LJ 541 it is submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that before a Single Bench of this Court in a writ petition involving the legality, propriety and correctness of the allocation of plots by the KMDA in the self- same project as involved in the present lis, KMDA had produced one guideline for off-loading of plots. However such guidelines are never placed before this Court in this writ petition which tantamounts to material suppression.

#23. Placing his reliance upon the judgment dated 27.09.2021 as passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in WPA 579 of 2016 [Humanity, Salt Lake & Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.] a coordinate Bench reiterated the settled principle of law as enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress (Supra) and thus opined that the State/ its agencies/ instrumentalities cannot give largesse to any person according to the sweet will and whims of the political entities.

#24. In course of his argument, Mr. Chakraborty further contended that while passing judgment in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors. reported in (1979) 3 SCC 489 the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of public largesse came to a finding that such decision must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non- discriminatory action and in the event of any departure from such standard or norm, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down unless it is shown on the part of the Government that the departure was not arbitrary but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory.

#25. In his next limb of submission Mr. Chakraborty places reliance upon the judgment as passed in the case of Basawaraj & Anr. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the settled legal proposition based on Article 14 of the Constitution of India came to a finding that in the event a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. It has been held further that equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and, therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or Court in a negative manner.

#26. It is thus submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that for the sake of argument even if this Court finds that similar such illegality was committed by the KMDA in distribution and/or allotment of plots to some other societies and/or individuals, such illegal action cannot come into way in granting relief/ reliefs of the writ petitioner since the private respondents cannot seek any negative equality on the strength that similar such wrong was committed in respect of others and no punitive action has been taken against them.

#27. Placing his reliance upon the judgment passed in the case of Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Vs. Vincent Daniel & Ors. reported in 2025 INSC 408 it is submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider the methods of ascertaining the market value of the land such as (i) opinion of experts, (ii) the price paid in bona fide transactions for the purchase of adjacent lands having similar advantages and disadvantages and (iii) capitalization of the actual and immediate prospective annual profits from the land while determining land/ or computing the compensation payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

#28. Drawing attention of this Court to page no. 91 of the paper-book being Annexure R2 of the affidavit-in-opposition of KMDA it is submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that from the contents of such annexure being a copy of the minutes of the meeting of the pricing committee held on 12.02.2009 it would reveal that on the day of allotment of the said two plots of land in favour of the private respondent no. 6 on 02.06.2008 there was no basis at all for fixation of premium amount and/or consideration payable to KMDA. It is thus submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that on account of such illegality and/or irrationality and/or arbitrariness on the part of the KMDA in favour of the private respondent nos. 5 and 6 there cannot be any hesitation to hold that the allotment of the aforementioned two plots of land in favour of the private respondents is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and thus such allotment may be quashed by issuing appropriate writ/ writs.

#29. Per contra, Mr. Dhar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the private respondent nos. 5 and 6 in his usual fairness submits before this court that admittedly there is no quarrel to the settled principle of law that a State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities cannot give public largesse to any person according to the sweet will and whims of the political entities and further the decision of the Government in the matter of grant of largesse must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and in the event any departure from the said principle is noticed, there cannot be any hesitation to hold that such a decision of the State is arbitrary in nature where from mala fide would be presumed and such an action is contrary to the settled principle of law as enshrined in the Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

#30. Placing his reliance upon the judgment as passed in the case of Joydeep Mukharjee Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in (2011) 2 SCC 706 it is urged by Mr. Dhar that in the case of Joydeep Mukharjee (Supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the legality, validity and correctness of the distribution of the plots of land under Chief Minister’s discretion quota, recorded the State Government’s conscious decision not to make further allotment under discretionary quota of the Chief Minister. However, by the self- same judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court noticing that the rights of the parties appeared to have been settled and attained finality in respect of the allotted plots under the said quota, declined to interfere with such settled rights and grants even in such public interest litigation. It is further submitted by Mr. Dhar that considering the fact that the private respondents and/or its members were allotted land on 02.06.2008 and also considering the fact that the rights of the members of the aforementioned cooperative society have been settled and attained finality with the passage of time, it would be highly unjust if any attempt is made to reopen and/or interfere with such settled rights and grants as has been done by the Supreme Court in a similar case that is in the case of Joydeep Mukharjee (Supra).

#31. In course of his argument, Mr. Dhar draws attention of this Court to page nos. 98to 100 of the paper-book being part and parcel of the affidavit-in- opposition of the private respondent nos. 5 and 6. It is submitted by Mr. Dhar that from the averments made in paragraph 2(b) of the said affidavit-in- opposition it would reveal that in a similar manner land/lands were allotted in favour of various persons particulars of whom have been given by way of a chart however, the writ petitioner, claimed to be a public spirited person for some obvious reason targeted the private respondent nos. 5 and 6 who is/are the promoters of the aforementioned cooperative society which clearly indicates lack of bona fide on the part of the writ petitioner. It is further submitted that the omission to question the largesse in favour of various other persons/ societies in the self-same year or immediately preceding or succeeding the said year of 2006 by the self-same authority that is KMDA deprives the writ petitioner for obtaining an equitable relief since such an action raises a serious doubt as to the bona fide of the writ petitioner which has been deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment as passed in the case of Aarsuday Projects & Infrastructure (P) Ltd. Vs. Jogen Chowdhury & Ors. reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 122.

#32. It is further submitted that during the pendency of the instant writ petition the writ petitioner filed IA No. CAN 1 of 2013 (Old CAN 10667 of 2013) whereby and whereunder a prayer was made for impleading the other allottees as party respondents who are similarly circumstanced with the private respondents but for the reason best known to the writ petitioner such an application has been ‘not pressed’ which again shows that the intention of the writ petitioner is calculative, selective and directed towards the present private respondents only.

#33. In course of his submission, Mr. Dhar further draws attention of this Court to Section 17(2) of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act of 2006 in short) as well as to the Rule 2(d) and 127 of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Rules, 2011 (hereinafter referred as the said Rules of 2011 for short). It is submitted that on conjoint perusal of the said section and the said rules it would reveal that the action of the respondent no. 6 being the Chief Promoter/ Chairman of the said cooperative society while submitting application for allotment shall be construed to be actions taken on behalf of the cooperative society after its registration and thus by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that there was any illegality or infirmity in making the application for allotment at the instance of the private respondent no. 6 even prior to registration of the said housing cooperative society.

#34. In course of his submission, Mr. Dhar also places his reliance upon page nos. 91 to 94 of the paper-book being Annexure R2 of the affidavit-in- opposition of the respondent no. 1 KMDA. It is submitted that from the copy of the minutes dated 12.09.2009 it would reveal that the earlier pricing committee of KMDA fixed the price of land at the rate of Rs. 4 lakhs per cottah and thus, it would be preposterous to hold that while allotting the said plots of land there was no standard in fixation of price and/or consideration as wrongfully alleged by the writ petitioner.

#35. Drawing further attention of this Court to the affidavit-in-opposition of the KMDA it is further submitted by Mr. Dhar that from the averments of the said affidavit-in-opposition it would reveal that in an earlier round of litigation before this Court the decision of the respondent no. 5 as CEO of KMDA was under challenge whereby and whereunder the private respondent no. 5 being the CEO of KMDA did not adhere to the prayer of the writ petitioner in WPA 21739 of 2012 regarding cancellation of allotment of land at Plot no. 37. It is argued by Mr. Dhar that in the said earlier round of litigation, a coordinate Bench of this Court in a public interest litigation declined to interfere with the decision of the respondent no. 5 as CEO of KMDA and for the aforesaid reason only the present writ petitioner in the garb of public interest litigation targeted the allotment of land in favour of the aforementioned society wherein the private respondent no. 5 is a member. It is thus submitted by Mr. Dhar that the present writ petitioner has not approached this Court with clean heart, clean mind and clean objective which is/are sine-qua-non for a public interest litigation as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey Vs. State of W.B. reported in (2004) 3 SCC

#36. Placing his reliance upon a judgment as passed by a Single Bench of this Court in the contempt case of Court on its own Motion: Re: Arunangshu Chakraborty reported in2025 SCC OnLine Cal 4718 it is further submitted by Mr. Dhar that in the said proceeding the present writ petitioner was found to be guilty of the offence punishable under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is further argued by Mr. Dhar that in the judgment in the case of Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in (2005) 1 SCC 590 the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressed its view that the Bar Councils and Bar Association should ensure that no member of the Bar becomes party as petitioner or in aiding and/or abetting files frivolous petitions carrying the attractive brand name of public interest litigation.

#37. In his next limb of submission, Mr. Dhar submits before this Court that there occurred unexplained delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner to approach this Court by way of filing public interest litigation challenging the allotment in favour of the private respondents in the year 2008 whereas the instant writ petition was filed in the year 2012. In support of his contention Mr. Dhar places his reliance on the judgments in the cases of Mrinmoy Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley & Ors. reported in (2024) 15 SCC 215, Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Ors. Vs. T.T. Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108, Rabindranath Bose & Ors. Vs. The Union of India & Ors. reported in (1970) 1 SCC 84 and New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Pan Singh & Ors. reported in (2007) 9 SCC 278.

#38. In course of his argument, Mr. Dhar further contended that Section 3(2) of the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘KMDA Act’ in short) postulates that KMDA shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provisions of the KMDA Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of the property and to contract and may sue and be sued in its name. It is thus submitted by Mr. Dhar that it is preposterous to suggest that the KMDA has no power to dispose of the said two plots in question in favour of the private respondent no.6 by virtue of the lease deed dated 23.10.2009.

#39. Drawing attention to Section 14(1) of the KMDA Act it is further submitted by Mr. Dhar that the said section enables the KMDA to constitute as many committees for smooth transaction of business as may be determined by the regulations made in this behalf. Drawing attention to Section 22 of the KMDA Act it is further submitted by Mr. Dhar that the KMDA is empowered to make such regulations as it may think fit for the exercise of its power and discharge of its functions under the KMDA Act.

#40. Drawing attention to page nos. 72 to 77 of the paper-book being a copy of the minutes of the 6th meeting of the Land and Flat Allotment committee (Annexure R-2 of the affidavit-in-opposition of KMDA) held on 20.05.2008 it is submitted by Mr. Dhar that in the said meeting the aforementioned committee recommended for allotment of a plot of land under ‘group housing category’ at East Kolkata Area Development Project (‘EKADP’ in short) at the existing rate, terms and conditions and on submission of affidavit. It is thus submitted that in view of the provisions of Sections 3(2), 21 and 14(1) of the KMDA Act, there was no occasion to hold that either the consideration of the committee of KMDA is not in accordance with law or the recommendations as have been done by the said committee pursuant to the regulations made by KMDA is contrary to the provisions of the KMDA Act.

#41. It is further submitted by Mr. Dhar that the reported decisions as cited from the side of the writ petitioners are distinguishable from the facts and circumstances as involved in the instant writ petition. It is thus submitted on behalf of the private respondents that the instant writ petition may be dismissed.

#42. Mr. Ashok Kumar Banerjee, learned Senior Advocate duly assisted by Mr. Talukdar, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the KMDA at the very outset draws our attention to the affidavit-in-opposition as filed by the respondent no. 1 KMDA as available at page nos. 57 to 95 of the paper-book. Drawing attention to the various averments made by the KMDA in the said affidavit-in- opposition, it is submitted by Mr. Banerjee that in such affidavit-in-opposition it has been specifically disclosed as to how Land and Flat committee of KMDA recommended for allotment of a plot of land in EKADP in favour of the private respondent no. 6, as well as other applicants as per the existing rate, terms and conditions and on compliance of required formalities.

#43. It is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that in absence of any denial and/or production of any contrary material, there is hardly any scope to come to a finding that the said allotment of plots at EKADP in favour of the private respondent no. 6 as well as in respect of other cooperative societies as well as other individuals/ persons are contrary to the KMDA Act. Drawing attention to page nos. 61 to 63 of the paper-book being the part and parcel of the affidavit- in-opposition of the KMDA it is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that the writ petitioner has not approached this Court by filing the instant writ petition with clean heart, clean mind and clean objective in as much as sufficient materials have been placed before this Court by way of filing affidavit-in-opposition by the KMDA that the present petitioner who is a legal practitioner of this Court moved a writ petition for his client one Maya Majumder who is the writ petitioner in WPA 21739 of 2012 wherein he questioned the legality, propriety and correctness of the order dated 07.09.2012 as passed by the then Chief Executive Officer who is the respondent no. 5 herein whereby and whereunder the respondent no. 5 authority declined to cancel the allotment of Plot no. 37 in Block R, MIG-1, under BP Township Project on account of some inter-se dispute between the said Maya Majumder and her other family members.

#44. It is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that subsequently the present writ petitioner being the learned Advocate for the said Maya Majumder also filed and moved a public interest litigation being WPA 27307 (W) of 2012 which was also dismissed.

#45. It is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that sufficient materials have also been placed that since the present writ petitioner being the Learned Advocate of the said Maya Majumder has miserably failed to obtain a favourable order for his client, he with some oblique motive filed the instant writ petition challenging the allotment in favour of the said society since the respondent no. 5 himself was a member of the said cooperative society and the private respondent no. 6 is the Chief Promoter/ Chairman.

#46. It is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that for the reason best known to him the writ petitioner in this public interest litigation and/or in any other litigation of similar nature made no endeavour to question the allotment as made by the said Committee in favour of the various persons/ cooperative societies by virtue of the minutes of meeting of the said Committee dated

20.05.2008 and on the contrary, he has chosen the action of the KMDA in connection with the allotment of the plot of land in favour of the said society only because of the fact that the respondent no. 5 himself is a member of the said society.

#47. Placing his reliance upon the judgment as passed in the case of Holicow Pictures (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. Prem Chandra Mishra & Ors. reported in (2007) 14 SCC 281 it is argued by Mr. Banerjee that in the judgment of Holicow Pictures (Supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court discarded the practice of approaching the constitutional Court by filing public interest litigation which is basically in the nature of private interest litigation or politics interest litigation considering the fact that the person approaches the Court is/are not acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation. It is thus submitted by Mr. Banerjee that since the writ petitioner has miserably failed to prove his locus standi and in view of the fact that the writ petitioner has miserably failed to substantiate his bona fide in the instant public interest litigation, he is not entitled to any relief as prayed for.

#48. Drawing attention to the order dated 27.11.2019 as passed by a Single Bench of this Court in CO 1244 of 2019 (Sri Gordhan Das Mundra Vs. Sri Partha Sarathi Paul) it is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that in the said order dated 27.11.2019 a single Bench of this Court noticed that the present writ petitioner who is the advocate on behalf of the petitioner in CO 1244 of 2019 made some unfounded and direct aspersion not only against an individual Judge but also against the highest judicial authority of the State. It is thus submitted by Mr. Banerjee that considering the background of the present writ petitioner and also considering the fact that the writ petitioner has approached this Court with some oblique consideration, the instant writ petition may be dismissed.

#49. In course of his submission Mr. Banerjee further places reliance upon the judgment as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Ganeshi Lal reported in AIR 2008 SC 690. He contends that since each case depends upon its own facts, the principle of ratio decidendi may be followed since a decision is an authority for what it actually decides and what is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. It is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that within the four corners of the instant writ petition, no cogent explanation has been furnished by the writ petitioner for challenging the allotment in favour of the said Committee 4 years after such allotment and on account of such unexplained delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner, the writ petition may be dismissed.

#50. Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent State adopted the argument of Mr. Banerjee. He prays for dismissal of the instant writ petition.

#51. In course of his reply, Mr. Chakraborty again placed his reliance upon the reported judgment of Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress (Supra). It is submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that in paragraphs 80 and 81 of the said reported decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that even if a person files a writ petition for vindication of a private interest but raises question of public importance involving exercise of power by men in authority then it is the duty of the Court to enquire into the matter. It is further submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that sufficient materials have been placed before this Court that the impugned allotment is the outcome of an exercise undertaken by KMDA in gross violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and thus, this Court must not be hesitant to quash such allotment since it has been shown by the writ petitioner that such allotment is a glaring example of favouritism and nepotism.

#52. It is further submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that since the minutes of the meeting dated 20.05.2008 were never published, there was no occasion on the part of the writ petitioner to come across the resolutions taken in the said meeting and thus the allegation of the KMDA as well as of the private respondents regarding abandonment of the writ petitions against other beneficiaries is not at all relevant especially on account of long passage of time. In this regard, Mr. Chakraborty places his reliance upon the judgment dated 22/23.04.2013 as passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in WP24542 (W) of 2010.

#53. In course of his argument, Mr. Chakraborty made an attempt to distinguish obiter dicta and ratio decidendi by placing reliance upon the judgment dated 24.04.2023 as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 7455-7456/2023 (Career Institute Educational Society Vs. Om Shree Thakurji Educational Society) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressed the following view: “The distinction between obiter dicta and ratio decidendi in a judgment, as a proposition of law, has been examined by several judgments of this Court, but we would like to refer to two, namely, State of Gujarat & Ors. vs. Utility Users' Welfare Association &Ors. and Jayant Verma & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. The first judgment in State of Gujarat (supra) applies, what is called, "the inversion test" to identify what is ratio decidendi in a judgment. To test whether a particular proposition of law is to be treated as the ratio decidendi of the case, the proposition is to be inversed, i.e. to remove from the text of the judgment as if it did not exist. If the conclusion of the case would still have been the same even without examining the proposition, then it cannot be regarded as the ratio decidendi of the case. In Jayant Verma (supra), this Court has referred to an earlier decision of this Court in Dalbir Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab to state that it is not the findings of material facts, direct and inferential, but the statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts, which is the vital element in the decision and operates as a precedent. Even the conclusion does not operate as a precedent, albeit operates as res judicata. Thus, it is not everything said by a Judge when giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding as a legal precedent is the principle upon which the case is decided and, for this reason, it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the obiter dicta.”

#54. While replying to the alleged delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner Mr. Chakraborty draws attention of this Court to page nos. 22 to 24 of the paper-book being a copy of the letter dated 19.05.2012 as written by the writ petitioner addressed to the respondent authorities requesting the said authorities to take appropriate steps for cancellation of the allotment on the ground stated therein.

#55. It is thus submitted that on account of non-action and/or inaction on the part of the respondent authorities to take appropriate decision with regard to the representation dated 19.05.2002 as submitted by the writ petitioner, the instant writ petition is filed and thus by no stretch of imagination it can be said that there was unexplained delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner in filing the writ petition as wrongly alleged.

#56. Placing his reliance upon the judgment as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. Sonigra Juhi Uttamchand reported in (2025) 3 SCC 23 it is submitted that it is trite that when a principle of law is enunciated in a decision by a constitutional Court it is applicable to all cases irrespective of the stage of pendency thereof. It is thus submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that for the sake of argument even if it is assumed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has framed and/or enunciated a principle of law regarding largesse of Government land during the pendency of the instant writ petition, the said principle of law duly applies in such pending litigation. It is further submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that materials have been placed before this Court that KMDA for the reason best known to them failed and neglected to disclose all the necessary facts before this Court which tantamount to fraud as have been held in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Ramesh Gandhi reported in (2012) 1 SCC 476 as well as in the case of Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs. Mohamed Haji Latif & Ors. reported in 1968 SCC OnLine SC 63 : AIR 1968 SC 1413.

#57. We have meticulously gone through the entire materials as placed before us. We have given our due consideration over the submissions of the learned Advocates for the contending parties.

#58. Since in course of his argument Mr. Chakraborty was very vocal with regard to the authority of the KMDA to allot land in favour of the private respondent no. 6 being the Chief Promoter/ Chairman of the said society, we at the very outset propose to look to the preamble of the KMDA Act which reads as under: “An Act to provide for the establishment of an Authority for the formulation and execution of plans for the development of the Calcutta Metropolitan Area, for the co-ordination and supervision of the execution of such plans and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto;”

#59. Section 3 of the KMDA Act is also required to be looked into and the same is quoted hereinbelow in verbatim: called to be “3. (1) As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute, for the purposes of this Act, an authority the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the Metropolitan Authority). (2) The Metropolitan Authority shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provisions of this Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and to contract, and may sue and be sued in its name.”

#60. Section 22 of the KMDA Act is also reproduced hereinbelow in verbatim: “22.The Metropolitan Authority may make such regulations as it may think fit for the exercise of its powers and discharge of its functions under this Act.”

#61. On careful perusal of the aforementioned legislative provisions it appears to us that it is the intention of the legislature while enacting KMDA Act that KMDA would be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire, hold and dispose of the property and to contract and may sue and be sued in its name. At this juncture, if we look to the factual aspects as involved in the instant writ petition, it appears to us that while executing a deed of lease dated 23.10.2009 in favour of the said society, the KMDA had every authority to execute such deed of lease in favour of the said society as such power is given to the KMDA by the legislatures while enacting KMDA Act.

#62. It thus appears to us that the contention of Mr. Chakraborty that in respect of the aforementioned two plots of land the KMDA is mere trustee and thus has no power to dispose of the same in favour of any third party, has no force at all since the KMDA Act authorizes KMDA not only to make formulation and execution of plans for the development of the said project but also KMDA possessed sufficient authority to dispose of the said developed project and to that extent the KMDA is quite competent to enter into a contract.

#63. In course of hearing Mr. Chakraborty was also very vocal with regard to the alleged violation of the provisions of the said Act of 2006. It is submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that the allotment as has been done in favour of the respondent no. 6 and/or the said society is per se illegal in as much as the KMDA had failed to notice that the said allotment of land was made even prior to the formation and registration of the cooperative society which was however opposed by Mr. Dhar, learned Senior Advocate for the private respondents in course of his argument. In order to arrive at a logical conclusion with regard to alleged violation of the said Act of 2006 at the instance of the respondent no. 6 and/or the said society, we propose to look to some of the provisions of the said Act of 2006.

#64. Section 17 of the said Act of 2006 is quoted hereinbelow in verbatim: “17. Co-operative society to be body corporate.-(1) The registration of a co-operative society shall render it a body corporate by the name under which it is registered, having a perpetual succession and a common seal and the co- operative society shall be entitled to acquire, hold and dispose of property, to enter into contracts on its behalf, to institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings, and to do all other things necessary to achieve its objectives. (2) All transactions entered into in good faith prior to registration of the purposes of the co-operative, shall be deemed to be transactions of the co-operative society after registration.”

#65. Section 87 of the said Act of 2006 is as under: “87. Eligibility for membership of housing co- operative society.- (1)………. (2) No person shall be admitted as a member or function as an organiser of a housing co-operative society until he has made a declaration to be sworn by him before an Executive Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate in accordance with the requirements specified in clauses (a) to (f) of sub- section (1): Provided that if such declaration is subsequently found to be false in whole or in part, it shall be an offence punishable under this Act.”

#66. Section 88 of the said Act of 2006 is as under: “88. Type of housing co-operative societies to be registered.--Housing co-operative societies of the following types may be registered under section 16:- (a) a housing co-operative society of which all the members eligible under section 87 have purchased a consolidated land for the purpose of construction of unit houses on separate plots which shall be allotted by the co-operative society and the common services and amenities shall be provided by the co-operative society to all members who may construct their houses either on their own or through the co-operative society: Provided that the members opting for construction of houses on their own must undertake construction within three years from the date of possession, failing which he shall surrender the plot of land in favour of the co- operative society: Provided further that if he does not surrender, it shall be deemed to have been surrendered by him and the price of land shall be refunded to him by the co-operative society which may re-allot the plot to a new member; (b) a housing co-operative society of which all members eligible under section 87 have purchased a consolidated land for construction of flats which shall be allotted to each of them by the co-operative society and maintenance, common services and amenities to all members will be provided by the co-operative society; (c) a housing co-operative society of which all the members eligible under section 87 are the owners of the flats in any building constructed or under construction by any authority or agency and have entered into an agreement to form the co-operative society for providing maintenance, common services and amenities to all members.”

#67. Section 89 of the said Act of 2006 is as under: anything Notwithstanding “89. First general meeting of housing co-operative society.-(1) contained elsewhere in this Act, the first board of the housing co- operative society shall, within three months from the date of registration under section 16, call the first general meeting of the housing co-operative society for the purposes of- (a) electing directors of new board; (b) placing a report on progress of work and other particulars relating to the project of the co-operative housing society; (c) apportionment of cost of land, house or flat, applicable; (d) placing a report of fund raised from the members, expenses incurred under various heads prior to, and after registration, any resignation and enrolment of members, latest estimate of the project cost and manner of payment towards cost of construction; (e) appointing architects, contractors and valuers: Provided such appointment shall be made after inviting application for the same through a daily newspaper, if applicable: Provided further that no person acting as an architect or contractor or valuer shall act as any of the other two; (f) revising allotment of plots of land or flats on the basis of draw of lots if there is any change in the sanctioned plan of the housing project, if applicable: Provided that if the sanctioned plan is not received before the general meeting, the revision of allotment, if any shall be considered in the next annual or half yearly or special general meeting. (2)……………….”

#68. At this juncture, if we look to page 15 of the paper-book being a copy of the letter dated 12.05.2008, it appears that the private respondent no. 6 being the Chief Promoter of the said society under cover of his letter dated

12.05.2008 made an application before the Hon’ble MIC of the Department of Municipal Affairs and Urban Development and Chairman of KMDA for allotment of land in favour of a proposed cooperative housing society to be formed by a group of 8 officers and professionals who were desirous of settling down in Kolkata. On perusal of page nos. 16 to 18 of the paper-book being a copy of the letter dated 02.06.2008 as written by the Special Secretary of KMDA addressed to the private respondent no. 6 it reveals further that the private respondent no. 6 was intimated that pursuant to his application the aforementioned two plots at EKADP were allotted in favour of the proposed housing cooperative society for the purpose of construction of residential plots. It further reveals from page no. 20 of the paper-book that on 08.10.2009, the possession of the aforementioned two plots were given to the private respondent no. 6 being the Chief Promoter of the said Society. On perusal of page no. 123 of the paper-book being Annexure R-2 of the affidavit-in- opposition of the private respondent nos. 5 and 6 it reveals that the competent authority forwarded a certificate of registration and by-laws of the said society under cover of a letter dated 14.09.2009.

#69. At this juncture, the moot question arises for consideration is as to whether submission of an application by the Chief Promoter of the said proposed society for allotment of plot of land prior to the registration of the said society and the allotment of land by the KMDA in favour of a proposed society (which is yet to be registered) in any way contravenes the provisions of the said Act of 2006.

#70. On careful perusal of the aforementioned statutory provisions of the said Act of 2006 as quoted in the preceding paragraph it does not appear to us that prior to making an application for allotment of land by the Chief Promoter of a cooperative housing society registration of such society under the said Act of 2006 is mandatory. It rather appears to us that Section 17(2) of the said Act of 2006 clearly mandates that all transactions entered into in good faith prior to the registration of the purposes of the cooperative society deemed to be transactions of the cooperative society after its registration. On perusal of the letter of allotment dated 02.06.2008, the certification of possession dated

08.10.2009, the copy of the registered deed of lease dated 23.10.2009 and the letter dated 14.09.2009 as mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs it appears that though letter of allotment and certificate of possession were given by the KMDA in favour of the private respondent no. 6 prior to registration of the said cooperative society however, the said deed of lease was executed and registered on 23.10.2009 that is after registration of the said cooperative society which was effected on or before 14.09.2009.

#71. In view of the chronology of events and in view of the discussion made hereinabove this Court thus finds that the present writ petitioner has miserably failed to establish that action of the KMDA and/or of the private respondent no. 6 are contrary to the provisions of the said Act of 2006.

#72. Since the writ petitioner in the instant public interest litigation had alleged infraction of rules on the part of the KMDA while allotting the aforementioned two plots of land in favour of the private respondent No.6 and/or the said society, we at the very outset propose to look to the law of land regarding distribution of public largesse. In the reported judgment of Lok Prahari (Supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to deal with U.P. Ex Chief Minister’s Resident Allotment Rule, 1997 which permitted the Ex Chief Ministers to continue in occupation of Government Bunglows for lifetime after demitting office. In doing so the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressed the following view: “46. ......... One should remember here that public property cannot be disposed of in favour of any one without adequate consideration. Allotment of government property to someone without adequate market rent, in absence of any special statutory provision, would also be bad in law because the State has no right to fritter away government property in favour of private persons or bodies without adequate consideration and therefore, all such allotments, which have been made in absence of any statutory provision cannot be upheld. If any allotment was not made in accordance with a statutory provision at the relevant time, it must be discontinued and must be treated as cancelled and the State shall take possession of such premises as soon as possible and at the same time, the State should also recover appropriate rent in respect of such premises which had been allotted without any statutory provision.”

#73. In the reported decision of Dipak Babaria (Supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the subject of largesse expressed thus: “61. It is well settled that where the statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. This proposition of law laid down in Taylor v. Taylor [(1875) LR 1 Ch D 426 at p. 431] was first adopted by the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor [(1935-36) 63 1A 372: (1936) 44 LW 583: AIR 1936 PC 253] and then followed by a Bench of three Judges of this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh [AIR 1954 SC 322: 1954 Cri LJ 910]. This proposition was further explained in para 8 of State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh [AIR 1964 SC 358: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 263 (2)] by a Bench of three Judges in the following words: (AIR p. 361) "8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor [(1875) LR 1 Ch D 426 at p. 431] is well recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted."