Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Limited v. Commercial Department, NSCBI Airport & Ors.

learned counsel for the appellant that the impugned order was passed on September 16, 2025. An appeal was initially filed against the same, erroneously, before the Commercial Division of this Court on September 25, 2025. On January 22, 2026, the same was withdrawn with liberty to file before the appropriate forum.

#11. Subsequently, the memorandum of the instant appeal was presented on February 13, 2026.

#12. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that the period of pendency of the appeal, filed erroneously before Commercial Division of this Court, should be excluded from the statutory limitation period or, at least, be considered to furnish sufficient explanation for the delay in preferring the appeal.

#13. Although not argued specifically, we shall also consider whether the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is 5 applicable by default unless otherwise specifically excluded by a particular statute.

#14. Even if we grant the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to the appellant or treat the pendency of the previous appeal, filed wrongly before the Commercial Division, as sufficient cause for the delay in preferring the present appeal, such benefit cannot extend beyond the period during which the challenge was pending before the Commercial Division of this Court, that is, from September 25, 2025 till January 22, 2026. If we exclude such period, the statutory limitation period of fifteen days had expired after six days from January 22, 2026, since nine days out of the fifteen days’ statutory period was lost by the appellant in preferring the appeal on September 25, 2025 whereas the order was passed on September 16, 2025.

#15. Even if we add a further fifteen days thereto, during which period the High Court has the discretion, if satisfied under the proviso to Section 28-K, to entertain such appeal, the outer time-limit within which such appeal can be entertained, that is, thirty days from the date of the impugned order, expired on February 12, 2026. 6

#16. However, the appeal was filed on February 13, 2026, that is one day thereafter.

#17. Thus, whether we extend the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or treat the period during which the prior appeal was pending before the Commercial Division of this Court (which did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal), the High Court does not have power (as per the proviso to Section 28-K) after the expiry of thirty days from the order to entertain the appeal under any pretext, even if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.

#18. The proviso to Section 28-K of the 1994 Act being couched in negative language, the High Court is denuded of the power to entertain an appeal after the expiry of thirty days from the impugned order, under any ground whatsoever. The said fetter, being worded in absolute terms, robs this Court of the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal after such period.

#19. Thus, we hold that the appeal is time-barred and that this Court is precluded from entertaining the appeal, by dint of the statutory embargo stipulated in the proviso to Section 28-K of 7 the 1994 Act, after the expiry of the period of thirty days from the impugned order.

#20. Accordingly, FAT No. 60 of 2026 is dismissed as time- barred.

#21. CAN 1 of 2026 and CAN 2 of 2026 are dismissed consequentially.

#22. There will be no order as to costs.

#23. Urgent photostat certified copies of the order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties at an early date. I agree. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) (Biswaroop Chowdhury, J.)