Civil Appellate Jurisdiction v. Pranab Kumar Mukherjee

Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd & Ors. v. Mr. Deepak Agarwal & Ors. rendered in SLP (C) Nos. 16631 -16632/2018, learned Advocate submitted that if notice under Section 4 of the LA Act 1894, was issued prior to the 2013 Act coming into force but no Award was passed prior to January 1, 2014, when the 2013 Act came into force, the land acquisition proceedings will continue as per provisions of the LA Act 1894 and only for determination of the compensation amount the provisions of the 2013 Act will be applicable.

7. Learned Advocate then submitted, relying on the Constitution Bench Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Ors. reported at (2020) 8 SCC 129, that possession of the land of the respondent/ writ petitioner having been taken over in 1982 and the writ petitioner having approached the Court only in 2016, i.e., after a lapse of 34 years, the writ petition is barred on the 4 grounds of delay and laches. Learned Advocate submitted that if a claimant is aware of violation of his rights and does not claim his remedies promptly, such inaction or conduct tantamounts to a waiver of his right. In such cases, the lapse of time and delay are very material factors and cannot be ignored by the Court. He submitted that the writ petition should have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

8. Learned Advocate for the respondent/writ petitioner submitted that since no declaration under Section 6 was published within one year from the date of notification under Section 4 of the LA Act 1894, or at all, in connection with the L.A. Case initiated in 2004-2005, the acquisition proceedings lapsed. This has also been admitted by the Government in its MEMO no. 214/1-LA dated February 19, 2015, (Annexure R-5 to the affidavit-in- opposition of the writ petitioner filed in connection with the stay application in this appeal). That the acquisition proceedings lapsed was also admitted by the State Government by filing an affidavit before the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 5568 of 2016. No Award was ever published and no compensation paid to the writ petitioner.

9. Learned Advocate submitted that since the proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act lapsed, therefore proceedings have to be initiated under the 2013 Act. Alternatively, even if the proceedings did not lapse because of physical possession of the land having been taken over by the State Government, since there was no Award as on January 1, 2014, determination of the compensation amount will have to be in terms of the provisions of the 2013 Act. 5

10. Learned Advocate further submitted that since Section 4 notification in connection with L.A. Case no. 3/PWD/2004 – 2005 was published in the year 2011, the date of such notification should be treated as the material date for determination of compensation amount following the provisions of the 2013 Act.

11. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contention of the parties.

12. The undisputed facts of the case have been noted above and I do not repeat the same. It is not in dispute that in connection with the L.A. Case initiated in 2004-2005, no Award was ever passed by the competent authority. It is an admitted fact that as on January 1, 2014, i.e, the date when the 2013 Act became operational, there was no Award. The short question is whether or not the notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act survived after coming into effect of the 2013 Act?

13. Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act reads as follows:- “24.(1) (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply;”

14. In the case of Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Ors. (supra), the supreme Court held that where Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act applies, i.e., where there is no Award on the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, the proceedings initiated under 1894 Act do not lapse. However, compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act. 6

15. In Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd & Ors. v. Mr. Deepak Agarwal (supra), a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court addressed the question as to whether a notification issued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act prior to January 1, 2014, (date of commencement of 2013 Act) “could continue or survive after

01.01.2014 and, as to whether Section 6 notification under the L.A. Act could be issued after 01.01.2014.

16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court answered the aforesaid questions follows:- “32. We think that while considering those questions we will have to bear in mind the purposes and the legislative history of the 2013 Act and also the intention of the legislature in drafting the same in the manner in which it now exists. We have already dealt with those aspects. One crucial aspect discernible from Section 24(1)(a) has also to be taken note of in this context. The combined effect of Section 24(1) and clause (a) thereof is that if land acquisition proceeding under the L.A. Act was initiated prior to

01.01.2014, the date of coming into force of the 2013 Act, and if it was not culminated in an award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act, then all the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation should apply to such acquisition proceedings. Thus, it is obvious that in case of non-passing of an award in terms of Section 11 of the L.A. Act where the acquisition proceedings have been initiated prior to 01.01.2014, all provisions under the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation 7 alone would apply to such acquisition proceedings. In other words, it would mean that in such circumstances the land acquisition proceedings should continue, but all the provisions relating to the determination of compensation under the 2013 Act alone will be applicable to such proceedings, meaning thereby, the 2013 Act would come into play only at that stage. There can be no doubt with respect to the position that between the initiation of land acquisition proceedings by issuance and publication of notice under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act and the stage at which compensation for the acquisition calls for determination, there are various procedures to be followed to make the acquisition in accordance with the law. The question is when Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act makes it clear with necessary implication that all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation alone would be applicable to such proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act but, not culminated in an award, how the procedures are to be regulated during the intervening period the proceedings reach the stage of determination of compensation. There cannot be any uncertainty on that aspect. The procedures to be undertaken and the manner in which they are to be regulated cannot remain uncertain. They are conducted either in the manner provided under the L.A. Act or in the manner provided under the 2013 Act. But then, in view of Section 24(1)(a), the provisions relating to the determination of compensation alone 8 can be applied to such proceedings or in other words, there is only a restricted application of the provisions of the 2013 Act in relation to such proceedings. The inevitable conclusion can only be that what is applicable to the various procedures to be undertaken during the period up to the stage of determination of compensation are those prescribed under the L.A. Act. We have no doubt that without such a construction, the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) would not work out, in view of the restrictive application of the 2013 Act. It is in this context that the decision in ‘Ambica Quarry Works’ case (supra) assumes relevance. Any construction of the said provision without taking into the legislative intention, referred hereinbefore would defeat the legislative intention as also the very objects of the 2013 Act. Certainly, it would not be in public interest to allow such proceedings to lapse or allow the authorities to follow the procedures during such period according to their sweet will. A uniform procedure has to be followed in respect of such proceedings. The acquisitions initiated for public purposes should go on in a fair and transparent manner with a view to achieve the intent and purport of the 2013 Act and at the same time, the persons affected shall have definite idea about the manner in which procedures would be conducted. The Party ‘B’ would not be justified in describing such situations of necessity and the consequential application of provisions which are actually saved on account of the construction of Section 24 as an attempt 9 to bring the words expressly employed in Section 24(1)(b) and absent in Section 24(1)(a), by indirect method to Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. The aforesaid conclusions and findings would make the contentions of Party ‘B’ that Section 4(1) notification issued prior to 01.01.2014 could not survive after 01.01.2014 and also that Section 6 notification under the L.A. Act could not be issued after 01.01.2014, unsustainable. In fact, all such procedures and formalities shall be continued the determination of compensation by applying all the provisions for determination of compensation, under the 2013 Act. A contra-construction, in view of the restrictive application of the provisions to such proceedings during its continuance, would make the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act unworkable.”

17. Therefore, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court appears to be that a Section 4 notification under the 1894 Act issued prior to January 1, 2014, would be alive even after that date notwithstanding that as on that date no Award had been made. Proceedings will continue in terms of the provisions of the 1894 Act in so far as the procedure is concerned till the stage of determination of compensation. However, compensation will be computed applying the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation.

18. Accordingly, we do not find any infirmity in the judgment and order assailed before us. The learned Judge has directed the competent authority to determine the market value of the land in question in terms of Section 26 10 of the 2013 Act and thereafter follow the process of law as laid down under that Act. We simply clarify, following the decision in the case of Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd & Ors. v. Mr. Deepak Agarwal (supra) that proceedings will continue following the procedure laid down in the 1894 Act excepting that the provisions in the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation shall be applicable for computation of compensation.

19. As regards the point of delay, in Vidya Devi v. The State of Himachal