Distribution Division Electricity Sub Station Kursi, Barabanki v. Smt. Meera Kumari Thru. Rakeshmani Tripathi And Others

1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record.

2. The present belated appeal under Section 30 (1)(C) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 has been filed by the appellant/Department against the impugned award and order dated August 30, 2024 as well as order dated May 15, 2025 passed by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923/Assistant Labour Commissioner, Lucknow in Case No.E.C.A14/2018/LR/E.C.A. (Smt. Meera Kumari v. Sachiv, U.P. Power Corporation Limited and others).

3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is a delay of 115 days in filing the instant appeal and the reason for delay has been given that the impugned award was passed on August 30, 2024 and thereafter recall application was filed, which was decided on May 15, 2025 and there is a process in the department of filing the appeal, which took reasonable period of time.

4. In view of the above, it is apparent that the instant appeal has been filed with the delay of 115 days and the reasons shown for the delay are purely bureaucratic set up at the end of the appellant. Hence, the delay so occasioned may be condoned.

5. Before further proceeding in the matter, this Court would like to deal 2 FAFOD No. 305 of 2025 with various judgements passed on this issue by Hon'ble Supreme Court.

6. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Others Vs. Union of India and Another; (2023) 10 SCC 531. The relevant paragraphs 31 and 32 are extracted here-in-below:- "31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. for something. It helps clarify the cause

32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication." (emphasis added)

7. Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654, wherein the appellant-State was seeking a condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court sternly noted that it will not let the courts to be forums wherein the Government can walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the period of limitation, and buttress reliance on cases wherein it allowed condonation, employing its discretionary powers, on merits or modalities of peculiarities of those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: 3 FAFOD No. 305 of 2025 "3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [...] ***

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible." (Emphasis added)

8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board; MANU/SC/1262/2025, categorically stated that the State or its instrumentality cannot claim special treatment or preferrential handling in litigation. The State must be treated equally with private litigants and follow the same rules and regulations. The delay by the State must not be condoned unless justified, promoting accountability and diligence in public litigation. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "189. This was followed by Indian Oil Corpn (supra) wherein this Court sowed the seeds for the shift in approach of the courts in matters where condonation of delay was sought by the State or its instrumentalities, inasmuch as it held that the Government and its various functionaries cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than any ordinary litigants, and held that the pragmatic and justice-oriented approach of the courts should be confined only to cases where there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction on part of the State. ***

210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a significant shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence to the State, premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia, the law has now evolved to insist upon parity between the government and private litigants. The rationale is that public interest is better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation. FAFOD No. 305 of 2025 4 ***

249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration." (emphasis added)

9. In conclusion, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs (supra) held that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. State callous attitude authorities

262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals 5 FAFOD No. 305 of 2025 under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.

263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.

264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law." (emphasis added)

10. The appellant being an Electricity Department is equipped with a dedicated legal set-up, trained law officers, and panel advocates who are fully conversant with statutory requirements, procedural steps and limitation periods applicable to such claim petitions. Such an entity is expected to act with due diligence and within the time prescribed by law. Internal administrative procedures, movement of files, or departmental processing cannot constitute "sufficient cause" for delay.

11. Institutional inefficiency, red-tapism, or routine procedural delays are not valid grounds for condonation of delay. Accordingly, when any department fails to act within limitation despite having adequate infrastructure and professional legal assistance, the plea of departmental delay does not justify condonation. The burden lies heavily on such institutional or departmental litigants to show bonafide and unavoidable circumstances otherwise delay cannot be condoned.

12. In view of above, the delay can only be condoned if sufficient ground is shown for condonation of delay. However, in this case the appellant has failed to show any sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, which has so occasioned. The appellant has even failed to disclose as to who was responsible for the delay and the person on whose shoulder, they can put 6 FAFOD No. 305 of 2025 the burden of the delay

13. Here the appellant being a department has proper machinery to deal with court cases, therefore, the grounds shown by the appellant are nothing but seems to be a concocted story, only to get the delay condoned in the matter of accident claim, therefore, the application for condonation of delay is misconceived and liable to be dismissed.

13. The application for condonation of delay is dismissed.

14. In view of the above, the instant appeal suffers from delay and laches and consequently, the appeal is dismissed. December 12, 2025 Anupam S/- (Prashant Kumar,J.) ANUPAM SINGH PATEL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record.

2. The present belated appeal under Section 30 (1)(C) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 has been filed by the appellant/Department against the impugned award and order dated August 30, 2024 as well as order dated May 15, 2025 passed by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923/Assistant Labour Commissioner, Lucknow in Case No.E.C.A14/2018/LR/E.C.A. (Smt. Meera Kumari v. Sachiv, U.P. Power Corporation Limited and others).

3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is a delay of 115 days in filing the instant appeal and the reason for delay has been given that the impugned award was passed on August 30, 2024 and thereafter recall application was filed, which was decided on May 15, 2025 and there is a process in the department of filing the appeal, which took reasonable period of time.

4. In view of the above, it is apparent that the instant appeal has been filed with the delay of 115 days and the reasons shown for the delay are purely bureaucratic set up at the end of the appellant. Hence, the delay so occasioned may be condoned.

5. Before further proceeding in the matter, this Court would like to deal 2 FAFOD No. 305 of 2025 with various judgements passed on this issue by Hon'ble Supreme Court.

6. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Others Vs. Union of India and Another; (2023) 10 SCC 531. The relevant paragraphs 31 and 32 are extracted here-in-below:- "31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. for something. It helps clarify the cause

32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication." (emphasis added)

7. Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654, wherein the appellant-State was seeking a condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court sternly noted that it will not let the courts to be forums wherein the Government can walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the period of limitation, and buttress reliance on cases wherein it allowed condonation, employing its discretionary powers, on merits or modalities of peculiarities of those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: 3 FAFOD No. 305 of 2025 "3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [...] ***

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible." (Emphasis added)

8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board; MANU/SC/1262/2025, categorically stated that the State or its instrumentality cannot claim special treatment or preferrential handling in litigation. The State must be treated equally with private litigants and follow the same rules and regulations. The delay by the State must not be condoned unless justified, promoting accountability and diligence in public litigation. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "189. This was followed by Indian Oil Corpn (supra) wherein this Court sowed the seeds for the shift in approach of the courts in matters where condonation of delay was sought by the State or its instrumentalities, inasmuch as it held that the Government and its various functionaries cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than any ordinary litigants, and held that the pragmatic and justice-oriented approach of the courts should be confined only to cases where there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction on part of the State. ***

210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a significant shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence to the State, premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia, the law has now evolved to insist upon parity between the government and private litigants. The rationale is that public interest is better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation. FAFOD No. 305 of 2025 4 ***

249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration." (emphasis added)

9. In conclusion, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs (supra) held that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. State callous attitude authorities

262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals 5 FAFOD No. 305 of 2025 under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.

263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.

264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law." (emphasis added)

10. The appellant being an Electricity Department is equipped with a dedicated legal set-up, trained law officers, and panel advocates who are fully conversant with statutory requirements, procedural steps and limitation periods applicable to such claim petitions. Such an entity is expected to act with due diligence and within the time prescribed by law. Internal administrative procedures, movement of files, or departmental processing cannot constitute "sufficient cause" for delay.

11. Institutional inefficiency, red-tapism, or routine procedural delays are not valid grounds for condonation of delay. Accordingly, when any department fails to act within limitation despite having adequate infrastructure and professional legal assistance, the plea of departmental delay does not justify condonation. The burden lies heavily on such institutional or departmental litigants to show bonafide and unavoidable circumstances otherwise delay cannot be condoned.

12. In view of above, the delay can only be condoned if sufficient ground is shown for condonation of delay. However, in this case the appellant has failed to show any sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, which has so occasioned. The appellant has even failed to disclose as to who was responsible for the delay and the person on whose shoulder, they can put 6 FAFOD No. 305 of 2025 the burden of the delay

13. Here the appellant being a department has proper machinery to deal with court cases, therefore, the grounds shown by the appellant are nothing but seems to be a concocted story, only to get the delay condoned in the matter of accident claim, therefore, the application for condonation of delay is misconceived and liable to be dismissed.

13. The application for condonation of delay is dismissed.

14. In view of the above, the instant appeal suffers from delay and laches and consequently, the appeal is dismissed. December 12, 2025 Anupam S/- (Prashant Kumar,J.) ANUPAM SINGH PATEL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench