Others vs Counsel for Appellant(s)

Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellant(s), Shri Vatsala Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 3 and learned Standing Counsel.

2. This is a Special Appeal filed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 challenging the judgment and order dated 15.04.2025 passed by the writ court in Writ A No. 3944 of 2025.

3. The limitation for filing such appeal is 30 days as prescribed in Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

4. The appeal as reported is delayed by 203 days. The affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay runs into ten paragraphs. Para 4 to 10 could be said to be relevant, which read as under:- "4. That the petitioner/opposite party had fled a writ petition before this Hon'ble court bearing no. Writ- A No. 3944 of 2025, (Dr. Lokendra Singh Vs State of U.P. and others), which was decided by this Hon'ble Court vide its Judgment dated 15.4.2025. 2 SPLAD No. 486 of 2025

5. That once the order dated 19.5.2025 was uploaded on the official website of this Hon'ble Court the Appellants approached their counsel for seeking advice and as such the counsel of the appellants advised them to start gathering the requisite documents for filling of a special appeal against the order dated 19.5.2025 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge.

6. That thereafter the appellants applied for the certified copy and started gathering all the requisite documents which would be need in filing of the Special Appeal. It is submitted that the Hon'ble Court was closed for summer vacations during the month of June and as such it took them time to co-ordinate amongst the registry in gathering the requisite documents.

7. That it is submitted that the delay in filing of the instant Special Appeal is bonafide and not intentional and the same is liable to be condoned by this Hon'ble Court in the facts and circumstances of the case.

8. That it is submitted that the delay in bling of the instant Special Appeal is bonafide and not intentional and the same is liable to be condoned by this Hon'ble Court in the facts and circumstances of the case.

9. That it is respectfully submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in a catena of judgments that incase the delay in filing the writ petition/Appeal etc. is not deliberate, rather is circumstantial and the case deserve merit consideration, in such cases the Court should consider the question of delay from that perspective and the delay should be condoned. In this connection the Appellants crave the liberty of this Hob'ble Court to kindly refer to the case of State of U.P. and others Vs Harish Chandra and others reported in 1996(9) SCC 309.

10. That in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances it is expedite and necessary in the interest of justice that the delay in filling the present Special Appeal be condoned and the Special Appeal be heard and decided on its merit, otherwise the appellants would suffer an irreparable loss and injury which cannot be made good in any event."

5. On bare reading of the averments contained in the above quoted paragraphs, no prudent person much less a Constitutional Court could arrive at a conclusion that the appellants have shown any earnestness, diligence, sincerity in attempting to prefer the special appeal within the limitation prescribed or at least within reasonable period of its expiry or that the appellants have furnished sufficient explanation for this Court to 3 SPLAD No. 486 of 2025 condone the delay. This is the situation after rendering of a recent judgment by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969.

6. We have gone through the decision of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) wherein most of the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant aforesaid in the affidavit have been considered and the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The period of limitation for filing the appeal being thirty days, there is hardly any explanation for the said period in the affidavit in support of the application. At least, it is not satisfactory. As regards the period after expiry of limitation also, hardly any acceptable explanation has been offered. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression 'sufficient cause' is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice- oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression 'sufficient cause' must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay 4 SPLAD No. 486 of 2025 certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether 'sufficient cause' has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of 'sufficient cause' cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, 5 SPLAD No. 486 of 2025 ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a ?sufficient cause? for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

9. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court 6 SPLAD No. 486 of 2025 in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra), we find that not only the delay is inordinate but the explanation offered is not at all sufficient. The appellants have been negligent in filing this appeal with such delay and are unable to offer any satisfactory explanation.

10. The application for condonation of delay is rejected.

11. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. December 10, 2025 Raj (Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) RAJ NIGAM High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellant(s), Shri Vatsala Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 3 and learned Standing Counsel.

2. This is a Special Appeal filed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 challenging the judgment and order dated 15.04.2025 passed by the writ court in Writ A No. 3944 of 2025.

3. The limitation for filing such appeal is 30 days as prescribed in Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

4. The appeal as reported is delayed by 203 days. The affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay runs into ten paragraphs. Para 4 to 10 could be said to be relevant, which read as under:- "4. That the petitioner/opposite party had fled a writ petition before this Hon'ble court bearing no. Writ- A No. 3944 of 2025, (Dr. Lokendra Singh Vs State of U.P. and others), which was decided by this Hon'ble Court vide its Judgment dated 15.4.2025. 2 SPLAD No. 486 of 2025

5. That once the order dated 19.5.2025 was uploaded on the official website of this Hon'ble Court the Appellants approached their counsel for seeking advice and as such the counsel of the appellants advised them to start gathering the requisite documents for filling of a special appeal against the order dated 19.5.2025 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge.

6. That thereafter the appellants applied for the certified copy and started gathering all the requisite documents which would be need in filing of the Special Appeal. It is submitted that the Hon'ble Court was closed for summer vacations during the month of June and as such it took them time to co-ordinate amongst the registry in gathering the requisite documents.

7. That it is submitted that the delay in filing of the instant Special Appeal is bonafide and not intentional and the same is liable to be condoned by this Hon'ble Court in the facts and circumstances of the case.

8. That it is submitted that the delay in bling of the instant Special Appeal is bonafide and not intentional and the same is liable to be condoned by this Hon'ble Court in the facts and circumstances of the case.

9. That it is respectfully submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in a catena of judgments that incase the delay in filing the writ petition/Appeal etc. is not deliberate, rather is circumstantial and the case deserve merit consideration, in such cases the Court should consider the question of delay from that perspective and the delay should be condoned. In this connection the Appellants crave the liberty of this Hob'ble Court to kindly refer to the case of State of U.P. and others Vs Harish Chandra and others reported in 1996(9) SCC 309.

10. That in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances it is expedite and necessary in the interest of justice that the delay in filling the present Special Appeal be condoned and the Special Appeal be heard and decided on its merit, otherwise the appellants would suffer an irreparable loss and injury which cannot be made good in any event."

5. On bare reading of the averments contained in the above quoted paragraphs, no prudent person much less a Constitutional Court could arrive at a conclusion that the appellants have shown any earnestness, diligence, sincerity in attempting to prefer the special appeal within the limitation prescribed or at least within reasonable period of its expiry or that the appellants have furnished sufficient explanation for this Court to 3 SPLAD No. 486 of 2025 condone the delay. This is the situation after rendering of a recent judgment by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969.

6. We have gone through the decision of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) wherein most of the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant aforesaid in the affidavit have been considered and the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The period of limitation for filing the appeal being thirty days, there is hardly any explanation for the said period in the affidavit in support of the application. At least, it is not satisfactory. As regards the period after expiry of limitation also, hardly any acceptable explanation has been offered. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression 'sufficient cause' is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice- oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression 'sufficient cause' must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay 4 SPLAD No. 486 of 2025 certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether 'sufficient cause' has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of 'sufficient cause' cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, 5 SPLAD No. 486 of 2025 ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a ?sufficient cause? for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

9. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court 6 SPLAD No. 486 of 2025 in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra), we find that not only the delay is inordinate but the explanation offered is not at all sufficient. The appellants have been negligent in filing this appeal with such delay and are unable to offer any satisfactory explanation.

10. The application for condonation of delay is rejected.

11. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. December 10, 2025 Raj (Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) RAJ NIGAM High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench