Mohammad Naseem vs Counsel for Appellant(s)

3. Although a preliminary objection has been raised by Shri Rama Shankar Mishra, counsel appearing for the respondent-petitioner, that present appeal itself is not maintainable since the writ petition arose out of an order passed under the Indian Forest Act, 1927 that too when the appellate order was also under challenge, and the aforesaid Act and the State Amendment are referable to Entry 17(A) and 17(B) of the Concurrent List, in view of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, however, we find that the appeal is delayed by about 250 days, therefore, we have to first consider this delay.

4. We have gone through the affidavit filed in support of application for condonation of delay, and yet we again find that the explanation offered by the appellants is not at all satisfactory and sufficient for condoning the delay. Only a formality of filing an affidavit alongwith application condonation of delay has been carried out, without any diligence and sincere effort to explain the delay. This may be because there is no explanation available with the appellants, as they have sat over the matter for quite some time and 2 SPLAD No. 480 of 2025 have filed this appeal only after contempt proceedings having been initiated by the respondent-petitioner for non-compliance of the impugned judgment in the month of October, 2025.

5. We have gone through the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay. Although the judgment impugned was passed on

24.02.2025, the first date which figures in the affidavit is 23.05.2025, when the Divisional Director, Social Forestry Division, Deoria, referred the matter to the Chief Standing Counsel, Lucknow, for legal opinion. There is no explanation for the intervening period i.e. the period between 25.02.2025 till

22.05.2025.

6. Para 8 merely states that State Government examined the proposal and referred the matter to the Department of law and Justice which granted permission for filing the appeal on 23.05.2025.

7. Para 10 states that on 27.05.2025 the Chief Standing Counsel, High Court, Lucknow, opined for referring the matter to the Department of Law and Justice for seeking consent which in fact had already been granted and that the Officials ultimately contacted the Office of the Chief Standing Counsel on 14.11.2025. There is absolutely no explanation whatsoever for intervening period i.e. from May, 2025 to 13.11.2025. The affidavit has been drafted in a most casual manner, which shows a lack of any urgency on the part of the appellants.

8. We have gone through the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 wherein law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression 'sufficient cause' is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression 'sufficient cause' must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be 3 SPLAD No. 480 of 2025 swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

9. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether 'sufficient cause' has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of 'sufficient cause' cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before 4 SPLAD No. 480 of 2025 the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

10. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a 'sufficient cause' for the purpose of 5 SPLAD No. 480 of 2025 Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

11. Considering the facts of this case, we are of the opinion, as already expressed, firstly that the delay is inordinate, secondly, the explanation offered in this regard is certainly not an acceptable one and is not satisfactory as there is no sufficient cause shown by the appellants for entertaining the appeal which has been filed with such delay.

12. In view of the above, we cannot help but reject the application for condonation of delay.

13. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 5, 2025 Vinay/- (Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) VINAY KUMAR VINAY KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Lucknow Bench

3. Although a preliminary objection has been raised by Shri Rama Shankar Mishra, counsel appearing for the respondent-petitioner, that present appeal itself is not maintainable since the writ petition arose out of an order passed under the Indian Forest Act, 1927 that too when the appellate order was also under challenge, and the aforesaid Act and the State Amendment are referable to Entry 17(A) and 17(B) of the Concurrent List, in view of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, however, we find that the appeal is delayed by about 250 days, therefore, we have to first consider this delay.

4. We have gone through the affidavit filed in support of application for condonation of delay, and yet we again find that the explanation offered by the appellants is not at all satisfactory and sufficient for condoning the delay. Only a formality of filing an affidavit alongwith application condonation of delay has been carried out, without any diligence and sincere effort to explain the delay. This may be because there is no explanation available with the appellants, as they have sat over the matter for quite some time and 2 SPLAD No. 480 of 2025 have filed this appeal only after contempt proceedings having been initiated by the respondent-petitioner for non-compliance of the impugned judgment in the month of October, 2025.

5. We have gone through the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay. Although the judgment impugned was passed on

24.02.2025, the first date which figures in the affidavit is 23.05.2025, when the Divisional Director, Social Forestry Division, Deoria, referred the matter to the Chief Standing Counsel, Lucknow, for legal opinion. There is no explanation for the intervening period i.e. the period between 25.02.2025 till

22.05.2025.

6. Para 8 merely states that State Government examined the proposal and referred the matter to the Department of law and Justice which granted permission for filing the appeal on 23.05.2025.

7. Para 10 states that on 27.05.2025 the Chief Standing Counsel, High Court, Lucknow, opined for referring the matter to the Department of Law and Justice for seeking consent which in fact had already been granted and that the Officials ultimately contacted the Office of the Chief Standing Counsel on 14.11.2025. There is absolutely no explanation whatsoever for intervening period i.e. from May, 2025 to 13.11.2025. The affidavit has been drafted in a most casual manner, which shows a lack of any urgency on the part of the appellants.

8. We have gone through the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 wherein law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression 'sufficient cause' is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression 'sufficient cause' must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be 3 SPLAD No. 480 of 2025 swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

9. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether 'sufficient cause' has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of 'sufficient cause' cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before 4 SPLAD No. 480 of 2025 the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

10. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a 'sufficient cause' for the purpose of 5 SPLAD No. 480 of 2025 Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

11. Considering the facts of this case, we are of the opinion, as already expressed, firstly that the delay is inordinate, secondly, the explanation offered in this regard is certainly not an acceptable one and is not satisfactory as there is no sufficient cause shown by the appellants for entertaining the appeal which has been filed with such delay.

12. In view of the above, we cannot help but reject the application for condonation of delay.

13. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 5, 2025 Vinay/- (Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) VINAY KUMAR VINAY KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Lucknow Bench