Others v. Counsel for

2. The appeal, as per the report is delayed by 451 days as on the date of its filing i.e. 29.11.2025. We have gone through the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay. Paragraph no.3 mentions about receipt of certified copy of the judgment impugned herein in the office of Regional Higher Education Officer, Lucknow on 03.10.2024 where it was served by the respondent-petitioner. There is no explanation whatsoever as to why, with a battery of lawyers available to serve the State's cause in the High Court, the same was not informed by the CSC office to the concerned department of the State Government that is if it is so, unless of course it was informed. No light has been thrown on this aspect, therefore, there is no explanation for the period 07.08.2024 till 02.10.2024 in this regard.

3. In paragraph no.4, it has been stated that concerned college of the respondent-petitioner also sent a certified copy to the same office on 15.02.2025. Again, there is no explanation for the period 04.10.2024 till 14.02.2024 as to what was done by the authorities when they had already received certified copy of the judgement on 03.10.2024. Paragraph no.5 thereafter, goes on to state that the aforesaid Officer sent the matter to the Director, Higher Education, Prayagraj vide letter dated 19.03.2025 i.e. almost a month after receipt of the impugned judgment for the second time on 15.02.2025 and more than four months after its receipt at the first instance on 03.10.2024. This clearly discloses a leisurely, casual and negligent approach on the part of concerned authorities with hardly any 2 SPLAD No. 479 of 2025 urgency being shown to prefer an appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 for which limitation prescribed is 30 days as per Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963. Paragraph no. 6 of the affidavit speaks of a letter by the Directorate dated 09.04.2025 requesting the Chief Standing Counsel Office for his opinion, there again, no urgency is reflected. Paragraph no.7 of the affidavit speaks allotment of the file for giving legal opinion on 17.04.2025. The legal opinion as stated in paragraph no.8, was given only on 26.06.2025 more than two months after receipt of the letter dated 09.04.2025. Paragraph no. 9 of the affidavit states that after receiving legal opinion, State Government was requested for grant of permission to file the appeal vide letter dated 22.08.2025 which again is almost two months after the legal opinion had been given. In paragraph no.10 it has been stated that the State Government granted the permission to file appeal vide letter dated 13.10.2025. Here again, there is further delay of two months. Paragraph no.11 speaks of allotment of file for preparation of appeal on 04.11.2025. Paragraph no.12 of the affidavit speaks of the document etc being handed over to the Standing Counsel on 06.11.2025. Explanation for the delay was provided to the Standing Counsel on 12.11.2025 as stated in paragraph no.13, thereafter the affidavit only goes on to state about the process followed for preparation and filing the appeal which in fact was filed on 29.11.2025.

4. The affidavit does not disclose any due diligence on the part of state authorities in filing this appeal. This is not the first case. We have rejected so many applications for condonation of delay after rendering of the judgment by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivomma (Dead) by LRS Vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on 12.09.2025, yet, casual affidavits are being filed which do not disclose any earnestness or sincerity in furnishing explanation for the delay may be because there is no explanation at all, as appears to be in the case at hand.

5. We have gone through the decision of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression sufficient cause is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest 3 SPLAD No. 479 of 2025 reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression ?sufficient cause? must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether ?sufficient cause? has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ?sufficient cause? cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the 4 SPLAD No. 479 of 2025 court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage. judicial towards sympathy the State and

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a ?sufficient cause? for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards. 5 SPLAD No. 479 of 2025

8. Considering the facts of this case, we are of the opinion, as already expressed, firstly that the delay is inordinate, secondly, the explanation offered in this regard is certainly not an acceptable one and is not satisfactory as there is no sufficient cause shown by the appellants for entertaining the appeal which has been filed with such delay.

9. In view of the above, we cannot help but reject the application for condonation of delay.

10. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 5, 2025 Mohit (Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) MOHIT KUMAR KUSHWAHA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

2. The appeal, as per the report is delayed by 451 days as on the date of its filing i.e. 29.11.2025. We have gone through the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay. Paragraph no.3 mentions about receipt of certified copy of the judgment impugned herein in the office of Regional Higher Education Officer, Lucknow on 03.10.2024 where it was served by the respondent-petitioner. There is no explanation whatsoever as to why, with a battery of lawyers available to serve the State's cause in the High Court, the same was not informed by the CSC office to the concerned department of the State Government that is if it is so, unless of course it was informed. No light has been thrown on this aspect, therefore, there is no explanation for the period 07.08.2024 till 02.10.2024 in this regard.

3. In paragraph no.4, it has been stated that concerned college of the respondent-petitioner also sent a certified copy to the same office on 15.02.2025. Again, there is no explanation for the period 04.10.2024 till 14.02.2024 as to what was done by the authorities when they had already received certified copy of the judgement on 03.10.2024. Paragraph no.5 thereafter, goes on to state that the aforesaid Officer sent the matter to the Director, Higher Education, Prayagraj vide letter dated 19.03.2025 i.e. almost a month after receipt of the impugned judgment for the second time on 15.02.2025 and more than four months after its receipt at the first instance on 03.10.2024. This clearly discloses a leisurely, casual and negligent approach on the part of concerned authorities with hardly any 2 SPLAD No. 479 of 2025 urgency being shown to prefer an appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 for which limitation prescribed is 30 days as per Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963. Paragraph no. 6 of the affidavit speaks of a letter by the Directorate dated 09.04.2025 requesting the Chief Standing Counsel Office for his opinion, there again, no urgency is reflected. Paragraph no.7 of the affidavit speaks allotment of the file for giving legal opinion on 17.04.2025. The legal opinion as stated in paragraph no.8, was given only on 26.06.2025 more than two months after receipt of the letter dated 09.04.2025. Paragraph no. 9 of the affidavit states that after receiving legal opinion, State Government was requested for grant of permission to file the appeal vide letter dated 22.08.2025 which again is almost two months after the legal opinion had been given. In paragraph no.10 it has been stated that the State Government granted the permission to file appeal vide letter dated 13.10.2025. Here again, there is further delay of two months. Paragraph no.11 speaks of allotment of file for preparation of appeal on 04.11.2025. Paragraph no.12 of the affidavit speaks of the document etc being handed over to the Standing Counsel on 06.11.2025. Explanation for the delay was provided to the Standing Counsel on 12.11.2025 as stated in paragraph no.13, thereafter the affidavit only goes on to state about the process followed for preparation and filing the appeal which in fact was filed on 29.11.2025.

4. The affidavit does not disclose any due diligence on the part of state authorities in filing this appeal. This is not the first case. We have rejected so many applications for condonation of delay after rendering of the judgment by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivomma (Dead) by LRS Vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on 12.09.2025, yet, casual affidavits are being filed which do not disclose any earnestness or sincerity in furnishing explanation for the delay may be because there is no explanation at all, as appears to be in the case at hand.

5. We have gone through the decision of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression sufficient cause is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest 3 SPLAD No. 479 of 2025 reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression ?sufficient cause? must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether ?sufficient cause? has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ?sufficient cause? cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the 4 SPLAD No. 479 of 2025 court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage. judicial towards sympathy the State and

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a ?sufficient cause? for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards. 5 SPLAD No. 479 of 2025

8. Considering the facts of this case, we are of the opinion, as already expressed, firstly that the delay is inordinate, secondly, the explanation offered in this regard is certainly not an acceptable one and is not satisfactory as there is no sufficient cause shown by the appellants for entertaining the appeal which has been filed with such delay.

9. In view of the above, we cannot help but reject the application for condonation of delay.

10. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 5, 2025 Mohit (Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) MOHIT KUMAR KUSHWAHA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench