District Basic Education Officer, Sitapur vs Counsel for Appellant(s)

been filed on 22.11.2025, therefore, we have first of all to consider the delay in filing the appeal keeping in mind the recent decision of Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on 12.09.2025.

3. The affidavit filed in support of application for condonation of delay merely states that some delay in filing the appeal, approximately of 22 months has been caused which is not deliberate but is bonafide and in the facts and circumstances of the case it is liable to be condoned as all the records had to be examined at the 2 SPLAD No. 456 of 2025 level of competent authority as valid sanction had to be obtained before filing the present appeal and permission was also sought from the Secretary, Basic Shiksha Parishad, Prayagraj lastly on

07.11.2025, in anticipation of which the present appeal is being filed without any further delay. Thereafter, the affidavit states that certified copy of the judgment dated 05.01.2024 was received on

19.11.2025. This latter averment is nothing but an attempt to mislead the court, as it does not disclose the date on which the certified copy was applied. The certified copy itself shows that it was applied only on 18.11.2025, whereas the judgment was passed on 05.01.2024, therefore, no benefit of the facts avered in paragraph 4 of the affidavit can be given. The earlier averment as noticed in paragraph 3 are apparently casual. This is not how a delay of 22 months is to be explained.

4. Apart from the above, the only other thing stated in the affidavit is that the appeal is being preferred after being handed over to the counsel after some unavoidable delay. The affidavit to say the least has been drafted in the most casual manner. It shows lack of bonafide, abject absence of promptness on the part of the appellants to prefer an appeal, limitation for which is 30 days vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

5. We have gone through the decision of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) wherein most of the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant aforesaid in the affidavit have been considered and the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The period of limitation for filing the appeal being thirty days, there is hardly any explanation for the said period in the affidavit in support of the application. At least, it is not satisfactory. As regards the period after expiry of limitation also, hardly any acceptable explanation has been offered. 3 SPLAD No. 456 of 2025 Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay 4 SPLAD No. 456 of 2025 is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether ‘sufficient cause’ has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier 5 SPLAD No. 456 of 2025 decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted 6 SPLAD No. 456 of 2025 as a ‘sufficient cause’ for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

8. Considering the facts of this case, we are of the opinion, as already expressed, firstly that the delay is inordinate and deliberate, secondly, the explanation offered in this regard which is hardly an explanation is certainly not an acceptable one and is not satisfactory as there is no sufficient cause shown by the appellants for entertaining the appeal which has been filed with such delay.

9. In view of the above, we cannot help but reject the application for condonation of delay.

10. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. November 25, 2025 Arnima (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) ARNIMA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

been filed on 22.11.2025, therefore, we have first of all to consider the delay in filing the appeal keeping in mind the recent decision of Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on 12.09.2025.

3. The affidavit filed in support of application for condonation of delay merely states that some delay in filing the appeal, approximately of 22 months has been caused which is not deliberate but is bonafide and in the facts and circumstances of the case it is liable to be condoned as all the records had to be examined at the 2 SPLAD No. 456 of 2025 level of competent authority as valid sanction had to be obtained before filing the present appeal and permission was also sought from the Secretary, Basic Shiksha Parishad, Prayagraj lastly on

07.11.2025, in anticipation of which the present appeal is being filed without any further delay. Thereafter, the affidavit states that certified copy of the judgment dated 05.01.2024 was received on

19.11.2025. This latter averment is nothing but an attempt to mislead the court, as it does not disclose the date on which the certified copy was applied. The certified copy itself shows that it was applied only on 18.11.2025, whereas the judgment was passed on 05.01.2024, therefore, no benefit of the facts avered in paragraph 4 of the affidavit can be given. The earlier averment as noticed in paragraph 3 are apparently casual. This is not how a delay of 22 months is to be explained.

4. Apart from the above, the only other thing stated in the affidavit is that the appeal is being preferred after being handed over to the counsel after some unavoidable delay. The affidavit to say the least has been drafted in the most casual manner. It shows lack of bonafide, abject absence of promptness on the part of the appellants to prefer an appeal, limitation for which is 30 days vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

5. We have gone through the decision of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) wherein most of the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant aforesaid in the affidavit have been considered and the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The period of limitation for filing the appeal being thirty days, there is hardly any explanation for the said period in the affidavit in support of the application. At least, it is not satisfactory. As regards the period after expiry of limitation also, hardly any acceptable explanation has been offered. 3 SPLAD No. 456 of 2025 Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay 4 SPLAD No. 456 of 2025 is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether ‘sufficient cause’ has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier 5 SPLAD No. 456 of 2025 decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted 6 SPLAD No. 456 of 2025 as a ‘sufficient cause’ for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

8. Considering the facts of this case, we are of the opinion, as already expressed, firstly that the delay is inordinate and deliberate, secondly, the explanation offered in this regard which is hardly an explanation is certainly not an acceptable one and is not satisfactory as there is no sufficient cause shown by the appellants for entertaining the appeal which has been filed with such delay.

9. In view of the above, we cannot help but reject the application for condonation of delay.

10. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. November 25, 2025 Arnima (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) ARNIMA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench