State Of U.P. Thru. Secy. Secondary Education U.P. Lko. And Others v. C/M , Mahatma Gandhi Sanskrit Madhyamik Vidyalaya , Ballia Thru. Manager

Government which is the appellant herein was informed about the impugned judgment only on 10.03.2023 whereas the judgment was passed way back on

23.08.2022. The State Government on its part kept sitting over the matter for almost four months. A reminder was sent by the Directorate of Secondary Education to the State Government on 11.07.2023 regarding the judgment passed by the High Court on 23.08.2022.

9. It is only on 24.07.2023 that the State Government woke up, considered the case as stated in paragraph No.9 of the affidavit and rejected the claim. While we are not required to express any opinion on the merits of the matter, we cannot help but say that there was no direction for the State Government to consider and decide the claim rather there was a positive mandamus to grant the benefit referred therein, whether it was correctly issued or not is another issue which we cannot see at this stage while considering the application for condonation of delay in view of the recent decision of 3 SPLAD No. 982 of 2023 Hon'ble the Supreme in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Ors. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969

10. Be that as it may, in the interregnum a contempt petition was filed on

18.07.2023 by the respondent-petitioner wherein notices were issued. Whereupon a compliance affidavit dated 20.08.2023 was filed annexing the order of the State Government dated 24.07.2023. The contempt Court rejected the said compliance affidavit against which the State-appellant went to Hon'ble the Supreme Court i.e. challenging the judgment of the contempt Court but not the judgment dated 23.08.2022 passed in writ proceedings. Hon'ble the Supreme Court passed an order on 14.05.2024. In the interregnum, on 23.12.2023, this Special Appeal had been filed albeit with a delay of 458 days, which had not been condoned. Hon'ble the Supreme Court requested the High Court to decide the special appeal on its merit or at least for grant of interim relief. Only after such consideration by the Division Bench, the learned Single Judge of the High Court would consider the contempt petition.

11. The contempt proceedings were initiated against the State-appellants on 18.07.2023 whereas this special appeal has been filed on 23.12.2023 only after rejection of the compliance affidavit by the Contempt Judge on

06.12.2023.

12. Apart from the explanation aforesaid no other explanation has been offered in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay.

13. Most of the decisions relied upon by the State-appellants in the said affidavit such as the one rendered in State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132 have been specifically considered in a recent judgment rendered in the case of Shivamma (Dead)(supra).

14. We have gone through the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court dated

12.09.2025 rendered in Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025 'Shivamma (Dead) By LRS vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors' wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to 4 SPLAD No. 982 of 2023 punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bonafide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed hereinabove. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

15. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a 5 SPLAD No. 982 of 2023 weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

16. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterised by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P.' reported in (2011) SCC Online SC 403 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The 6 SPLAD No. 982 of 2023 State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

17. Having considered the recent decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead)(supra) apart from the fact that the delay in filing the appeal is inordinate, the explanation offered is only a ruse and a sham explanation, the same is not at all satisfactory.

18. For all the reasons indicated hereinabove, we do not find it a fit case for condoning the delay in filing the appeal, therefore, relying upon the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead)(supra), we reject the application for condonation of delay, consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. October 14, 2025 -Piyush- (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) PIYUSH YADAV High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Government which is the appellant herein was informed about the impugned judgment only on 10.03.2023 whereas the judgment was passed way back on

23.08.2022. The State Government on its part kept sitting over the matter for almost four months. A reminder was sent by the Directorate of Secondary Education to the State Government on 11.07.2023 regarding the judgment passed by the High Court on 23.08.2022.

9. It is only on 24.07.2023 that the State Government woke up, considered the case as stated in paragraph No.9 of the affidavit and rejected the claim. While we are not required to express any opinion on the merits of the matter, we cannot help but say that there was no direction for the State Government to consider and decide the claim rather there was a positive mandamus to grant the benefit referred therein, whether it was correctly issued or not is another issue which we cannot see at this stage while considering the application for condonation of delay in view of the recent decision of 3 SPLAD No. 982 of 2023 Hon'ble the Supreme in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Ors. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969

10. Be that as it may, in the interregnum a contempt petition was filed on

18.07.2023 by the respondent-petitioner wherein notices were issued. Whereupon a compliance affidavit dated 20.08.2023 was filed annexing the order of the State Government dated 24.07.2023. The contempt Court rejected the said compliance affidavit against which the State-appellant went to Hon'ble the Supreme Court i.e. challenging the judgment of the contempt Court but not the judgment dated 23.08.2022 passed in writ proceedings. Hon'ble the Supreme Court passed an order on 14.05.2024. In the interregnum, on 23.12.2023, this Special Appeal had been filed albeit with a delay of 458 days, which had not been condoned. Hon'ble the Supreme Court requested the High Court to decide the special appeal on its merit or at least for grant of interim relief. Only after such consideration by the Division Bench, the learned Single Judge of the High Court would consider the contempt petition.

11. The contempt proceedings were initiated against the State-appellants on 18.07.2023 whereas this special appeal has been filed on 23.12.2023 only after rejection of the compliance affidavit by the Contempt Judge on

06.12.2023.

12. Apart from the explanation aforesaid no other explanation has been offered in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay.

13. Most of the decisions relied upon by the State-appellants in the said affidavit such as the one rendered in State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132 have been specifically considered in a recent judgment rendered in the case of Shivamma (Dead)(supra).

14. We have gone through the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court dated

12.09.2025 rendered in Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025 'Shivamma (Dead) By LRS vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors' wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to 4 SPLAD No. 982 of 2023 punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bonafide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed hereinabove. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

15. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a 5 SPLAD No. 982 of 2023 weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

16. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterised by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P.' reported in (2011) SCC Online SC 403 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The 6 SPLAD No. 982 of 2023 State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

17. Having considered the recent decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead)(supra) apart from the fact that the delay in filing the appeal is inordinate, the explanation offered is only a ruse and a sham explanation, the same is not at all satisfactory.

18. For all the reasons indicated hereinabove, we do not find it a fit case for condoning the delay in filing the appeal, therefore, relying upon the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead)(supra), we reject the application for condonation of delay, consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. October 14, 2025 -Piyush- (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) PIYUSH YADAV High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench