Others v. Vinay Kumar

2. This is an appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 challenging the judgment and order dated 02.05.2024 passed in Writ-A No.3416 of 2024. The appeal is delayed by 507 days.

3. We have gone through the affidavit filed in support of the condonation of delay. Para 2 of the affidavit merely mentions about the judgment impugned which is dated 02.05.2025. Para 3 states that it took certain time to get proper legal advice with regard to filing of the special appeal and the Law Department further advised the appellants to take advice of the Chief Standing Counsel of the State Government, but it has not been disclosed as to on which date these events took place nor any documents have been annexed in support of these averments. Para 4 goes on to state that the officials of the appellants approached the Chief Standing Counsel and the said Counsel after going through the judgment and order dated 02.05.2024 and the records of the case provided advise on 05.08.2024. The said legal advice was sent to the Directorate vide letter dated 29.08.2024 requesting for permission to file the appeal. Para 6 then refers to letters dated 07.05.2025, 2 SPLAD No. 460 of 2025

24.05.2025, 12.06.2025, 01.07.2025, 01.08.2025 and 01.09.2025 by which the Directorate requested the State Government for such permission. Para 7 states that the State Government granted permission to file the appeal on

09.09.2025. Thereafter file relating to the Special Appeal was submitted in the office of the Chief Standing Counsel on 12.09.2025. The case was allotted to the Standing Counsel for preparation of appeal on the same day. After preparation the record of the Special Appeal was handed over to the Standing Counsel on 19.09.2025. Then certain informations were required by the Standing Counsel. Para 11 states that the High Court was closed for Dusherra vacations from 27.09.2025 to 05.09.2025. It was then closed for Diwali vacations from 18.10.2025 to 26.10.2025. In the meantime the deponent contacted the Standing Counsel for preparation of the appeal. A certified copy of the order dated 02.05.2024 was applied on 07.11.2025, which was received on 10.11.2025. The other paragraphs also are on the same lines. These paragraphs only provide lame excuses. Even the certified copy of the judgment dated 02.05.2025 was applied only on 07.11.2025. The legal advice was given by the Chief Standing Counsel on 05.08.2024 even then the appeal was filed as late as on 19.11.2025. Movement of the file from desk to another for more than 500 days can hardly be a justification for belated filing of appeal in facts of this case.

4. We have gone through the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) By LRS vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors' reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium 3 SPLAD No. 460 of 2025 and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bonafide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed hereinabove. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

5. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of 4 SPLAD No. 460 of 2025 delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterised by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P.' reported in (2011) SCC Online SC 403 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause 5 SPLAD No. 460 of 2025 for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

7. Having considered the recent decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead)(supra) apart from the fact that the delay in filing the appeal is inordinate, the explanation offered is neither satisfactory nor sufficient. The facts as disclosed lack of bonafide and promptness as also lack of due diligence on the part of the appellants in preparing and filing the appeal, as the limitation for filing special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 is 30 days vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

8. In view of the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead)(supra) and the facts noticed hereinabove, we see no reason to condone the delay in filing the appeal. The application is 6 SPLAD No. 460 of 2025 accordingly rejected, consequently the appeal stands dismissed. November 25, 2025 Anand/- (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) ANAND KUMAR SRIVASTAVA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

2. This is an appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 challenging the judgment and order dated 02.05.2024 passed in Writ-A No.3416 of 2024. The appeal is delayed by 507 days.

3. We have gone through the affidavit filed in support of the condonation of delay. Para 2 of the affidavit merely mentions about the judgment impugned which is dated 02.05.2025. Para 3 states that it took certain time to get proper legal advice with regard to filing of the special appeal and the Law Department further advised the appellants to take advice of the Chief Standing Counsel of the State Government, but it has not been disclosed as to on which date these events took place nor any documents have been annexed in support of these averments. Para 4 goes on to state that the officials of the appellants approached the Chief Standing Counsel and the said Counsel after going through the judgment and order dated 02.05.2024 and the records of the case provided advise on 05.08.2024. The said legal advice was sent to the Directorate vide letter dated 29.08.2024 requesting for permission to file the appeal. Para 6 then refers to letters dated 07.05.2025, 2 SPLAD No. 460 of 2025

24.05.2025, 12.06.2025, 01.07.2025, 01.08.2025 and 01.09.2025 by which the Directorate requested the State Government for such permission. Para 7 states that the State Government granted permission to file the appeal on

09.09.2025. Thereafter file relating to the Special Appeal was submitted in the office of the Chief Standing Counsel on 12.09.2025. The case was allotted to the Standing Counsel for preparation of appeal on the same day. After preparation the record of the Special Appeal was handed over to the Standing Counsel on 19.09.2025. Then certain informations were required by the Standing Counsel. Para 11 states that the High Court was closed for Dusherra vacations from 27.09.2025 to 05.09.2025. It was then closed for Diwali vacations from 18.10.2025 to 26.10.2025. In the meantime the deponent contacted the Standing Counsel for preparation of the appeal. A certified copy of the order dated 02.05.2024 was applied on 07.11.2025, which was received on 10.11.2025. The other paragraphs also are on the same lines. These paragraphs only provide lame excuses. Even the certified copy of the judgment dated 02.05.2025 was applied only on 07.11.2025. The legal advice was given by the Chief Standing Counsel on 05.08.2024 even then the appeal was filed as late as on 19.11.2025. Movement of the file from desk to another for more than 500 days can hardly be a justification for belated filing of appeal in facts of this case.

4. We have gone through the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) By LRS vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors' reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium 3 SPLAD No. 460 of 2025 and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bonafide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed hereinabove. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

5. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of 4 SPLAD No. 460 of 2025 delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterised by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P.' reported in (2011) SCC Online SC 403 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause 5 SPLAD No. 460 of 2025 for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

7. Having considered the recent decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead)(supra) apart from the fact that the delay in filing the appeal is inordinate, the explanation offered is neither satisfactory nor sufficient. The facts as disclosed lack of bonafide and promptness as also lack of due diligence on the part of the appellants in preparing and filing the appeal, as the limitation for filing special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 is 30 days vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

8. In view of the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead)(supra) and the facts noticed hereinabove, we see no reason to condone the delay in filing the appeal. The application is 6 SPLAD No. 460 of 2025 accordingly rejected, consequently the appeal stands dismissed. November 25, 2025 Anand/- (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) ANAND KUMAR SRIVASTAVA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench