Vijay Kumar And Another vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Revenue, Lko. And

: Pankaj Gupta, Mohd. Kashif Rafi : C.S.C., Anurag Narain Srivastava Court No. - 5 HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

1. Heard Sri Pankaj Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned Standing Counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 3 and Sri Anurag Narain Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for respondent nos. 4 to 7.

2. The dispute in the present case pertains to allocation of the property which has been bequeathed to the petitioner as well as private respondents from their common ancestor namely Suresh Pal.

3. Undisputed facts of the case are that the dispute pertains to the land being Gata No. 126/1, 126/2, 229 and 428 (new number of which are 369/1205, 369/1206, 369, 181 and 368), situated at Village - Bedeejor, Tehsil - Sawaijpur, District - Hardoi which was initially recorded in the name of Suresh Pal S/o Jagpal. Suresh Pal had two sons Ajay Kumar and Vijay Kumar (petitioner no. 1), while Chandravati (petitioner no. 2) is the wife of Om Prakash.

4. It has been submitted that Ajay Kumar who is son of deceased Suresh Pal and he had four children namely Munni Devi, Situ, Amit and Sheelja. Suresh Pal during his life time had executed will on 10.07.2009 whereby half share of the property was given to Chandravati W/o Om Prakash while his two sons namely Ajay Kumar and Vijay Kumar where given 1/4th share each in the said property. As Ajay Kumar had died, his 1/4th share devolved upon his legal heirs.

5. It has been submitted that at the stage of Assistant Consolidation Officer it was noticed that certain land which were recorded as chak road, bachat and naveen parti, had been wrongly allotted to the legal heirs of Suresh Pal and therefore, necessary correction was required in the revenue records, which purpose reference was prepared and sent to the Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer in turn, accepted the reference and amended the allotment of chaks made in favour of legal 2 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025 heirs of Suresh Pal on the basis of report which has stated that no objections had been filed by any of the party who are effected and after recording the said fact, the reference was forwarded to the Consolidation Officer, who has also recorded that the parties are agreed to the amendment in the chaks and accordingly confirmed the order of Assistant Consolidation Officer by order dated 18.04.2012.

6. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that parties were in possession of their respective shares on the disputed land and the private respondents had been given chaks along the road while the petitioners had been allotted chaks behind the chak of private respondents.

7. It is the case of the petitioners that when they came to know about the existence of order dated 18.04.2012, they searched for the reference and thereafter had filed revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The said revision was filed some time in 2024 after delay of more then 12 years. The said revision was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. According to the said application it is stated that on 25.05.2024, the regional Lekhpal has come to the Tehsil when the petitioners and showed them map, from which they came to know that they have been allotted chaks behind the chaks of the private respondents. Thereafter, they obtained copy of order dated 18.04.2012 and preferred revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation.

8. The Deputy Director of Consolidation by means of order dated 26.09.2024, allowed the revision and re-allocated the chaks to the three legal heirs of Suresh Pal. All the three chak holders were given land adjacent to the main road by means of order dated 26.09.2024. The order dated 26.09.2024 was assailed before this Court by Smt Munni Devi @ Smt. Geeta Devi (respondent no. 4), on the ground that application for condonation of delay has not been considered nor any reasons have been disclosed while condoning the delay.

9. This Court while while considering the arguments of the parties as well as perusal of the record, was of the view that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not decided the aspect of delay in accordance with law and has not given any reason and accordingly set aside order dated 26.09.2024 while allowing the said writ petition and remanded the matter back to the Deputy Director of Consolidation for deciding the matter afresh in accordance with law and he was further directed to duly consider the grounds of delay.

10. It is in the remand proceedings that the Deputy Director of Consolidation by means of impugned order dated 06.11.2025, has rejected the application for condonation of delay. It is in the impugned order it has been noticed that delay was of 12 years and after order dated 18.04.2012 was passed, in all probability, the parties were in possession of their 3 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025 respective shares in the disputed land. Apart from which, he was of the view that during consolidation proceedings at various stages parties are made aware of the chaks and it was not possible that the petitioners were not aware of the existence of order dated 18.04.2012 and therefore he was of the view that satisfactory explanation is forthcoming regarding condonation of delay.

11. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has also considered the fact that order dated 18.04.2012 was passed with the consent of the parties and at that point of time only road was existing and none of the parties wanted land next to the road, as such land is infested with the cattle who destroy the crops and it is only after 2022 when damar road has been made leading to increase in the value of the land next to the damar road, the petitioners has initiated proceedings and sought their land next to the damar road. Accordingly, he was of the view that allocation of chaks was made with the consent of the parties at that very point of time and no objections were raised by any of the party and it is only when damar road was constructed, that claim of the petitioners has been initiated by the Deputy Director of assailing Consolidation was of the view that satisfactory explanation exists for condonation of delay and therefore rejected the said application. the said order. Accordingly,

12. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently submitted that re- allocation of chaks by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by means of previous order dated 26.09.2024 is equitable inasmuch as all the legal hiers of Suresh Pal now had been allotted land adjacent to the damar road and its equal distribution of the land and therefore there cannot be any doubt with regard to the same.

13. With regard to condonation of delay, it is submitted that infact there could not have been any consent by the parties as in the proceedings during reference notice was sought to be served on Suresh Pal, who had died at that point of time, in support of his submissions he has placed on record death certificate prior to the date of service to canvass his submissions.

14. Accordingly, it is submitted that order dated 18.04.2012 was passed without giving opportunity of hearing to any of the party and therefore it cannot be said that petitioners had any knowledge about the said order and therefore, in absence of any knowledge they could not have assailed the validity of the said order any time prior to the said challenge, and it is only when they came to know about the said order though Lekhpal, they obtained documents and subsequently revision was filed. Accordingly, it is submitted that satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay was offered by the petitioners which has been wrongly rejected.

15. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025

16. The only aspect which falls for consideration for this Court is as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case the Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in rejecting the application for condonation of delay preferred by the petitioners in filing the revision.

17. There is no dispute with regard to the shares allocated to the petitioners and private respondents which was on the basis of will made by Suresh Pal on 10.07.2009 where his sons Ajay Kumar and Vijay Kumar who were given 1/4th share while Chandrawati W/o Om Prakash was given 1/2 share in the property.

18. It is only at the stage of preparation of final reference it was discovered that land which was recorded as Naveen Parti, Chak Road, Bchat had been allotted, which could not have been subject matter of allotment during consolidation proceedings and therefore necessary amendments were to be made in the said exercise and therefore Assistant Consolidation Officer had made reference to the Consolidation Officwer. Alongwith the report, proposal was also submitted where it was stated that parties had no objection to the proposed allotment of chaks and accordingly the aforesaid circumstances Consolidation Officer, confirmed the reference by means of order dated 18.04.2012.

19. In the impugned order it has been mentioned that in all probability parties were granted possession of their respective shares. Be that as it may, the parties continued to be in possession over the disputed land till revision was filed in 2024.

20. Learned counsel for the petitioners has based his arguments only on the ground that petitioner were not aware of order dated 18.04.2012. To contradict the grounds taken by the petitioners it is noticed that Assistant Consolidation Officer has also recorded that the parties have accepted re- allocation of chaks and even the Consolidation Officer has recorded that no objections have been filed against the said proposal.

21. Apart from the above, this Court finds that parties were in possession of re-allocated chaks as per order dated 18.04.2012 and no objections were raised. It is further noticed that it is only in 2022 when Damar Road was made and value of the land adjacent to the Damar Road has arisen, it is only then the petitioners tried to find out about the allocation of chaks and it is only then they came to know about the existence of order dated 18.04.2012.

22. Merely by saying that petitioners were not aware of the allocation despite the fact that petitioners continued to be in possession of the land next to he Damar Road and petitioners land was behind the land of the private respondents, is not acceptable. Apart from the fact that this Court finds that in the order of Assistant Consolidation Officer as well as Consolidation Officer, it has clearly been stated that said order has been 5 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025 passed with the consent of the parties.

23. With regard death of Suresh Pal and service of notice is an issue which was never raised by the petitioners before any of the authorities below and it is for the first time in the present writ petition this ground has been taken. Accordingly, this Court do not see any reason as to why when the petitioners were aware of the said facts, they have not placed the said facts before the authorities below.

24. It is for the aforesaid reasons that this Court could not rely upon the documents filed by the petitioners inasmuch as these are questions of fact which ought to have been raised before the consolidation authorities, giving opportunity to the respondents to contradict the said facts.

25. This Court further finds that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has rightly recorded the fact that it is only when value of land has been enhanced after constructions of Damar Road that grievance of the petitioners has arisen. Merely enhancement of value of the land in special circumstances, can never be a valid reason to assail the settled position which was concluded by means of order dted 18.04.2012.

26. In case there was any dispute with regard to allocation of land and the petitioners for long since 2012 continued to be in possession of the land which was away from the road, they could have certainly raised grievance within reasonable period of time after order dated 18.04.2012 was passed.

27. With regard to delay, Hon'ble Supreme Court in number of cases has discussed the issue in detail and has settled the legal position. The Apex Court in the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala (Civil Appeal No. 6514 of 1997, decided on 19.09.1997), the Court has observed as under :- "4. That apart, we find that in the application filed by the respondent seeking condonation of delay, the thrust in explaining the delay after 12.05.1995, is : "at the time the Advocate General's office was fed up with so many arbitration matters equally important to this case were pending for consideration as per the directions of the Advocate General on 02.09.1995." This can hardly be said to be a reasonable, satisfactory or even a proper explanation for seeking condonation of delay. In the reply filed to the application seeking condonation of delay by the appellant in the High Court, it is asserted that after the judgment and decree was pronounced by the learned Sub judge, Kollam on 30.10.1993, the scope for filing of the appeal was examined by the District Government Pleader, Special Law Officer, Law Secretary and the Advocate General and in accordance 6 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025 with their opinion, it was decided that there was no scope for filing the appeal but later on, despite the opinion referred to above, the appeal was filed as late as on 18.01.1996 without disclosing why it was being filed. The High Court does not appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicuous by its absence from the order. We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by the respondent-State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days.

5. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs."

28. The Apex Court the case of Lingeswaran Etc. Vs. Thrunagalingam (Sepecial Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 2054 - 2055 of 2022, decided on 25.02.2022), the Court has held as under :- "5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explaint the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane V. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.

5.1 In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157, in paragraph 14, it is observed and held as under :- 7 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025 "The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy remain alive only till the expire of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation.""

29. The Apex Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) By LRS Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 SCC Online SC 1969, the Court on the issue of delay has held as under :- “202. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, this Court speaking through one of us (J.B. Pardiwala J.) held that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning a gross delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be. It held that unless the Department has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The relevant observations read as under:— “25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. xxx xxx xxx

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. xxx xxx xxx 8 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025

30. In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563, this Court, while dismissing the application for condonation of delay of 427 days in filing the Special Leave Petition, held that condonation of delay is not an exception and it should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. In that case, this Court held that unless the Department has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process cannot be accepted. […] (Emphasis supplied)

203. This Court in Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (supra) further held that when it comes to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not a free-pass to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The vital test for condoning the delay is for the party that is praying for such condonation to prove that it was reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter. The relevant observations read as under:— “35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.”

255. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 11-years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started in 1989. We are in 2025. Almost 36 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. The High Court has made a mockery of justice by condoning this delay of 3966 days and once again ask the appellant to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

257. We also wish to highlight that the High Court applied the legal position incorrectly in the impugned order and performed an exercise of “merit-hunting”. It gave a prima facie relevance to the argument of the respondent no. 1 on the grounds that the suit of the appellant was not at all maintainable in the first place. In paragraph 13 of the impugned order, the High Court recorded that a semblance of right in favour of respondent no. 1 swayed its mind to allow the condonation of delay, and it accepted the same as a “sufficient cause”. We hold such observations 9 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025 to be erroneous and ex facie bad in law. Similar contentions were rejected by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, wherein the appellant-State was seeking a condonation of delay of 663 days. This Court sternly noted that it will not let the courts to be forums wherein the Government can walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the period of limitation, and buttress reliance on cases of this Court wherein it allowed condonation, employing its discretionary powers, on merits or modalities of peculiarities of those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: “3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government […] xxx xxx xxx

5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be propounded that if there is some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any case. It is really a bar of limitation which can even shut out good cases. This does not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay.

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorised earlier as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the officer concerned responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.” 10 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025

261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State- authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.

263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never- exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.”

30. It is for the aforesaid reasons, this Court do not find any infirmity in the findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, nor do we find any ground for relying upon the contention of the petitioners that they had no knowledge about order dated 18.04.2012, at any time prior to the same being intimated by the regional Lekhpal.

31. In the light of above, this Court do not find any infirmity in the impugned order requiring interference in the matter under Article 226/227 11 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025 of the Constitution of India.

32. The present writ petition being devoid of merits is dismissed. December 10, 2025 A. Verma (Alok Mathur,J.) ANURAG VERMA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

: Pankaj Gupta, Mohd. Kashif Rafi : C.S.C., Anurag Narain Srivastava Court No. - 5 HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

1. Heard Sri Pankaj Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned Standing Counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 3 and Sri Anurag Narain Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for respondent nos. 4 to 7.

2. The dispute in the present case pertains to allocation of the property which has been bequeathed to the petitioner as well as private respondents from their common ancestor namely Suresh Pal.

3. Undisputed facts of the case are that the dispute pertains to the land being Gata No. 126/1, 126/2, 229 and 428 (new number of which are 369/1205, 369/1206, 369, 181 and 368), situated at Village - Bedeejor, Tehsil - Sawaijpur, District - Hardoi which was initially recorded in the name of Suresh Pal S/o Jagpal. Suresh Pal had two sons Ajay Kumar and Vijay Kumar (petitioner no. 1), while Chandravati (petitioner no. 2) is the wife of Om Prakash.

4. It has been submitted that Ajay Kumar who is son of deceased Suresh Pal and he had four children namely Munni Devi, Situ, Amit and Sheelja. Suresh Pal during his life time had executed will on 10.07.2009 whereby half share of the property was given to Chandravati W/o Om Prakash while his two sons namely Ajay Kumar and Vijay Kumar where given 1/4th share each in the said property. As Ajay Kumar had died, his 1/4th share devolved upon his legal heirs.

5. It has been submitted that at the stage of Assistant Consolidation Officer it was noticed that certain land which were recorded as chak road, bachat and naveen parti, had been wrongly allotted to the legal heirs of Suresh Pal and therefore, necessary correction was required in the revenue records, which purpose reference was prepared and sent to the Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer in turn, accepted the reference and amended the allotment of chaks made in favour of legal 2 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025 heirs of Suresh Pal on the basis of report which has stated that no objections had been filed by any of the party who are effected and after recording the said fact, the reference was forwarded to the Consolidation Officer, who has also recorded that the parties are agreed to the amendment in the chaks and accordingly confirmed the order of Assistant Consolidation Officer by order dated 18.04.2012.

6. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that parties were in possession of their respective shares on the disputed land and the private respondents had been given chaks along the road while the petitioners had been allotted chaks behind the chak of private respondents.

7. It is the case of the petitioners that when they came to know about the existence of order dated 18.04.2012, they searched for the reference and thereafter had filed revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The said revision was filed some time in 2024 after delay of more then 12 years. The said revision was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. According to the said application it is stated that on 25.05.2024, the regional Lekhpal has come to the Tehsil when the petitioners and showed them map, from which they came to know that they have been allotted chaks behind the chaks of the private respondents. Thereafter, they obtained copy of order dated 18.04.2012 and preferred revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation.

8. The Deputy Director of Consolidation by means of order dated 26.09.2024, allowed the revision and re-allocated the chaks to the three legal heirs of Suresh Pal. All the three chak holders were given land adjacent to the main road by means of order dated 26.09.2024. The order dated 26.09.2024 was assailed before this Court by Smt Munni Devi @ Smt. Geeta Devi (respondent no. 4), on the ground that application for condonation of delay has not been considered nor any reasons have been disclosed while condoning the delay.

9. This Court while while considering the arguments of the parties as well as perusal of the record, was of the view that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not decided the aspect of delay in accordance with law and has not given any reason and accordingly set aside order dated 26.09.2024 while allowing the said writ petition and remanded the matter back to the Deputy Director of Consolidation for deciding the matter afresh in accordance with law and he was further directed to duly consider the grounds of delay.

10. It is in the remand proceedings that the Deputy Director of Consolidation by means of impugned order dated 06.11.2025, has rejected the application for condonation of delay. It is in the impugned order it has been noticed that delay was of 12 years and after order dated 18.04.2012 was passed, in all probability, the parties were in possession of their 3 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025 respective shares in the disputed land. Apart from which, he was of the view that during consolidation proceedings at various stages parties are made aware of the chaks and it was not possible that the petitioners were not aware of the existence of order dated 18.04.2012 and therefore he was of the view that satisfactory explanation is forthcoming regarding condonation of delay.

11. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has also considered the fact that order dated 18.04.2012 was passed with the consent of the parties and at that point of time only road was existing and none of the parties wanted land next to the road, as such land is infested with the cattle who destroy the crops and it is only after 2022 when damar road has been made leading to increase in the value of the land next to the damar road, the petitioners has initiated proceedings and sought their land next to the damar road. Accordingly, he was of the view that allocation of chaks was made with the consent of the parties at that very point of time and no objections were raised by any of the party and it is only when damar road was constructed, that claim of the petitioners has been initiated by the Deputy Director of assailing Consolidation was of the view that satisfactory explanation exists for condonation of delay and therefore rejected the said application. the said order. Accordingly,

12. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently submitted that re- allocation of chaks by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by means of previous order dated 26.09.2024 is equitable inasmuch as all the legal hiers of Suresh Pal now had been allotted land adjacent to the damar road and its equal distribution of the land and therefore there cannot be any doubt with regard to the same.

13. With regard to condonation of delay, it is submitted that infact there could not have been any consent by the parties as in the proceedings during reference notice was sought to be served on Suresh Pal, who had died at that point of time, in support of his submissions he has placed on record death certificate prior to the date of service to canvass his submissions.

14. Accordingly, it is submitted that order dated 18.04.2012 was passed without giving opportunity of hearing to any of the party and therefore it cannot be said that petitioners had any knowledge about the said order and therefore, in absence of any knowledge they could not have assailed the validity of the said order any time prior to the said challenge, and it is only when they came to know about the said order though Lekhpal, they obtained documents and subsequently revision was filed. Accordingly, it is submitted that satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay was offered by the petitioners which has been wrongly rejected.

15. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025

16. The only aspect which falls for consideration for this Court is as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case the Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in rejecting the application for condonation of delay preferred by the petitioners in filing the revision.

17. There is no dispute with regard to the shares allocated to the petitioners and private respondents which was on the basis of will made by Suresh Pal on 10.07.2009 where his sons Ajay Kumar and Vijay Kumar who were given 1/4th share while Chandrawati W/o Om Prakash was given 1/2 share in the property.

18. It is only at the stage of preparation of final reference it was discovered that land which was recorded as Naveen Parti, Chak Road, Bchat had been allotted, which could not have been subject matter of allotment during consolidation proceedings and therefore necessary amendments were to be made in the said exercise and therefore Assistant Consolidation Officer had made reference to the Consolidation Officwer. Alongwith the report, proposal was also submitted where it was stated that parties had no objection to the proposed allotment of chaks and accordingly the aforesaid circumstances Consolidation Officer, confirmed the reference by means of order dated 18.04.2012.

19. In the impugned order it has been mentioned that in all probability parties were granted possession of their respective shares. Be that as it may, the parties continued to be in possession over the disputed land till revision was filed in 2024.

20. Learned counsel for the petitioners has based his arguments only on the ground that petitioner were not aware of order dated 18.04.2012. To contradict the grounds taken by the petitioners it is noticed that Assistant Consolidation Officer has also recorded that the parties have accepted re- allocation of chaks and even the Consolidation Officer has recorded that no objections have been filed against the said proposal.

21. Apart from the above, this Court finds that parties were in possession of re-allocated chaks as per order dated 18.04.2012 and no objections were raised. It is further noticed that it is only in 2022 when Damar Road was made and value of the land adjacent to the Damar Road has arisen, it is only then the petitioners tried to find out about the allocation of chaks and it is only then they came to know about the existence of order dated 18.04.2012.

22. Merely by saying that petitioners were not aware of the allocation despite the fact that petitioners continued to be in possession of the land next to he Damar Road and petitioners land was behind the land of the private respondents, is not acceptable. Apart from the fact that this Court finds that in the order of Assistant Consolidation Officer as well as Consolidation Officer, it has clearly been stated that said order has been 5 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025 passed with the consent of the parties.

23. With regard death of Suresh Pal and service of notice is an issue which was never raised by the petitioners before any of the authorities below and it is for the first time in the present writ petition this ground has been taken. Accordingly, this Court do not see any reason as to why when the petitioners were aware of the said facts, they have not placed the said facts before the authorities below.

24. It is for the aforesaid reasons that this Court could not rely upon the documents filed by the petitioners inasmuch as these are questions of fact which ought to have been raised before the consolidation authorities, giving opportunity to the respondents to contradict the said facts.

25. This Court further finds that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has rightly recorded the fact that it is only when value of land has been enhanced after constructions of Damar Road that grievance of the petitioners has arisen. Merely enhancement of value of the land in special circumstances, can never be a valid reason to assail the settled position which was concluded by means of order dted 18.04.2012.

26. In case there was any dispute with regard to allocation of land and the petitioners for long since 2012 continued to be in possession of the land which was away from the road, they could have certainly raised grievance within reasonable period of time after order dated 18.04.2012 was passed.

27. With regard to delay, Hon'ble Supreme Court in number of cases has discussed the issue in detail and has settled the legal position. The Apex Court in the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala (Civil Appeal No. 6514 of 1997, decided on 19.09.1997), the Court has observed as under :- "4. That apart, we find that in the application filed by the respondent seeking condonation of delay, the thrust in explaining the delay after 12.05.1995, is : "at the time the Advocate General's office was fed up with so many arbitration matters equally important to this case were pending for consideration as per the directions of the Advocate General on 02.09.1995." This can hardly be said to be a reasonable, satisfactory or even a proper explanation for seeking condonation of delay. In the reply filed to the application seeking condonation of delay by the appellant in the High Court, it is asserted that after the judgment and decree was pronounced by the learned Sub judge, Kollam on 30.10.1993, the scope for filing of the appeal was examined by the District Government Pleader, Special Law Officer, Law Secretary and the Advocate General and in accordance 6 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025 with their opinion, it was decided that there was no scope for filing the appeal but later on, despite the opinion referred to above, the appeal was filed as late as on 18.01.1996 without disclosing why it was being filed. The High Court does not appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicuous by its absence from the order. We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by the respondent-State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days.

5. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs."

28. The Apex Court the case of Lingeswaran Etc. Vs. Thrunagalingam (Sepecial Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 2054 - 2055 of 2022, decided on 25.02.2022), the Court has held as under :- "5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explaint the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane V. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.

5.1 In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157, in paragraph 14, it is observed and held as under :- 7 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025 "The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy remain alive only till the expire of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation.""

29. The Apex Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) By LRS Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 SCC Online SC 1969, the Court on the issue of delay has held as under :- “202. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, this Court speaking through one of us (J.B. Pardiwala J.) held that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning a gross delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be. It held that unless the Department has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The relevant observations read as under:— “25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. xxx xxx xxx

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. xxx xxx xxx 8 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025

30. In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563, this Court, while dismissing the application for condonation of delay of 427 days in filing the Special Leave Petition, held that condonation of delay is not an exception and it should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. In that case, this Court held that unless the Department has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process cannot be accepted. […] (Emphasis supplied)

203. This Court in Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (supra) further held that when it comes to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not a free-pass to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The vital test for condoning the delay is for the party that is praying for such condonation to prove that it was reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter. The relevant observations read as under:— “35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.”

255. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 11-years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started in 1989. We are in 2025. Almost 36 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. The High Court has made a mockery of justice by condoning this delay of 3966 days and once again ask the appellant to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

257. We also wish to highlight that the High Court applied the legal position incorrectly in the impugned order and performed an exercise of “merit-hunting”. It gave a prima facie relevance to the argument of the respondent no. 1 on the grounds that the suit of the appellant was not at all maintainable in the first place. In paragraph 13 of the impugned order, the High Court recorded that a semblance of right in favour of respondent no. 1 swayed its mind to allow the condonation of delay, and it accepted the same as a “sufficient cause”. We hold such observations 9 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025 to be erroneous and ex facie bad in law. Similar contentions were rejected by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, wherein the appellant-State was seeking a condonation of delay of 663 days. This Court sternly noted that it will not let the courts to be forums wherein the Government can walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the period of limitation, and buttress reliance on cases of this Court wherein it allowed condonation, employing its discretionary powers, on merits or modalities of peculiarities of those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: “3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government […] xxx xxx xxx

5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be propounded that if there is some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any case. It is really a bar of limitation which can even shut out good cases. This does not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay.

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorised earlier as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the officer concerned responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.” 10 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025

261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State- authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.

263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never- exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.”

30. It is for the aforesaid reasons, this Court do not find any infirmity in the findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, nor do we find any ground for relying upon the contention of the petitioners that they had no knowledge about order dated 18.04.2012, at any time prior to the same being intimated by the regional Lekhpal.

31. In the light of above, this Court do not find any infirmity in the impugned order requiring interference in the matter under Article 226/227 11 WRIB No. 1136 of 2025 of the Constitution of India.

32. The present writ petition being devoid of merits is dismissed. December 10, 2025 A. Verma (Alok Mathur,J.) ANURAG VERMA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench