Shyam Murat vs Counsel for Petitioner(s)
Case Details
Cited in this judgment
: Vaibhav Srivastava, Shashank Tripathi : Court No. - 6 HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sayed Anzar Hussain learned counsel for the respondents who submits that he has instructions in the matter. He further submits that in light of the issue involved in the instant petition, he does not formally wish to file any response and as such the petition may be decided at the admission stage itself. In view of the aforesaid, this Court, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, is deciding the petition at the admission stage itself. The sole ground raised by the petitioner is that the petitioner had filed a Rent Appeal under Section 22 of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 against the order dated 12.03.2025 passed by the Prescribed Authority. It is urged that the appeal was preferred on 15.04.2025 and though the same was within time, however, the appellate court noticing that the appeal has been preferred after thirty days from the date of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority rejected the appeal on the ground of limitation alone. It is urged that the Court did not notice that the time taken for preparation of the certified copy of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority was not considered and had the same been noticed the appeal would have been within limitation and the same should have been decided on merit. Refuting the aforesaid submission learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the petitioner itself did not have the right to file the appeal. It has been urged that the premises in question in respect whereto the release order dated 12.03.2025 was passed was a residential premises. The same had been let out to the father of the petitioner namely Ram Subhag. Upon his death, the legal heirs who normally resided in the premises would be the tenant within the definition as provided in Section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. It is thus urged that the petitioner who was neither normally residing with the original tenant and though he had moved an application for impleadment before the Prescribed Authority, which was not decided, hence, in the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner would have no locus to file the appeal 2 A227 No. 6764 of 2025 in the first place. In the aforesaid circumstances, the order passed by the Appellate Court requires no interference at the behest of the present petitioner. The Court has considered the aforesaid submissions and also perused the material on record. The admitted facts are :- (i) the premises in question for which a release application was moved is a residential premises. (ii) It is also an admitted fact that Ram Subhag was the original tenant. During the subsistence of the tenancy, Ram Subhag expired and in terms of the definition of the word 'tenant' contained in Section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, only such legal heirs who normally resided with the tenant would be treated as part of the family, accordingly, if the petitioner was not normally residing, he would otherwise have no right to be treated as family. However, this fact is not for this Court to adjudicate as it is not the subject matter of adjudication nor any finding of this nature has been given by the Appellate Court in its order dated 06.05.2025. Confining the controversy in terms of the order impugned, it would reveal that the only issue upon which the appeal has been rejected is limitation. Apparently, from the date of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority i.e. 12.03.2025 till the date of the filing of the appeal i.e. 15.04.2025, it appears that there is a gap of 3 to 4 days as far the limitation provided in the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is 30 days. The learned counsel for the respondents could not dispute that the time obtained for taking certified copies have to be excluded and if it was done then the appeal would have been within time. Thus, in the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the order dated 06.05.2025, cannot be sustained. It has also been put to the learned counsel for the petitioner as to once he had filed an appeal under his own name as an Appellate and despite the fact that his application for impleadment had not been allowed by the Prescribed Authority, yet his own real brother Ram Poojan who had contested the matter before the Prescribed Authority has not been impleaded in the memo of appeal preferred by the petitioner nor he has been impleaded in the instant petition either as a co-petitioner or as a proforma-respondent. It was also put to the learned counsel for the petitioner whether the brother of the petitioner has filed an appeal to which it has been informed that the appeal filed by Sri Ram Poojan bearing No. 44 of 2025 is listed on 12.12.2025 before the Appellate Court. Be that as it may, taking an overall stock of the situation, the fact remains that the instant appeal preferred by the petitioner was incorrectly rejected on the ground of limitation, even though it suffered from the vice of non- impleadment of a necessary party and the instant writ petition also suffers from the same vice. However, considering the fact that the appeal has been rejected on the ground of limitation which perhaps was not applicable, accordingly, in the ends of justice, the writ petition is allowed and disposed of with a direction 3 A227 No. 6764 of 2025 that the petitioner who had filed his appeal it shall also be taken up by the Appellate Court where Appeal No.44 of 2025 preferred by the brother of the petitioner is being considered. Both the appeals shall be considered and decided together within a period of four months from the date, a certified copy of the order is placed before the Appellate Court concerned. It is made clear that the Court has not expressed any opinion regarding the locus of the petitioner to maintain the appeal which issue is left open to be considered by the Appellate Court itself. It is also provided that none of the parties shall be entitled to any unnecessary adjournments and in case if any party tries to misuse the liberty, the Court shall be well within its right to pass appropriate orders including fixing realistic costs considering the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1. December 3, 2025 Harshita. (Jaspreet Singh,J.) HARSHITA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
: Vaibhav Srivastava, Shashank Tripathi : Court No. - 6 HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sayed Anzar Hussain learned counsel for the respondents who submits that he has instructions in the matter. He further submits that in light of the issue involved in the instant petition, he does not formally wish to file any response and as such the petition may be decided at the admission stage itself. In view of the aforesaid, this Court, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, is deciding the petition at the admission stage itself. The sole ground raised by the petitioner is that the petitioner had filed a Rent Appeal under Section 22 of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 against the order dated 12.03.2025 passed by the Prescribed Authority. It is urged that the appeal was preferred on 15.04.2025 and though the same was within time, however, the appellate court noticing that the appeal has been preferred after thirty days from the date of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority rejected the appeal on the ground of limitation alone. It is urged that the Court did not notice that the time taken for preparation of the certified copy of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority was not considered and had the same been noticed the appeal would have been within limitation and the same should have been decided on merit. Refuting the aforesaid submission learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the petitioner itself did not have the right to file the appeal. It has been urged that the premises in question in respect whereto the release order dated 12.03.2025 was passed was a residential premises. The same had been let out to the father of the petitioner namely Ram Subhag. Upon his death, the legal heirs who normally resided in the premises would be the tenant within the definition as provided in Section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. It is thus urged that the petitioner who was neither normally residing with the original tenant and though he had moved an application for impleadment before the Prescribed Authority, which was not decided, hence, in the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner would have no locus to file the appeal 2 A227 No. 6764 of 2025 in the first place. In the aforesaid circumstances, the order passed by the Appellate Court requires no interference at the behest of the present petitioner. The Court has considered the aforesaid submissions and also perused the material on record. The admitted facts are :- (i) the premises in question for which a release application was moved is a residential premises. (ii) It is also an admitted fact that Ram Subhag was the original tenant. During the subsistence of the tenancy, Ram Subhag expired and in terms of the definition of the word 'tenant' contained in Section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, only such legal heirs who normally resided with the tenant would be treated as part of the family, accordingly, if the petitioner was not normally residing, he would otherwise have no right to be treated as family. However, this fact is not for this Court to adjudicate as it is not the subject matter of adjudication nor any finding of this nature has been given by the Appellate Court in its order dated 06.05.2025. Confining the controversy in terms of the order impugned, it would reveal that the only issue upon which the appeal has been rejected is limitation. Apparently, from the date of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority i.e. 12.03.2025 till the date of the filing of the appeal i.e. 15.04.2025, it appears that there is a gap of 3 to 4 days as far the limitation provided in the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is 30 days. The learned counsel for the respondents could not dispute that the time obtained for taking certified copies have to be excluded and if it was done then the appeal would have been within time. Thus, in the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the order dated 06.05.2025, cannot be sustained. It has also been put to the learned counsel for the petitioner as to once he had filed an appeal under his own name as an Appellate and despite the fact that his application for impleadment had not been allowed by the Prescribed Authority, yet his own real brother Ram Poojan who had contested the matter before the Prescribed Authority has not been impleaded in the memo of appeal preferred by the petitioner nor he has been impleaded in the instant petition either as a co-petitioner or as a proforma-respondent. It was also put to the learned counsel for the petitioner whether the brother of the petitioner has filed an appeal to which it has been informed that the appeal filed by Sri Ram Poojan bearing No. 44 of 2025 is listed on 12.12.2025 before the Appellate Court. Be that as it may, taking an overall stock of the situation, the fact remains that the instant appeal preferred by the petitioner was incorrectly rejected on the ground of limitation, even though it suffered from the vice of non- impleadment of a necessary party and the instant writ petition also suffers from the same vice. However, considering the fact that the appeal has been rejected on the ground of limitation which perhaps was not applicable, accordingly, in the ends of justice, the writ petition is allowed and disposed of with a direction 3 A227 No. 6764 of 2025 that the petitioner who had filed his appeal it shall also be taken up by the Appellate Court where Appeal No.44 of 2025 preferred by the brother of the petitioner is being considered. Both the appeals shall be considered and decided together within a period of four months from the date, a certified copy of the order is placed before the Appellate Court concerned. It is made clear that the Court has not expressed any opinion regarding the locus of the petitioner to maintain the appeal which issue is left open to be considered by the Appellate Court itself. It is also provided that none of the parties shall be entitled to any unnecessary adjournments and in case if any party tries to misuse the liberty, the Court shall be well within its right to pass appropriate orders including fixing realistic costs considering the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1. December 3, 2025 Harshita. (Jaspreet Singh,J.) HARSHITA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench