Navneet Kumar v. Vaishali Rajpoot), and to issue a direction to the family court to al

1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, who are husband and wife, as well as learned counsel appearing for the State-respondents and perused the record.

2. The instant petition has been preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, wherein a prayer has been made to set aside the impugned order dated 10.10.2025 passed by learned Principal Judge (Family Court), Bahraich in Suit No.1192 of 2025 (Navneet Kumar versus Vaishali Rajpoot), and to issue a direction to the family court to allow the petitioners to proceed with the second motion without waiting for the completion of the cooling-off period.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner nos.1 and 2 are husband and wife. They are Hindu by religion and faith and still profess the same. The ages of the petitioners were 31 and 25 years, respectively, at the time of marriage, which was solemnized between them on 24.11.2023 at Shri Govardhan Garden Resort, Najibabad Road, Kiratpur, Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh, according to Hindu rites and rituals. The petitioners lived together as husband and wife only for a period of one and a half months from the date of marriage and thereafter they parted ways due to difference of opinion and they have lived separately for a period of one year and eight months. No child was born out of their wedlock. The parties filed a petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu 2 A227 No. 6700 of 2025 Marriage Act, 1955 for divorce by mutual consent on 19.09.2025, which is the date of the first motion. Thus, the period of more than one and a half years has already lapsed before the first motion of the filing of the writ petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act. The parties made efforts to reconcile their differences, which were unsuccessful and their marital relationship is irreconcilable. There is no other civil or criminal litigation between them. Petitioner no.1 has already received her full settlement from petitioner no.2. The parties had filed a mutual application before the family court for waiving off the cooling-off period of six months from the date of filing of the divorce petition, but the same has been dismissed by the learned court below, taking a hyper-technical approach.

4. He next submits that the learned court below placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amardeep Singh versus Harveen Kaur, 2017 AIR (Supreme Court) 4417, wherein it is held that the period mentioned in Section 13B is not mandatory but discretionary, and that a Court may exercise this discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case, where there is no possibility of the parties to resume cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation. In the case of Shilpa Sailesh versus Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231, Apex Court held that a court can waive the cooling-off periods when it is satisfied that the marriage has irretrievably broken down and that forcing couples to wait would serve no constructive purpose.

5. Learned counsel further submits that the object of the cooling-off period provided under Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is to allow the parties sufficient time to reconsider their decision for separation, but when it is apparent that the marriage has broken down irretrievably and there is no possibility of reunion, insistence on such period will only prolong the agony of the parties. The learned Family Court failed to appreciate that petitioner no.1 is a permanent resident of State of Rajasthan and is facing considerable hardship in attending the proceedings before the Family Court at Bahraich. The continuation of the present litigation would not only cause unnecessary inconvenience but may also adversely affect the petitioner's future matrimonial prospects. Hence, the rejection of the application for waiving the cooling-off period 3 A227 No. 6700 of 2025 is arbitrary and contrary to the settled principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The petitioner, being aggrieved, had no alternative and efficacious remedy, but to prefer present petition invoking extra ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

6. Learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kumar versus Suman Beniwal, (2021) SCC Online SC 1270, wherein it is held as under:- "17. Legislature has, in its wisdom, enacted section 13B (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act to provide for a cooling period of six months from the date of filing of the divorce petition under Section 13B (1), in case the parties should change their mind and resolve their differences. After six months if the parties still wish to go ahead with the divorce, and make a motion, the Court has to grant a decree of divorce declaring the marriage dissolved with effect from the date of the decree, after making such enquiries as it considers fit.

18. The object of Section 13B(2) read with Section 14 is to save the institution of marriage, by preventing hasty dissolution of marriage. It is often said that "time is the best healer. With passage of time, tempers cool down and anger dissipates. The waiting period gives the spouses time to forgive and forget. If the spouses have children, they may, after some time, think of the consequences of divorce on their children, and reconsider their decision to separate. Even otherwise, the cooling period gives the couple time to ponder and reflect and take a considered decision as to whether they should really put an end to the marriage for all time to come.

19. Where there is a chance of reconciliation, however slight, the cooling period of six months from the date of filing of the divorce petition should be enforced. However, if there is no possibility of reconciliation, it would be meaningless to prolong the agony of the parties to the marriage. Thus, if the marriage has broken down irretrievably, the spouses have been living apart for a long time, but not been able to reconcile their differences and have mutually decided to part, it is better to end the marriage, to enable both the spouses to move on with the life.

20. In Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur, (2017) 8 SCC 746, relied upon by the Family Court and the High Court, this Court held: 4 A227 No. 6700 of 2025 "19. Applying the above to the present situation, we are of the view that where the court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13B (2), it can do so after considering the following: (i) The statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself; (ii) All efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order 32A Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/section 9 of the Family Courts Art to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts; (iii) The parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties; (iv) The waiting period will only prolong their agony. The waiver application can be filed one week after the first motion giving reasons for the prayer for waiver. If the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the waiting period for the second motion will be in the discretion of the court concerned.

20. Since we are of the view that the period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory, it will be open to the court to exercise its discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case where there is no possibility of parties resuming cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation."

21. The factors mentioned in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (supra), in Paragraph 19 are illustrative and not exhaustive. These are factors which the Court is obliged to take note of. If all the four conditions mentioned above are fulfilled, the Court would necessarily have to exercise its discretion to waive the statutory waiting period under Section 13B (2) of the Marriage Act"

7. Per contra, learned counsel for the State-respondent submits that the State has unnecessarily and wrongly been impleaded as a party in the present case as this is a private dispute between the parties, since the 5 A227 No. 6700 of 2025 divorce petition resulted from private differences between the spouses due to some matrimonial reasons. He also submits that the State-respondent has not been impleaded as a party before the Family Court.

8. In light of the above citations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the ground taken by the learned Principal Judge (Family Court), by dismissing application 14C, in which a joint prayer has been made by the petitioners to waive the cooling-off period that the parties had lived together only for a period of one and a half months and they have not been blessed with any offspring and, in that situation, maintenance of the cooling-off period becomes important, does not appears informed and convincing in my consideration given. The case has been made out by the petitioners before the court below in respect of their prayer to waive the cooling-off period of six months and the learned trial court has dismissed the application 14C on extraneous grounds without taking into consideration the relevant legal position enumerated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in right perspective.

9. Consequently, the application 14C is allowed and the cooling-off period of six months from the date of filing of the writ petition is hereby waived. The petition is allowed accordingly. The learned Family Court is directed to consider the divorce petition by mutual consent without waiting for completion of the waiving off period, in accordance with law.

10. The petition is allowed accordingly.

11. Parties are directed to appear before the court below within 10 days and file a certified copy of this order; the court will then proceed in the case as per the directions given in this order. November 17, 2025 Mohd. Sharif (Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra,J.) MOHAMMAD SHARIF High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, who are husband and wife, as well as learned counsel appearing for the State-respondents and perused the record.

2. The instant petition has been preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, wherein a prayer has been made to set aside the impugned order dated 10.10.2025 passed by learned Principal Judge (Family Court), Bahraich in Suit No.1192 of 2025 (Navneet Kumar versus Vaishali Rajpoot), and to issue a direction to the family court to allow the petitioners to proceed with the second motion without waiting for the completion of the cooling-off period.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner nos.1 and 2 are husband and wife. They are Hindu by religion and faith and still profess the same. The ages of the petitioners were 31 and 25 years, respectively, at the time of marriage, which was solemnized between them on 24.11.2023 at Shri Govardhan Garden Resort, Najibabad Road, Kiratpur, Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh, according to Hindu rites and rituals. The petitioners lived together as husband and wife only for a period of one and a half months from the date of marriage and thereafter they parted ways due to difference of opinion and they have lived separately for a period of one year and eight months. No child was born out of their wedlock. The parties filed a petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu 2 A227 No. 6700 of 2025 Marriage Act, 1955 for divorce by mutual consent on 19.09.2025, which is the date of the first motion. Thus, the period of more than one and a half years has already lapsed before the first motion of the filing of the writ petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act. The parties made efforts to reconcile their differences, which were unsuccessful and their marital relationship is irreconcilable. There is no other civil or criminal litigation between them. Petitioner no.1 has already received her full settlement from petitioner no.2. The parties had filed a mutual application before the family court for waiving off the cooling-off period of six months from the date of filing of the divorce petition, but the same has been dismissed by the learned court below, taking a hyper-technical approach.

4. He next submits that the learned court below placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amardeep Singh versus Harveen Kaur, 2017 AIR (Supreme Court) 4417, wherein it is held that the period mentioned in Section 13B is not mandatory but discretionary, and that a Court may exercise this discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case, where there is no possibility of the parties to resume cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation. In the case of Shilpa Sailesh versus Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231, Apex Court held that a court can waive the cooling-off periods when it is satisfied that the marriage has irretrievably broken down and that forcing couples to wait would serve no constructive purpose.

5. Learned counsel further submits that the object of the cooling-off period provided under Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is to allow the parties sufficient time to reconsider their decision for separation, but when it is apparent that the marriage has broken down irretrievably and there is no possibility of reunion, insistence on such period will only prolong the agony of the parties. The learned Family Court failed to appreciate that petitioner no.1 is a permanent resident of State of Rajasthan and is facing considerable hardship in attending the proceedings before the Family Court at Bahraich. The continuation of the present litigation would not only cause unnecessary inconvenience but may also adversely affect the petitioner's future matrimonial prospects. Hence, the rejection of the application for waiving the cooling-off period 3 A227 No. 6700 of 2025 is arbitrary and contrary to the settled principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The petitioner, being aggrieved, had no alternative and efficacious remedy, but to prefer present petition invoking extra ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

6. Learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kumar versus Suman Beniwal, (2021) SCC Online SC 1270, wherein it is held as under:- "17. Legislature has, in its wisdom, enacted section 13B (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act to provide for a cooling period of six months from the date of filing of the divorce petition under Section 13B (1), in case the parties should change their mind and resolve their differences. After six months if the parties still wish to go ahead with the divorce, and make a motion, the Court has to grant a decree of divorce declaring the marriage dissolved with effect from the date of the decree, after making such enquiries as it considers fit.

18. The object of Section 13B(2) read with Section 14 is to save the institution of marriage, by preventing hasty dissolution of marriage. It is often said that "time is the best healer. With passage of time, tempers cool down and anger dissipates. The waiting period gives the spouses time to forgive and forget. If the spouses have children, they may, after some time, think of the consequences of divorce on their children, and reconsider their decision to separate. Even otherwise, the cooling period gives the couple time to ponder and reflect and take a considered decision as to whether they should really put an end to the marriage for all time to come.

19. Where there is a chance of reconciliation, however slight, the cooling period of six months from the date of filing of the divorce petition should be enforced. However, if there is no possibility of reconciliation, it would be meaningless to prolong the agony of the parties to the marriage. Thus, if the marriage has broken down irretrievably, the spouses have been living apart for a long time, but not been able to reconcile their differences and have mutually decided to part, it is better to end the marriage, to enable both the spouses to move on with the life.

20. In Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur, (2017) 8 SCC 746, relied upon by the Family Court and the High Court, this Court held: 4 A227 No. 6700 of 2025 "19. Applying the above to the present situation, we are of the view that where the court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13B (2), it can do so after considering the following: (i) The statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself; (ii) All efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order 32A Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/section 9 of the Family Courts Art to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts; (iii) The parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties; (iv) The waiting period will only prolong their agony. The waiver application can be filed one week after the first motion giving reasons for the prayer for waiver. If the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the waiting period for the second motion will be in the discretion of the court concerned.

20. Since we are of the view that the period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory, it will be open to the court to exercise its discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case where there is no possibility of parties resuming cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation."

21. The factors mentioned in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (supra), in Paragraph 19 are illustrative and not exhaustive. These are factors which the Court is obliged to take note of. If all the four conditions mentioned above are fulfilled, the Court would necessarily have to exercise its discretion to waive the statutory waiting period under Section 13B (2) of the Marriage Act"

7. Per contra, learned counsel for the State-respondent submits that the State has unnecessarily and wrongly been impleaded as a party in the present case as this is a private dispute between the parties, since the 5 A227 No. 6700 of 2025 divorce petition resulted from private differences between the spouses due to some matrimonial reasons. He also submits that the State-respondent has not been impleaded as a party before the Family Court.

8. In light of the above citations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the ground taken by the learned Principal Judge (Family Court), by dismissing application 14C, in which a joint prayer has been made by the petitioners to waive the cooling-off period that the parties had lived together only for a period of one and a half months and they have not been blessed with any offspring and, in that situation, maintenance of the cooling-off period becomes important, does not appears informed and convincing in my consideration given. The case has been made out by the petitioners before the court below in respect of their prayer to waive the cooling-off period of six months and the learned trial court has dismissed the application 14C on extraneous grounds without taking into consideration the relevant legal position enumerated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in right perspective.

9. Consequently, the application 14C is allowed and the cooling-off period of six months from the date of filing of the writ petition is hereby waived. The petition is allowed accordingly. The learned Family Court is directed to consider the divorce petition by mutual consent without waiting for completion of the waiving off period, in accordance with law.

10. The petition is allowed accordingly.

11. Parties are directed to appear before the court below within 10 days and file a certified copy of this order; the court will then proceed in the case as per the directions given in this order. November 17, 2025 Mohd. Sharif (Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra,J.) MOHAMMAD SHARIF High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench