Deputy Director Of Consolidation, Sultanpur And Others vs Counsel for Petitioner(s) on 24 Nov 2025

Judgment

1. Heard Sri Mohiuddin Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Sanding counsel on behalf of respondent No.s 1 and 2 and Sri Mohan Singh for respondent No.3.

2. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that he is the recorded tenure holder of gata No.211 situated at Village Lohramau, Pargana Meeranpur, Tehsil Sadar, District Sultanpur. Previously, the land was recorded in the name of late Liyakat Husain, the father of the petitioner, who has got demarcation of the said land done and also moved an application for demarcation and report in this regard was submitted on 9.5.1994 and it seems that the application was rejected and the petitioner being minor was not aware of the said proceedings and it is after death of his father that the petitioner on attaining the age of majority had moved appropriate application for referring his dispute under Section 48 (3) of U.P.C.H.Act for correction of the map, where according to the petitioner, there was a shortage in gata No.s 211 and 220.

3. Accordingly, the said dispute was referred to Deputy Director of Consolidation, who rejected the application of the petitioner by means of order dated

10.10.2019. While rejecting the said application he had observed that the reference has been made after issuance of notification under Section 52 of U.P.C.H. Act and therefore, the said reference was not maintainable and after recording the same he proceeded to consider the various reports which were on record and declined to interfere in the matter and rejected his application.

4. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 10.10.2019 had approached this Court by filing writ petition B No.11341 of 2020 which was allowed by means of judgment and order dated 18.4.2022. This Court while allowing the said petition had observed as under:- 2 WRIB No. 1104 of 2025 "It would have been a different issue, had the application been dismissed only on the ground of maintainability but the DDC, Sultanpur has also entered into the merits of the matter and by relying upon the reports inadvertently has given a finding also noticing that the application was not maintainable. The manner in which the impugned order has been passed does not inspire confidence, accordingly, the same cannot be sustained. The order dated 10.10.2019 passed by the DDC is set aside. The matter shall stand remanded to the DDC concerned to take fresh look at the entire controversy in light of the reports and the map available which are duly authenticated if required may get a fresh inspection and report done and prepared and thereafter affording an

opportunity of hearing to the parties pass a fresh order strictly in accordance with law. With the aforesaid, the petition is allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the order dated 10.10.2019 passed by the DDC, Sultanpur. The matter shall stand restored before the DDC, Sultanpur who shall pass fresh orders in light of the directions given in this order and conclude the proceedings preferrably within a period of four months from the date a certified copy of the order is placed before the Authority concerned. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs."

5. It is in pursuance of the directions of this Court that a fresh order has been passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation on 6.6.2025 which has been impugned in the present writ petition.

6. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has noticed the fact hat the consolidation operations were concluded by issuance of notification under Section 52 of U.P. C.H. Act, 1953 on 10.4.1982 and, therefore, after the said date all the records are transmitted to the revenue department and any other authority who can pass orders on the application would be under the provisions of U.P. Revenue Code and was of the view that no orders can be passed in exercise of the powers under Section 48 (3) of U.P. C.H.Act as the Deputy Director of Consolation was denuded of all the powers after the said notification and only on this ground rejected the application of the petitioner as being not maintainable.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that it was directed by this Court vide its order dated 18.4.2022 to decide the case on merits but the Deputy Director of Consolidation having rejected on the ground of maintainability has committed error of jurisdiction and therefore, thw matter requires interference.

8. Learned Standing counsel, on the other hand, has submitted that a perusal of the order of this Court would indicate that this court was persuaded by the fact hat once the reference itself was not maintainable then no occasion had arisen for 3 WRIB No. 1104 of 2025 the Deputy Director of Consolidation to have entered into merits of the dispute. It is in this regard that he further submits that the matter was remanded back by the Deputy Director of Consolidation to decide the case in accordance with law.

9. It is in remand proceedings that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has confined himself only to the aspect of maintainability. He has observed that once the notification under Section 52 of U.P.C.H.Act, 1953 has been issued then Deputy Director of Consolidation is denuded of powers under Section 48 (3) considering the fact that it was stated that a perusal of Section 52 itself is abundantly clear in its terms and the consolidation authorities did not have powers of reference under the Act and the revenue authority can exercise their powers pursuant to the notification under Section 53 has been specifically stated therein in terms of provision of sub clause 1 and 2. It was further stated that the only where such proceedings are pending on the date of notification, the said proceedings would not be a bar under Section 52 of U.P. C.H. Act but the said powers cannot be invoked under the Act of 1953 after issuance of notification under Section 52. In the present case, it is noticed that the application was given by the petitioner nearly four decades after issuance of the notification under Section 52 of U.P.C.H.Act, 1953. It has been submitted that this very aspect of the matter is engaging he attention of the Full Bench of this Court and accordingly prayed that his mater maybe kept pending till decision of the Full Bench.

10. I have considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the record.

11. The first question that arises for determination is whether this Court should proceed to decide the present matter notwithstanding that a similar issue is stated to be engaging the attention of a Full Bench. The legal position on this aspect is well-settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu & Kashmir National Conference , 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 749 has reiterated that pendency of a reference or review before a Larger Bench cannot operate as a bar upon courts deciding matters on the basis of the law as it presently stands. The relevant paragraph is as under:- “32. The Court would categorically emphasize that no litigant should have even an iota of doubt or an impression (rather, a misimpression) that just because of systemic delay or the matter not being taken up by the Courts resulting in efflux of time the cause would be defeated, and the Court would be rendered helpless to ensure justice to the party concerned. It would not be out of place to mention that this Court can even turn the clock back, if the situation warrants such dire measures. The powers of this Court, if need be, to even restore status quo ante 4 WRIB No. 1104 of 2025 are not in the realm of any doubt. The relief(s) granted in the lead opinion by Hon. Khehar, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was), concurred with by the other 4 learned Judges, in Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1 is enough on this aspect. We know full well that a 5Judge Bench in Subhash Desai v Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 607 has referred Nabam Rebia (supra) to a Larger Bench. However, the questions referred to the Larger Bench do not detract from the power to bring back status quo ante. That apart, it is settled that mere reference to a larger Bench does not unsettle declared law. In Harbhajan Singh v State of Punjab, (2009) 13 SCC 608, a 2- Judge Bench said: “15. Even if what is contended by the learned counsel is correct, it is not for us to go into the said question at this stage; herein cross-examination of the witnesses had taken place. The Court had taken into consideration the materials available to it for the purpose of arriving at a satisfaction that a case for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code was made out. Only because the correctness of a portion of the judgment in Mohd. Shafi [(2007) 14 SCC 544 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889 : (2007) 4 SCR 1023 : (2007) 5 Scale 611] has been doubted by another Bench, the same would not mean that we should wait for the decision of the larger Bench, particularly when the same instead of assisting the appellants runs counter to their contention.””

35. We are seeing before us judgments and orders byHigh Courts not deciding cases on the ground that the leading judgment of this Court on this subject is either referred to a larger Bench or a review petition relating thereto is pending. We have also come across examples of High Courts refusing deference to judgments of this Court on the score that a later Coordinate Bench has doubted its correctness. In this regard, we lay down the position in law. We make it absolutely clear that the High Courts will proceed to decide matters on the basis of the law as it stands. It is not open, unless specifically directed by this Court, to await an outcome of a reference or a review petition, as the case may be. It is also not open to a High Court to refuse to follow a judgment by stating that it has been doubted by a later Coordinate Bench. In any case, when faced with conflicting judgments by Benches of equal strength of this Court, it is the earlier one which is to be followed by the High Courts, as held by a 5- Judge Bench in National Insurance Company Limited v Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 6805. The High Courts, of course, will do so with careful regard to the facts and circumstances of the case before it.” The doctrine of precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution obliges all courts to apply the law declared by the Supreme Court until such declaration is 5 WRIB No. 1104 of 2025 expressly overruled by a Bench of larger strength, and the mere pendency of such a reference does not dilute the binding character of existing law.Equally settled is the principle that a subsequent judgment of a Larger Bench shall operate prospectively only where the court expressly so directs. In the absence of such declaration, overruling—whether by the Supreme Court or a Larger Bench—operates retrospectively. In view of this settled jurisprudence, the present petition cannot be permitted to remain pending merely because a cognate issue is before a Full Bench. The matter must, therefore, be adjudicated on the basis of the current legal position as enunciated by the Supreme Court.

12. In light of the above, we proceed to decide the present controversy.

13. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that notification under Section 52 of the Act of 1953 was issued on 10.4.1982 and the application for referring the dispute was given by the petitioner only in April, 2021 i.e. after about 40 years after issuance o the notification under Section 52. Accordingly, there is no dispute that the consolidation authorities had no jurisdictional authority or power to embark to adjudicate upon the matter and refer to the consolidation authorities which is concluded in 1982.

14. Apart from the above, we find that no proceedings were pending on the date of issuance of the notification under Section 52 and, therefore, it denuded the exercise of the powers after notification under Section 52 is not maintainable and, therefore, the application of the petitioner was not maintainable at the very outset and the Deputy Director of Consolidation has correctly appreciated the legal position and rejected the reference and accordingly, for the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the present writ petition.

15. It is further stated that the petitioner had also moved application for correction of map before the Chief Revenue Officer which was rejected on 19th May,

2018. We have perused the aforesaid order and find that the said application was given during pendency of the reference made by the petitioner and the Chief Revenue Officer while rejecting the application of the petitioner underlined this fact and only on this ground that the petitioner has availed alternate remedy before the Consolidation Officer, declined to entertain the application preferred by the petitioner.

16. Accordingly, it is for the aforesaid reasons that this Court is of the considered opinion that after issuance of notification under Section 52 of the Act of 1953, the dispute of the nature which has been referred can be adjudicated under the provisions of U.P.Revenue Code. Accordingly, the petitioner is relegated to move appropriate application under U.P. Revenue Code for redressal of his 6 WRIB No. 1104 of 2025 grievances and in case such an application is made, the competent authority shall proceed to decide the same strictly in accordance with law and shall not rely upon any report or document which might have been obtained during pendency of the proceedings under Section 48 (3) and the revenue authorities shall also be not bound by previous order dated 19.5.2018 which was decided only on the ground of maintainability due to pendency of the application or petition which were referred under Section 48 (3) by the Deputy Director of Consolidation.

17. Subject to aforesaid observations, the petition stands dismissed. November 24, 2025 RKM. (Alok Mathur,J.) RAKESH KUMAR MAURYA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench