S S.J.S. Business Enterprises Private Ltd v. State of Bihar, reported in

1. Heard Shri Digvijay Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents.

2. The captioned writ petition has been filed inter alia, praying therein for the following reliefs:- "(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned notice u/s 148 as well as the order u/s 148A(d) passed by the Opp. Party No. 2 the, the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) for the A.Y. 2017-18 on 28.03.2024 as contained in Annexure No.1 to this Writ Petition after summoning the records. (b) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of Certiorari quashing the consequential order passed u/s 147 r.w.s. 144 read with section 144B of the Act by the Opp. Party no. 3 on 10.12.2024 (Annexure No. 6) on the basis of notice issued u/s 148 by the Jurisdictional Assessing Authority (JAO) on 28.03.2024. (c) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of mandamus directing the Opp. Parties not to proceed with the recovery for the A.Y. 2017-18 in pursuance of the order u/s 148 dated 10.12.2024 during the pendency of this Writ Petition before this Hon'ble Court. (d) Issue a Writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Opp. Parties to release the Bank Accounts of the Petitioner with Bank of Baroda, Circular Road, Hardoi and HDFC Bank, Indira Nagar, Lucknow during the pendency of this Writ Petition so that the Petitioner 2 WTAX No. 1270 of 2025 may carry on the business."

3. Upon perusal of this writ petition and after hearing learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State-respondents, it appears that against the order passed under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the petitioner had filed a rectification application which has not been disclosed in the said writ petition. The above disclosure, in our view, amounts to suppression of material facts.

4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/S S.J.S. Business Enterprises Private Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar, reported in 2004 (7) SCC 166, has categorically laid down the principles with regard to material facts that may amount to suppression of material facts. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are quoted hereinbelow:- (13) As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court, whatever view the court may have taken. Thus when the liability to income tax was questioned by an applicant on the ground of her non-residence, the fact that she had purchased and was maintaining a house in the country was held to be a material fact, the suppression of which disentitled her to the relief claimed. Again when in earlier proceedings before this Court, the appellant had undertaken that it would not carry on the manufacture of liquor at its distillery and the proceedings before this Court were concluded on that basis, a subsequent writ petition for renewal of the licence to manufacture liquor at the same distillery before the High Court was held to have been initiated for oblique and ulterior purposes and the interim order passed by the High Court in such subsequent application was set aside by this Court. Similarly, a challenge to an order fixing the price was rejected because the petitioners had suppressed the fact that an agreement had been entered into between the petitioners and the Government relating to the fixation of price and that the impugned order had been replaced by another order.

14. Assuming that the explanation given by the appellant that the suit had been filed by one of the Directors of the Company without the knowledge of the Director who almost simultaneously approached the High Court 3 WTAX No. 1270 of 2025 under Article 226 is unbelievable (sic), the question still remains whether the filing of the suit can be said to be a fact material to the disposal of the writ petition on merits. We think not. The existence of an adequate or suitable alternative remedy available to a litigant is merely a factor which a court entertaining an application under Article 226 will consider for exercising the discretion to issue a writ under Article 226. But the existence of such remedy does not impinge upon the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with the matter itself if it is in a position to do so on the basis of the affidavits filed. If, however, a party has already availed of the alternative remedy while invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226, it would not be appropriate for the court to entertain the writ petition. The rule is based on public policy but the motivating factor is the existence of a parallel jurisdiction in another court. But this Court has also held in Chandra Bhan Gosain vs. State of Orissa that even when an alternative remedy has been availed of by a party but not pursued that the party could prosecute proceedings under Article 226 for the same relief. This Court has also held that when a party has already moved the High Court under Article 226 and failed to obtain relief and then moved an application under Article 32 before this Court for the same relief, normally the Court will not entertain the application under Article 32. But where in the parallel jurisdiction, the order is not a speaking one or the matter has been disposed of on some other ground, this Court has, in a suitable case, entertained the application under Article 32. Instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground that the alternative remedy had been availed of, the Court may call upon the party to elect whether it will proceed with the alternative remedy or with the application under Article 226. Therefore, the fact that a suit had already been filed by the appellant was not such a fact the suppression of which could have affected the final disposal of the writ petition on merits."

5. Furthermore, in the case of Bhriguram De Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 2019 (1) CHN(Cal.) 598, a judgment of the Single Judge Bench, wherein one of us ( Shekhar B. Saraf, J. ) was a member, the principles of fraud, fraudulent concealment, "Suppressio veri, suggestio falsi" have been discussed and the doctrine of uberrima fides has been explained. It is to be noted that in the judgment authored by Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R. in the case of Rex Vs. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners reported in 1917 (1) KB 486, the principle of uberrima fides, i.e. abundant good faith, was elucidated. The principles are that when a petitioner comes before this Court seeking an interlocutory order, he must come with clean hands and in good faith.

6. When it is found that material facts have been suppressed, the Writ Court 4 WTAX No. 1270 of 2025 is duty bound to not exercise its discretion in favour of such a petitioner.

7. Furthermore, the present writ petition is hit by the doctrine of election, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the petitioner has chosen a particular path, he cannot be allowed to tread on a different path for the same cause of action in the case.

8. The Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd. reported in (2013) 5 SCC 470 has categorically held that one cannot 'approbate and reprobate' at the same time as it vitiates the legal principle that one cannot accept and reject the same legal instrument or transaction. The relevant paragraph of the judgement is quoted herein-below:- "16. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel?the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had."

9. In the present case, the petitioner after filing an application for rectification as provided in the statute of an order has subsequently chosen to approach the writ court for quashing the same order. Having chosen to proceed under the remedy provided in the statute, he cannot be now allowed to seek a fresh remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The rationale behind the same is that when on the same facts, a person has the right to claim one of two reliefs and with full knowledge he elects to claim one and obtains it, it is not open to him thereafter to fink out on his election and claim the alternative relief.

10. In light of the aforesaid, the writ petition is dismissed. November 27, 2025 Lokesh Kumar (Manjive Shukla,J.) (Shekhar B. Saraf,J.) LOKESH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

1. Heard Shri Digvijay Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents.

2. The captioned writ petition has been filed inter alia, praying therein for the following reliefs:- "(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned notice u/s 148 as well as the order u/s 148A(d) passed by the Opp. Party No. 2 the, the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) for the A.Y. 2017-18 on 28.03.2024 as contained in Annexure No.1 to this Writ Petition after summoning the records. (b) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of Certiorari quashing the consequential order passed u/s 147 r.w.s. 144 read with section 144B of the Act by the Opp. Party no. 3 on 10.12.2024 (Annexure No. 6) on the basis of notice issued u/s 148 by the Jurisdictional Assessing Authority (JAO) on 28.03.2024. (c) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of mandamus directing the Opp. Parties not to proceed with the recovery for the A.Y. 2017-18 in pursuance of the order u/s 148 dated 10.12.2024 during the pendency of this Writ Petition before this Hon'ble Court. (d) Issue a Writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Opp. Parties to release the Bank Accounts of the Petitioner with Bank of Baroda, Circular Road, Hardoi and HDFC Bank, Indira Nagar, Lucknow during the pendency of this Writ Petition so that the Petitioner 2 WTAX No. 1270 of 2025 may carry on the business."

3. Upon perusal of this writ petition and after hearing learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State-respondents, it appears that against the order passed under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the petitioner had filed a rectification application which has not been disclosed in the said writ petition. The above disclosure, in our view, amounts to suppression of material facts.

4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/S S.J.S. Business Enterprises Private Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar, reported in 2004 (7) SCC 166, has categorically laid down the principles with regard to material facts that may amount to suppression of material facts. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are quoted hereinbelow:- (13) As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court, whatever view the court may have taken. Thus when the liability to income tax was questioned by an applicant on the ground of her non-residence, the fact that she had purchased and was maintaining a house in the country was held to be a material fact, the suppression of which disentitled her to the relief claimed. Again when in earlier proceedings before this Court, the appellant had undertaken that it would not carry on the manufacture of liquor at its distillery and the proceedings before this Court were concluded on that basis, a subsequent writ petition for renewal of the licence to manufacture liquor at the same distillery before the High Court was held to have been initiated for oblique and ulterior purposes and the interim order passed by the High Court in such subsequent application was set aside by this Court. Similarly, a challenge to an order fixing the price was rejected because the petitioners had suppressed the fact that an agreement had been entered into between the petitioners and the Government relating to the fixation of price and that the impugned order had been replaced by another order.

14. Assuming that the explanation given by the appellant that the suit had been filed by one of the Directors of the Company without the knowledge of the Director who almost simultaneously approached the High Court 3 WTAX No. 1270 of 2025 under Article 226 is unbelievable (sic), the question still remains whether the filing of the suit can be said to be a fact material to the disposal of the writ petition on merits. We think not. The existence of an adequate or suitable alternative remedy available to a litigant is merely a factor which a court entertaining an application under Article 226 will consider for exercising the discretion to issue a writ under Article 226. But the existence of such remedy does not impinge upon the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with the matter itself if it is in a position to do so on the basis of the affidavits filed. If, however, a party has already availed of the alternative remedy while invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226, it would not be appropriate for the court to entertain the writ petition. The rule is based on public policy but the motivating factor is the existence of a parallel jurisdiction in another court. But this Court has also held in Chandra Bhan Gosain vs. State of Orissa that even when an alternative remedy has been availed of by a party but not pursued that the party could prosecute proceedings under Article 226 for the same relief. This Court has also held that when a party has already moved the High Court under Article 226 and failed to obtain relief and then moved an application under Article 32 before this Court for the same relief, normally the Court will not entertain the application under Article 32. But where in the parallel jurisdiction, the order is not a speaking one or the matter has been disposed of on some other ground, this Court has, in a suitable case, entertained the application under Article 32. Instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground that the alternative remedy had been availed of, the Court may call upon the party to elect whether it will proceed with the alternative remedy or with the application under Article 226. Therefore, the fact that a suit had already been filed by the appellant was not such a fact the suppression of which could have affected the final disposal of the writ petition on merits."

5. Furthermore, in the case of Bhriguram De Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 2019 (1) CHN(Cal.) 598, a judgment of the Single Judge Bench, wherein one of us ( Shekhar B. Saraf, J. ) was a member, the principles of fraud, fraudulent concealment, "Suppressio veri, suggestio falsi" have been discussed and the doctrine of uberrima fides has been explained. It is to be noted that in the judgment authored by Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R. in the case of Rex Vs. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners reported in 1917 (1) KB 486, the principle of uberrima fides, i.e. abundant good faith, was elucidated. The principles are that when a petitioner comes before this Court seeking an interlocutory order, he must come with clean hands and in good faith.

6. When it is found that material facts have been suppressed, the Writ Court 4 WTAX No. 1270 of 2025 is duty bound to not exercise its discretion in favour of such a petitioner.

7. Furthermore, the present writ petition is hit by the doctrine of election, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the petitioner has chosen a particular path, he cannot be allowed to tread on a different path for the same cause of action in the case.

8. The Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd. reported in (2013) 5 SCC 470 has categorically held that one cannot 'approbate and reprobate' at the same time as it vitiates the legal principle that one cannot accept and reject the same legal instrument or transaction. The relevant paragraph of the judgement is quoted herein-below:- "16. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel?the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had."

9. In the present case, the petitioner after filing an application for rectification as provided in the statute of an order has subsequently chosen to approach the writ court for quashing the same order. Having chosen to proceed under the remedy provided in the statute, he cannot be now allowed to seek a fresh remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The rationale behind the same is that when on the same facts, a person has the right to claim one of two reliefs and with full knowledge he elects to claim one and obtains it, it is not open to him thereafter to fink out on his election and claim the alternative relief.

10. In light of the aforesaid, the writ petition is dismissed. November 27, 2025 Lokesh Kumar (Manjive Shukla,J.) (Shekhar B. Saraf,J.) LOKESH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench