Rahul Kumar Singh vs State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Basic Edu.

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Prashant Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent nos. 2 & 3, Mr. P.K. Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State and perused the record. Instant petition has been filed with the following main reliefs:- "(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties ot forthwith pay arrears of salary to the petitioner for the period from

10.01.2021 to 18.05.2022; (ii) Issue any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court deem just, fit and necessary in the circumstances of the case may also be passed;" It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was roped in a criminal case and detained in jail since 10.01.2021 to 18.05.2022 and subsequently, the trial concluded and the petitioner has been acquitted on 18.04.2024. He submits that the salary for the period of 10.01.2021 to

18.05.2022 has not been yet paid to the petitioner on the premises that he was under detention in jail for the same period. He submitted that the controversy has already been put to rest in the case of Anil Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. and 4 Other passed in Writ A No. 11555 of 2021 and has referred paragraph nos. 10 to 16, which are extracted as under:- "10. In the absence of any departmental proceeding being drawn, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that petitioner was restrained from discharging duties on account of his detention in jail in connection with a criminal case a circumstance to be taken as beyond his control and his innocence ultimately being proved by way of 2 WRIA No. 12746 of 2025 acquittal in the said criminal case, he should not be penalized.

11. The principle of 'no work no pay' could have been attracted if petitioner had enjoyed bail in criminal case and had been merely kept under suspension but this is not the case either. Petitioner remained in detention until he was acquitted. There was no question of petitioner giving any certificate that he was not gainfully employed anywhere during the period he was under suspension. One must draw difference between an under-trial on bail and convicted person in jail.

12. In the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner I find that the some observations regarding payment of salary for the period during the employee was under detention, but there was a decree of trial court which is not a case here. In principle petitioner might have been simply acquitted but petitioner was not responsible in any manner for not discharging his duties in the department.

13. There is nothing in the counter affidavit to demonstrate that even otherwise the conduct of the petitioner has not been good and fair while discharging his official duties. The averments raised in the counter affidavit are quite sketchy as they only refer to the criminal case and detention of petitioner in jail.

14. On the backwages to the petitioner for the period he remained suspended due to detention in jail and upon his reinstatement by revoking his suspension for acquittal in the criminal case, I find support of my view in an authority of Supreme Court in the case of Raj Narain v. Union of India and others (2019) 5 SCC 809 in which an identical issue was dealt with. In the said case even though departmental inquiry was set up but was later on dropped and upon acquittal the employee was reinstated revoking his suspension order. Vide paragraphs 7 and 8 the Court held thus:- "7. The point that remains to be considered is whether the appellant is entitled to payment of full wages between 1979 and 1987. The appellant was placed under suspension on 23-10-1979 and his suspension was revoked on 21-10-1987. An interesting development took place during the interregnum by which the disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21-3-1983. It is clear from the record that the appellant was the one who was seeking postponement of the departmental enquiry in view of the pendency of criminal case. The order of suspension was in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental enquiry. Thereafter, the respondents took four years to reinstate him by revoking his suspension. The order of suspension dated 23-10-1979 came to an end on 21-3-1983 which is the date on which disciplinary proceedings were dropped. The appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial which did not happen. Ultimately, the appellant was reinstated by an order dated 21-10-1987 by revocation of the order of suspension. Though, technically, the learned Additional Solicitor General is right in submitting that the impugned judgment does not even refer to the IA, we are not inclined to remit the matter to the High Court at this stage for fresh consideration of this point. We hold that the appellant is entitled for full wages from 3 WRIA No. 12746 of 2025 23-10-1979 to 21-10-1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance.

8. For the reasons mentioned above, we approve the judgment of the High Court by holding that the appellant shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal on 31-8-2001, till the date of his reinstatement on 20-1-2003. Further, the appellant shall be entitled to full salary from 23-10-1979 to 21- 10-1987."

15. I find petitioner's case to be on a much better footing as he was only suspended for detention in jail without there being any inquiry in contemplation and his suspension was revoked immediately upon his acquittal in the criminal case and no appeal was preferred against the judgment of acquittal.

16. In view of the above, therefore, the Court is of the considered view that respondents are not justified in denying salary to the petitioner applying the principle of 'no work no pay'." Referring to the aforesaid, he submits that after the aforesaid judgment and order, the controversy has been dealt with cases in Writ A No. 67719 of 2013 and the benefit of the aforesaid judgment has been accorded to other identically situated employees. Concluding his arguments, he submits that the petitioner is entitled for the same relief. Learned counsel appearing for the District Education Officer could not refute the aforesaid contentions. Considering the submissions of counsel for the parties, it is evident that the identically situated other employees have been granted the benefit of Anil Kumar Singh(Supra), therefore, the present petitioner is also entitled for the same relief. Ergo, the present writ petition is disposed of while granting the benefit of judgment and order passed in Anil Kumar Singh(Supra), to the present petitioner. November 3, 2025 Mayank (Shree Prakash Singh,J.) MAYANK PRATAP SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Prashant Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent nos. 2 & 3, Mr. P.K. Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State and perused the record. Instant petition has been filed with the following main reliefs:- "(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties ot forthwith pay arrears of salary to the petitioner for the period from

10.01.2021 to 18.05.2022; (ii) Issue any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court deem just, fit and necessary in the circumstances of the case may also be passed;" It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was roped in a criminal case and detained in jail since 10.01.2021 to 18.05.2022 and subsequently, the trial concluded and the petitioner has been acquitted on 18.04.2024. He submits that the salary for the period of 10.01.2021 to

18.05.2022 has not been yet paid to the petitioner on the premises that he was under detention in jail for the same period. He submitted that the controversy has already been put to rest in the case of Anil Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. and 4 Other passed in Writ A No. 11555 of 2021 and has referred paragraph nos. 10 to 16, which are extracted as under:- "10. In the absence of any departmental proceeding being drawn, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that petitioner was restrained from discharging duties on account of his detention in jail in connection with a criminal case a circumstance to be taken as beyond his control and his innocence ultimately being proved by way of 2 WRIA No. 12746 of 2025 acquittal in the said criminal case, he should not be penalized.

11. The principle of 'no work no pay' could have been attracted if petitioner had enjoyed bail in criminal case and had been merely kept under suspension but this is not the case either. Petitioner remained in detention until he was acquitted. There was no question of petitioner giving any certificate that he was not gainfully employed anywhere during the period he was under suspension. One must draw difference between an under-trial on bail and convicted person in jail.

12. In the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner I find that the some observations regarding payment of salary for the period during the employee was under detention, but there was a decree of trial court which is not a case here. In principle petitioner might have been simply acquitted but petitioner was not responsible in any manner for not discharging his duties in the department.

13. There is nothing in the counter affidavit to demonstrate that even otherwise the conduct of the petitioner has not been good and fair while discharging his official duties. The averments raised in the counter affidavit are quite sketchy as they only refer to the criminal case and detention of petitioner in jail.

14. On the backwages to the petitioner for the period he remained suspended due to detention in jail and upon his reinstatement by revoking his suspension for acquittal in the criminal case, I find support of my view in an authority of Supreme Court in the case of Raj Narain v. Union of India and others (2019) 5 SCC 809 in which an identical issue was dealt with. In the said case even though departmental inquiry was set up but was later on dropped and upon acquittal the employee was reinstated revoking his suspension order. Vide paragraphs 7 and 8 the Court held thus:- "7. The point that remains to be considered is whether the appellant is entitled to payment of full wages between 1979 and 1987. The appellant was placed under suspension on 23-10-1979 and his suspension was revoked on 21-10-1987. An interesting development took place during the interregnum by which the disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21-3-1983. It is clear from the record that the appellant was the one who was seeking postponement of the departmental enquiry in view of the pendency of criminal case. The order of suspension was in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental enquiry. Thereafter, the respondents took four years to reinstate him by revoking his suspension. The order of suspension dated 23-10-1979 came to an end on 21-3-1983 which is the date on which disciplinary proceedings were dropped. The appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial which did not happen. Ultimately, the appellant was reinstated by an order dated 21-10-1987 by revocation of the order of suspension. Though, technically, the learned Additional Solicitor General is right in submitting that the impugned judgment does not even refer to the IA, we are not inclined to remit the matter to the High Court at this stage for fresh consideration of this point. We hold that the appellant is entitled for full wages from 3 WRIA No. 12746 of 2025 23-10-1979 to 21-10-1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance.

8. For the reasons mentioned above, we approve the judgment of the High Court by holding that the appellant shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal on 31-8-2001, till the date of his reinstatement on 20-1-2003. Further, the appellant shall be entitled to full salary from 23-10-1979 to 21- 10-1987."

15. I find petitioner's case to be on a much better footing as he was only suspended for detention in jail without there being any inquiry in contemplation and his suspension was revoked immediately upon his acquittal in the criminal case and no appeal was preferred against the judgment of acquittal.

16. In view of the above, therefore, the Court is of the considered view that respondents are not justified in denying salary to the petitioner applying the principle of 'no work no pay'." Referring to the aforesaid, he submits that after the aforesaid judgment and order, the controversy has been dealt with cases in Writ A No. 67719 of 2013 and the benefit of the aforesaid judgment has been accorded to other identically situated employees. Concluding his arguments, he submits that the petitioner is entitled for the same relief. Learned counsel appearing for the District Education Officer could not refute the aforesaid contentions. Considering the submissions of counsel for the parties, it is evident that the identically situated other employees have been granted the benefit of Anil Kumar Singh(Supra), therefore, the present petitioner is also entitled for the same relief. Ergo, the present writ petition is disposed of while granting the benefit of judgment and order passed in Anil Kumar Singh(Supra), to the present petitioner. November 3, 2025 Mayank (Shree Prakash Singh,J.) MAYANK PRATAP SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench