Ravi Kumar Sharma And Another v. Union Of India Ministry Of Finance Deptt. Financial Services Thru. Secy. And

1. Heard Ms. Jyoti Rajpoot, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Ashwani Kumar Singh, the learned Standing Counsel for the Union of India, and Sri Akash Deep Srivastava, Advocate holding brief of respondent/opposite party no. 3.

2. By means of the instant writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the validity of an order dated 15.07.2025 passed by the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow in Securitization Application No. 314 of 2024 filed under Section 17 of Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred as "SARFAESI Act") .

3. The learned counsel for the opposite parties have raised a preliminary objection that the petitioners have got a statutory remedy of filing an appeal under Section 18 of DRT Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.

4. The learned counsel for the respondent- Union of India has relied upon a judgment dated 10.04.2025 rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PHR Invent Education Society Vs. UCO Bank and Others, in SLP(C) No. 8867 of 2022, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:- "19. Again, the case of Varimadugu OBI Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu and others, after referring to earlier judgments, this Court observed thus: 2 WRIC No. 10052 of 2025 "34. The order of the Tribunal dated 1-8-2019 was an appealable order under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the ordinary course of business, borrowers/person aggrieved was supposed to avail the statutory remedy of appeal which the law provides under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. In the absence of efficacious alternative remedy being availed, there was no reasonable justification tendered by respondent borrowers in approaching the High Court and filing writ application assailing order of the Tribunal dated 1-8-2019 under its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution without exhausting the statutory right of appeal available at its command."

20. It could thus be seen that this Court has strongly deprecated the practice of entertaining writ petitions in such matters.

21. Recently, in the case of Celir LLP (supra), after surveying various judgments of this Court, the Court observed thus: "101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even after, the decision of this Court in Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260], it appears that the High Courts have continued to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act."

22. It can thus be seen that it is more than a settled legal position of law that in such matters, the High Court should not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution particularly when an alternative statutory remedy is available.

23. The only reasoning that could be seen from the impugned order given by the learned Division Bench of the High Court is as under: "11. It is true that under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 3 WRIC No. 10052 of 2025 petitioner has the alternative remedy against the impugned order by filing appeal before the appellate Tribunal. However, having regard to the fact that the writ petition is pending before this Court for quite some time and also considering the fact that if the impugned order is allowed to stand, petitioner would be left without a remedy to ventilate his grievance, we deem it fit and proper not to non-suit the petitioner on the ground of not availing the alternative remedy.

12. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act provides that any person including a borrower who is aggrieved by the action of secured creditor under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act may file an application thereunder. Supreme Court has held time and again that the Tribunal exercises wide jurisdiction under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, even to the extent of setting aside an auction sale. In the instant case, we are consciously not referring to the merit of the case. All that we are concerned is whether for whatever reason a person who is aggrieved in law should be left remediless. In the instant case, petitioner had invoked his remedy by filing securitization application under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The application was pending for three years before the Tribunal. From the docket order dated 21.09.2020, we find that a junior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had reported that the matter was settled out of Court and therefore, leave was sought for withdrawing the securitization application which was accordingly granted.

13. When the settlement did not materialize, petitioner went back to the Tribunal for revival of the securitization application which was however dismissed on the ground that version of the petition did not deserve acceptance.

14. On thorough consideration of the matter we are of the view that dismissal of the miscellaneous application of the petitioner by the Tribunal dies not appear to be justified. 4 WRIC No. 10052 of 2025

15. Though subsequent developments may have a bearing on the grant of ultimate relief to a litigant but the same by itself cannot denude the adjudicating authority of its power to adjudicate the grievance raised by the aggrieved person which it otherwise possess."

24. It can thus clearly be seen that though it was specifically contended on behalf of the appellant herein that the writ petition was not maintainable on account of availability of alternative remedy, the High Court has interfered with the writ petition only on the ground that the matter was pending for sometime before it and if the petition was not entertained, the Borrower would be left remediless. We however find that the High Court has failed to take into consideration the conduct of the Borrower. It is further to be noted that, though the High Court had been specifically informed that, on account of subsequent developments, that is confirmation of sale and registration thereof, the position had reached an irreversible stage, the High Court has failed to take into consideration those aspects of the matter."

5. In response to the aforesaid objection, the learned counsel for the petitioners has drawn attention of this Court to the averments made in Para 4 of the writ petition wherein the petitioners have placed reliance upon a judgement in the case of Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks:1998 8 SCC 1.

6. In Whirlpool Corporation (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:- "15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are 5 WRIC No. 10052 of 2025 wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged..."

7. Since the present writ petition has not been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights, there has been no violation of principles of natural justice, neither is the order or the proceedings wholly without jurisdiction nor is the vires of any Act challenged, therefore, ratio as laid down in Whirlpool Corporation (supra) does not apply to the present case.

8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition is dismissed in view of the availability of statutory remedy of filing an appeal. . October 14, 2025 Preeti (Subhash Vidyarthi,J.) PREETI GAUTAM High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

1. Heard Ms. Jyoti Rajpoot, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Ashwani Kumar Singh, the learned Standing Counsel for the Union of India, and Sri Akash Deep Srivastava, Advocate holding brief of respondent/opposite party no. 3.

2. By means of the instant writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the validity of an order dated 15.07.2025 passed by the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow in Securitization Application No. 314 of 2024 filed under Section 17 of Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred as "SARFAESI Act") .

3. The learned counsel for the opposite parties have raised a preliminary objection that the petitioners have got a statutory remedy of filing an appeal under Section 18 of DRT Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.

4. The learned counsel for the respondent- Union of India has relied upon a judgment dated 10.04.2025 rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PHR Invent Education Society Vs. UCO Bank and Others, in SLP(C) No. 8867 of 2022, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:- "19. Again, the case of Varimadugu OBI Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu and others, after referring to earlier judgments, this Court observed thus: 2 WRIC No. 10052 of 2025 "34. The order of the Tribunal dated 1-8-2019 was an appealable order under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the ordinary course of business, borrowers/person aggrieved was supposed to avail the statutory remedy of appeal which the law provides under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. In the absence of efficacious alternative remedy being availed, there was no reasonable justification tendered by respondent borrowers in approaching the High Court and filing writ application assailing order of the Tribunal dated 1-8-2019 under its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution without exhausting the statutory right of appeal available at its command."

20. It could thus be seen that this Court has strongly deprecated the practice of entertaining writ petitions in such matters.

21. Recently, in the case of Celir LLP (supra), after surveying various judgments of this Court, the Court observed thus: "101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even after, the decision of this Court in Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260], it appears that the High Courts have continued to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act."

22. It can thus be seen that it is more than a settled legal position of law that in such matters, the High Court should not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution particularly when an alternative statutory remedy is available.

23. The only reasoning that could be seen from the impugned order given by the learned Division Bench of the High Court is as under: "11. It is true that under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 3 WRIC No. 10052 of 2025 petitioner has the alternative remedy against the impugned order by filing appeal before the appellate Tribunal. However, having regard to the fact that the writ petition is pending before this Court for quite some time and also considering the fact that if the impugned order is allowed to stand, petitioner would be left without a remedy to ventilate his grievance, we deem it fit and proper not to non-suit the petitioner on the ground of not availing the alternative remedy.

12. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act provides that any person including a borrower who is aggrieved by the action of secured creditor under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act may file an application thereunder. Supreme Court has held time and again that the Tribunal exercises wide jurisdiction under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, even to the extent of setting aside an auction sale. In the instant case, we are consciously not referring to the merit of the case. All that we are concerned is whether for whatever reason a person who is aggrieved in law should be left remediless. In the instant case, petitioner had invoked his remedy by filing securitization application under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The application was pending for three years before the Tribunal. From the docket order dated 21.09.2020, we find that a junior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had reported that the matter was settled out of Court and therefore, leave was sought for withdrawing the securitization application which was accordingly granted.

13. When the settlement did not materialize, petitioner went back to the Tribunal for revival of the securitization application which was however dismissed on the ground that version of the petition did not deserve acceptance.

14. On thorough consideration of the matter we are of the view that dismissal of the miscellaneous application of the petitioner by the Tribunal dies not appear to be justified. 4 WRIC No. 10052 of 2025

15. Though subsequent developments may have a bearing on the grant of ultimate relief to a litigant but the same by itself cannot denude the adjudicating authority of its power to adjudicate the grievance raised by the aggrieved person which it otherwise possess."

24. It can thus clearly be seen that though it was specifically contended on behalf of the appellant herein that the writ petition was not maintainable on account of availability of alternative remedy, the High Court has interfered with the writ petition only on the ground that the matter was pending for sometime before it and if the petition was not entertained, the Borrower would be left remediless. We however find that the High Court has failed to take into consideration the conduct of the Borrower. It is further to be noted that, though the High Court had been specifically informed that, on account of subsequent developments, that is confirmation of sale and registration thereof, the position had reached an irreversible stage, the High Court has failed to take into consideration those aspects of the matter."

5. In response to the aforesaid objection, the learned counsel for the petitioners has drawn attention of this Court to the averments made in Para 4 of the writ petition wherein the petitioners have placed reliance upon a judgement in the case of Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks:1998 8 SCC 1.

6. In Whirlpool Corporation (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:- "15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are 5 WRIC No. 10052 of 2025 wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged..."

7. Since the present writ petition has not been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights, there has been no violation of principles of natural justice, neither is the order or the proceedings wholly without jurisdiction nor is the vires of any Act challenged, therefore, ratio as laid down in Whirlpool Corporation (supra) does not apply to the present case.

8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition is dismissed in view of the availability of statutory remedy of filing an appeal. . October 14, 2025 Preeti (Subhash Vidyarthi,J.) PREETI GAUTAM High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench