LUCKNOW vs Others

No.4, Shri Anil Kumar Akela, learned counsel has put in appearance on behalf of the private-respondents No.5 to 14.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioners and the private-respondents, both have exchanged their pleadings and the counter affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit filed by them is taken on record.

3. Since, the pleadings have been exchanged, accordingly, this matter is decided at the admission stage itself.

4. Under challenge is the order dated 29.04.2025 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Unnao, whereby the revision preferred by the petitioners has been rejected, as a consequence, the order passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation dated 24.04.2023 has been affirmed which in turn affirms the order dated 04.04.2022 passed by the Consolidation Officer, rejecting the application for recall on the grounds of limitation.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently urged that the three 2 WRIB No. 971 of 2025 Courts have committed a grave error in rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Act of 1963') on technical grounds. It is urged that the cause shown in the application seeking condonation of delay was substantially explained, however, a pedantic view has been taken by the three authorities, which has resulted in miscarriage of justice.

7. It is further urged that it is now too well settled that in case, if the substantial justice is pitted against technicalities, it is the cause of substantial justice which must be espoused and forwarded and this premise has been lost sight by the three Consolidation Authorities, hence, the orders are patently erroneous and deserve to be set aside.

8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon two decisions of the Apex Court in Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab, (1995) 6 SCC 614 and N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123.

9. Responding to the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the private-respondents No.5 to 14 has urged that even though the course of substantial justice must prevail over technicalities, but at the same time, it is also to be noticed that deliberate delay which gives rise certain vested rights to a party cannot be unsettled merely on the whim of a party. It is also submitted that longer the delay, the explanation for it is to be more robust. In the instant case, reference has been made to Annexure No.4, which is a copy of the recall application seeking condonation of delay of an order dated 07.01.2002, which was moved on 27.01.2020 that is to say after eighteen years and in this context, if the explanation as furnished in the said application is perused, it would reveal that let alone a sufficient cause, no cause at all has been shown. It is, thus, urged that the three Consolidation Authorities after considering the matter at length have delivered their orders which cannot be said to be either arbitrary or without jurisdiction or patently erroneous for this Court to exercise its power under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India and for the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

11. The Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused 3 WRIB No. 971 of 2025 the material available on record.

12. As far as the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are concerned, suffice to state that in Nand Kishore (supra) the issue was not in respect of condonation of delay. Moreover, the decision would indicate that the said order was passed by the Apex Court categorically noting in Para-13 of the said report that the said order was passed in exceptional circumstances and in view thereof, the powers under Article 136 are all pervading and an order passed under exceptional circumstances would be in the nature of an order under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which does not make it as a binding precedent. Thus, for the aforesaid reason, the said decision in Nand Kishore (supra) does not come to the aid of the petitioners.

13. As far as the other decision in N. Balakrishnan (supra) is concerned, it is not disputed that the proposition laid down therein clearly indicates that it is not the length of delay which is material, but it is the sufficiency of cause. In the said decision, it was also noticed by the Apex Court that in case, even if there is huge delay, but the cause has been appropriately explained, such delay can be condoned, but its converse is, even where there is a short delay, but not adequately explained it may be fatal.

14. It is this proposition which is to be applied in the instant case and now in the backdrop of the proposition noticed above, it will be appropriate to take a look at the application moved by the petitioners seeking condonation of delay and recall of the order dated 07.01.2002, which has been brought on record, as Annexure No.4.

15. The said application dated 27.01.2020, in Para-5 mentions casually that in January, 2020, the petitioners came to know about the order and thereafter on 27.01.2020, the application for recall has been moved. For the purposes of clarity, it will be appropriate to reproduce Para-3 to 7 of the said application and the same reads as under:- "धारा-3 यह िक उपरो्व वाद में हम ्ऺाथर्गणों को व िवप्षी संख्या-8, 9 व 10 को कोई वैधािनक सूचना नहीं दी गयी और न ्ऺाथर् को आकार प्ऴ 23 बन गया व 45 भी बन गया और कब्जा भी दे िदया गया और उसी ्ऺकार से कािबज व 4 WRIB No. 971 of 2025 दखील घले आ रहे है। धारा-4 यह िक िववािदत भूिम का इन््शाज तब से बराबर चला आ रहा है तथा कब्जा भी चला आ रहा है और चू ंिक ्ऺाथर्गण कब्जा म चला आ रहा है इसिलए कोई इन्तखाब भी नहीं ली। धारा-5 यह िक बमाह जनवरी 2020 में िवप्षी संख्या 1 ता 7 ने िववािदत खाते की भूिम में जो हम ्ऺाथर्गणो के नाम अंिकत थी कब्जा करने के िलए ्ऺयास िकया और यह कहा िक हमारा िहस्सा कायम हो चुका है तथा हमारा नाम भी चढ़ चुका है। धारा-6 यह िक िदनांक 22.01.2020 को लेखपाल से िमला तब इन्ताख ्ऺाप्त की तो उनके नाम अंिकत होने का तथ्य ्ऺकाश में आया। धारा-7 यह िक इन्तखाब लेने के उपरान्त ्ऺाथर्गणो ने उन्नाव आकर वकील से िमले और कागजात का मुआइना कराया तब िदनांक 25.01.2020 को इन सभी मुकदमो की जानकारी हुयी।"

16. It is in this backdrop, from a perusal of the material on record, it would indicate that there has been no real attempt on the part of the petitioners to explain a delay of eighteen years. It is true that where cause has been sufficiently explained, the Court is vested with powers to condone the delay, but it is equally true that the delay is not to be condoned in a routine manner or as an act of generosity. The longer the delay, the heavier is the onus to explain the sufficiency of cause and consequently it was incumbent upon the petitioners to have explained it cogently. From a perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs, it would indicate that there is hardly any cause explained rather just a vague averment has been made that in the month of January, 2020 the petitioners became aware and thereafter the application has been moved on 27.01.2020.

17. At this stage, it will also be relevant to refer to a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, wherein the entire law on the sufficient cause and limitation has been reviewed by the Apex Court and it has been held that it is not only for the period after the limitation expires that cause has to be shown and explained, but it is also to be explained from the date the limitation starts to run and the bonafides of 5 WRIB No. 971 of 2025 the applicant relating to what steps were taken during the period of limitation.

18. This Court is reminded of another decision of the Apex Court in the case of H. Guruswamy & Ors. v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, wherein the Apex Court has reiterated and re-visited the principles upon which an application for condonation of delay is to be tested in Paras 13 to 17 reads as under:- "13. We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the concepts such as "liberal approach", "Justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation.

14. We are constrained to observe that the High Court has exhibited complete absence of judicial conscience and restraints, which a judge is expected to maintain while adjudicating a lis between the parties.

15. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.

16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non- deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to 6 WRIB No. 971 of 2025 be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time."

19. In this background, it would reveal that there is hardly any statement made in the application seeking condonation of delay. The issue relates to the proceedings initiated under the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 (for short, 'the Act of 1953') and it is also not disputed that on the date when the said application for recall was moved i.e. on 27.01.2020, the notification under Section 52 of the Act of 1953 had been published long ago and had it not been for moving an application for condonation of delay, the Consolidation Authorities loose their jurisdiction after the notification of Section 52 of the Act of 1953.

20. It is taking note of the aforesaid circumstances including the material available on record which indicates that the petitioner No.2 himself participated in the proceedings, but at a later stage, stopped appearing, as a consequence, the impugned orders though ex parte dated 07.01.2002 was passed.

21. There is no explanation in this regard rather it is not even indicated that once Ram Khilawan himself had participated in the proceedings then what was the cause which prevented him from appearing in the proceedings thereafter coupled with the fact that once the order impugned dated 07.01.2002 was passed and subsequent thereto, the notification under Section 52 of the Act of 1953 was published even then what was 7 WRIB No. 971 of 2025 the explanation, which prevented the petitioners to move an appropriate application within time or the cause which prevented the petitioners to move the application after eighteen years.

22. In absence of cogent explanation, the cause cannot be treated to be sufficient and merely to cover up the period of eighteen years of delay, a futile attempt has been made in a cavalier manner. Accordingly, taking note of the aforesaid propositions including the decision of the Apex Court in Shivamma (supra) and H. Guruswamy (supra) the reasoning given by the three Consolidation Authorities, this Court does not find that there is any palpable error committed by the three authorities in rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Act of 1963. Hence, for all the aforesaid reasons, the petition is devoid of merits and it is dismissed at the admission stage itself. October 15, 2025 Rakesh/- (Jaspreet Singh,J.) RAKESH PRAJAPAT High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

No.4, Shri Anil Kumar Akela, learned counsel has put in appearance on behalf of the private-respondents No.5 to 14.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioners and the private-respondents, both have exchanged their pleadings and the counter affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit filed by them is taken on record.

3. Since, the pleadings have been exchanged, accordingly, this matter is decided at the admission stage itself.

4. Under challenge is the order dated 29.04.2025 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Unnao, whereby the revision preferred by the petitioners has been rejected, as a consequence, the order passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation dated 24.04.2023 has been affirmed which in turn affirms the order dated 04.04.2022 passed by the Consolidation Officer, rejecting the application for recall on the grounds of limitation.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently urged that the three 2 WRIB No. 971 of 2025 Courts have committed a grave error in rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Act of 1963') on technical grounds. It is urged that the cause shown in the application seeking condonation of delay was substantially explained, however, a pedantic view has been taken by the three authorities, which has resulted in miscarriage of justice.

7. It is further urged that it is now too well settled that in case, if the substantial justice is pitted against technicalities, it is the cause of substantial justice which must be espoused and forwarded and this premise has been lost sight by the three Consolidation Authorities, hence, the orders are patently erroneous and deserve to be set aside.

8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon two decisions of the Apex Court in Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab, (1995) 6 SCC 614 and N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123.

9. Responding to the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the private-respondents No.5 to 14 has urged that even though the course of substantial justice must prevail over technicalities, but at the same time, it is also to be noticed that deliberate delay which gives rise certain vested rights to a party cannot be unsettled merely on the whim of a party. It is also submitted that longer the delay, the explanation for it is to be more robust. In the instant case, reference has been made to Annexure No.4, which is a copy of the recall application seeking condonation of delay of an order dated 07.01.2002, which was moved on 27.01.2020 that is to say after eighteen years and in this context, if the explanation as furnished in the said application is perused, it would reveal that let alone a sufficient cause, no cause at all has been shown. It is, thus, urged that the three Consolidation Authorities after considering the matter at length have delivered their orders which cannot be said to be either arbitrary or without jurisdiction or patently erroneous for this Court to exercise its power under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India and for the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

11. The Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused 3 WRIB No. 971 of 2025 the material available on record.

12. As far as the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are concerned, suffice to state that in Nand Kishore (supra) the issue was not in respect of condonation of delay. Moreover, the decision would indicate that the said order was passed by the Apex Court categorically noting in Para-13 of the said report that the said order was passed in exceptional circumstances and in view thereof, the powers under Article 136 are all pervading and an order passed under exceptional circumstances would be in the nature of an order under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which does not make it as a binding precedent. Thus, for the aforesaid reason, the said decision in Nand Kishore (supra) does not come to the aid of the petitioners.

13. As far as the other decision in N. Balakrishnan (supra) is concerned, it is not disputed that the proposition laid down therein clearly indicates that it is not the length of delay which is material, but it is the sufficiency of cause. In the said decision, it was also noticed by the Apex Court that in case, even if there is huge delay, but the cause has been appropriately explained, such delay can be condoned, but its converse is, even where there is a short delay, but not adequately explained it may be fatal.

14. It is this proposition which is to be applied in the instant case and now in the backdrop of the proposition noticed above, it will be appropriate to take a look at the application moved by the petitioners seeking condonation of delay and recall of the order dated 07.01.2002, which has been brought on record, as Annexure No.4.

15. The said application dated 27.01.2020, in Para-5 mentions casually that in January, 2020, the petitioners came to know about the order and thereafter on 27.01.2020, the application for recall has been moved. For the purposes of clarity, it will be appropriate to reproduce Para-3 to 7 of the said application and the same reads as under:- "धारा-3 यह िक उपरो्व वाद में हम ्ऺाथर्गणों को व िवप्षी संख्या-8, 9 व 10 को कोई वैधािनक सूचना नहीं दी गयी और न ्ऺाथर् को आकार प्ऴ 23 बन गया व 45 भी बन गया और कब्जा भी दे िदया गया और उसी ्ऺकार से कािबज व 4 WRIB No. 971 of 2025 दखील घले आ रहे है। धारा-4 यह िक िववािदत भूिम का इन््शाज तब से बराबर चला आ रहा है तथा कब्जा भी चला आ रहा है और चू ंिक ्ऺाथर्गण कब्जा म चला आ रहा है इसिलए कोई इन्तखाब भी नहीं ली। धारा-5 यह िक बमाह जनवरी 2020 में िवप्षी संख्या 1 ता 7 ने िववािदत खाते की भूिम में जो हम ्ऺाथर्गणो के नाम अंिकत थी कब्जा करने के िलए ्ऺयास िकया और यह कहा िक हमारा िहस्सा कायम हो चुका है तथा हमारा नाम भी चढ़ चुका है। धारा-6 यह िक िदनांक 22.01.2020 को लेखपाल से िमला तब इन्ताख ्ऺाप्त की तो उनके नाम अंिकत होने का तथ्य ्ऺकाश में आया। धारा-7 यह िक इन्तखाब लेने के उपरान्त ्ऺाथर्गणो ने उन्नाव आकर वकील से िमले और कागजात का मुआइना कराया तब िदनांक 25.01.2020 को इन सभी मुकदमो की जानकारी हुयी।"

16. It is in this backdrop, from a perusal of the material on record, it would indicate that there has been no real attempt on the part of the petitioners to explain a delay of eighteen years. It is true that where cause has been sufficiently explained, the Court is vested with powers to condone the delay, but it is equally true that the delay is not to be condoned in a routine manner or as an act of generosity. The longer the delay, the heavier is the onus to explain the sufficiency of cause and consequently it was incumbent upon the petitioners to have explained it cogently. From a perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs, it would indicate that there is hardly any cause explained rather just a vague averment has been made that in the month of January, 2020 the petitioners became aware and thereafter the application has been moved on 27.01.2020.

17. At this stage, it will also be relevant to refer to a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, wherein the entire law on the sufficient cause and limitation has been reviewed by the Apex Court and it has been held that it is not only for the period after the limitation expires that cause has to be shown and explained, but it is also to be explained from the date the limitation starts to run and the bonafides of 5 WRIB No. 971 of 2025 the applicant relating to what steps were taken during the period of limitation.

18. This Court is reminded of another decision of the Apex Court in the case of H. Guruswamy & Ors. v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, wherein the Apex Court has reiterated and re-visited the principles upon which an application for condonation of delay is to be tested in Paras 13 to 17 reads as under:- "13. We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the concepts such as "liberal approach", "Justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation.

14. We are constrained to observe that the High Court has exhibited complete absence of judicial conscience and restraints, which a judge is expected to maintain while adjudicating a lis between the parties.

15. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.

16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non- deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to 6 WRIB No. 971 of 2025 be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time."

19. In this background, it would reveal that there is hardly any statement made in the application seeking condonation of delay. The issue relates to the proceedings initiated under the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 (for short, 'the Act of 1953') and it is also not disputed that on the date when the said application for recall was moved i.e. on 27.01.2020, the notification under Section 52 of the Act of 1953 had been published long ago and had it not been for moving an application for condonation of delay, the Consolidation Authorities loose their jurisdiction after the notification of Section 52 of the Act of 1953.

20. It is taking note of the aforesaid circumstances including the material available on record which indicates that the petitioner No.2 himself participated in the proceedings, but at a later stage, stopped appearing, as a consequence, the impugned orders though ex parte dated 07.01.2002 was passed.

21. There is no explanation in this regard rather it is not even indicated that once Ram Khilawan himself had participated in the proceedings then what was the cause which prevented him from appearing in the proceedings thereafter coupled with the fact that once the order impugned dated 07.01.2002 was passed and subsequent thereto, the notification under Section 52 of the Act of 1953 was published even then what was 7 WRIB No. 971 of 2025 the explanation, which prevented the petitioners to move an appropriate application within time or the cause which prevented the petitioners to move the application after eighteen years.

22. In absence of cogent explanation, the cause cannot be treated to be sufficient and merely to cover up the period of eighteen years of delay, a futile attempt has been made in a cavalier manner. Accordingly, taking note of the aforesaid propositions including the decision of the Apex Court in Shivamma (supra) and H. Guruswamy (supra) the reasoning given by the three Consolidation Authorities, this Court does not find that there is any palpable error committed by the three authorities in rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Act of 1963. Hence, for all the aforesaid reasons, the petition is devoid of merits and it is dismissed at the admission stage itself. October 15, 2025 Rakesh/- (Jaspreet Singh,J.) RAKESH PRAJAPAT High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench