U.P. Zila Niravachan Adhikari Panchayat Lakhimpur Kheri And Another v. Punjab Tent House Thru. Harvansh Singh Bagga

3. Sri Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary, learned counsel for the review-applicant contends that as the respondents had also filed a Special Leave to Appeal No. 19846 of 2025 against the judgment and order of this Court dated

07.04.2025 as such, the delay can be counted from the date the Apex Court dismissed the Special Leave to Appeal filed by the respondents and then the delay at most would be of 18 days.

4. The Court is of the view that considering the aforesaid, the delay can be condoned .

5. However, Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mohd. Aslam Khan, learned counsel for the respondents has argued that 2 CMRAD No. 156 of 2025 the short delay of approximately 20 days from the date the Special Leave to Appeal was dismissed may not be construed to be of such a large period but still the same cannot be condoned.

6. He raises an objection that in the review application it has been contended in ground (F) that this Court has over looked the fact that the decree dated 19.10.2016 was passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kheri despite pendency of Civil Revision No. 65 of 2014 before this Court challenging the refusal to implead the State Election Commission and that the "pendency of such proceedings" as indicated in the review application is material concealment of fact.

7. Elaborating the same, Sri Khan has indicated that the aforesaid Civil Revision No. 65 of 2014 has been dismissed for want of prosecution on

07.03.2024 and thus it is apparent that the review application has been filed with material concealment of facts inasmuch as once the civil revision had already been dismissed consequently, there was no occasion for the Court to have considered the "pendency" of the civil revision as has been urged in ground (F) of the review application.

8. The other objection as taken by Sri Khan is that in the application for condonation of delay it has been indicated in paragraphs 27 & 28 that the recall application has been filed against the Civil Revision No. 65 of 2014 (which was dismissed for want of prosecution on 07.03.2024) and that the same is pending before this Court. He contends that the affidavit supporting the review application is dated 18.09.2025 at 0315 PM and as of said date, the recall application had not been filed.

9. The Court has checked up the filing of the said recall application which is numbered as I.A.No. 04 of 2025 and as per the computer report, the said application has been filed on 22.09.2025 and thus it is apparent that the affidavit indicating the aforesaid filing of the recall application which affidavit is dated 18.09.2025 is patently false.

10. Responding Sri Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary, learned counsel for the review-applicant has argued that as per information made available by the learned counsel who filed the application for recall namely Sri Rohit Tripathi, Advocate in Civil Revision No. 65 of 2014, the affidavit was 3 CMRAD No. 156 of 2025 sworn on 18.09.2025 at 1120 AM and had also been filed on the said day but certain defects had been indicated with the result that defects could only be removed subsequently. Thus, the computer report of the application having been filed on 22.09.2025. Sri Chaudhary has fairly submitted that application was registered in the Registry on 19.09.2025 with Diary No. 5030 of 2025.

11. From a perusal of averments made in the application of condonation of delay, it emerges that a specific averment has been made in paragraphs 27 & 28 of the application of condonation of delay that a recall application has been filed in the civil revision. The affidavit itself is dated

18.09.2025 but from the computer report it emerges that the said recall application has been filed on 22.09.2025. Even as per Sri Chaudhary the application was registered in the Registry on 19.09.2025. It was in the fitness of things that once a specific averment had been made in the application for condonation of delay the facts which subsequently came to the knowledge of the learned counsel for the review-applicant regarding certain defects having been noted in the recall application, could have been indicated by means of a supplementary affidavit indicating the aforesaid facts in order to show his bonafide. It is only when the learned counsel for the respondents has taken the aforesaid objection that a plea is now sought to be taken of the application for recall having been filed and certain defects having been noted. This does not indicate the bonafide on the part of the applicant initially averring something and thereafter upon an objection being taken by the other side, indicating the contrary.

12. Considering the aforesaid it is apparent that the application for condonation of delay has not been filed bonafidely rather filed by concealment of facts. Thus the application for condonation of delay is rejected.

13. However, on the insistence of the learned counsel for the review- applicant to also consider the grounds as raised in the review application, the Court proceeds to consider the grounds also. Order on memo of the review application

1. Heard Sri Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary, Advocate assisted by Sri Rajni 4 CMRAD No. 156 of 2025 Kant Pandey, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the review-applicant and Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Mohd. Aslam Khan, Advocate who has put in appearance on behalf of the respondents no. 1 & 2.

2. Instant review application has been filed praying for review of the judgment and order dated 07.04.2025 passed in First Appeal No. 60 of 2016 Inre; Up Zila Nirvanchan Adhikari Panchayat L.Kheri and Ors Vs. Punjab Tent House Bus Station Road, L.Kheri and ors. By the said order, this Court had dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants/review applicants herein.

3. Instant review application has been filed on various grounds. The Court finds that admittedly against the judgment and order of this Court dated

07.04.2025, the review-applicants had filed Special Leave to Appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide Special Leave to Appeal No. 19846 of 2025 Inre; Up Zila Nirvachan Adhikari (Panchayat) Lakhimpur Kheri and anr Vs. Punjab Tent House and Ors. The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 01.08.2025, a copy of which is annexure 1 to the review-application has observed that "We do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed."

4. Thus, it is apparent that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not found any ground to interfere with the judgment as passed by this Court and consequently, there cannot be any occasion for this Court to find errors in the judgment of this Court on the grounds as indicated by the review- applicant in the instant review application.

5. However, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the review-applicants has argued that considering the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited (Now known as Khoday India Limited) and Ors Vs. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal (Under Liquidation) Represented by Liquidator- (2019) 4 SCC 376 more particularly paragraphs 26 to 29 as the Apex Court has not assigned any reasons while dismissing the Special Leave to Appeal consequently, it cannot be said that the judgment of this Court has merged with the order passed by the Apex Court and as such, 5 CMRAD No. 156 of 2025 the review-application would be maintainable.

6. For the sake of convenience, the relevant observations of the Apex Court in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited (supra) are reproduced below:-

26. From a cumulative reading of the various judgments, we sum up the legal position as under: 26.1. The conclusions rendered by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Kunhayammed [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359] and summed up in para 44 are affirmed and reiterated. 26.2. We reiterate the conclusions relevant for these cases as under : (Kunhayammed case [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359] , SCC p. 384) “(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. (vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation. (vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.” 26.3. Once we hold that the law laid down in Kunhayammed [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359] is to be followed, it will not make any difference whether the review petition was filed before the filing of special leave petition or was filed after the dismissal of special leave petition. Such a situation is covered in para 37 of Kunhayammed case [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359] . 27. Applying the aforesaid principles, the outcome of these appeals would be as under. Civil appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 490 of 2012 28. In the instant case, since special leave petition was dismissed in limine without giving any reasons, the review petition filed by the appellant in the 6 CMRAD No. 156 of 2025 High Court would be maintainable and should have been decided on merits. Order dated 12-11-2008 [Sri Mahadeswara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd. v. Khoday Distilleries Ltd., 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 824] passed by the High Court is accordingly set aside and matter is remanded back to the High Court for deciding the review petition on merits. The civil appeal is disposed of accordingly. Civil appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 13792 of 2013 29. In this case, we find that the special leave petition was dismissed with the following order passed on 5-1-2012 [Ram Krushna Dasmohapatra v. Indian Tea Provisions, 2012 SCC OnLine SC 1183] : “We find no ground to interfere with the impugned order [Indian Tea Provisions v. Ram Krushna Dasmohapatra, Writ Appeal No. 367 of 2011, decided on 27-10-2011 (Ori)] . The special leave petition is dismissed.” leave petition was dismissed [Ram Krushna Here also, Dasmohapatra v. Indian Tea Provisions, 2012 SCC OnLine SC 1183] in limine and without any speaking order. After the dismissal of the special leave petition, the respondent in this appeal had approached the High Court with review petition. The said review petition is allowed by passing order dated 12- 12-2012 [Ram Krushna Dasmohapatra v. Indian Tea Provisions, Review Petition No. 74 of 2012, order dated 12-12-2012 (Ori)] on the ground of suppression of material facts by the appellant herein and commission of fraud on the Court. Such a review petition was maintainable. Therefore, the High Court was empowered to entertain the same on merits. Insofar as appeal of the appellant challenging [Ram Krushna Dasmohapatra v. Indian Tea Provisions, Review Petition No. 74 of 2012, order dated 12-12-2012 (Ori)] on merits is concerned, the matter shall be placed before the regular Board to decide the same. the order dated 12-12-2012 the special

7. From a perusal of paragraph 26. 2 (v) it emerges that if the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order i.e gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications namely (a) the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and (b) other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto.

8. As already indicated above, a perusal of the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 01.08.2025 indicates that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has specifically indicated that it has not found any grounds to interfere with the judgment passed by this Court and has thereafter dismissed the Special Leave to Appeal.

9. However, learned counsel for the review-applicants submits that paragraph 29 of the judgment of Khoday Distilleries Limited (supra) would be relevant wherein despite a similar order having been passed by 7 CMRAD No. 156 of 2025 the Hon'ble Supreme Court i.e Hon'ble Supreme Court having dismissed the Special Leave to Petition by indicating that it did not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order yet as the High Court had entertained the review application filed by the respondents in the said appeal before the High Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the said review petition was maintainable.

10. A perusal of paragraph 29 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited (supra) would indicate that a review application was filed alleging that there was suppression of material facts and commission of fraud and, therefore, the review application was entertained by the High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has thus held that, therefore, the High Court was empowered to entertain the same on merits.

11. Sri Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary, learned counsel for the review- applicants fairly states that there is no allegation of fraud and misrepresentation being committed by the respondents herein at the time when the judgment was passed by this Court. Thus, it is apparent that even the said observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court may not be available to entertain this instant-review application.

12. However, Sri Chaudhary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the review-applicant has argued on the grounds as indicated in the review application but primarily has confined himself to ground (F) that this Court has over looked the fact that the decree dated 19.02.2016 was passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kheri despite the pendency of the Civil Revision No. 65 of 2014 and the pendency of such proceedings was a material fact which ought to have been considered by this Court.

13. As already indicated above, yet at the risk of the repetition, it is indicated that on the date when the first appeal was decided by this Court i.e 07.04.2025, the Civil Revision No. 65 of 2014 was no longer pending having already been dismissed on 07.03.2024 and as such, in the absence of pendency of the civil revision on the said date, there was no occasion for this Court to have examined the same. Thus, the said ground is rejected. 8 CMRAD No. 156 of 2025

13. The other grounds as urged in the review application are found to be grounds per which the applicant/appellant in the first appeal wants to re- argue the matter which is impermissible keeping in view the settled proposition of law in this regard. (See:- Malleeswari Vs. K. Suguna and Anr passd in Special Leave to Petition (C) No. 12787 of 2025 decided on 08.09.2025).

14. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, the instant review application is rejected. September 23, 2025 Pachhere/- (Abdul Moin,J.) SATYENDRA SINGH PACHHERE High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

3. Sri Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary, learned counsel for the review-applicant contends that as the respondents had also filed a Special Leave to Appeal No. 19846 of 2025 against the judgment and order of this Court dated

07.04.2025 as such, the delay can be counted from the date the Apex Court dismissed the Special Leave to Appeal filed by the respondents and then the delay at most would be of 18 days.

4. The Court is of the view that considering the aforesaid, the delay can be condoned .

5. However, Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mohd. Aslam Khan, learned counsel for the respondents has argued that 2 CMRAD No. 156 of 2025 the short delay of approximately 20 days from the date the Special Leave to Appeal was dismissed may not be construed to be of such a large period but still the same cannot be condoned.

6. He raises an objection that in the review application it has been contended in ground (F) that this Court has over looked the fact that the decree dated 19.10.2016 was passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kheri despite pendency of Civil Revision No. 65 of 2014 before this Court challenging the refusal to implead the State Election Commission and that the "pendency of such proceedings" as indicated in the review application is material concealment of fact.

7. Elaborating the same, Sri Khan has indicated that the aforesaid Civil Revision No. 65 of 2014 has been dismissed for want of prosecution on

07.03.2024 and thus it is apparent that the review application has been filed with material concealment of facts inasmuch as once the civil revision had already been dismissed consequently, there was no occasion for the Court to have considered the "pendency" of the civil revision as has been urged in ground (F) of the review application.

8. The other objection as taken by Sri Khan is that in the application for condonation of delay it has been indicated in paragraphs 27 & 28 that the recall application has been filed against the Civil Revision No. 65 of 2014 (which was dismissed for want of prosecution on 07.03.2024) and that the same is pending before this Court. He contends that the affidavit supporting the review application is dated 18.09.2025 at 0315 PM and as of said date, the recall application had not been filed.

9. The Court has checked up the filing of the said recall application which is numbered as I.A.No. 04 of 2025 and as per the computer report, the said application has been filed on 22.09.2025 and thus it is apparent that the affidavit indicating the aforesaid filing of the recall application which affidavit is dated 18.09.2025 is patently false.

10. Responding Sri Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary, learned counsel for the review-applicant has argued that as per information made available by the learned counsel who filed the application for recall namely Sri Rohit Tripathi, Advocate in Civil Revision No. 65 of 2014, the affidavit was 3 CMRAD No. 156 of 2025 sworn on 18.09.2025 at 1120 AM and had also been filed on the said day but certain defects had been indicated with the result that defects could only be removed subsequently. Thus, the computer report of the application having been filed on 22.09.2025. Sri Chaudhary has fairly submitted that application was registered in the Registry on 19.09.2025 with Diary No. 5030 of 2025.

11. From a perusal of averments made in the application of condonation of delay, it emerges that a specific averment has been made in paragraphs 27 & 28 of the application of condonation of delay that a recall application has been filed in the civil revision. The affidavit itself is dated

18.09.2025 but from the computer report it emerges that the said recall application has been filed on 22.09.2025. Even as per Sri Chaudhary the application was registered in the Registry on 19.09.2025. It was in the fitness of things that once a specific averment had been made in the application for condonation of delay the facts which subsequently came to the knowledge of the learned counsel for the review-applicant regarding certain defects having been noted in the recall application, could have been indicated by means of a supplementary affidavit indicating the aforesaid facts in order to show his bonafide. It is only when the learned counsel for the respondents has taken the aforesaid objection that a plea is now sought to be taken of the application for recall having been filed and certain defects having been noted. This does not indicate the bonafide on the part of the applicant initially averring something and thereafter upon an objection being taken by the other side, indicating the contrary.

12. Considering the aforesaid it is apparent that the application for condonation of delay has not been filed bonafidely rather filed by concealment of facts. Thus the application for condonation of delay is rejected.

13. However, on the insistence of the learned counsel for the review- applicant to also consider the grounds as raised in the review application, the Court proceeds to consider the grounds also. Order on memo of the review application

1. Heard Sri Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary, Advocate assisted by Sri Rajni 4 CMRAD No. 156 of 2025 Kant Pandey, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the review-applicant and Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Mohd. Aslam Khan, Advocate who has put in appearance on behalf of the respondents no. 1 & 2.

2. Instant review application has been filed praying for review of the judgment and order dated 07.04.2025 passed in First Appeal No. 60 of 2016 Inre; Up Zila Nirvanchan Adhikari Panchayat L.Kheri and Ors Vs. Punjab Tent House Bus Station Road, L.Kheri and ors. By the said order, this Court had dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants/review applicants herein.

3. Instant review application has been filed on various grounds. The Court finds that admittedly against the judgment and order of this Court dated

07.04.2025, the review-applicants had filed Special Leave to Appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide Special Leave to Appeal No. 19846 of 2025 Inre; Up Zila Nirvachan Adhikari (Panchayat) Lakhimpur Kheri and anr Vs. Punjab Tent House and Ors. The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 01.08.2025, a copy of which is annexure 1 to the review-application has observed that "We do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed."

4. Thus, it is apparent that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not found any ground to interfere with the judgment as passed by this Court and consequently, there cannot be any occasion for this Court to find errors in the judgment of this Court on the grounds as indicated by the review- applicant in the instant review application.

5. However, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the review-applicants has argued that considering the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited (Now known as Khoday India Limited) and Ors Vs. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal (Under Liquidation) Represented by Liquidator- (2019) 4 SCC 376 more particularly paragraphs 26 to 29 as the Apex Court has not assigned any reasons while dismissing the Special Leave to Appeal consequently, it cannot be said that the judgment of this Court has merged with the order passed by the Apex Court and as such, 5 CMRAD No. 156 of 2025 the review-application would be maintainable.

6. For the sake of convenience, the relevant observations of the Apex Court in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited (supra) are reproduced below:-

26. From a cumulative reading of the various judgments, we sum up the legal position as under: 26.1. The conclusions rendered by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Kunhayammed [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359] and summed up in para 44 are affirmed and reiterated. 26.2. We reiterate the conclusions relevant for these cases as under : (Kunhayammed case [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359] , SCC p. 384) “(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. (vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation. (vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.” 26.3. Once we hold that the law laid down in Kunhayammed [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359] is to be followed, it will not make any difference whether the review petition was filed before the filing of special leave petition or was filed after the dismissal of special leave petition. Such a situation is covered in para 37 of Kunhayammed case [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359] . 27. Applying the aforesaid principles, the outcome of these appeals would be as under. Civil appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 490 of 2012 28. In the instant case, since special leave petition was dismissed in limine without giving any reasons, the review petition filed by the appellant in the 6 CMRAD No. 156 of 2025 High Court would be maintainable and should have been decided on merits. Order dated 12-11-2008 [Sri Mahadeswara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd. v. Khoday Distilleries Ltd., 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 824] passed by the High Court is accordingly set aside and matter is remanded back to the High Court for deciding the review petition on merits. The civil appeal is disposed of accordingly. Civil appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 13792 of 2013 29. In this case, we find that the special leave petition was dismissed with the following order passed on 5-1-2012 [Ram Krushna Dasmohapatra v. Indian Tea Provisions, 2012 SCC OnLine SC 1183] : “We find no ground to interfere with the impugned order [Indian Tea Provisions v. Ram Krushna Dasmohapatra, Writ Appeal No. 367 of 2011, decided on 27-10-2011 (Ori)] . The special leave petition is dismissed.” leave petition was dismissed [Ram Krushna Here also, Dasmohapatra v. Indian Tea Provisions, 2012 SCC OnLine SC 1183] in limine and without any speaking order. After the dismissal of the special leave petition, the respondent in this appeal had approached the High Court with review petition. The said review petition is allowed by passing order dated 12- 12-2012 [Ram Krushna Dasmohapatra v. Indian Tea Provisions, Review Petition No. 74 of 2012, order dated 12-12-2012 (Ori)] on the ground of suppression of material facts by the appellant herein and commission of fraud on the Court. Such a review petition was maintainable. Therefore, the High Court was empowered to entertain the same on merits. Insofar as appeal of the appellant challenging [Ram Krushna Dasmohapatra v. Indian Tea Provisions, Review Petition No. 74 of 2012, order dated 12-12-2012 (Ori)] on merits is concerned, the matter shall be placed before the regular Board to decide the same. the order dated 12-12-2012 the special

7. From a perusal of paragraph 26. 2 (v) it emerges that if the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order i.e gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications namely (a) the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and (b) other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto.

8. As already indicated above, a perusal of the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 01.08.2025 indicates that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has specifically indicated that it has not found any grounds to interfere with the judgment passed by this Court and has thereafter dismissed the Special Leave to Appeal.

9. However, learned counsel for the review-applicants submits that paragraph 29 of the judgment of Khoday Distilleries Limited (supra) would be relevant wherein despite a similar order having been passed by 7 CMRAD No. 156 of 2025 the Hon'ble Supreme Court i.e Hon'ble Supreme Court having dismissed the Special Leave to Petition by indicating that it did not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order yet as the High Court had entertained the review application filed by the respondents in the said appeal before the High Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the said review petition was maintainable.

10. A perusal of paragraph 29 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited (supra) would indicate that a review application was filed alleging that there was suppression of material facts and commission of fraud and, therefore, the review application was entertained by the High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has thus held that, therefore, the High Court was empowered to entertain the same on merits.

11. Sri Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary, learned counsel for the review- applicants fairly states that there is no allegation of fraud and misrepresentation being committed by the respondents herein at the time when the judgment was passed by this Court. Thus, it is apparent that even the said observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court may not be available to entertain this instant-review application.

12. However, Sri Chaudhary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the review-applicant has argued on the grounds as indicated in the review application but primarily has confined himself to ground (F) that this Court has over looked the fact that the decree dated 19.02.2016 was passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kheri despite the pendency of the Civil Revision No. 65 of 2014 and the pendency of such proceedings was a material fact which ought to have been considered by this Court.

13. As already indicated above, yet at the risk of the repetition, it is indicated that on the date when the first appeal was decided by this Court i.e 07.04.2025, the Civil Revision No. 65 of 2014 was no longer pending having already been dismissed on 07.03.2024 and as such, in the absence of pendency of the civil revision on the said date, there was no occasion for this Court to have examined the same. Thus, the said ground is rejected. 8 CMRAD No. 156 of 2025

13. The other grounds as urged in the review application are found to be grounds per which the applicant/appellant in the first appeal wants to re- argue the matter which is impermissible keeping in view the settled proposition of law in this regard. (See:- Malleeswari Vs. K. Suguna and Anr passd in Special Leave to Petition (C) No. 12787 of 2025 decided on 08.09.2025).

14. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, the instant review application is rejected. September 23, 2025 Pachhere/- (Abdul Moin,J.) SATYENDRA SINGH PACHHERE High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench