Sudarshan Kaur vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of Revenue,

1. Heard Shri Ratnesh Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Standing Counsel for respondents no. 1 to 4 and Shri Pankaj Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent no.5.

2. The proceedings for cancellation of patta initiated against the mother of the petitioner, has been assailed in the present case.

3. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that her mother, namely, Shanti Devi, wife of Khairati Lal was granted patta some time on 28.3.1987 of Gata No. 145 area 0.548 hectare, Gata No. 153, area

2.384 hectare and Gata No. 690 area 0.93 hectare, total of three plots and the same was also recorded in the Khetauni pertaining to Fasli year 1394 to 1399.

4. It has further been submitted hat the Area Lekhpal submitted a report on 25.01.1988 stating that the petitioner was not eligible for grant of patta in Gram Sabha according to the petitioner proceedings under Section 198(4), U.op. Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950 were initiated against the mother of the petitioner. It seems that the notices were issued but no appearance was made on behalf of the mother of the petitioner and accordingly the Additional Collector, Bahraich dated 31.12.2003 cancelled the patta of Shanti Devi, mother of the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter has filed an appeal against the order dated 31.12.2003, before the Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda in the year 2021, which has been rejected by 2 WRIC No. 9228 of 2025 means of the impugned order dated 16.12.2024 on the ground of limitation.

5. The petitioner in his application for condonation of delay has stated that he had contacted a lawyer on 4.12.2011 and giving all the papers but the appeal was not filed and in the meanwhile the said counsel died and when the petitioner went on 12.6.2021 she obtained the papers and engaged the new counsel in pursuance of which, the appeal was preferred. It is noticed that the certified copy of the impugned order dated 31.12.2003 was obtained in the year 2011 and after a period of 10 years when the appeal was not filed, on query is being made by the petitioner in fact the appeal has not yet been filed. There is no material on record to believe that the petitioner had engaged Kailash Nath Srivastava as his counsel or that he has died in the meanwhile.

6. Apart from the above, the laxity on the part of the petitioner is writ large, in as much as, in the year 2011 he had engaged the counsel efforts made by the petitioner to contact the counsel only after 10 years that is in the year 2021. There is no explanation why for 10 years he did not pursue the litigation and chose to keep silent. I also do not find any material with regard to delay from the date of passing of the order i.e.

31.12.2003 till 4.12.2011 which is nearly 7 years. No explanation with regard to the delay of 7 years has even canvassed by the petitioner.

7. In this context, reliance is placed on Shivamma Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that condonation of dely is not a matter of right and can be granted only on a bonafide and satisfactory explanation. Vague or casual reasons, negligence, or lack of due diligence cannot constitute sufficient cause, and judicial discretion must be exercised sparingly to preserve the finality of the proceedings and protect the rights accrued to opposite party. The relevant paragraphs are as under:- "38. It is a well settled rule of statutory interpretation that while construing a provision, a meaningful effect should be given to each and every word used by the legislature within the text of the provision in interpreting a provision, a coherent meaning has to be culled out from the entire scheme of the Act and the provisions contained therein. The entire text of the provision must be read holistically with the 3 WRIC No. 9228 of 2025 entire Act, in toto, and harmoniously integrated with the other provisions to preserve internal consistency. Stray lines or words of a provision cannot be isolated or construed in fragments, detached from the remaining words and expressions of the provision as well as the other provisions within the statute.

40. As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, beyond the stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be explained by demonstrating the existence of a "sufficient cause" that resulted in such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as well as the period after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or application, as the case may be, or to put it simply, explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the date when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

116. As already discussed in the foregoing parts, for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the party has to demonstrate the existence of a "sufficient cause" "within the prescribed period" to the satisfaction of the court. Thus, establishment of "sufficient cause" is the first ingredient for the purpose of condonation of delay. Insofar, as what is meant by the phrase "sufficient cause", neither Section 5 nor the Limitation Act itself provide any guidance on what its constituent elements ought to be. Instead, Section 5 leaves the task of determining appropriate reasons for seeking condonation of delay to judicial interpretation and exercise of discretion upon the facts and individual circumstances of each case.

126. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.

235. An application seeking condonation of delay is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, on lofty ideals amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard tot he statute."

8. From the perusal of the petition, I further find that there is no explanation for come as to whether the mother of the petitioner is resident 4 WRIC No. 9228 of 2025 of village, where the patta was granted in her favour and accordingly for all the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned orders dated 6.12.2024 as well as on 31.12.2003.

7. Accordingly, I do not find any ground for interference in the impugned orders in exercise of power under Section 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petition devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed. September 26, 2025 Muk (Alok Mathur,J.) MOHD UMAR KHAN High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

1. Heard Shri Ratnesh Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Standing Counsel for respondents no. 1 to 4 and Shri Pankaj Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent no.5.

2. The proceedings for cancellation of patta initiated against the mother of the petitioner, has been assailed in the present case.

3. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that her mother, namely, Shanti Devi, wife of Khairati Lal was granted patta some time on 28.3.1987 of Gata No. 145 area 0.548 hectare, Gata No. 153, area

2.384 hectare and Gata No. 690 area 0.93 hectare, total of three plots and the same was also recorded in the Khetauni pertaining to Fasli year 1394 to 1399.

4. It has further been submitted hat the Area Lekhpal submitted a report on 25.01.1988 stating that the petitioner was not eligible for grant of patta in Gram Sabha according to the petitioner proceedings under Section 198(4), U.op. Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950 were initiated against the mother of the petitioner. It seems that the notices were issued but no appearance was made on behalf of the mother of the petitioner and accordingly the Additional Collector, Bahraich dated 31.12.2003 cancelled the patta of Shanti Devi, mother of the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter has filed an appeal against the order dated 31.12.2003, before the Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda in the year 2021, which has been rejected by 2 WRIC No. 9228 of 2025 means of the impugned order dated 16.12.2024 on the ground of limitation.

5. The petitioner in his application for condonation of delay has stated that he had contacted a lawyer on 4.12.2011 and giving all the papers but the appeal was not filed and in the meanwhile the said counsel died and when the petitioner went on 12.6.2021 she obtained the papers and engaged the new counsel in pursuance of which, the appeal was preferred. It is noticed that the certified copy of the impugned order dated 31.12.2003 was obtained in the year 2011 and after a period of 10 years when the appeal was not filed, on query is being made by the petitioner in fact the appeal has not yet been filed. There is no material on record to believe that the petitioner had engaged Kailash Nath Srivastava as his counsel or that he has died in the meanwhile.

6. Apart from the above, the laxity on the part of the petitioner is writ large, in as much as, in the year 2011 he had engaged the counsel efforts made by the petitioner to contact the counsel only after 10 years that is in the year 2021. There is no explanation why for 10 years he did not pursue the litigation and chose to keep silent. I also do not find any material with regard to delay from the date of passing of the order i.e.

31.12.2003 till 4.12.2011 which is nearly 7 years. No explanation with regard to the delay of 7 years has even canvassed by the petitioner.

7. In this context, reliance is placed on Shivamma Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that condonation of dely is not a matter of right and can be granted only on a bonafide and satisfactory explanation. Vague or casual reasons, negligence, or lack of due diligence cannot constitute sufficient cause, and judicial discretion must be exercised sparingly to preserve the finality of the proceedings and protect the rights accrued to opposite party. The relevant paragraphs are as under:- "38. It is a well settled rule of statutory interpretation that while construing a provision, a meaningful effect should be given to each and every word used by the legislature within the text of the provision in interpreting a provision, a coherent meaning has to be culled out from the entire scheme of the Act and the provisions contained therein. The entire text of the provision must be read holistically with the 3 WRIC No. 9228 of 2025 entire Act, in toto, and harmoniously integrated with the other provisions to preserve internal consistency. Stray lines or words of a provision cannot be isolated or construed in fragments, detached from the remaining words and expressions of the provision as well as the other provisions within the statute.

40. As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, beyond the stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be explained by demonstrating the existence of a "sufficient cause" that resulted in such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as well as the period after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or application, as the case may be, or to put it simply, explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the date when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

116. As already discussed in the foregoing parts, for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the party has to demonstrate the existence of a "sufficient cause" "within the prescribed period" to the satisfaction of the court. Thus, establishment of "sufficient cause" is the first ingredient for the purpose of condonation of delay. Insofar, as what is meant by the phrase "sufficient cause", neither Section 5 nor the Limitation Act itself provide any guidance on what its constituent elements ought to be. Instead, Section 5 leaves the task of determining appropriate reasons for seeking condonation of delay to judicial interpretation and exercise of discretion upon the facts and individual circumstances of each case.

126. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.

235. An application seeking condonation of delay is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, on lofty ideals amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard tot he statute."

8. From the perusal of the petition, I further find that there is no explanation for come as to whether the mother of the petitioner is resident 4 WRIC No. 9228 of 2025 of village, where the patta was granted in her favour and accordingly for all the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned orders dated 6.12.2024 as well as on 31.12.2003.

7. Accordingly, I do not find any ground for interference in the impugned orders in exercise of power under Section 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petition devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed. September 26, 2025 Muk (Alok Mathur,J.) MOHD UMAR KHAN High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench