Jai Prakash Narain Srivastava v. U.P. State Food and Essential Commodities Corporation Limited Lucknow an

5. It is admitted between the parties that the stage which had been specified by the Division Bench of this Court was the stage of appointment of an Inquiry Officer.

6. The Inquiry Officer himself sent a letter dated 12.10.2017, a copy of which is Annexure 32 to the petition, indicating that in pursuance of the orders passed by the Headquarters dated 21.05.2017 and considering the Division Bench judgment dated 11.07.2017 he has been appointed as an Inquiry Officer and he intends to complete the inquiry within the time stipulated. The petitioner was required to submit his additional reply, if any, apart from the reply already submitted during the course of earlier proceedings along with the evidence, if any.

7. The petitioner raised his objection to the appointment of the Inquiry Officer after the time stipulated by the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 11.07.2017, by means of his letter dated 22.10.2017, a copy of which is Annexure 33 to the petition, specifically indicating that the time period specified by the High Court was two months and the appointment of the Inquiry Officer is subsequent thereto. The petitioner further prayed in his reply for being granted certain documents as well as to call certain witnesses. However, the same may not detain the Court.

8. Without responding to the objections of the the petitioner, the inquiry proceedings started which culminated into an inquiry report dated 04.12.2017 and thereafter the Disciplinary Authority passed the order impugned dated 20.03.2018, a copy of which is Annexure-1 to the writ petition, whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service and a recovery has also been imposed upon him. Being aggrieved with the order impugned instant writ petition has been filed.

9. The sheet anchor of learned counsel for the petitioner is the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Ram Prakash Singh - 2025 INSC 555 which elaborately and exhaustively deals with the issue as to whether once a time frame has been fixed by a Court of law for completion of the inquiry, as to whether the disciplinary proceedings could continue thereafter and the result thereof.

10. Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgment, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that in case a time frame has been fixed by a Court of law and the respondents are continuing the proceedings beyond the time stipulated and in case the delinquent employee objects to the continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated, then the Disciplinary Authority without proceeding further, ought to apply for extension of time and may not go ahead till such time its prayer for extension is granted on such application. Further, proceeding despite objection and without there being an extension could give rise to apprehensions of bias.

11. It is contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that even if the delinquent employee has not objected to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated by the court but before the final order is passed in the proceedings, the disciplinary authority would be bound to seek and obtain extension of time for the simple reason that the sanctity of the orders of courts cannot be disrespected by errant parties, for the dignity of the judicial process would be seriously eroded and there would be nothing left of the rule of law if orders of courts, validly made, are disobeyed and the disobedience is encouraged by being indulgent.

12. The argument of Sri S.P. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner is that once the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 11.07.2017 had fixed a time frame of two months which was to start from 11.07.2017 itself considering the words as used in the judgment of 'two months from today' which was for the purpose of appointment of an Inquiry Officer consequently the Inquiry Officer should have been appointed at least by 11.09.2017 and further the inquiry proceedings should have been completed within next six months i.e. by 11.03.2018.

13. The contention is that the appointment of an Inquiry Officer by means of the letter dated 12.10.2017 is itself beyond the time stipulated by the Division Bench of this Court and passing of the final order by means of the order impugned dated 20.03.2018 is also beyond the time stipulated by the Division Bench of this Court and thus keeping in view the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra) the entire proceedings as well as the impugned order are patently vitiated in the eyes of law and consequently merit to be quashed.

14. On the other hand, Sri Kaushlendra Tewari, learned counsel for respondents, has raised the following arguments:- (a) The Inquiry Officer was appointed by the Headquarters on

21.09.2017 as would be apparent from perusal of the letter dated

12.10.2017 that had been sent by the Inquiry Officer and thus appointment of the Inquiry Officer as per the directions of the Division Bench of this Court was within the period of time stipulated by it. Further the inquiry proceedings have been completed within six months of the appointment of the Inquiry Officer i.e. he having been appointed by the Headquarters on 21.09.2017 and having culminated on with the passing of the dismissal order dated 20.03.2018 which is within time stipulated; (b) The charges as imposed against the petitioner have not been correctly reproduced while filing the writ petition which amounts to concealment of facts; (c) The petitioner has not filed any appeal against the dismissal order dated 20.03.2018 and consequently the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.

15. No other ground has been urged by the learned counsel for the respondents.

16. However, Sri Tewari fairly states that no application for extension of time as provided by the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 11.07.2017 was ever filed. He also states that the Division Bench judgment dated 11.07.2017 has also attained finality as it has not been challenged by the respondents.

17. Heard learned counsels for the contesting parties and perused the records.

18. From perusal of the records, it emerges that initially the petitioner had been dismissed from service on 03.08.2007. The appeal filed against the said order was also dismissed vide order dated 06.05.2008. The writ petition filed against both the orders was also dismissed vide order dated 29.01.2013. In the special appeal, which was filed by the petitioner, the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 11.07.2017 passed the following order:- "17. In the result, appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and order dated 29.01.2013 passed by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 4404 (SS) of 2008, Jai Prakash Narain Srivastava Vs. U.P. State Food and Essential Commodities Corporation Limited and other is hereby set aside. We also set aside punishment order dated 03.08.2007 and appellate order dated 06.05.2008. However, looking to the nature of seriousness of charge imposed against petitioner, we permit respondents to initiate proceedings afresh against petitioner from the stage after, receipt of reply from the petitioner. In case such decision is taken by respondents within two months from today, they shall complete proceedings within six months thereafter. During such proceeding, petitioner shall remain under suspension and shall be paid subsistence allowance. The decision with regard to arrears of salary shall be taken in the light of ultimate order passed by respondents. In case respondents decide not to initiate proceeding within time stipulated above, petitioner shall be entitled for all consequential benefits." (Emphasis by the Court)

19. From perusal of the Division Bench judgment of this Court dated

11.07.2017 it emerges that the Division Bench had quashed the dismissal order, appellate order and set-aside the judgment of the writ Court dated 29.01.2013. However, the respondents were permitted to initiate proceedings afresh against the petitioner from the stage after receipt of the reply from the petitioner which decision was to be taken by the respondents within two months from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench i.e. 11.07.2017 i.e. up to 11.09.2017. They were also required to complete the proceedings within next six months thereafter i.e by 11.03.2018.

20. However, the appointment of the Inquiry Officer has been done and informed to the petitioner by means of the letter dated 12.10.2017 and the final order has been passed by the respondents vide the order dated 20.03.2018 as impugned in the petition, which is clearly beyond the time stipulated by the Court.

21. As to what would be the effect in case where time frame has been fixed by a Court of law for culmination of the disciplinary proceedings and the said time frame has not been adhered to, has been considered threadbare by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court had framed various issues of which issue no.4 would be relevant. The said issue along with relevant observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court are reproduced below:- "(iv) Whether the enquiry not having been completed within the time stipulated by the Tribunal in its order dated 23rd January, 2014, the disciplinary proceedings could have been continued beyond May, 2014? ..................

62. While affirming the aforesaid view of the Full Bench, we would like to provide clarification on certain points not touched by such bench. First, in view of unseen institutional hurdles that can slow down swift action, it may not always be possible for the disciplinary authority in each such case where a fixed time has been stipulated by a tribunal/court to conclude the proceedings to apply and seek extension of time before expiry of such time although there can be no gainsaying that applying and obtaining an extension before expiry is eminently desirable. In exceptional cases, even after expiry of the stipulated time, such an application can be moved; and, depending on the cause shown for inability or failure to conclude the proceedings within the time stipulated and also for not applying for extension before expiry, the tribunal/court may, in its discretion, allow or reject the prayer for extension. If the application is rejected, the proceedings cannot be carried forward unless a superior court, reversing the order of rejection, permits the disciplinary authority to so proceed. Secondly, if the delinquent employee objects to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated, the disciplinary authority without proceeding further ought to apply for extension of time and may not go ahead till such time its prayer for extension is granted on such application. Proceeding despite objection and without there being an extension could give rise to apprehensions of bias. Therefore, applying for extension upon halting the proceedings awaiting order on the application would be an advisable course of action to balance the interests of both the employer and the employee. Thirdly, even if the delinquent employee has not objected to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated by the tribunal/court but before the final order is passed in the proceedings, the disciplinary authority would be bound to seek and obtain extension of time. This is for the simple reason that the sanctity of the orders of tribunals/courts cannot be disrespected by errant parties. The dignity of the judicial process would be seriously eroded and there would be nothing left of the rule of law if orders of tribunals/courts, validly made, are disobeyed and the disobedience is encouraged by being indulgent. Finally, we hasten to add that if a tribunal/court stipulates a fixed time by which an enquiry or proceedings for disciplinary action ought to be concluded coupled with a rider that, in default, the enquiry/proceedings will stand lapsed, the disciplinary authority in such a case would cease to have the jurisdiction to proceed further unless, of course, citing genuine grounds, a recall of such default clause is sought and obtained to proceed further in accordance with law.

63. We also hold that continuation of disciplinary proceedings beyond the time stipulated by a tribunal/court could invite interdiction if no bona fide attempt is shown to have been made to seek an extension of time. However, much would depend on the facts of each case and it may not be possible to lay down a common formula applicable to each case. In an exceptional case, the tribunal/court would have the discretion to overlook the laxity and make such direction as it deems fit in the circumstances.

64. The answer to the fourth issue, in view of our discussion, has to be in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. Without an extension of time, no order of punishment could have been validly made and the grievance of the respondent in this behalf is absolutely legitimate." (Emphasis by the Court)

22. From perusal of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra), which in fact considered the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi vs. The New India Assurance Company Ltd- (2014) 32 LCD 405, it clearly emerges that where a time frame has been fixed by a Court of law and in case the delinquent employee objects to the continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated, the Disciplinary Authority without proceeding further has to apply for extension of time and can not go ahead till such time its prayer for extension is granted on such application. Further, even if the delinquent employee has not objected to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated by the court but before the final order is passed in the proceedings, the disciplinary authority would be bound to seek and obtain extension of time. This is for the simple reason that the sanctity of the orders of courts cannot be disrespected by errant parties and that the dignity of the judicial process would be seriously eroded and there would be nothing left of the rule of law if orders of courts, validly made, are disobeyed and the disobedience is encouraged by being indulgent.

23. However, despite the aforesaid time frame fixed by the Division Bench of this Court it is apparent that the respondents have flagrantly violated the same as would be apparent from the fact that despite the Inquiry Officer to be appointed within two months of the date of the judgment i.e. 11.07.2017, he has been appointed, as informed to the petitioner vide letter dated 12.10.2017. Even if as per the arguments of Sri Tewari that the Headquarters had appointed the Inquiry Officer on

21.09.2017 then even such appointment on 21.09.2017 would also take the appointment of the Inquiry Officer beyond the time stipulated by the Division Bench of this Court, the two months' time having lapsed on 11.09.2017.

24. The disciplinary proceedings were to be concluded within six months thereafter i.e. within two months of the judgment of the Division Bench the Inquiry Officer was to be appointed i.e. up to

11.09.2017 and the proceedings to be culminated within six thereafter i.e. by 11.03.2018. However, the disciplinary proceedings have only been concluded after passing of the final order on 20.03.2018 which again takes it beyond the time stipulated by the Division Bench of this Court. Thus, clearly the principles of law as laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra) are attracted in the instant case more particularly when the Division Bench judgment of this Court has attained finality and admittedly the respondents have failed to file any application seeking extension of time as had been granted by the Division Bench of this Court.

25. So far as the argument of Sri Tewari that it is only when the petitioner had served a copy of the judgment through his application dated 22.07.2017 that the Inquiry Officer had been appointed within two months thereafter, the same is found to be fallacious inasmuch as the Division Bench of this Court provided that a decision was to be taken by the respondents within two months from 'today' i.e. within two months from the judgment of the Division Bench dated

11.07.2017, which lapsed on 11.09.2017.

26. So far as the argument of Sri Tewari that the petitioner has failed to file an appeal against the impugned order, the same is also rejected considering the fact that the matter has been pending before this court since the year 2018 and a period of seven years have since lapsed as such it would be too late in the day to relegate the petitioner to file an appeal more particularly when there is not much dispute on the merits of the matter rather the case is being decided on the principles of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra).

27. So far as the ground taken by the learned counsel for the respondents that the charges as imposed against the petitioner have not been correctly reproduced in the petition, the same may not detain the Court inasmuch as the writ petition has not been decided on the basis of allegations levelled against the petitioner rather has been decided on the principle of law as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra). Thus, the said ground is rejected.

28. Although it has not been argued by the learned counsel for the respondents yet the Court finds it necessary to record that when the writ petition itself was filed taking the grounds as raised above the Court had considered the Full Bench judgment of Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra) and the respondents being duty bound to complete the inquiry within the time stipulated by the writ Court yet considering that the judgment of Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra) had also provided that in case there are extremely serious charges against delinquent employee such delay may not vitiate the inquiry and that this Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can also extend the time suo moto.

29. However, the Full Bench judgment of Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra) has been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra) wherein the Apex Court has held that in an exceptional case the Court would have the discretion to overlook the laxity and make such direction as it deems fit in the circumstances.

30. Considering the aforesaid and the fact that the petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation on 31.07.2017 and is now aged approximately 68 years as such it would not be in the interest of justice and fitness of things to direct for a fresh inquiry.

31. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition is allowed. The order impugned dated 20.03.2018, a copy of which is Annexure-1 to the writ petition, is quashed. Consequences to follow.

32. Let the respondents comply with this order within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Order Date :- 24.7.2025 A. Katiyar AMIT KATIYAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

5. It is admitted between the parties that the stage which had been specified by the Division Bench of this Court was the stage of appointment of an Inquiry Officer.

6. The Inquiry Officer himself sent a letter dated 12.10.2017, a copy of which is Annexure 32 to the petition, indicating that in pursuance of the orders passed by the Headquarters dated 21.05.2017 and considering the Division Bench judgment dated 11.07.2017 he has been appointed as an Inquiry Officer and he intends to complete the inquiry within the time stipulated. The petitioner was required to submit his additional reply, if any, apart from the reply already submitted during the course of earlier proceedings along with the evidence, if any.

7. The petitioner raised his objection to the appointment of the Inquiry Officer after the time stipulated by the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 11.07.2017, by means of his letter dated 22.10.2017, a copy of which is Annexure 33 to the petition, specifically indicating that the time period specified by the High Court was two months and the appointment of the Inquiry Officer is subsequent thereto. The petitioner further prayed in his reply for being granted certain documents as well as to call certain witnesses. However, the same may not detain the Court.

8. Without responding to the objections of the the petitioner, the inquiry proceedings started which culminated into an inquiry report dated 04.12.2017 and thereafter the Disciplinary Authority passed the order impugned dated 20.03.2018, a copy of which is Annexure-1 to the writ petition, whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service and a recovery has also been imposed upon him. Being aggrieved with the order impugned instant writ petition has been filed.

9. The sheet anchor of learned counsel for the petitioner is the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Ram Prakash Singh - 2025 INSC 555 which elaborately and exhaustively deals with the issue as to whether once a time frame has been fixed by a Court of law for completion of the inquiry, as to whether the disciplinary proceedings could continue thereafter and the result thereof.

10. Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgment, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that in case a time frame has been fixed by a Court of law and the respondents are continuing the proceedings beyond the time stipulated and in case the delinquent employee objects to the continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated, then the Disciplinary Authority without proceeding further, ought to apply for extension of time and may not go ahead till such time its prayer for extension is granted on such application. Further, proceeding despite objection and without there being an extension could give rise to apprehensions of bias.

11. It is contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that even if the delinquent employee has not objected to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated by the court but before the final order is passed in the proceedings, the disciplinary authority would be bound to seek and obtain extension of time for the simple reason that the sanctity of the orders of courts cannot be disrespected by errant parties, for the dignity of the judicial process would be seriously eroded and there would be nothing left of the rule of law if orders of courts, validly made, are disobeyed and the disobedience is encouraged by being indulgent.

12. The argument of Sri S.P. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner is that once the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 11.07.2017 had fixed a time frame of two months which was to start from 11.07.2017 itself considering the words as used in the judgment of 'two months from today' which was for the purpose of appointment of an Inquiry Officer consequently the Inquiry Officer should have been appointed at least by 11.09.2017 and further the inquiry proceedings should have been completed within next six months i.e. by 11.03.2018.

13. The contention is that the appointment of an Inquiry Officer by means of the letter dated 12.10.2017 is itself beyond the time stipulated by the Division Bench of this Court and passing of the final order by means of the order impugned dated 20.03.2018 is also beyond the time stipulated by the Division Bench of this Court and thus keeping in view the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra) the entire proceedings as well as the impugned order are patently vitiated in the eyes of law and consequently merit to be quashed.

14. On the other hand, Sri Kaushlendra Tewari, learned counsel for respondents, has raised the following arguments:- (a) The Inquiry Officer was appointed by the Headquarters on

21.09.2017 as would be apparent from perusal of the letter dated

12.10.2017 that had been sent by the Inquiry Officer and thus appointment of the Inquiry Officer as per the directions of the Division Bench of this Court was within the period of time stipulated by it. Further the inquiry proceedings have been completed within six months of the appointment of the Inquiry Officer i.e. he having been appointed by the Headquarters on 21.09.2017 and having culminated on with the passing of the dismissal order dated 20.03.2018 which is within time stipulated; (b) The charges as imposed against the petitioner have not been correctly reproduced while filing the writ petition which amounts to concealment of facts; (c) The petitioner has not filed any appeal against the dismissal order dated 20.03.2018 and consequently the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.

15. No other ground has been urged by the learned counsel for the respondents.

16. However, Sri Tewari fairly states that no application for extension of time as provided by the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 11.07.2017 was ever filed. He also states that the Division Bench judgment dated 11.07.2017 has also attained finality as it has not been challenged by the respondents.

17. Heard learned counsels for the contesting parties and perused the records.

18. From perusal of the records, it emerges that initially the petitioner had been dismissed from service on 03.08.2007. The appeal filed against the said order was also dismissed vide order dated 06.05.2008. The writ petition filed against both the orders was also dismissed vide order dated 29.01.2013. In the special appeal, which was filed by the petitioner, the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 11.07.2017 passed the following order:- "17. In the result, appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and order dated 29.01.2013 passed by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 4404 (SS) of 2008, Jai Prakash Narain Srivastava Vs. U.P. State Food and Essential Commodities Corporation Limited and other is hereby set aside. We also set aside punishment order dated 03.08.2007 and appellate order dated 06.05.2008. However, looking to the nature of seriousness of charge imposed against petitioner, we permit respondents to initiate proceedings afresh against petitioner from the stage after, receipt of reply from the petitioner. In case such decision is taken by respondents within two months from today, they shall complete proceedings within six months thereafter. During such proceeding, petitioner shall remain under suspension and shall be paid subsistence allowance. The decision with regard to arrears of salary shall be taken in the light of ultimate order passed by respondents. In case respondents decide not to initiate proceeding within time stipulated above, petitioner shall be entitled for all consequential benefits." (Emphasis by the Court)

19. From perusal of the Division Bench judgment of this Court dated

11.07.2017 it emerges that the Division Bench had quashed the dismissal order, appellate order and set-aside the judgment of the writ Court dated 29.01.2013. However, the respondents were permitted to initiate proceedings afresh against the petitioner from the stage after receipt of the reply from the petitioner which decision was to be taken by the respondents within two months from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench i.e. 11.07.2017 i.e. up to 11.09.2017. They were also required to complete the proceedings within next six months thereafter i.e by 11.03.2018.

20. However, the appointment of the Inquiry Officer has been done and informed to the petitioner by means of the letter dated 12.10.2017 and the final order has been passed by the respondents vide the order dated 20.03.2018 as impugned in the petition, which is clearly beyond the time stipulated by the Court.

21. As to what would be the effect in case where time frame has been fixed by a Court of law for culmination of the disciplinary proceedings and the said time frame has not been adhered to, has been considered threadbare by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court had framed various issues of which issue no.4 would be relevant. The said issue along with relevant observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court are reproduced below:- "(iv) Whether the enquiry not having been completed within the time stipulated by the Tribunal in its order dated 23rd January, 2014, the disciplinary proceedings could have been continued beyond May, 2014? ..................

62. While affirming the aforesaid view of the Full Bench, we would like to provide clarification on certain points not touched by such bench. First, in view of unseen institutional hurdles that can slow down swift action, it may not always be possible for the disciplinary authority in each such case where a fixed time has been stipulated by a tribunal/court to conclude the proceedings to apply and seek extension of time before expiry of such time although there can be no gainsaying that applying and obtaining an extension before expiry is eminently desirable. In exceptional cases, even after expiry of the stipulated time, such an application can be moved; and, depending on the cause shown for inability or failure to conclude the proceedings within the time stipulated and also for not applying for extension before expiry, the tribunal/court may, in its discretion, allow or reject the prayer for extension. If the application is rejected, the proceedings cannot be carried forward unless a superior court, reversing the order of rejection, permits the disciplinary authority to so proceed. Secondly, if the delinquent employee objects to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated, the disciplinary authority without proceeding further ought to apply for extension of time and may not go ahead till such time its prayer for extension is granted on such application. Proceeding despite objection and without there being an extension could give rise to apprehensions of bias. Therefore, applying for extension upon halting the proceedings awaiting order on the application would be an advisable course of action to balance the interests of both the employer and the employee. Thirdly, even if the delinquent employee has not objected to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated by the tribunal/court but before the final order is passed in the proceedings, the disciplinary authority would be bound to seek and obtain extension of time. This is for the simple reason that the sanctity of the orders of tribunals/courts cannot be disrespected by errant parties. The dignity of the judicial process would be seriously eroded and there would be nothing left of the rule of law if orders of tribunals/courts, validly made, are disobeyed and the disobedience is encouraged by being indulgent. Finally, we hasten to add that if a tribunal/court stipulates a fixed time by which an enquiry or proceedings for disciplinary action ought to be concluded coupled with a rider that, in default, the enquiry/proceedings will stand lapsed, the disciplinary authority in such a case would cease to have the jurisdiction to proceed further unless, of course, citing genuine grounds, a recall of such default clause is sought and obtained to proceed further in accordance with law.

63. We also hold that continuation of disciplinary proceedings beyond the time stipulated by a tribunal/court could invite interdiction if no bona fide attempt is shown to have been made to seek an extension of time. However, much would depend on the facts of each case and it may not be possible to lay down a common formula applicable to each case. In an exceptional case, the tribunal/court would have the discretion to overlook the laxity and make such direction as it deems fit in the circumstances.

64. The answer to the fourth issue, in view of our discussion, has to be in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. Without an extension of time, no order of punishment could have been validly made and the grievance of the respondent in this behalf is absolutely legitimate." (Emphasis by the Court)

22. From perusal of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra), which in fact considered the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi vs. The New India Assurance Company Ltd- (2014) 32 LCD 405, it clearly emerges that where a time frame has been fixed by a Court of law and in case the delinquent employee objects to the continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated, the Disciplinary Authority without proceeding further has to apply for extension of time and can not go ahead till such time its prayer for extension is granted on such application. Further, even if the delinquent employee has not objected to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated by the court but before the final order is passed in the proceedings, the disciplinary authority would be bound to seek and obtain extension of time. This is for the simple reason that the sanctity of the orders of courts cannot be disrespected by errant parties and that the dignity of the judicial process would be seriously eroded and there would be nothing left of the rule of law if orders of courts, validly made, are disobeyed and the disobedience is encouraged by being indulgent.

23. However, despite the aforesaid time frame fixed by the Division Bench of this Court it is apparent that the respondents have flagrantly violated the same as would be apparent from the fact that despite the Inquiry Officer to be appointed within two months of the date of the judgment i.e. 11.07.2017, he has been appointed, as informed to the petitioner vide letter dated 12.10.2017. Even if as per the arguments of Sri Tewari that the Headquarters had appointed the Inquiry Officer on

21.09.2017 then even such appointment on 21.09.2017 would also take the appointment of the Inquiry Officer beyond the time stipulated by the Division Bench of this Court, the two months' time having lapsed on 11.09.2017.

24. The disciplinary proceedings were to be concluded within six months thereafter i.e. within two months of the judgment of the Division Bench the Inquiry Officer was to be appointed i.e. up to

11.09.2017 and the proceedings to be culminated within six thereafter i.e. by 11.03.2018. However, the disciplinary proceedings have only been concluded after passing of the final order on 20.03.2018 which again takes it beyond the time stipulated by the Division Bench of this Court. Thus, clearly the principles of law as laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra) are attracted in the instant case more particularly when the Division Bench judgment of this Court has attained finality and admittedly the respondents have failed to file any application seeking extension of time as had been granted by the Division Bench of this Court.

25. So far as the argument of Sri Tewari that it is only when the petitioner had served a copy of the judgment through his application dated 22.07.2017 that the Inquiry Officer had been appointed within two months thereafter, the same is found to be fallacious inasmuch as the Division Bench of this Court provided that a decision was to be taken by the respondents within two months from 'today' i.e. within two months from the judgment of the Division Bench dated

11.07.2017, which lapsed on 11.09.2017.

26. So far as the argument of Sri Tewari that the petitioner has failed to file an appeal against the impugned order, the same is also rejected considering the fact that the matter has been pending before this court since the year 2018 and a period of seven years have since lapsed as such it would be too late in the day to relegate the petitioner to file an appeal more particularly when there is not much dispute on the merits of the matter rather the case is being decided on the principles of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra).

27. So far as the ground taken by the learned counsel for the respondents that the charges as imposed against the petitioner have not been correctly reproduced in the petition, the same may not detain the Court inasmuch as the writ petition has not been decided on the basis of allegations levelled against the petitioner rather has been decided on the principle of law as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra). Thus, the said ground is rejected.

28. Although it has not been argued by the learned counsel for the respondents yet the Court finds it necessary to record that when the writ petition itself was filed taking the grounds as raised above the Court had considered the Full Bench judgment of Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra) and the respondents being duty bound to complete the inquiry within the time stipulated by the writ Court yet considering that the judgment of Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra) had also provided that in case there are extremely serious charges against delinquent employee such delay may not vitiate the inquiry and that this Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can also extend the time suo moto.

29. However, the Full Bench judgment of Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra) has been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra) wherein the Apex Court has held that in an exceptional case the Court would have the discretion to overlook the laxity and make such direction as it deems fit in the circumstances.

30. Considering the aforesaid and the fact that the petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation on 31.07.2017 and is now aged approximately 68 years as such it would not be in the interest of justice and fitness of things to direct for a fresh inquiry.

31. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition is allowed. The order impugned dated 20.03.2018, a copy of which is Annexure-1 to the writ petition, is quashed. Consequences to follow.

32. Let the respondents comply with this order within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Order Date :- 24.7.2025 A. Katiyar AMIT KATIYAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench