High Court · 2025

3. The contention of learned counsel for the applicant is that this matter was sent to mediation centre of this Court vide order dated 25.09.2023 and in pursuance of said order, both the parties have participated in mediation proceedings which was culminated into successful mediation and the parties have executed an agreement dated 21.08.2024. Copy of the same is available on record along with report of mediation. As per the settlement agreement dated 21.08.2024 executed in mediation centre, both the parties have decided to withdraw the case against each other.

4. The terms and conditions of the aforesaid settlement, are being quoted herein below:- "A) That both the parties solemnized their marriage on

05.06.2010 and they have dissolved their marriage and they are living separately. B) That out of the wedlock of both the parties, three babies namely Naaz Fatima (daughter) aged about 13 years, Affan Khan (son) aged about 9 years and Asra Khan (daughter) were born. Presently they are living with t heir mother i.e. Second Party and the parties have agreed that all the three children shall continue to live with their mother in future and the First Party i.e., father would have visitation rights. The Second Party shall be permitted to visit the children once in a month. The First Party has also agreed that the children will be allowed to join all the family functions of father's side. C) That the First Party i.e., father has agreed to bear the financial responsibility of marriage of his both the daughters Naaz Fatima and Asra Khan. The First Party has agreed to provide all legal right to his son Affan Khan in his immovable property in accordance with law. D) The parties have agree that a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Lacs only) shall be paid by the First Party to the Second Party towards one time full and final settlement of all the claims including the claim for temporary/permanent alimony as well as expenses for bringing up of their children. E) That both the parties agree that the amount of Rs. Rs.8,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Lacs only) would be paid to the Second Party/wife in two installments through Demand Draft/NEFT. The first installment of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lacs only) will be paid by the First Party/husband to the Second Party/wife on the date of entering into settlement agreement before Mediation and Conciliation Centre, Allahabad High Court, Lucknow. The second installment of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lacs only) will be paid by the First Party/husband to the Second Party/wife by transferring in Bank A/c No. 2760001701227490, IFSC: PUNB0276000, Punjab National Bank, Branch Mehali, Balrampur on or before 21st November, 2024. F) That the First Party has handed over a Demand Draft No.000561 dated 14.08.2024 amounting to Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lacs only), drawn on HDFC Bank, Utraula to the Second Party today i.e. 21.08.2024 towards payment of first installment. The Second Party acknowledge receipt of the payment. G) The Second Party has agreed to withdraw/not press the cases filed by her against the First Party and his family members after receiving of second installment. The details of the cases are mentioned hereunder: (i) Case No. 454 of 2022 U/s 125 Cr.P.C. pending before Principal Judge, Family Court, Balrampur. (ii) Complaint Case No. 1042 of 2022 U/s 498-A, 506 IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Gaidas Bujurg, District Balrampur. H) That the Second Party has agreed that she she will have no objection if the Hon'ble Court decide the Application U/s 482 No. 9251 of 2023 (Irfan Ahamd alias Irfan Vs. State of U.P. and Another) in terms of this settlement agreement. I) The parties have agreed that apart from mentioned case, if any other criminal cases(s) is pending between the parties or their family members with regard to the present dispute, both the parties or their family members with regard to the present dispute, both the parties shall get the same disposed off in terms of this Settlement Agreement. J) That it is also agreed between the parties that henceforth no case will be instituted by them against each other or any of their respective family members in future in the form of criminal or civil proceedings in respect of present dispute. K) That both the parties shall be bound by the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement in strict sense. In case of any default, the party committing default shall be liable for playing fraud with the Court, hence for contempt of the Court.

7. By signing this agreement the parties hereto state that they have no further claims or demands against each other with respect to the matter involved in Application U/s 482 No. 9251 of 2023 (Irfan Ahmad alias Irfan Vs. State of U.P. and Another) and all disputes and difference in this regard have been amicably settled by the parties hereto through the process of Conciliation/Mediation.

5. Learned counsel for the applicant thus submits that since both the parties have entered into compromise and settled their dispute amicably which was also reduced in writing, the aforesaid case may be quashed.

6. Learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 as well as learned AGA for the State could not dispute the aforesaid fact.

7. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another; (2012) 10 SCC 303, in paragraph No. 61 of the judgement, observed as under:- "The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

8. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Laxmi Narayan; (2019) 5 SCC 688, observed as under:- "15.1. the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

15.2. such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

15.3 similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;"

9. From above noted judgements, it is clear that merely mentioning the section of serious offences will not refrain the court from quashing the proceeding, if on considering the material on record, offences under that section is not made out.

10. Considering the material on record, this Court finds that no serious offence is made out against the applicants, which falls in the category of mental depravity or serious offences.

11. Considering the fact as well as on perusal of record, it appears that no heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or other offences, which may affect the society in general, are made out and both the parties have amicably settled their dispute through compromise which has been duly verified by the court below as well as in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another ; (2012) 10 SCC 303, Narinder Singh & Others vs. State of Punjab & Another (2014) 6 SCC 477, State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 and State of M.P. vs. Dhruv Gurjar, AIR 2017 SC 1106, the proceedings of Complaint Case No. 1042 of 2022, under Sections 498-1, & 506 IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Gaidas Bujurg, District Balrampur pending in the court of learned learned Chief Judicial Magistrate/Fast Track Court-II, Balrampur, is hereby quashed.

12. With the aforesaid direction, the present application is allowed. . Order Date :- 10.4.2025 Virendra (Alok Mathur, J.) VIRENDRA KUMAR GUPTA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

3. The contention of learned counsel for the applicant is that this matter was sent to mediation centre of this Court vide order dated 25.09.2023 and in pursuance of said order, both the parties have participated in mediation proceedings which was culminated into successful mediation and the parties have executed an agreement dated 21.08.2024. Copy of the same is available on record along with report of mediation. As per the settlement agreement dated 21.08.2024 executed in mediation centre, both the parties have decided to withdraw the case against each other.

4. The terms and conditions of the aforesaid settlement, are being quoted herein below:- "A) That both the parties solemnized their marriage on

05.06.2010 and they have dissolved their marriage and they are living separately. B) That out of the wedlock of both the parties, three babies namely Naaz Fatima (daughter) aged about 13 years, Affan Khan (son) aged about 9 years and Asra Khan (daughter) were born. Presently they are living with t heir mother i.e. Second Party and the parties have agreed that all the three children shall continue to live with their mother in future and the First Party i.e., father would have visitation rights. The Second Party shall be permitted to visit the children once in a month. The First Party has also agreed that the children will be allowed to join all the family functions of father's side. C) That the First Party i.e., father has agreed to bear the financial responsibility of marriage of his both the daughters Naaz Fatima and Asra Khan. The First Party has agreed to provide all legal right to his son Affan Khan in his immovable property in accordance with law. D) The parties have agree that a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Lacs only) shall be paid by the First Party to the Second Party towards one time full and final settlement of all the claims including the claim for temporary/permanent alimony as well as expenses for bringing up of their children. E) That both the parties agree that the amount of Rs. Rs.8,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Lacs only) would be paid to the Second Party/wife in two installments through Demand Draft/NEFT. The first installment of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lacs only) will be paid by the First Party/husband to the Second Party/wife on the date of entering into settlement agreement before Mediation and Conciliation Centre, Allahabad High Court, Lucknow. The second installment of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lacs only) will be paid by the First Party/husband to the Second Party/wife by transferring in Bank A/c No. 2760001701227490, IFSC: PUNB0276000, Punjab National Bank, Branch Mehali, Balrampur on or before 21st November, 2024. F) That the First Party has handed over a Demand Draft No.000561 dated 14.08.2024 amounting to Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lacs only), drawn on HDFC Bank, Utraula to the Second Party today i.e. 21.08.2024 towards payment of first installment. The Second Party acknowledge receipt of the payment. G) The Second Party has agreed to withdraw/not press the cases filed by her against the First Party and his family members after receiving of second installment. The details of the cases are mentioned hereunder: (i) Case No. 454 of 2022 U/s 125 Cr.P.C. pending before Principal Judge, Family Court, Balrampur. (ii) Complaint Case No. 1042 of 2022 U/s 498-A, 506 IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Gaidas Bujurg, District Balrampur. H) That the Second Party has agreed that she she will have no objection if the Hon'ble Court decide the Application U/s 482 No. 9251 of 2023 (Irfan Ahamd alias Irfan Vs. State of U.P. and Another) in terms of this settlement agreement. I) The parties have agreed that apart from mentioned case, if any other criminal cases(s) is pending between the parties or their family members with regard to the present dispute, both the parties or their family members with regard to the present dispute, both the parties shall get the same disposed off in terms of this Settlement Agreement. J) That it is also agreed between the parties that henceforth no case will be instituted by them against each other or any of their respective family members in future in the form of criminal or civil proceedings in respect of present dispute. K) That both the parties shall be bound by the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement in strict sense. In case of any default, the party committing default shall be liable for playing fraud with the Court, hence for contempt of the Court.

7. By signing this agreement the parties hereto state that they have no further claims or demands against each other with respect to the matter involved in Application U/s 482 No. 9251 of 2023 (Irfan Ahmad alias Irfan Vs. State of U.P. and Another) and all disputes and difference in this regard have been amicably settled by the parties hereto through the process of Conciliation/Mediation.

5. Learned counsel for the applicant thus submits that since both the parties have entered into compromise and settled their dispute amicably which was also reduced in writing, the aforesaid case may be quashed.

6. Learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 as well as learned AGA for the State could not dispute the aforesaid fact.

7. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another; (2012) 10 SCC 303, in paragraph No. 61 of the judgement, observed as under:- "The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

8. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Laxmi Narayan; (2019) 5 SCC 688, observed as under:- "15.1. the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

15.2. such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

15.3 similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;"

9. From above noted judgements, it is clear that merely mentioning the section of serious offences will not refrain the court from quashing the proceeding, if on considering the material on record, offences under that section is not made out.

10. Considering the material on record, this Court finds that no serious offence is made out against the applicants, which falls in the category of mental depravity or serious offences.

11. Considering the fact as well as on perusal of record, it appears that no heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or other offences, which may affect the society in general, are made out and both the parties have amicably settled their dispute through compromise which has been duly verified by the court below as well as in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another ; (2012) 10 SCC 303, Narinder Singh & Others vs. State of Punjab & Another (2014) 6 SCC 477, State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 and State of M.P. vs. Dhruv Gurjar, AIR 2017 SC 1106, the proceedings of Complaint Case No. 1042 of 2022, under Sections 498-1, & 506 IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Gaidas Bujurg, District Balrampur pending in the court of learned learned Chief Judicial Magistrate/Fast Track Court-II, Balrampur, is hereby quashed.

12. With the aforesaid direction, the present application is allowed. . Order Date :- 10.4.2025 Virendra (Alok Mathur, J.) VIRENDRA KUMAR GUPTA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench