S Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Jagdishpur, Dist. Sultanpur And Another v. Sri Ramesh Chandra Mishra

1. Heard Sri Shireesh Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Vyas Narayan Shukla, the learned counsel for the opposite party.

2. By means of the instant writ petition the petitioners have challenged the validity of an order dated 03.09.2004 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, U.P., Faizabad in Industrial Dispute Case No. 57/1994 whereby the preliminary objection of the petitioners regarding lack of jurisdiction of the Labour Court was rejected. Thereafter the labour court proceeded with the matter and decided the dispute by an award dated

14.05.2025, the validity whereof has also been challenged through this petition.

3. The proceedings were instituted on a reference made by the State Government regarding validity of an order dated 26.06.1993 removing the opposite party from service of the petitioner-Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited after holding a detailed enquiry, in which the charges leveled against the petitioners were proved.

4. The petitioners raised a preliminary objection before the Labour Court stating that BHEL is a Government of India undertaking and is under the control and authority of the Central Government. Therefore, the Central Government is the appropriate government for referring the dispute for adjudication. The petitioner placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation 2 WRIC No. 8390 of 2025 and Others v. United Labour Union and Others: (1997) 9 SCC 377 and Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar & Ors.: (1969) 1 SCC 765.

5. The preliminary objection of the petitioners was rejected by the impugned order dated 03.09.2004 passed by the Labour Court wherein it was held that by means of a Notification dated 03.07.1998, the Central Government has delegated its power to make references to the State Governments under Section 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The present matter arises out of a reference made in the year 1994 and the Notification dated 03.07.1998 does not have retrospective operation. However, BHEL is not included in institutions enumerated in Section 2(a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 2(a)(ii) of the Act provides that the State Government will be the appropriate government regarding other organizations. Therefore, the labour court held that the preliminary objection raised by the petitioners regarding jurisdiction of the labour court was not tenable and rejected the same accordingly.

6. Thereafter the petitioners continued to participate in the proceedings which have culminated in the impugned award dated 14.05.2025.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioners has confined his submissions to the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the labour tribunal and he has submitted that since the award is without jurisdiction, correctness of its findings recorded on various issues need not be gone into by this Court.

8. The learned Counsel for the opposite party has submitted that the Labour Court has rightly held that BHEL is not enumerated in the organizations mentioned in Section 2(a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947. He has further submitted that after rejection of the preliminary objection by the impugned order dated 03.08.2004, the petitioners continuously participated in the proceedings before the Labour Court and they submitted to it jurisdiction. Therefore, the petitioners are estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Court after having participated in the proceedings for more than two decades.

9. Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines the appropriate government in the following words:- (a) “appropriate Government” means,— 3 WRIC No. 8390 of 2025 the Employees' State (i) in relation to any Industrial Disputes concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or by a railway company or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government or in relation to an Industrial Dispute concerning a Dock Labour Board established under Section 5-A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948), or the Industrial Finance Corporation of India Limited formed and registered under the Companies Act, 1956, or Insurance Corporation established under Section 3 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), or the Board of Trustees constituted under Section 3-A of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948 (46 of 1948), or the Central Board of Trustees and the State Boards of Trustees constituted under Section 5-A and Section 5-B, respectively, of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or the Life Insurance Corporation of India established under Section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956), or the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation established under Section 3 of the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961 (47 of 1961), or the Central Warehousing Corporation established under Section 3 of the Warehousing Corporations Act, 1962 (58 of 1962), or the Unit Trust of India established under Section 3 of the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963), or the Food Corporation of India established under Section 3, or a Board of Management established for two or more contiguous States under Section 16 of the Food Corporations Act, 1964 (37 of 1964), or the Airports Authority of India constituted under Section 3 of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 (55 of 1994)], or a Regional Rural Bank established under Section 3 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (21 of 1976), or the Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation Limited or the Industrial Reconstruction Corporation of India Limited, or the Banking Service Commission established, under Section 3 of the Banking Service Commission Act, 1975, or an air transport service, or a banking or an insurance company, a mine, an oilfield, a Cantonment Board, or a major port, any company in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government, or any corporation, not being a corporation referred to in this clause, established by or under any law made by Parliament, or the Central public sector undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the Central Government, the Central Government, and (ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute, including the State public sector undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the 4 WRIC No. 8390 of 2025 principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the State Government, the State Government: Provided that in case of a dispute between a contractor and the contract labour employed through the contractor in any industrial establishment where such dispute first arose, the appropriate Government shall be the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, which has control over such industrial establishment.”

10. A bare perusal of the aforesaid statutory provision makes it manifest that the appropriate government in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any public sector undertaking controlled by the Central Government, will be the Central Government. It has specifically been pleaded in the writ petition that Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited is an undertaking of Central Government and this plea has not been denied in the counter affidavit. When undisputedly BHEL is an undertaking of the Central Government, obviously is controlled by the Central Government and, therefore, as per the provisions contained in Section 2(a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Central Government will be the appropriate Government for referring industrial disputes regarding the petitioners.

11. Section 2(a)(ii) contains provisions in relation to any other industrial dispute, not covered by the provision contained in Section 2(a)(i). When industrial disputes concerning BHEL are covered by Section 2(a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the same will not be governed by the provisions contained in Section 2(a)(ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute.

12. Regarding the second submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party that the petitioner has participated in the proceedings and, therefore, it is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour C ourt, suffice it to say that it is settled law that jurisdiction can be conferred by statute alone and not by mere participation by the parties and more particularly when the petitioner has challenged the jurisdiction of the labour court at the inception and it has participated in the proceedings after rejection of the preliminary objections. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the labour court. This view finds support by the following passage of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka v. Jasjit Singh: (1993) 2 SCC 507: - 5 WRIC No. 8390 of 2025 “17. ...consent cannot confer jurisdiction nor an estoppel against statute. ... In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602] when a Constitution Bench directed the High Court Judge to try the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act with which the petitioner therein was charged and the trial was being proceeded with, he questioned by way of writ petition the jurisdiction of this Court to give such a direction. A Bench of seven judges per majority construed the meaning of the word ‘jurisdiction’. Mukharji, J. as he then was, speaking per himself, Oza and Natarajan, JJ. held that the power to create or enlarge jurisdiction is legislative in character. So also the power to confer a right of appeal or to take away a right of appeal. The Parliament alone can do it by law and no court, whether superior or inferior or both combined, can enlarge the jurisdiction of a court and divest a person of his rights of appeal or revision. Ranganath Mishra, J. as he then was, held that jurisdiction comes solely from the law of the land and cannot be exercised otherwise. In this country, jurisdiction can be exercised only when provided for either in the Constitution or in the laws made by the legislature. Jurisdiction is thus the authority or power of the court to deal with a matter and make an order carrying binding force in the facts. Oza, J. supplementing the question held that the jurisdiction to try a case could only be conferred by law enacted by the legislature. The Supreme Court could not confer jurisdiction if it does not exist in law. Ray, J. held that the Court cannot confer a jurisdiction on itself which is not provided in the law. In the dissenting opinion Venkatachaliah, J., as he then was, lay down that the expression jurisdiction or prior determination is a “verbal coat of many colours”. In the case of a tribunal, an error of law might become not merely an error in jurisdiction but might partake of the character of an error of jurisdiction. But, otherwise, jurisdiction is a ‘legal shelter’ and a power to bind despite a possible error in the decision. The existence of jurisdiction does not depend on the correctness of its exercise. The authority to decide embodies a privilege to bind despite error, a privilege which is inherent in and indispensable to every judicial function. The characteristic attribute of a judicial act is that it binds whether it be right or it be wrong. Thus this Court laid down as an authoritative proposition of law that the jurisdiction could be conferred by statute and this Court cannot confer jurisdiction or an authority on a tribunal. In that case this Court held that Constitution Bench has no power to give direction contrary to Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. The direction per majority was held to be void.

18. It is settled law that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction on the subject-matter or on the grounds on which the decree made which goes to the root of its jurisdiction or lacks inherent jurisdiction is a coram non judice. A decree passed by such 6 WRIC No. 8390 of 2025 a court is a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the court to pass decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party...”

13. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that the appropriate government regarding industrial disputes concerning the petitioner is the Central Government and the Central Government alone could have referred the dispute for adjudication to a Labour Court constituted by it under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The State Government had no authority to make a reference to any industrial dispute concerning the petitioner to a Labour Court constituted by it.

14. Accordingly, the Labour Court constituted by the State Government had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the industrial dispute concerning BHEL. The entire proceedings of Industrial Dispute Case No. 57/1994 and the order passed by the Labour Court constituted by the State Government, is bad in law for want of jurisdiction.

15. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed.

16. The order dated 03.09.2004 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, U.P., Faizabad in Industrial Dispute Case No. 57/1994 and award dated 14.05.2025 are quashed. October 29, 2025 Pradeep/- (Subhash Vidyarthi,J.) PRADEEP SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

1. Heard Sri Shireesh Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Vyas Narayan Shukla, the learned counsel for the opposite party.

2. By means of the instant writ petition the petitioners have challenged the validity of an order dated 03.09.2004 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, U.P., Faizabad in Industrial Dispute Case No. 57/1994 whereby the preliminary objection of the petitioners regarding lack of jurisdiction of the Labour Court was rejected. Thereafter the labour court proceeded with the matter and decided the dispute by an award dated

14.05.2025, the validity whereof has also been challenged through this petition.

3. The proceedings were instituted on a reference made by the State Government regarding validity of an order dated 26.06.1993 removing the opposite party from service of the petitioner-Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited after holding a detailed enquiry, in which the charges leveled against the petitioners were proved.

4. The petitioners raised a preliminary objection before the Labour Court stating that BHEL is a Government of India undertaking and is under the control and authority of the Central Government. Therefore, the Central Government is the appropriate government for referring the dispute for adjudication. The petitioner placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation 2 WRIC No. 8390 of 2025 and Others v. United Labour Union and Others: (1997) 9 SCC 377 and Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar & Ors.: (1969) 1 SCC 765.

5. The preliminary objection of the petitioners was rejected by the impugned order dated 03.09.2004 passed by the Labour Court wherein it was held that by means of a Notification dated 03.07.1998, the Central Government has delegated its power to make references to the State Governments under Section 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The present matter arises out of a reference made in the year 1994 and the Notification dated 03.07.1998 does not have retrospective operation. However, BHEL is not included in institutions enumerated in Section 2(a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 2(a)(ii) of the Act provides that the State Government will be the appropriate government regarding other organizations. Therefore, the labour court held that the preliminary objection raised by the petitioners regarding jurisdiction of the labour court was not tenable and rejected the same accordingly.

6. Thereafter the petitioners continued to participate in the proceedings which have culminated in the impugned award dated 14.05.2025.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioners has confined his submissions to the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the labour tribunal and he has submitted that since the award is without jurisdiction, correctness of its findings recorded on various issues need not be gone into by this Court.

8. The learned Counsel for the opposite party has submitted that the Labour Court has rightly held that BHEL is not enumerated in the organizations mentioned in Section 2(a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947. He has further submitted that after rejection of the preliminary objection by the impugned order dated 03.08.2004, the petitioners continuously participated in the proceedings before the Labour Court and they submitted to it jurisdiction. Therefore, the petitioners are estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Court after having participated in the proceedings for more than two decades.

9. Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines the appropriate government in the following words:- (a) “appropriate Government” means,— 3 WRIC No. 8390 of 2025 the Employees' State (i) in relation to any Industrial Disputes concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or by a railway company or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government or in relation to an Industrial Dispute concerning a Dock Labour Board established under Section 5-A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948), or the Industrial Finance Corporation of India Limited formed and registered under the Companies Act, 1956, or Insurance Corporation established under Section 3 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), or the Board of Trustees constituted under Section 3-A of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948 (46 of 1948), or the Central Board of Trustees and the State Boards of Trustees constituted under Section 5-A and Section 5-B, respectively, of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or the Life Insurance Corporation of India established under Section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956), or the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation established under Section 3 of the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961 (47 of 1961), or the Central Warehousing Corporation established under Section 3 of the Warehousing Corporations Act, 1962 (58 of 1962), or the Unit Trust of India established under Section 3 of the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963), or the Food Corporation of India established under Section 3, or a Board of Management established for two or more contiguous States under Section 16 of the Food Corporations Act, 1964 (37 of 1964), or the Airports Authority of India constituted under Section 3 of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 (55 of 1994)], or a Regional Rural Bank established under Section 3 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (21 of 1976), or the Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation Limited or the Industrial Reconstruction Corporation of India Limited, or the Banking Service Commission established, under Section 3 of the Banking Service Commission Act, 1975, or an air transport service, or a banking or an insurance company, a mine, an oilfield, a Cantonment Board, or a major port, any company in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government, or any corporation, not being a corporation referred to in this clause, established by or under any law made by Parliament, or the Central public sector undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the Central Government, the Central Government, and (ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute, including the State public sector undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the 4 WRIC No. 8390 of 2025 principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the State Government, the State Government: Provided that in case of a dispute between a contractor and the contract labour employed through the contractor in any industrial establishment where such dispute first arose, the appropriate Government shall be the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, which has control over such industrial establishment.”

10. A bare perusal of the aforesaid statutory provision makes it manifest that the appropriate government in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any public sector undertaking controlled by the Central Government, will be the Central Government. It has specifically been pleaded in the writ petition that Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited is an undertaking of Central Government and this plea has not been denied in the counter affidavit. When undisputedly BHEL is an undertaking of the Central Government, obviously is controlled by the Central Government and, therefore, as per the provisions contained in Section 2(a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Central Government will be the appropriate Government for referring industrial disputes regarding the petitioners.

11. Section 2(a)(ii) contains provisions in relation to any other industrial dispute, not covered by the provision contained in Section 2(a)(i). When industrial disputes concerning BHEL are covered by Section 2(a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the same will not be governed by the provisions contained in Section 2(a)(ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute.

12. Regarding the second submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party that the petitioner has participated in the proceedings and, therefore, it is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour C ourt, suffice it to say that it is settled law that jurisdiction can be conferred by statute alone and not by mere participation by the parties and more particularly when the petitioner has challenged the jurisdiction of the labour court at the inception and it has participated in the proceedings after rejection of the preliminary objections. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the labour court. This view finds support by the following passage of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka v. Jasjit Singh: (1993) 2 SCC 507: - 5 WRIC No. 8390 of 2025 “17. ...consent cannot confer jurisdiction nor an estoppel against statute. ... In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602] when a Constitution Bench directed the High Court Judge to try the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act with which the petitioner therein was charged and the trial was being proceeded with, he questioned by way of writ petition the jurisdiction of this Court to give such a direction. A Bench of seven judges per majority construed the meaning of the word ‘jurisdiction’. Mukharji, J. as he then was, speaking per himself, Oza and Natarajan, JJ. held that the power to create or enlarge jurisdiction is legislative in character. So also the power to confer a right of appeal or to take away a right of appeal. The Parliament alone can do it by law and no court, whether superior or inferior or both combined, can enlarge the jurisdiction of a court and divest a person of his rights of appeal or revision. Ranganath Mishra, J. as he then was, held that jurisdiction comes solely from the law of the land and cannot be exercised otherwise. In this country, jurisdiction can be exercised only when provided for either in the Constitution or in the laws made by the legislature. Jurisdiction is thus the authority or power of the court to deal with a matter and make an order carrying binding force in the facts. Oza, J. supplementing the question held that the jurisdiction to try a case could only be conferred by law enacted by the legislature. The Supreme Court could not confer jurisdiction if it does not exist in law. Ray, J. held that the Court cannot confer a jurisdiction on itself which is not provided in the law. In the dissenting opinion Venkatachaliah, J., as he then was, lay down that the expression jurisdiction or prior determination is a “verbal coat of many colours”. In the case of a tribunal, an error of law might become not merely an error in jurisdiction but might partake of the character of an error of jurisdiction. But, otherwise, jurisdiction is a ‘legal shelter’ and a power to bind despite a possible error in the decision. The existence of jurisdiction does not depend on the correctness of its exercise. The authority to decide embodies a privilege to bind despite error, a privilege which is inherent in and indispensable to every judicial function. The characteristic attribute of a judicial act is that it binds whether it be right or it be wrong. Thus this Court laid down as an authoritative proposition of law that the jurisdiction could be conferred by statute and this Court cannot confer jurisdiction or an authority on a tribunal. In that case this Court held that Constitution Bench has no power to give direction contrary to Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. The direction per majority was held to be void.

18. It is settled law that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction on the subject-matter or on the grounds on which the decree made which goes to the root of its jurisdiction or lacks inherent jurisdiction is a coram non judice. A decree passed by such 6 WRIC No. 8390 of 2025 a court is a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the court to pass decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party...”

13. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that the appropriate government regarding industrial disputes concerning the petitioner is the Central Government and the Central Government alone could have referred the dispute for adjudication to a Labour Court constituted by it under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The State Government had no authority to make a reference to any industrial dispute concerning the petitioner to a Labour Court constituted by it.

14. Accordingly, the Labour Court constituted by the State Government had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the industrial dispute concerning BHEL. The entire proceedings of Industrial Dispute Case No. 57/1994 and the order passed by the Labour Court constituted by the State Government, is bad in law for want of jurisdiction.

15. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed.

16. The order dated 03.09.2004 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, U.P., Faizabad in Industrial Dispute Case No. 57/1994 and award dated 14.05.2025 are quashed. October 29, 2025 Pradeep/- (Subhash Vidyarthi,J.) PRADEEP SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench