Manju Shree Rathore vs Counsel for Appellant(s)

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

3. This is a delayed special appeal which has been filed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952. The judgment impugned herein is dated 05.03.2020 which was passed by the writ Court in Writ- A No. 3438 of 2020. The appeal challenging the said judgment has been filed on 31.10.2022, with a delay of 154 days.

4. In the interregnum Covid-19 pandemic set in. As such, in view of the orders passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in suo motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020 the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall be excluded as the limitation stood extended till then, but, this by itself does not persuade us to condone the delay in filing the special appeal for the reason even thereafter there was sufficient time to file the appeal, but, it 2 SPLAD No. 229 of 2022 was filed only on 31.10.2022. In the interregnum an application for review was filed but this was also rejected on 15.12.2021. Although, during the Covid-19 pandemic this was one of the High Courts where except for a few months petitions/appeals were being filed and heard either through video conferencing or in person, nevertheless, in view of the orders of Hon'ble the Supreme Court giving the benefit of extension of limitation till 28.02.2022 we have now to see as to what was the explanation for the delay offered in filing the appeal thereafter.

5. When we peruse the affidavit we find all that it mentions is that an application was submitted by the respondent-petitioner for correction of pension payment order dated 10.06.2011 in pursuance to the judgment of the writ Court, and it is then that the order was received by the appellants. Neither the date of receipt is mentioned nor is it mentioned as to why it is so when there is a battery of lawyers running into hundreds of them who appear on behalf of the State before various Benches of the High Court including at Lucknow and the order passed in the writ petition is not a reserved order but one which was dictated in open Court, therefore, in the ordinary course of things the learned Chief Standing Counsel office would have intimated the concerned Department/officers but nothing has been stated in this regard. The affidavit then goes on to state that a decision was taken to file a review petition which was ultimately filed and dismissed on 15.12.2021. As already stated, the period up to 28.02.2022 is irrelevant because the limitation stood extended till that day for the purposes of filing the special appeal under the orders of Hon'ble the Supreme Court referred hereinabove. We have to see the explanation offered for the period thereafter. Affidavit Merely mentions about some directions having been issued on 02.09.2022 to the Directorate, Child 3 SPLAD No. 229 of 2022 Development and Nutrition followed by the letter dated 09.09.2022 for filing an appeal, there is no explanation whatsoever for the period

01.03.2022 till 30.08.2022. The affidavit goes on to state that on

27.09.2022 a request was made to learned Chief Standing Counsel for filing of the appeal which was ultimately filed on 31.10.2022. Thereafter, various decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court have been referred.

6. On a bare reading of the affidavit it demonstrate the casual and negligent approach/attitude of the appellants. There is no bona fide and serious effort reflected from a reading of the affidavit which should have been made for filing the appeal promptly.

7. We have gone through the recent judgment rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Ors. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969, wherein the law discussed in the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant as mentioned in the affidavit aforesaid have been considered and the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The period of limitation for filing the appeal being thirty days, there is hardly any explanation for the said period in the affidavit in support of the application. At least, it is not satisfactory. As regards the period after expiry of limitation also, hardly any acceptable explanation has been offered. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross 4 SPLAD No. 229 of 2022 negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed hereinabove. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly 5 SPLAD No. 229 of 2022 extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

9. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General v. 6 SPLAD No. 229 of 2022 Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterised by judicial sympathy towards the State and instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P.' reported in (2011) SCC Online SC 403 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking 7 SPLAD No. 229 of 2022 condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

10. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any reason to condone the delay in filing of the special appeal. The application for condonation of delay is rejected.

11. Consequently, the special appeal also stands dismissed. November 21, 2025 R.K.P. (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) RAJ KUMAR PATEL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

3. This is a delayed special appeal which has been filed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952. The judgment impugned herein is dated 05.03.2020 which was passed by the writ Court in Writ- A No. 3438 of 2020. The appeal challenging the said judgment has been filed on 31.10.2022, with a delay of 154 days.

4. In the interregnum Covid-19 pandemic set in. As such, in view of the orders passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in suo motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020 the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall be excluded as the limitation stood extended till then, but, this by itself does not persuade us to condone the delay in filing the special appeal for the reason even thereafter there was sufficient time to file the appeal, but, it 2 SPLAD No. 229 of 2022 was filed only on 31.10.2022. In the interregnum an application for review was filed but this was also rejected on 15.12.2021. Although, during the Covid-19 pandemic this was one of the High Courts where except for a few months petitions/appeals were being filed and heard either through video conferencing or in person, nevertheless, in view of the orders of Hon'ble the Supreme Court giving the benefit of extension of limitation till 28.02.2022 we have now to see as to what was the explanation for the delay offered in filing the appeal thereafter.

5. When we peruse the affidavit we find all that it mentions is that an application was submitted by the respondent-petitioner for correction of pension payment order dated 10.06.2011 in pursuance to the judgment of the writ Court, and it is then that the order was received by the appellants. Neither the date of receipt is mentioned nor is it mentioned as to why it is so when there is a battery of lawyers running into hundreds of them who appear on behalf of the State before various Benches of the High Court including at Lucknow and the order passed in the writ petition is not a reserved order but one which was dictated in open Court, therefore, in the ordinary course of things the learned Chief Standing Counsel office would have intimated the concerned Department/officers but nothing has been stated in this regard. The affidavit then goes on to state that a decision was taken to file a review petition which was ultimately filed and dismissed on 15.12.2021. As already stated, the period up to 28.02.2022 is irrelevant because the limitation stood extended till that day for the purposes of filing the special appeal under the orders of Hon'ble the Supreme Court referred hereinabove. We have to see the explanation offered for the period thereafter. Affidavit Merely mentions about some directions having been issued on 02.09.2022 to the Directorate, Child 3 SPLAD No. 229 of 2022 Development and Nutrition followed by the letter dated 09.09.2022 for filing an appeal, there is no explanation whatsoever for the period

01.03.2022 till 30.08.2022. The affidavit goes on to state that on

27.09.2022 a request was made to learned Chief Standing Counsel for filing of the appeal which was ultimately filed on 31.10.2022. Thereafter, various decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court have been referred.

6. On a bare reading of the affidavit it demonstrate the casual and negligent approach/attitude of the appellants. There is no bona fide and serious effort reflected from a reading of the affidavit which should have been made for filing the appeal promptly.

7. We have gone through the recent judgment rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Ors. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969, wherein the law discussed in the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant as mentioned in the affidavit aforesaid have been considered and the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The period of limitation for filing the appeal being thirty days, there is hardly any explanation for the said period in the affidavit in support of the application. At least, it is not satisfactory. As regards the period after expiry of limitation also, hardly any acceptable explanation has been offered. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross 4 SPLAD No. 229 of 2022 negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed hereinabove. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly 5 SPLAD No. 229 of 2022 extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

9. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General v. 6 SPLAD No. 229 of 2022 Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterised by judicial sympathy towards the State and instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P.' reported in (2011) SCC Online SC 403 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking 7 SPLAD No. 229 of 2022 condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

10. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any reason to condone the delay in filing of the special appeal. The application for condonation of delay is rejected.

11. Consequently, the special appeal also stands dismissed. November 21, 2025 R.K.P. (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) RAJ KUMAR PATEL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench