High Court · 2025

Petitioner :- Annapurna Srivastava And 83 Others Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief/Prin. Secy. Housing And Urban Planning Hazratganj Lko. And Another Counsel for Petitioner :- Avinash Singh Vishen,Shishir Raj,Vedant Srivastava Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia,J.

1. Preliminary objection filed by respondent no.2 and reply thereto filed by the petitioners are taken on record.

2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for the State and Shri Prashant Chandra, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Prashant Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent no.2.

3. Present petition has been filed by the petitioners, who are 84 in number, alleging that the petitioners had applied for allotment of the properties with respondent no.2. Main grievance of the petitioners is that the benefits which have been extended in respect of the OTS scheme and the benefits of zero period scheme as has been decided by respondent no.2 through its 61st and 85th Board Meeting have been refused to the petitioners.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners states that decision of the board meeting to extend the said two benefits only in respect of persons who withdraw their cases initiated and pending before the Regulatory Authority constituted under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 is bad in law.

5. Learned counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection with regard to jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the writ petition. It is argued that the board resolution was passed at Gautam Buddha Nagar, U.P.; the petitioners had initiated the proceedings before the Regulatory Authority at Gautam Buddha Nagar, U.P. and no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of High Court at Lucknow, thus, this Court would have no jurisdiction.

6. On the said points, learned counsel for the petitioners states that the board resolution passed by respondent no.2/authority was approved by the State Government.

7. The said fact was denied by the respondents by arguing that the board resolution, aggrieved against which the present petition has been filed, was not approved by the State Government and instructions to that effect were also placed on record.

8. In the light of the said, it is argued that once even the approval has not been granted by the State Government having its seat at Lucknow, the Court at Lucknow would not have jurisdiction.

9. In response to the said, learned counsel for the petitioners argues that respondent no.2 is an authority created by virtue of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. He draws my attention to Section 19 of the said Act which empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act through a notification. He argues that, thus, it is the State Government which exercises the control and can make rules for implementation of the provisions of the Act and the purposes as contained in Section 19 of the Act.

10. It is further argued that the Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Gaursons Mega Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors.; 2025:AHC:57689-DB has held that a board resolution which has not been approved by the State Government cannot be implemented and has no consequences.

11. My attention is also drawn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India & Anr.; 1960 SCC OnLine SC 12, with emphasis on Paragraphs 50, 51 & 55 which are quoted herein below, to impress that this Court at Lucknow would have jurisdiction. "50. It has first to be noticed that the limitation introduced by the use of these words “in appropriate cases' has not been placed in respect of issue of writs to persons and to authorities other than government. It has been suggested that the effect of these words is that in issuing writs against any Government the High Court has not got the same freedom as it has when issuing writs against any person or authority other than Government and that when relief is asked against a Government the High Court has to take special care to see that writs are not issued indiscriminately but only in proper cases. I have no hesitation in rejecting this suggestion. It cannot be seriously contemplated for a moment that the Constitution makers intended to lay down different standards for the courts when the relief is asked for against the Government from when the relief is asked for against other authorities. In every case where relief under Article 226 is sought the High Court has the duty to exercise its discretion whether relief should be given or not. It is equally clear that in exercising such discretion the High Court will give relief only in proper cases and not in cases where the relief should not be granted.

51. Why then were these words “in appropriate cases” used at all? It seems to me that the Constitution makers being conscious of the difficulties that would arise if all the High Courts in the country were given jurisdiction to issue writs against the Central Government on the ground that the Central Government was functioning within its territories wanted to give such jurisdiction only to that High Court where the act or omission in respect of which relief was sought had taken place. In every case where relief is sought under Article 226 it would be possible to ascertain the place where the act complained of was performed or when the relief is sought against an omission, the place where the act ought to have been performed. Once this place is ascertained the High Court which exercises jurisdiction over that place is the only High Court which has jurisdiction to give relief under Article 226. That, in my view, is the necessary result of the words “in appropriate cases”.

55. It may seem at first sight that to hold that the High Court within whose jurisdiction the action or omission, complained of took place will have jurisdiction, is in effect to accept the accrual of cause of action as the basis of jurisdiction. This however is not correct. The High Court within the jurisdiction of which the act or omission takes place, has jurisdiction, not because a part of the cause of action arose there, but in consequence of the use of the words “in appropriate cases”."

12. In the light of the said, it is argued that this Court should entertain the petition and the objections of the respondent with regard to lack of territorial jurisdiction should be rejected.

13. Considering the arguments raised at the Bar, the first submission of learned counsel for the petitioners in the context of Section 19 of U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 cannot be accepted as the said section only empowers the State Government to frame regulations for carrying out the purposes of the Act. In case, the regulations are framed and the authorities do not follow the same, the same can at best give a cause of action to the aggrieved parties to approach the Court for redressal of the grievance. Merely because a power is conferred on the State Government to frame regulations for carrying out the purposes of the Act, that by itself would not create any territorial jurisdiction with the High Court at Lucknow.

14. The second submission based upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Gaursons Mega Projects Pvt. Ltd. (supra), also merits rejection in terms of the said judgment as non-approval of the board resolution can only result in the consequence that no rights can be claimed or liabilities incurred on the basis of an unapproved board resolution. It certainly does not confer territorial jurisdiction upon this Court.

15. The third submission, based upon judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra), also merits rejection as the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the phrase 'in appropriate cases'. The said judgment in no way prescribes or deals with the issue of jurisdiction which is dependent on cause of action.

16. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal; (1975) 2 SCC 671 extensively considered the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court at Allahabad and High Court at Lucknow and held as follows: "36. The meaning of the expression “in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh” in the first proviso to para 14 of the Order was answered by the High Court that with regard to applications under Article 226 the same will be “a case arising within the areas in Oudh” only if the right of the petitioner in such an application arose first at a place within an area in Oudh. The implication according to the High Court is that if the right of the petitioner arose first at any place outside any area in Oudh and if the subsequent orders either in the revisional or appellate stage were passed by an authority within an area in Oudh then in such cases the Lucknow Bench would not have any jurisdiction. The factor which weighed heavily with the High Court is that in most cases where an appeal or revision would lie to the State Government, the impugned order would be made at Lucknow and on that view practically all writ petitions would arise at Lucknow.

37. The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court is incorrect. It is unsound because the expression “cause of action” in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original order was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression “cause of action” is well-known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to go to a court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen partly within specified areas in Oudh and partly outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action.

38. To sum up. Our conclusions are as follows. First, there is no permanent seat of the High Court at Allahabad. The seats at Allahabad and at Lucknow may be changed in accordance with the provisions of the Order. Second, the Chief Justice of the High Court has no power to increase or decrease the areas in Oudh from time to time. The areas in Oudh have been determined once by the Chief Justice and, therefore, there is no scope for changing the areas. Third, the Chief Justice has power under the second proviso to para 14 of the Order to direct in his discretion that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Any case or class of cases are those which are instituted at Lucknow. The interpretation given by the High Court that the word “heard” confers powers on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad, instead of Lucknow is wrong. The word “heard” means that cases which have already been instituted or filed at Lucknow may in the discretion of the Chief Justice under the second proviso to para 14 of the Order be directed to be heard at Allahabad. Fourth, the expression “cause of action” with regard to a civil matters means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at Allahabad. Fifth, a criminal case arises when the offence has been committed or otherwise as provided in the Criminal Procedure Code. That will attract the jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or Lucknow. In some cases depending on the facts and the provision regarding jurisdiction, it may arise in either place."

17. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Nasiruddin (supra) and considering the fact that no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction vested in High Court at Lucknow, present writ petition cannot be entertained.

18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners states that arising out of the proceedings initiated before the authority constituted under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, appeals were preferred before the Appellate Tribunal which has a seat at Lucknow and arising out of the orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal, second appeals have been preferred which are pending before this Court and thus, it would cause lot of inconvenience to the petitioners if they have to go to Allahabad as the appeals filed by the respondents are pending before this Court.

19. I am afraid that the said submission cannot be accepted for the sole reason that for preferring an appeal against the order of the Appellate Tribunal, respondents had the jurisdiction to approach this Court as a part of cause of action being decision by the Appellate Tribunal was rendered at Lucknow; merely because inconvenience would be caused, the same cannot be interpreted to be that jurisdiction is conferred upon a particular Court.

20. For all the reasons recorded above, present petition is dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction.

21. Petitioners would still have the liberty to approach the High Court at Allahabad for filing writ petition.

22. In addition thereof, the petitioners would also have the liberty to take such steps as may be advised in accordance with law.

23. In view of the final decision, order dated 06.08.2025 passed by this Court loses significance particularly when a statement has been made that the board resolution has not been approved.

24. The Court fees submitted before this Court shall be returned to the petitioners on their moving an appropriate application. Order Date :- 19.8.2025 nishant NISHANT MOHAN High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Petitioner :- Annapurna Srivastava And 83 Others Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief/Prin. Secy. Housing And Urban Planning Hazratganj Lko. And Another Counsel for Petitioner :- Avinash Singh Vishen,Shishir Raj,Vedant Srivastava Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia,J.

1. Preliminary objection filed by respondent no.2 and reply thereto filed by the petitioners are taken on record.

2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for the State and Shri Prashant Chandra, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Prashant Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent no.2.

3. Present petition has been filed by the petitioners, who are 84 in number, alleging that the petitioners had applied for allotment of the properties with respondent no.2. Main grievance of the petitioners is that the benefits which have been extended in respect of the OTS scheme and the benefits of zero period scheme as has been decided by respondent no.2 through its 61st and 85th Board Meeting have been refused to the petitioners.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners states that decision of the board meeting to extend the said two benefits only in respect of persons who withdraw their cases initiated and pending before the Regulatory Authority constituted under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 is bad in law.

5. Learned counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection with regard to jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the writ petition. It is argued that the board resolution was passed at Gautam Buddha Nagar, U.P.; the petitioners had initiated the proceedings before the Regulatory Authority at Gautam Buddha Nagar, U.P. and no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of High Court at Lucknow, thus, this Court would have no jurisdiction.

6. On the said points, learned counsel for the petitioners states that the board resolution passed by respondent no.2/authority was approved by the State Government.

7. The said fact was denied by the respondents by arguing that the board resolution, aggrieved against which the present petition has been filed, was not approved by the State Government and instructions to that effect were also placed on record.

8. In the light of the said, it is argued that once even the approval has not been granted by the State Government having its seat at Lucknow, the Court at Lucknow would not have jurisdiction.

9. In response to the said, learned counsel for the petitioners argues that respondent no.2 is an authority created by virtue of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. He draws my attention to Section 19 of the said Act which empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act through a notification. He argues that, thus, it is the State Government which exercises the control and can make rules for implementation of the provisions of the Act and the purposes as contained in Section 19 of the Act.

10. It is further argued that the Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Gaursons Mega Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors.; 2025:AHC:57689-DB has held that a board resolution which has not been approved by the State Government cannot be implemented and has no consequences.

11. My attention is also drawn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India & Anr.; 1960 SCC OnLine SC 12, with emphasis on Paragraphs 50, 51 & 55 which are quoted herein below, to impress that this Court at Lucknow would have jurisdiction. "50. It has first to be noticed that the limitation introduced by the use of these words “in appropriate cases' has not been placed in respect of issue of writs to persons and to authorities other than government. It has been suggested that the effect of these words is that in issuing writs against any Government the High Court has not got the same freedom as it has when issuing writs against any person or authority other than Government and that when relief is asked against a Government the High Court has to take special care to see that writs are not issued indiscriminately but only in proper cases. I have no hesitation in rejecting this suggestion. It cannot be seriously contemplated for a moment that the Constitution makers intended to lay down different standards for the courts when the relief is asked for against the Government from when the relief is asked for against other authorities. In every case where relief under Article 226 is sought the High Court has the duty to exercise its discretion whether relief should be given or not. It is equally clear that in exercising such discretion the High Court will give relief only in proper cases and not in cases where the relief should not be granted.

51. Why then were these words “in appropriate cases” used at all? It seems to me that the Constitution makers being conscious of the difficulties that would arise if all the High Courts in the country were given jurisdiction to issue writs against the Central Government on the ground that the Central Government was functioning within its territories wanted to give such jurisdiction only to that High Court where the act or omission in respect of which relief was sought had taken place. In every case where relief is sought under Article 226 it would be possible to ascertain the place where the act complained of was performed or when the relief is sought against an omission, the place where the act ought to have been performed. Once this place is ascertained the High Court which exercises jurisdiction over that place is the only High Court which has jurisdiction to give relief under Article 226. That, in my view, is the necessary result of the words “in appropriate cases”.

55. It may seem at first sight that to hold that the High Court within whose jurisdiction the action or omission, complained of took place will have jurisdiction, is in effect to accept the accrual of cause of action as the basis of jurisdiction. This however is not correct. The High Court within the jurisdiction of which the act or omission takes place, has jurisdiction, not because a part of the cause of action arose there, but in consequence of the use of the words “in appropriate cases”."

12. In the light of the said, it is argued that this Court should entertain the petition and the objections of the respondent with regard to lack of territorial jurisdiction should be rejected.

13. Considering the arguments raised at the Bar, the first submission of learned counsel for the petitioners in the context of Section 19 of U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 cannot be accepted as the said section only empowers the State Government to frame regulations for carrying out the purposes of the Act. In case, the regulations are framed and the authorities do not follow the same, the same can at best give a cause of action to the aggrieved parties to approach the Court for redressal of the grievance. Merely because a power is conferred on the State Government to frame regulations for carrying out the purposes of the Act, that by itself would not create any territorial jurisdiction with the High Court at Lucknow.

14. The second submission based upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Gaursons Mega Projects Pvt. Ltd. (supra), also merits rejection in terms of the said judgment as non-approval of the board resolution can only result in the consequence that no rights can be claimed or liabilities incurred on the basis of an unapproved board resolution. It certainly does not confer territorial jurisdiction upon this Court.

15. The third submission, based upon judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra), also merits rejection as the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the phrase 'in appropriate cases'. The said judgment in no way prescribes or deals with the issue of jurisdiction which is dependent on cause of action.

16. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal; (1975) 2 SCC 671 extensively considered the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court at Allahabad and High Court at Lucknow and held as follows: "36. The meaning of the expression “in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh” in the first proviso to para 14 of the Order was answered by the High Court that with regard to applications under Article 226 the same will be “a case arising within the areas in Oudh” only if the right of the petitioner in such an application arose first at a place within an area in Oudh. The implication according to the High Court is that if the right of the petitioner arose first at any place outside any area in Oudh and if the subsequent orders either in the revisional or appellate stage were passed by an authority within an area in Oudh then in such cases the Lucknow Bench would not have any jurisdiction. The factor which weighed heavily with the High Court is that in most cases where an appeal or revision would lie to the State Government, the impugned order would be made at Lucknow and on that view practically all writ petitions would arise at Lucknow.

37. The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court is incorrect. It is unsound because the expression “cause of action” in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original order was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression “cause of action” is well-known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to go to a court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen partly within specified areas in Oudh and partly outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action.

38. To sum up. Our conclusions are as follows. First, there is no permanent seat of the High Court at Allahabad. The seats at Allahabad and at Lucknow may be changed in accordance with the provisions of the Order. Second, the Chief Justice of the High Court has no power to increase or decrease the areas in Oudh from time to time. The areas in Oudh have been determined once by the Chief Justice and, therefore, there is no scope for changing the areas. Third, the Chief Justice has power under the second proviso to para 14 of the Order to direct in his discretion that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Any case or class of cases are those which are instituted at Lucknow. The interpretation given by the High Court that the word “heard” confers powers on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad, instead of Lucknow is wrong. The word “heard” means that cases which have already been instituted or filed at Lucknow may in the discretion of the Chief Justice under the second proviso to para 14 of the Order be directed to be heard at Allahabad. Fourth, the expression “cause of action” with regard to a civil matters means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at Allahabad. Fifth, a criminal case arises when the offence has been committed or otherwise as provided in the Criminal Procedure Code. That will attract the jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or Lucknow. In some cases depending on the facts and the provision regarding jurisdiction, it may arise in either place."

17. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Nasiruddin (supra) and considering the fact that no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction vested in High Court at Lucknow, present writ petition cannot be entertained.

18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners states that arising out of the proceedings initiated before the authority constituted under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, appeals were preferred before the Appellate Tribunal which has a seat at Lucknow and arising out of the orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal, second appeals have been preferred which are pending before this Court and thus, it would cause lot of inconvenience to the petitioners if they have to go to Allahabad as the appeals filed by the respondents are pending before this Court.

19. I am afraid that the said submission cannot be accepted for the sole reason that for preferring an appeal against the order of the Appellate Tribunal, respondents had the jurisdiction to approach this Court as a part of cause of action being decision by the Appellate Tribunal was rendered at Lucknow; merely because inconvenience would be caused, the same cannot be interpreted to be that jurisdiction is conferred upon a particular Court.

20. For all the reasons recorded above, present petition is dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction.

21. Petitioners would still have the liberty to approach the High Court at Allahabad for filing writ petition.

22. In addition thereof, the petitioners would also have the liberty to take such steps as may be advised in accordance with law.

23. In view of the final decision, order dated 06.08.2025 passed by this Court loses significance particularly when a statement has been made that the board resolution has not been approved.

24. The Court fees submitted before this Court shall be returned to the petitioners on their moving an appropriate application. Order Date :- 19.8.2025 nishant NISHANT MOHAN High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench