Criminal Revision No. 808 of 2025 · High Court · 2025

Judgment

1. Supplementary affidavit filed today is taken on record.

2. Heard.

3. This criminal revision under Section 397/401 Cr.P.C. has been filed against the judgment and order dated 09.05.2025, passed by the Special Judge (POCSO) Act Ist, Ayodhya in Complaint Case No.07/2024 (Smt. Anjali @ Anjana Vs. Alok Gupta & Another), PS.- Kotwali Ayodhya, District- Ayodhya.

4. Vide order dated 09.05.2025, the Special Judge/POCSO Act-Ist, Ayodhya rejected the application preferred by the applicant under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

5. Operative portion of order dated 09.05.2025 reads as under:- " प्रकरण में परिरवादि(cid:12)नी स्वयं घटना की चक्ष(cid:12)र्शी(cid:24) साक्षी नहीं है क्योंदिक उसके द्वारा अपने बयान में कथन दिकया है दिक उसकी नन(cid:12) ने बताया दिक (cid:12)ोनों दिवपक्षीगण ने उसके साथ गलत काम दिकया। पीडि+ता ने अपने बयान में कथन दिकया है दिक दिवपक्षीगण ने उसके साथ (cid:12)ो बार बलात्कार दिकया और उस समय घर में कोई नहीं था। पीदि/ता ने अपने बयान में यह भी कथन दिकया है दिक वह अपनी भाभी के साथ कू /ा बीनने जाती थी एवं यह भी कथन की है दिक जब से उसने होर्शी संभाला तब से उसके मां बाप काम नहीं कर रहे है। वह, भाई व भाभी ही काम करते हैं। मां बाप घर पर ही रहते हैं। यदि(cid:12) मां बाप घर पर रहते हैं तो दिवपक्षीगण द्वारा (cid:12)ो बार पीदि/ता के साथ घर में बलात्कार करना दिवश्वसनीय प्रतीत नहीं होता। पीदि/ता ने यह भी कहा दिक वो भाभी के साथ काम पर जाती है , ऐसी स्थिस्थडित में उसका घर पर अके ला रहने का व घटना का . रिरत होने का कथन दिवश्वसनीय प्रतीत नहीं होता। परिरवादि(cid:12)नी ने अपने बयान में कथन दिकया है दिक उसने दिवपक्षीगण को जमीन बेचने की कोई बात नहीं की जब दिक पत्रावली पर परिरवादि(cid:12)नी एवं दिवपक्षीगण के मध्य हुए जमीन के इकरारनामा की प्रडित व दिवपक्षीगण द्वारा वादि(cid:12)नी के दिवरूद्ध उक्त के बाबत (cid:12)ाखि@ल (cid:12)ीवानी मूल वा(cid:12) की प्रडित मौजू(cid:12) है जिजससे यह स्पष्ट है दिक पक्षकारों के मध्य जमीनी दिववा(cid:12) है । ऐसी स्थिस्थडित में यह प्रतीत होता है दिक परिरवादि(cid:12)नी द्वारा कथिथत घटना को इस Criminal Revision No.808 of 2025 Page No. 2 of 21 दिवर्शीेष न्यायालय के क्षेत्राडिGकार में लाने हेतु बढ़ा चढ़ा कर अपनी ननं(cid:12) के साथ दिवपक्षीगण द्वारा उक्त कृ त्य दिकए जाने के तथ्यों का उल्ले@ करते हुए प्राथLनापत्र प्रस्तुत दिकया गया है। गवाहों के बयान में गंभीर दिवरोGाभाष है जिजससे बयान दिवश्वसनीय प्रतीत नहीं होते व कथिथत घटना पर सं(cid:12)ेह उत्पन्न होता है। उपरोक्त तथ्यों को दृदिष्टगत र@ते हुए न्यायालय के मतानुसार प्रथम दृष्टया दिवपक्षीगण को दिवचारण के खिलए तलब दिकए जाने का आGार पयाLप्त नहीं है। त(cid:12)नुसार प्रस्तुत परिरवा(cid:12) दिनरस्त दिकए जाने योग्य है। आ(cid:12)ेर्शी प्रस्तुत परिरवा(cid:12) संख्या 07/2024, कम्प्यूटर पंजीयन संख्या 17/2024, श्रीमती अंजली उर्फL अंजना बनाम आलोक गुप्ता आदि(cid:12) अंतगLत Gारा 203 (cid:12)० प्र० सं० दिनरस्त दिकया जाता है। पत्रावली दिनयमानुसार (cid:12)ाखि@ल (cid:12)फ्तर हो।"

6. Considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

7. Law dealing with an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has already been settled in various pronouncements including the following judgments:-

8. Relevant paras of the judgment passed in the case of Sukhwasi vs. State of U.P., reported in 2007 SCC OnLine All 1088; wherein this Court answered the question referred on account of difference of opinion on the issue of exercise of power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., are as under:- "“Whether the Magistrate is bound to pass an order on each and every application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. containing allegations of commission of a cognizable offence for registration of the F.I.R. and its investigation by the police even if those allegations, prima-facie, do not appear to be genuine and do not appeal to reason, or he can exercise judicial discretion in the matter and can pass order for treating it as ‘complaint’ or to reject it in suitable cases”? XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 18. It is hardly possible to infer from the aforesaid observations that the Magistrate cannot treat an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a ‘complaint’. Even a nebulous of far fetched interpretation will not lead to that inference. The inference drawn by Hon'ble Vinod Prasad, J. is not logical.

19. The Hon'ble Judge has also referred to the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal: JT 1990 (4) SC 650 : (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604) and has extracted the following observations:— (Paras 30, 32) “At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of Section 154(1) of the Code, the concerned police officer cannot embark upon any enquiry as to whether the information, laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer-in-charge of a police station is statutorily obliged Criminal Revision No.808 of 2025 Page No. 3 of 21 to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 157 of the Code to investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157 (as we have proposed to make a detailed discussion about the power of a police officer to the field of investigation of a cognizable offence within the ambit of Sections 156 and 157 of the Code in the issuing part of this judgment, we do not propose to deal with those sections in extenso in the present context). In case an offence incharge of a police station refuses to exercise the jurisdiction in him and to register a case on the information of a cognizable offence reported and thereby violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the person aggrieved by such refusal can send the substance of the information in writing and by post to the superintendent of police concerned who if satisfied that the information forwarded to him discloses a cognizable offence, should either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him in the manner provided by sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code. Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and cautiously used the expression “information” without qualifying the same as in Section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the Code wherein the expressions, “reasonable complaint”, and “credible information” are used. Evidently, the non-qualification of the word “information” in Section 154(1) unlike in Section 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code may be for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words, ‘reasonableness’ or ‘credibility’ of the said information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had purposely thought it fit to employ only the word “information” without qualifying the said word. Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of 1861) passed by the Legislative Council of India read that ‘every complaint or information’ preferred to an officer-in-charge of a police station should be reduced into writing which provision was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act 10 of 1872) which thereafter read that ‘every complaint’ preferred to an officer-in- charge of a police station shall be reduced in writing. The word ‘complaint’ which occurred in previous two codes of 1861 and 1872 was deleted and in that place the word ‘information’ was used in the Codes of 1882 and 1898 which word is now used in Sections 154, 155, 157 and 189(c) of the present Code of 1973 (Act 2 of 1974). An overall reading of all the Codes makes it clear that the condition which is sine qua non for recording a first information report is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence.” “It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid therefore, officer-in-charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer had no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed from, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information.” (Emphasis mine) Criminal Revision No.808 of 2025 Page No. 4 of 21

20. As in the earlier case, a completely irrational and egregiously erroneous inference has been drawn from the aforesaid observation. The observations relate to the registration of a case by a police officer as will appear from the last paragraph with emphasis and they have nothing to do with the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

21. It will not be out of place to note that even for registration of a case by a police officer, the condition is that he must have reason to suspect the commission of an offence as will appear from the following quotations extracted from the case of Ramesh Kumari v. State NCT of Delhi: JT 2006 (2) SC 548 : ((2006) 2 SCC 677 : AIR 2006 SC 1322) the following are the words extracted:— “The true test is whether the information furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission of an offence which the concerned police officer is empowered under Section 156 of the code to investigate. If it does he has no option but to record the information and proceed to investigate the case either himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation. The question as to whether the report is true, whether it discloses full details regarding the manner of occurrence, whether the accused is named and whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations are all matters which are alien to the consideration of the question whether the report discloses commission of a cognizable offence. Even if the information does not give full details regarding these matters, the investigating officer is not absolve of his duty to investigate the case and discover the true facts, if he can.”

22. In a recent pronouncement, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Shiv Charan Sharma in the case of Chandrika Singh v. State of U.P. (2007 (58) ACC 777) : (2007 (4) ALJ 157), has held that a Magistrate can treat an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint. The Hon'ble Judge referred to various cases in his judgment and has come to this conclusion thereafter. It was observed by Shiv Charan, J. as follows (paras 24 to 26): “In view of this judgment of Full Bench, the Magistrate is fully competent to pass an order to register a case and investigate on an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., all the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. may be treated as complaint and in the circumstance, the Magistrate shall follow the procedure as provided in Chapter XV Cr.P.C. This, judgment of Full Bench has not been set aside. Hence, in view of the Apex Court and Full Bench of this Court the Magistrate is fully competent to treat an application under Section 156 Cr.P.C. as a complaint and in the present case the Magistrate passed an order in the circumstances of the case that it may be registered as a complaint case and proceed to record the statement under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. There appears no illegality and impropriety in the order of the Magistrate. This controversy must come to an end that an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can only be treated as an application for passing an order for registration of the case and investigation cannot be treated as a complaint case. The Magistrate is not bound in each and every case to pass an order to register a case and investigate if cognizable offence is made out. The Magistrate is fully competent to use this judicial direction in the matter. This is wrong notion that if an application has been moved under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. that the only order can be passed for registration in the matter. The magistrate has got direction under Section 190 Cr.P.C. to take the cognizance directly or to pass an order that the police to investigate and then take cognizance on submissions of a report Criminal Revision No.808 of 2025 Page No. 5 of 21 under Section 173 Cr.P.C. The Magistrate is also expected to act under some guidelines and it should not be left at the arbitrary discretion of the Magistrate to pass an order or not to pass an order to register the case and investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. In Gulab Chandra Upadhaya v. State of U.P. (2002 All LJ 1225). Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court laid down the guidelines for the guidance of Magistrate while deciding the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and the guidelines cannot be said against any provision of law or check on the judicial direction of the Magistrate. Even Hon'ble Apex Court also held that the Magistrate has got a direction to pass an order to register the case and investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or to treat an application as a complaint case. In the law laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court and various judgments of this Court clearly laid down that the Magistrate is not always bound to pass an order to register a case and investigation when application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is moved. It will not be proper to deal with this hypothetical position that if the Magistrate is of opinion that false and frivolous allegation has been made in application then he may reject the application or it is for the investigating officer to decide the truthfulness of the story and if found false then launch prosecution against the applicant. But it is discretion of the Magistrate to be used judiciously while disposing of the application. For the reasons mentioned above, I am of the opinion that the Magistrate is not always bound to pass an order for register of the case and investigation after receipt of the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. disclosing a cognizable offence. The Magistrate may use his discretion judiciously and if he is of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case, it will be proper to treat the application as a complaint case then he may proceed according to the procedure provided under Chapter XV of Cr.P.C. I am also of the opinion that it is not always mandatory in each and every case for the Magistrate to pass an order to register and investigate on receipt of the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. In the present case, the Magistrate is perfectly within the judicial power to treat the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint case. There is no illegality or impropriety in the order. The revision is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.”

23. The Full Bench decision of Ram Babu Gupta's case (2001 All LJ 1587) (supra) also lays down that the Magistrate can treat an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint. This will appear from the following observations (Para 18):— “Coming to the second question noted above, it is to be at once stated that a provision empowering a Court to Act in a particular manner and a provision creating a right for an aggrieved person to approach a Court or authority, must be understood distinctly and should not be mixed up. While Sections 154, 155 sub-section (1) and (2) of 156, Cr.P.C. confer right on an aggrieved person to reach the police, 156(3) empowers a Magistrate to act in a particular manner in a given situation. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that where a bare application is moved before Court only praying for exercise of powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., it will remain an application only and would not be in the nature of a complaint. It has been noted above that the Magistrate has to always apply his mind on the allegations in the complaint where he may use his powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. In this connection, it may be immediately added that where in an application, a complainant states Criminal Revision No.808 of 2025 Page No. 6 of 21 facts which constitute cognizable offence but makes a defective prayer, such an application will not cease to be a complaint nor can the Magistrate refuse to treat it as a complaint even though there be no prayer seeking trial of the known or unknown accused. The Magistrate has to deal with such facts as constitute cognizable offence and for all practical purposes even such an application would be a complaint. This Court can do no better than refer to the following observations in Suresh Chand Jain: ((2001) 2 SCC 628 : AIR 2001 SC 571) (supra) (Para 10):— “The position is thus clear. Any judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code…………… could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter."

9. In the case of Lalita Kumari vs. State of U.P., reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1; the Hon'ble Apex Court concluded as under:- "120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:-

120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.

120.2. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.

120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.

120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.

120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence.

120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under: (a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes (b) Commercial offences (c) Medical negligence cases (d) Corruption cases (e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months' delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay. The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry. Criminal Revision No.808 of 2025 Page No. 7 of 21

120.7 . While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time-bound and in any case it should not exceed fifteen days generally and in exceptional cases, by giving adequate reasons, six weeks' time is provided. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry.

120.8. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above."

10. In the case of Ramdev Food Products Private Limited vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2015) 6 SCC 439, the appellant making allegations of preparing forged partnership deed, sought directions for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and the Magistrate instead of directing investigation as prayed for, thought it fit to conduct further inquiry under Section 202 and sought report of the Police Sub-Inspector within thirty days and being aggrieved by the order of Magistrate the appellant approached the High Court and the High Court declined to interfere in the order of Magistrate and thereafter the appellant approached the Hon'ble Apex Court and after considering the facts and issue involved the Hon'ble Apex Court framed three questions and while dealing with question as to "(i) Whether the discretion of the Magistrate to call for a report under Section 202 instead of directing investigation under Section 156(3) is controlled by any defined parameters?" the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:- "15. Cognizance is taken by a Magistrate under Section 190 (in Chapter XIV) either on “receiving a complaint”, on “a police report” or “information received” from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge.

16. Chapter XV deals exclusively with complaints to Magistrates. Reference to Section 202, in the said Chapter, shows that it provides for “postponement of issue of process” which is mandatory if the accused resides beyond the Magistrate's jurisdiction (with which situation this case does not concern) and discretionary in other cases in which event an enquiry can be conducted by the Magistrate or investigation can be directed to be made by a police officer or such other person as may be thought fit “for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding”. We are skipping the proviso as it does not concern the question under discussion. Clause (3) provides that if investigation is by a person other than a police officer, he shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of a police station except the power to arrest. Criminal Revision No.808 of 2025 Page No. 8 of 21

17. Chapter XII, dealing with the information to the police and their powers to investigate, provides for entering information relating to a “cognizable offence” in a book to be kept by the officer in charge of a police station (Section 154) and such entry is called “FIR”. If from the information, the officer in charge of the police station has reason to suspect commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate subject to compliance with other requirements, he shall proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances and, if necessary, to take measure, for the discovery and arrest of the offender [Section 157(1)].

18. In Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , this Court dealt with the questions : (SCC p. 28, para 30) “30.1. (i) Whether the immediate non-registration of FIR leads to scope for manipulation by the police which affects the right of the victim/complainant to have a complaint immediately investigated upon allegations being made; and

30.2. (ii) Whether in cases where the complaint/information does not clearly disclose the commission of a cognizable offence but the FIR is compulsorily registered then does it infringe the rights of an accused.” These questions were answered as follows : (Lalita Kumari case [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , SCC pp. 35-36, 41, 51-52, 57-59 & 61, paras 49, 72-73, 94, 107-108, 111, 114- 15 & 120)

49. “Consequently, the condition that is sine qua non for recording an FIR under Section 154 of the Code is that there must be information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence. If any information disclosing a cognizable offence is led before an officer in charge of the police station satisfying the requirement of Section 154(1), the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information. The provision of Section 154 of the Code is mandatory and the officer concerned is duty-bound to register the case on the basis of information disclosing a cognizable offence. Thus, the plain words of Section 154(1) of the Code have to be given their literal meaning. ‘Shall’ ***

72. It is thus unequivocally clear that registration of FIR is mandatory and also that it is to be recorded in the FIR book by giving a unique annual number to each FIR to enable strict tracking of each and every registered FIR by the superior police officers as well as by the competent court to which copies of each FIR are required to be sent. “Information”

73. The legislature has consciously used the expression ‘information’ in Section 154(1) of the Code as against the expression used in Sections 41(1)(a) [Ed. : Vide Act 5 of 2009, w.e.f. 1-1-2010 Sections 41(1)(a) and (b) of the principal Act were substituted with differently worded Sections 41(1)(a) and (b) : the new clause (b) being substantially in pari materia with the old clause (a). A new clause (ba) was also added. The old clause (a) mentioned in most of the judgments cited hereinbelow stood as Criminal Revision No.808 of 2025 Page No. 9 of 21 follows:“41. (1)(a) who has been concerned in any cognizable offence, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been so concerned; or”The new Sections 41(1)(a), (b) and (ba) are as follows:“41. (1)(a) who commits, in the presence of a police officer, a cognizable offence;(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received …(ba) against whom credible information has been received that he has committed a cognizable offence …”Clause (g) of Section 41(1) remains unaltered.] and (g) where the expression used for arresting a person without warrant is ‘reasonable complaint’ or ‘credible information’. The expression under Section 154(1) of the Code is not qualified by the prefix ‘reasonable’ or ‘credible’. The non-qualification of the word ‘information’ in Section 154(1) unlike in Sections 41(1)(a) [Ed. : Vide Act 5 of 2009, w.e.f. 1-1- 2010 Sections 41(1)(a) and (b) of the principal Act were substituted with differently worded Sections 41(1)(a) and (b) : the new clause (b) being substantially in pari materia with the old clause (a). A new clause (ba) was also added. The old clause (a) mentioned in most of the judgments cited hereinbelow stood as follows:“41. (1)(a) who has been concerned in any cognizable offence, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been so concerned; or”The new Sections 41(1)(a), (b) and (ba) are as follows:“41. (1)(a) who commits, in the presence of a police officer, a cognizable offence;(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received …(ba) against whom credible information has been received that he has committed a cognizable offence …”Clause (g) of Section 41(1) remains unaltered.] and (g) of the Code is for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record any information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words, reasonableness or credibility of the said information is not a condition precedent for the registration of a case. ***

94. Principles of democracy and liberty demand a regular and efficient check on police powers. One way of keeping check on authorities with such powers is by documenting every action of theirs. Accordingly, under the Code, actions of the police, etc. are provided to be written and documented. For example, in case of arrest under Section 41(1)(b) of the Code, the arrest memo along with the grounds has to be in writing mandatorily; under Section 55 of the Code, if an officer is deputed to make an arrest, then the superior officer has to write down and record the offence, etc. for which the person is to be arrested; under Section 91 of the Code, a written order has to be passed by the officer concerned to seek documents; under Section 160 of the Code, a written notice has to be issued to the witness so that he can be called for recording of his/her statement, seizure memo/panchnama has to be drawn for every article seized, etc. ***

107. While registration of FIR is mandatory, arrest of the accused immediately on registration of FIR is not at all mandatory. In fact, registration of FIR and arrest of an accused person are two entirely different concepts under the law, and there are several safeguards Criminal Revision No.808 of 2025 Page No. 10 of 21 available against arrest. Moreover, it is also pertinent to mention that an accused person also has a right to apply for ‘anticipatory bail’ under the provisions of Section 438 of the Code if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied. Thus, in appropriate cases, he can avoid the arrest under that provision by obtaining an order from the court.

108. It is also relevant to note that in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. [(1994) 4 SCC 260 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1172] , this Court has held that arrest cannot be made by the police in a routine manner. Some important observations are reproduced as under : (SCC pp. 267-68, para 20) ‘20. … No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made against a person. It would be prudent for a police officer in the interest of protection of the constitutional rights of a citizen and perhaps in his own interest that no arrest should be made without a reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the genuineness and bona fides of a complaint and a reasonable belief both as to the person's complicity and even so as to the need to effect arrest. Denying a person of his liberty is a serious matter. The recommendations of the Police Commission merely reflect the constitutional concomitants of the fundamental right to personal liberty and freedom. A person is not liable to arrest merely on the suspicion of complicity in an offence. There must be some reasonable justification in the opinion of the officer effecting the arrest that such arrest is necessary and justified. Except in heinous offences, an arrest must be avoided if a police officer issues notice to person to attend the Station House and not to leave the Station without permission would do.’ ***

111. Besides, the Code gives power to the police to close a matter both before and after investigation. A police officer can foreclose an FIR before an investigation under Section 157 of the Code, if it appears to him that there is no sufficient ground to investigate the same. The section itself states that a police officer can start investigation when he has “reason to suspect the commission of an offence”. Therefore, the requirements of launching an investigation under Section 157 of the Code are higher than the requirement under Section 154 of the Code. The police officer can also, in a given case, investigate the matter and then file a final report under Section 173 of the Code seeking closure of the matter. Therefore, the police is not liable to launch an investigation in every FIR which is mandatorily registered on receiving information relating to commission of a cognizable offence. *** (emphasis in original)

114. It is true that a delicate balance has to be maintained between the interest of the society and protecting the liberty of an individual. As already discussed above, there are already sufficient safeguards provided in the Code which duly protect the liberty of an individual in case of registration of false FIR. At the same time, Section 154 was drafted keeping in mind the interest of the victim and the society. Therefore, we are of the cogent view that mandatory registration of FIRs under Section 154 of the Code will not be in contravention of Article 21 of the Constitution as purported by various counsel. Exceptions Criminal Revision No.808 of 2025 Page No. 11 of 21

115. Although, we, in unequivocal terms, hold that Section 154 of the Code postulates the mandatory registration of FIRs on receipt of all cognizable offences, yet, there may be instances where preliminary inquiry may be required owing to the change in genesis and novelty of crimes with the passage of time. One such instance is in the case of allegations relating to medical negligence on the part of doctors. It will be unfair and inequitable to prosecute a medical professional only on the basis of the allegations in the complaint. ***

120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under: (a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes (b) Commercial offences (c) Medical negligence cases (d) Corruption cases (e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months' delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.”

19. Thus, this Court has laid down that while prompt registration of FIR is mandatory, checks and balances on power of police are equally important. Power of arrest or of investigation is not mechanical. It requires application of mind in the manner provided. Existence of power and its exercise are different. Delicate balance had to be maintained between the interest of society and liberty of an individual. Commercial offences have been put in the category of cases where FIR may not be warranted without enquiry.

20. It has been held, for the same reasons, that direction by the Magistrate for investigation under Section 156(3) cannot be given mechanically. In Anil Kumar [(2013) 10 SCC 705 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) v. M.K. Aiyappa 35] , it was observed : (SCC p. 711, para 11)

11. “The scope of Section 156(3) CrPC came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. This Court in Maksud Saiyed case [Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 668 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 692] examined the requirement of the application of mind by the Magistrate before exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) and held that where jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 CrPC, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind, in such a case, the Special Judge/Magistrate cannot refer the matter under Section 156(3) against a public servant without a valid sanction order. The application of mind by the Magistrate should be reflected in the order. The mere statement that he has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complainant, as such, as reflected in the order, will not be sufficient. After going through the complaint, documents and hearing the complainant, what weighed with the Magistrate to order investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, should be reflected in the order, though a detailed expression of his views is neither required nor warranted. We have already extracted the order passed by the learned Special Judge which, in our view, has stated no reasons for ordering investigation.” Criminal Revision No.808 of 2025 Page No. 12 of 21 The above observations apply to category of cases mentioned in para 120.6 in v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] . [Lalita Kumari Lalita Kumari

21. On the other hand, power under Section 202 is of different nature. Report sought under the said provision has limited purpose of deciding “whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding”. If this be the object, the procedure under Section 157 or Section 173 is not intended to be followed. Section 157 requires sending of report by the police that the police officer suspected commission of offence from information received by the police and thereafter the police is required to proceed to the spot, investigate the facts and take measures for discovery and arrest. Thereafter, the police has to record statements and report on which the Magistrate may proceed under Section 190. This procedure is applicable when the police receives information of a cognizable offence, registers a case and forms the requisite opinion and not every case registered by the police.

22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that:

22.1. The direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone the issuance of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued.

22.2. The cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine “existence of sufficient ground to proceed”. Category of cases falling under para 120.6 in v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] may fall under Section 202." [Lalita Kumari Lalita Kumari

11. In the case of Priyanka Srivastava vs. State of U.P., reported in (2015) 6 SCC 287; subject matter of which relates to preferring an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. by the borrower against the Officer of the financial institution after initiation of proceedings under SARFAESI Act, 2002, the Hon'ble Apex Court, after considering the judgment(s) passed in the case of Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy [(1976) 3 SCC 252 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 380] (Para 17); Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa [(2013) 10 SCC 705 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 35] (Para 11); Dilawar Singh v. State of Delhi [(2007) 12 SCC 641 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 330] (Para 18); Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan, (2006) 1 SCC 627, SCC p. 631, Para 11 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 460.]; CREF Finance Ltd.v. Shree Shanthi Homes (P) Ltd. [(2005) 7 SCC 467 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1697]; Madhao v. State of Maharashtra [Madhao v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 141] (Para 18); Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat Criminal Revision No.808 of 2025