State Of U.P.Through The Secy.Irrigation Lko.And Ors.3140s/S01 v. Vijay Kumar

appellants and Shri Sharad Pathak, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Mayank Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent.

3. This is an appeal filed by the State appellants on 27.02.2012 challenging the judgment and order dated 21.07.2011 passed in Writ Petition No.3140 (S/S) of 2001. The appeal is filed with a delay of six months and seven days as on 27.02.2012, that is the date of its filing. An application for condonation of delay has been filed, to which objections have been filed by respondent/ petitioner.

4. We have gone through the affidavit in support of application for condonation of delay. Though the impugned order was passed on

21.07.2011 and there is a battery of lawyers engaged by the State to advance its cause before various benches of the High Court, inspite of it, 2 SPLAD No. 111 of 2012 the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay does not throw any light as to when the office of the Chief Standing Counsel at Lucknow informed the appellants about the passing of the order dated

21.07.2011 as the order impugned was passed in open court and was not a reserved one. The affidavit merely states that the impugned order was received in the office of the appellant on 29.08.2011 without giving any reasons as to what happened in the interregnum, whether or not the State's advocate informed the appellants about the passing of the said order. Even after receipt of impugned order on 29.08.2011 it is only on 12.09.2011 that the Executive Engineer, Nalkoop Khand, Barabanki directed his Junior Engineer to obtain a copy of the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Faizabad in criminal case lodged against the respondent/ petitioner so that necessary steps be taken in compliance of the Court's order, which is wholly irrelevant if the appellants wanted to file an appeal, for which limitation prescribed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 is 30 days vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

5. The affidavit thereafter goes to say that Executive Engineer, Nalkoop Khand, Barabanki then wrote on 29.09.2011 to Superintending Engineer, Nalkoop Mandal, Faizabad for filing of special appeal. The Senior Staff Officer in the office of the Chief Engineer (Mechanical), Irrigation Department, U.P., Lucknow wrote a letter on 24.10.2011 requesting the Joint Secretary for providing necessary permission for filing special appeal. The aforesaid facts do not display any urgency or promptness on the part of the appellants in preferring an appeal, rather it discloses a leisurely and casual approach in this regard. Again a letter was written by 3 SPLAD No. 111 of 2012 the Executive Engineer, Nalkoop Khand, Barabanki on 08.11.2011 to the aforesaid Senior Staff Officer for providing necessary permission for filing of appeal. The Law Department granted permission only on

25.11.2011, whereupon the Executive Engineer, Nalkoop Khand, Barabanki requested the Chief Standing Counsel vide letter dated

26.11.2011 to take necessary steps for filing special appeal. The paper book was assigned to the Standing Counsel on 28.11.2011. The special appeal was dictated by the Standing Counsel on 24.12.2011, almost a month after the receipt of paper book, and then the appeal was filed on

21.02.2012. There is no satisfactory explanation whatsoever for the period after 24.12.2011 till the date of filing of appeal, that is 27.02.2012. There is no explanation for the intervening period, that is from the date of passing of impugned order on 21.07.2011 till filing of the appeal on

27.02.2012.

6. Tested on the anvil of the recent decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on 12.09.2025, wherein the principles enunciated in the decisions relied upon in paragraph 11 of the affidavit by the appellants have been considered, we do not find any reason to condone the delay in filing this appeal, which is inordinate. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest 4 SPLAD No. 111 of 2012 reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above.

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, inquiry is confined to whether ‘sufficient cause’ has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of 5 SPLAD No. 111 of 2012 discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private 6 SPLAD No. 111 of 2012 individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a ‘sufficient cause’ for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

9. In view of the above discussion, as, not only the delay is inordinate, but the same has not been satisfactorily explained, we see no reason to 7 SPLAD No. 111 of 2012 condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is rejected.

10. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 15, 2025 Arnima (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) ARNIMA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

appellants and Shri Sharad Pathak, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Mayank Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent.

3. This is an appeal filed by the State appellants on 27.02.2012 challenging the judgment and order dated 21.07.2011 passed in Writ Petition No.3140 (S/S) of 2001. The appeal is filed with a delay of six months and seven days as on 27.02.2012, that is the date of its filing. An application for condonation of delay has been filed, to which objections have been filed by respondent/ petitioner.

4. We have gone through the affidavit in support of application for condonation of delay. Though the impugned order was passed on

21.07.2011 and there is a battery of lawyers engaged by the State to advance its cause before various benches of the High Court, inspite of it, 2 SPLAD No. 111 of 2012 the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay does not throw any light as to when the office of the Chief Standing Counsel at Lucknow informed the appellants about the passing of the order dated

21.07.2011 as the order impugned was passed in open court and was not a reserved one. The affidavit merely states that the impugned order was received in the office of the appellant on 29.08.2011 without giving any reasons as to what happened in the interregnum, whether or not the State's advocate informed the appellants about the passing of the said order. Even after receipt of impugned order on 29.08.2011 it is only on 12.09.2011 that the Executive Engineer, Nalkoop Khand, Barabanki directed his Junior Engineer to obtain a copy of the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Faizabad in criminal case lodged against the respondent/ petitioner so that necessary steps be taken in compliance of the Court's order, which is wholly irrelevant if the appellants wanted to file an appeal, for which limitation prescribed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 is 30 days vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

5. The affidavit thereafter goes to say that Executive Engineer, Nalkoop Khand, Barabanki then wrote on 29.09.2011 to Superintending Engineer, Nalkoop Mandal, Faizabad for filing of special appeal. The Senior Staff Officer in the office of the Chief Engineer (Mechanical), Irrigation Department, U.P., Lucknow wrote a letter on 24.10.2011 requesting the Joint Secretary for providing necessary permission for filing special appeal. The aforesaid facts do not display any urgency or promptness on the part of the appellants in preferring an appeal, rather it discloses a leisurely and casual approach in this regard. Again a letter was written by 3 SPLAD No. 111 of 2012 the Executive Engineer, Nalkoop Khand, Barabanki on 08.11.2011 to the aforesaid Senior Staff Officer for providing necessary permission for filing of appeal. The Law Department granted permission only on

25.11.2011, whereupon the Executive Engineer, Nalkoop Khand, Barabanki requested the Chief Standing Counsel vide letter dated

26.11.2011 to take necessary steps for filing special appeal. The paper book was assigned to the Standing Counsel on 28.11.2011. The special appeal was dictated by the Standing Counsel on 24.12.2011, almost a month after the receipt of paper book, and then the appeal was filed on

21.02.2012. There is no satisfactory explanation whatsoever for the period after 24.12.2011 till the date of filing of appeal, that is 27.02.2012. There is no explanation for the intervening period, that is from the date of passing of impugned order on 21.07.2011 till filing of the appeal on

27.02.2012.

6. Tested on the anvil of the recent decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on 12.09.2025, wherein the principles enunciated in the decisions relied upon in paragraph 11 of the affidavit by the appellants have been considered, we do not find any reason to condone the delay in filing this appeal, which is inordinate. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest 4 SPLAD No. 111 of 2012 reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above.

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, inquiry is confined to whether ‘sufficient cause’ has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of 5 SPLAD No. 111 of 2012 discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private 6 SPLAD No. 111 of 2012 individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a ‘sufficient cause’ for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

9. In view of the above discussion, as, not only the delay is inordinate, but the same has not been satisfactorily explained, we see no reason to 7 SPLAD No. 111 of 2012 condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is rejected.

10. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 15, 2025 Arnima (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) ARNIMA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench