Ramendra Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P and others). The relevant extract of the judgment dated

Applicant :- Ramendra Kumar Gupta Opposite Party :- Sri Manoj Kumar Singh Prin.Secy.Nagar Vikas Lucknow And Ors. Counsel for Applicant :- Laltaprasad Misra,Lalta Prasad Misra,Ravi Kant Mishra Counsel for Opposite Party :- M.K. Dixit,R.D,Shahi,Ripu Daman Shahi Hon'ble Manish Kumar,J.

1. The present contempt application has been preferred for non-compliance of the judgment and order dated 02.03.2017, passed by the writ court in Writ Petition No. 2542 (S/S) of 2010 (Ramendra Kumar Gupta versus State of U.P and others). The relevant extract of the judgment dated 02.03.2017 is quoted hereinbelow:- "As regards arrears of salary for the period of dismissal and suspension and other consequential benefits, if any, a decision in this regard shall be taken after conclusion of the proceedings permitted as aforesaid, but, the petitioner shall be reinstated forthwith and paid salary as per Rules."

2. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the judgment and order dated 02.03.2017 was served upon the respondents on 20.03.2017 and in pursuance thereof, the part compliance was made by reinstating the applicant in service on 21.03.2017, but the other part of the judgment has not been complied with i.e. with regard to the decision taken for payment of arrears of salary for the period of dismissal and suspension and other consequential benefits.

3. It is further submitted that when the decision was not taken regarding payment of arrears for the period of dismissal, suspension and other consequential benefits, the present contempt application has been preferred.

4. It is further submitted that for compliance of the judgment, several representations were made to the authorities in between.

5. On the other hand, Shri R.D Shahi, learned counsel for respondent no. 2 has submitted that the present contempt application is barred by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 as the same has been filed after one year of the cause of action arose for the first time and the same has specifically been mentioned in paragraph-12 of the counter afÏdavit and he also relied upon a judgment in the case of {Islammudin versus Umesh Chandra Tiwari and Another (reported in 2009 (5) ADJ 656 (DB)}

6. In reply, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the judgment and order is still in existence and the respondents have not complied the same till date and para-12 of the counter afÏdavit has been replied in paragraph-12 of the rejoinder afÏdavit that prior to the superannuation/retirement of the applicant dated 30.09.2018, the respondents had sufÏcient time to make the inquiry, but they had neither initiated the same nor completed it till date.

7. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, going through the records of the case, the position which emerges out in the present case is that the representation was made by the applicant on 20.03.2017 for compliance of the judgment and order dated 02.03.2017. The partial compliance was made by reinstating the applicant in service on 21.03.2017, but as far as with regard to arrears of salary for the period of dismissal and suspension and other consequential benefits, the court had directed that any decision in this regard shall be taken after the conclusion of the proceedings permitted as aforesaid, whereas the said proceedings were neither initiated nor concluded and the petitioner retired from the service on 30.09.2018. The court has not provided any period for conclusion of the proceedings and taking a decision for payment with regard to arrears of salary for the period of dismissal, suspension and other consequential benefits.

8. On being asked from learned counsel for the applicant that in case, the period is not provided then what is the reasonable period, on expiry of which the contempt could be filed as per the law settled by this Court, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the said reasonable period as prescribed by this Court is three months. The three months period expired on 20.06.2017 from the date the representation of the applicant was made and one year period from 20.06.2017 had expired on 20.06.2018, whereas the contempt application has been filed on 20.09.2019 i.e one year three months delay from the expiry of one year period from the period when cause of action arose for the first time i.e on 20.06.2017 and as per Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, no court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. For convenience, the same is quoted hereinbelow:- "20. Limitation for actions for contempt:- No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."

9. A specific plea has been taken in paragraph-12 of the counter afÏdavit, which is quoted hereinbelow:- "No Court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." It is submitted that in the case of Islamuddin Vs. Umesh Chandra Tiwari & Another [reported in 2009 (5) ADJ 656 (DB)] the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court, while answering issue referred to it has been pleased to hold that for the purpose of Section 20 of the Act, 1971, the Act 1963 and its provisions (except Section 17) have not application whatsoever. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth does not make Section 5 of Act, 1963 applicable and would not confer power upon the Court to condone or waive delay where proceedings of contempt are sought to be initiated under Act, 1971 after one year from the date when the contempt is alleged to have committed. It is submitted that though the cause of action to file the contempt petition had arisen on July, 2017, but in order to get the benefits of the reinstatement in service as well as service benefits, the petitioner intentionally did not proceed to file the contempt petition, even he has attained the age of superannuation on 30.9.2018, and presently has filed the present contempt petition which suffers from inordinate delay and latches, as such, the present contempt petition is liable to be dismissed orally on this count alone."

10. The averment made in the counter afÏdavit has been replied in paragraph-12 of the rejoinder afÏdavit wherein the applicant has neither denied nor disputed the judgment in the case of Islamuddin (supra) and averment made with regard to Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. For convenience, para-12 of the rejoinder afÏdavit is quoted hereinbelow:- " That in reply to the contents, as alleged in wrongly re-numbered paragraph 12 of the counter afÏdavit, it is stated that w.e.f. passing of the judgment and order dated 02.03.2017 by this Hon'ble Court in Writ Petition No. 2542 (S/S) of 2010 the Opp-parties had full time to make enquiry against the deponent before his superannuation retirement on 30.09.2018 but neither any enquiry was initiated against the deponent nor was completed till 30.09.2018, i.e. on the date of his retirement, therefore, the deponent cannot be held responsible for the same and, as such, the deponent is fully entitled for the entire post retiral benefits."

11. In the case of Islamuddin (supra), which has been referred in the aforequoted judgment, the Hon'ble Division Bench has to consider the following two questions:- "(i).Whether the decision in Pallav Sheth case, (2001) 7 SCC 549, can be construed so as to apply all the principles enshrined in the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act (except Section 17 thereof) and as to whether the same can be made applicable to proceedings to be initiated under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. (ii).Whether the High Court in exercise of its powers for initiating contempt of its Court or the contempt of its subordinate court or Tribunal, as the case may be, has the power to condone and waive the delay in initiation of contempt proceedings under Section 12 of the Courts Act."

12. The Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court after considering meticulously the aforesaid two questions answered both the questions referred by the Hon'ble Single Judge in negative and held that for the purpose of Section 20 of the Act, 1971, the Limitation Act, 1963 and its provisions (except Section 17) have no application whatsoever. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) does not make Section 5 of the Act, 1963 applicable and would not confer power upon the Court to condone or waive delay where proceedings of contempt are sought to be initiated under Act, 1971 after one year from the date when the contempt is alleged to have been committed. For convenience, the relevant excerpts of the judgment passed in the case of Islamuddin (supra) is being reproduced hereinbelow:- " 76. We, therefore, answer both the questions referred by the Hon'ble Single Judge in negative and hold that for the purpose of Section 20 of Act 1971, the Act 1963 and its provisions (except-Section 17) have no application whatsoever. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) does not make Section 5 of Act 1963 applicable and would not confer power upon the Court to condone or waive delay where proceedings of contempt are sought to be initiated under Act 1971 after one year from the date when the contempt is alleged to have been committed."

13. Learned counsel for the applicant is unable to dispute the applicability of the aforesaid law laid down by Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of Islamuddin (supra).

14. In the present case, the cause of action arose for the first time on 20.06.2017 whereas the present contempt petition has been preferred after the expiry of more than one year i.e. on 20.09.2019 whereas it was to be filed prior to 20.06.2018. Hence, it is barred by Section 20 of the Contempt Courts Act, 1971.

15. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the present contempt application is dismissed. Order Date :- 9.1.2025 DiVYa DIVYA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Applicant :- Ramendra Kumar Gupta Opposite Party :- Sri Manoj Kumar Singh Prin.Secy.Nagar Vikas Lucknow And Ors. Counsel for Applicant :- Laltaprasad Misra,Lalta Prasad Misra,Ravi Kant Mishra Counsel for Opposite Party :- M.K. Dixit,R.D,Shahi,Ripu Daman Shahi Hon'ble Manish Kumar,J.

1. The present contempt application has been preferred for non-compliance of the judgment and order dated 02.03.2017, passed by the writ court in Writ Petition No. 2542 (S/S) of 2010 (Ramendra Kumar Gupta versus State of U.P and others). The relevant extract of the judgment dated 02.03.2017 is quoted hereinbelow:- "As regards arrears of salary for the period of dismissal and suspension and other consequential benefits, if any, a decision in this regard shall be taken after conclusion of the proceedings permitted as aforesaid, but, the petitioner shall be reinstated forthwith and paid salary as per Rules."

2. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the judgment and order dated 02.03.2017 was served upon the respondents on 20.03.2017 and in pursuance thereof, the part compliance was made by reinstating the applicant in service on 21.03.2017, but the other part of the judgment has not been complied with i.e. with regard to the decision taken for payment of arrears of salary for the period of dismissal and suspension and other consequential benefits.

3. It is further submitted that when the decision was not taken regarding payment of arrears for the period of dismissal, suspension and other consequential benefits, the present contempt application has been preferred.

4. It is further submitted that for compliance of the judgment, several representations were made to the authorities in between.

5. On the other hand, Shri R.D Shahi, learned counsel for respondent no. 2 has submitted that the present contempt application is barred by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 as the same has been filed after one year of the cause of action arose for the first time and the same has specifically been mentioned in paragraph-12 of the counter afÏdavit and he also relied upon a judgment in the case of {Islammudin versus Umesh Chandra Tiwari and Another (reported in 2009 (5) ADJ 656 (DB)}

6. In reply, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the judgment and order is still in existence and the respondents have not complied the same till date and para-12 of the counter afÏdavit has been replied in paragraph-12 of the rejoinder afÏdavit that prior to the superannuation/retirement of the applicant dated 30.09.2018, the respondents had sufÏcient time to make the inquiry, but they had neither initiated the same nor completed it till date.

7. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, going through the records of the case, the position which emerges out in the present case is that the representation was made by the applicant on 20.03.2017 for compliance of the judgment and order dated 02.03.2017. The partial compliance was made by reinstating the applicant in service on 21.03.2017, but as far as with regard to arrears of salary for the period of dismissal and suspension and other consequential benefits, the court had directed that any decision in this regard shall be taken after the conclusion of the proceedings permitted as aforesaid, whereas the said proceedings were neither initiated nor concluded and the petitioner retired from the service on 30.09.2018. The court has not provided any period for conclusion of the proceedings and taking a decision for payment with regard to arrears of salary for the period of dismissal, suspension and other consequential benefits.

8. On being asked from learned counsel for the applicant that in case, the period is not provided then what is the reasonable period, on expiry of which the contempt could be filed as per the law settled by this Court, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the said reasonable period as prescribed by this Court is three months. The three months period expired on 20.06.2017 from the date the representation of the applicant was made and one year period from 20.06.2017 had expired on 20.06.2018, whereas the contempt application has been filed on 20.09.2019 i.e one year three months delay from the expiry of one year period from the period when cause of action arose for the first time i.e on 20.06.2017 and as per Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, no court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. For convenience, the same is quoted hereinbelow:- "20. Limitation for actions for contempt:- No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."

9. A specific plea has been taken in paragraph-12 of the counter afÏdavit, which is quoted hereinbelow:- "No Court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." It is submitted that in the case of Islamuddin Vs. Umesh Chandra Tiwari & Another [reported in 2009 (5) ADJ 656 (DB)] the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court, while answering issue referred to it has been pleased to hold that for the purpose of Section 20 of the Act, 1971, the Act 1963 and its provisions (except Section 17) have not application whatsoever. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth does not make Section 5 of Act, 1963 applicable and would not confer power upon the Court to condone or waive delay where proceedings of contempt are sought to be initiated under Act, 1971 after one year from the date when the contempt is alleged to have committed. It is submitted that though the cause of action to file the contempt petition had arisen on July, 2017, but in order to get the benefits of the reinstatement in service as well as service benefits, the petitioner intentionally did not proceed to file the contempt petition, even he has attained the age of superannuation on 30.9.2018, and presently has filed the present contempt petition which suffers from inordinate delay and latches, as such, the present contempt petition is liable to be dismissed orally on this count alone."

10. The averment made in the counter afÏdavit has been replied in paragraph-12 of the rejoinder afÏdavit wherein the applicant has neither denied nor disputed the judgment in the case of Islamuddin (supra) and averment made with regard to Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. For convenience, para-12 of the rejoinder afÏdavit is quoted hereinbelow:- " That in reply to the contents, as alleged in wrongly re-numbered paragraph 12 of the counter afÏdavit, it is stated that w.e.f. passing of the judgment and order dated 02.03.2017 by this Hon'ble Court in Writ Petition No. 2542 (S/S) of 2010 the Opp-parties had full time to make enquiry against the deponent before his superannuation retirement on 30.09.2018 but neither any enquiry was initiated against the deponent nor was completed till 30.09.2018, i.e. on the date of his retirement, therefore, the deponent cannot be held responsible for the same and, as such, the deponent is fully entitled for the entire post retiral benefits."

11. In the case of Islamuddin (supra), which has been referred in the aforequoted judgment, the Hon'ble Division Bench has to consider the following two questions:- "(i).Whether the decision in Pallav Sheth case, (2001) 7 SCC 549, can be construed so as to apply all the principles enshrined in the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act (except Section 17 thereof) and as to whether the same can be made applicable to proceedings to be initiated under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. (ii).Whether the High Court in exercise of its powers for initiating contempt of its Court or the contempt of its subordinate court or Tribunal, as the case may be, has the power to condone and waive the delay in initiation of contempt proceedings under Section 12 of the Courts Act."

12. The Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court after considering meticulously the aforesaid two questions answered both the questions referred by the Hon'ble Single Judge in negative and held that for the purpose of Section 20 of the Act, 1971, the Limitation Act, 1963 and its provisions (except Section 17) have no application whatsoever. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) does not make Section 5 of the Act, 1963 applicable and would not confer power upon the Court to condone or waive delay where proceedings of contempt are sought to be initiated under Act, 1971 after one year from the date when the contempt is alleged to have been committed. For convenience, the relevant excerpts of the judgment passed in the case of Islamuddin (supra) is being reproduced hereinbelow:- " 76. We, therefore, answer both the questions referred by the Hon'ble Single Judge in negative and hold that for the purpose of Section 20 of Act 1971, the Act 1963 and its provisions (except-Section 17) have no application whatsoever. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) does not make Section 5 of Act 1963 applicable and would not confer power upon the Court to condone or waive delay where proceedings of contempt are sought to be initiated under Act 1971 after one year from the date when the contempt is alleged to have been committed."

13. Learned counsel for the applicant is unable to dispute the applicability of the aforesaid law laid down by Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of Islamuddin (supra).

14. In the present case, the cause of action arose for the first time on 20.06.2017 whereas the present contempt petition has been preferred after the expiry of more than one year i.e. on 20.09.2019 whereas it was to be filed prior to 20.06.2018. Hence, it is barred by Section 20 of the Contempt Courts Act, 1971.

15. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the present contempt application is dismissed. Order Date :- 9.1.2025 DiVYa DIVYA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench