High Court · 2025

1. Heard Sri U.S. Sahai learned counsel for petitioner as well as learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondent No. 1 and Sri Mahendra Nath Mishra, learned counsel for respondent No. 2.

2. It has been submitted by learned counsel for petitioners that present dispute pertains to land situated at Gat NO. 335, Plot No. 1286 area 1-3-1 and Plot No. 1290/2-5-9 situated at Village Baurumau, Tehsil Bakshi Ka Talab (earlier Tehsil Sadar), Lucknow. He further submits that that the said land belong to one Sadhu S/o Ghanshyam who was a scheduled caste and died prior to 1977 leaving behind two unmarried daughters namely, Rupana @Ram Piyari and Chandrawati.

3. He also submits that during the consolidation operations which commenced somewhere around 1974-75, the names of daughters of Sadhu were recorded in khatauni on 24.11.1977. The petitioners claim their right through Ram Piyari and Chandrawati. The controversy in the present case according to the petitioners has arisen on the claim made by respondent No. 2 who has got his name recorded U/S 12 of the Consolidation of Holding Act by order dated 25.02.1985 in place of deceased Sadhu on 06 of the plots of Chak No. 646 on the basis of unregistered will dated 30.06.1981.

4. Against the order passed U/S 12 of Consolidation of Holding Act in favour of respondent No. 2, the petitioners have preferred an appeal before Settlement Officer Consolidation in 2024 after a lapse of 39 years. The respondent No. 2 had contested the said appeal and also stated that the appeal was barred by limitation and the Settlement Officer Consolidation allowed the application U/S 5 also the appeal preferred by the petitioners holding that the name of respondent No. 2 could not be mutated in place of Sadhu who was a scheduled caste on the basis of a Will.

5. The appellate authority was of the view that a land belonging to scheduled caste can be transferred only after taking due permission of the competent authority. The respondent No. 2 being aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority dated 23.12.2024 preferred a revision before the Dy. Director of Consolidation and contested the condonation of delay made by the Settlement Officer Consolidation. The Revisional Authority was of the view that the appeal preferred by the petitioners hopelessly barred by time.

6. Another issue which persuaded the Dy. Director of Consolidation to reject the revision was the ground of res- judicata taken by respondent No. 2. It was placed before the revisional authority that against the order dated 25.02.1985 appeals were filed by one Jageshwar, Munnu and Raj Kumar S/o Bhikha who claimed themselves to be legal heirs of Sadhu and also stated that Sadhu died issue-less. They had moved an application for recall before the Consolidation Officer who rejected their application by order dated 27.12.2014 subsequently they filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation which was also rejected by order dated 25.04.2016 and even the revisions preferred before the Dy. Director of Consolidation were rejected on 13.12.2018.

7. Accordingly while deciding the revision preferred by the petitioners the Dy. Director of Consolidation was of the view that he was bound by the judgment and order dated 13.12.2018 in revision preferred by Jageshwar, Munnu and Raj Kumar who had also challenged the order dated 25.02.1985 claiming themselves to be the legal heirs of Sadhu and therefore he found himself bound by the previous order and therefore rejected the revision preferred by the petitioners.

8. It has further been informed that against the order dated 13.12.2018, Jageshwar, Munnu and Raj Kumar had preferred a writ petition before this Court being Writ B No. 1485 of 2019 which this Court has been informed has been withdrawn by them on 08.07.2025. Accordingly, it seems that after loosing from all the three courts i.e. consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer consolidation and Dy. Director of Consolidation, they have withdrawn from the litigation and they had preferred an application for withdrawal in the writ petition and now their claims to be substituted in place of Sadhu cannot be considered.

9. In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the Settlement Officer Consolidation had considered all the relevant facts necessary for considering application for condonation of delay including the fact that one of the disputed properties was mutated in the name of mother of the petitioners who was daughter of the Sadhu and consequently they were of the view that remaining property also would be duly mutated during the course of time and also submitted that they were not aware of the order dated 25.02.1985 wherein the disputed land had been mutated in favour of respondent No. 2 and therefore they did not initiate any proceedings assailing the validity of the order dated 25.02.1985. 10 The law unequivocally provides that, in cases where a suit is barred by limitation, the adjudicating authority must examine whether the delay is attributable to a sufficient cause. Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly stated its view on condonation of delay in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan, (2008) 14 SCC 582: "11. "8. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary discretion vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay, but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123 : AIR 1998 SC 3222] it was held by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case as sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels.

9. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard-and-fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840] this Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram [ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 (PC)] it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.

10. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [(1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996] which is a case of negligence of the counsel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy, the default in delay was condoned. In Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770] this Court had held that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. In that case it was held that the mistake committed by the counsel was bona fide and it was not tainted by any mala fide motive.

11. In State of Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe [1981 Supp SCC 72] it was held that whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a question of fact dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath [(1982) 3 SCC 366] it was held that the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. This Court under Article 136 can reassess the ground and in appropriate case set aside the order made by the High Court or the tribunal and remit the matter for hearing on merits. It was accordingly allowed, delay was condoned and the case was remitted for decision on merits.

12. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh [(1984) 4 SCC 66] a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107] a Bench of two Judges considered the question of limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression 'sufficient cause' is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice— that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression 'every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense, pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.

13. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note- making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay was accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra [1987 Supp SCC 339] this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law.

14. In G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer [(1988) 2 SCC 142] it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression 'sufficient cause' must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts, omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have 'a little play at the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning—of course, within reasonable limits—is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned. ***

15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay—intentional or otherwise—is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression 'sufficient cause' should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice- oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants." in State of The above position was highlighted Nagaland v. Lipok Ao [(2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906] (SCC pp. 757-760, paras 8 to 15); Spl. Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma [(1996) 10 SCC 634] and State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132] . It was noted that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protract public justice, and it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal."

11. Accordingly, in the aforesaid circumstances, this Court finds that once due satisfaction was recorded by the Settlement Officer Consolidation then on an appeal preferred by respondent No. 2, the Dy. Director of Consolidation should have proceeded to decide the case on merits. Instead of doing so, he has rejected the claim of the petitioners on the ground of limitation and on the grounds of res-judicata.

12. As this Court has already discussed, the Dy. Director of Consolidation need not be bound by the previous order of Dy. Director of Consolidation dated 13.12.2018 inasmuch as the said order was passed in proceedings initiated at the behest of certain other persons claiming themselves to be the legal heirs of Sadhu and who have subsequently withdrawn their claim when they have withdrawn the writ petition filed before this Court on 08.07.2025.

13. Accordingly, in the aforesaid circumstances, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 27.05.2025 is quashed. The matter is remanded to the Dy. Director of Consolidation who shall consider the entire matter and decide the revision on merits. Considering that much time has lapsed, it is expected that the Dy. Director of Consolidation shall proceed and decide the matter with expedition, say, within a period of four months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him. The parties before this Court undertake to cooperate in the proceedings before the Dy. Director of Consolidation.

14. It is made clear that Dy. Director of Consolidation shall proceed to consider and decide the claim on merits without being influenced by any of the observations made by this Court in the present case. The parties agree to appear before the Dy. Director of Consolidation on 24.07.2025. Order Date :- 9.7.2025/Ravi/ (Alok Mathur, J.) RAVI SHANKAR SRIVASTAV High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

1. Heard Sri U.S. Sahai learned counsel for petitioner as well as learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondent No. 1 and Sri Mahendra Nath Mishra, learned counsel for respondent No. 2.

2. It has been submitted by learned counsel for petitioners that present dispute pertains to land situated at Gat NO. 335, Plot No. 1286 area 1-3-1 and Plot No. 1290/2-5-9 situated at Village Baurumau, Tehsil Bakshi Ka Talab (earlier Tehsil Sadar), Lucknow. He further submits that that the said land belong to one Sadhu S/o Ghanshyam who was a scheduled caste and died prior to 1977 leaving behind two unmarried daughters namely, Rupana @Ram Piyari and Chandrawati.

3. He also submits that during the consolidation operations which commenced somewhere around 1974-75, the names of daughters of Sadhu were recorded in khatauni on 24.11.1977. The petitioners claim their right through Ram Piyari and Chandrawati. The controversy in the present case according to the petitioners has arisen on the claim made by respondent No. 2 who has got his name recorded U/S 12 of the Consolidation of Holding Act by order dated 25.02.1985 in place of deceased Sadhu on 06 of the plots of Chak No. 646 on the basis of unregistered will dated 30.06.1981.

4. Against the order passed U/S 12 of Consolidation of Holding Act in favour of respondent No. 2, the petitioners have preferred an appeal before Settlement Officer Consolidation in 2024 after a lapse of 39 years. The respondent No. 2 had contested the said appeal and also stated that the appeal was barred by limitation and the Settlement Officer Consolidation allowed the application U/S 5 also the appeal preferred by the petitioners holding that the name of respondent No. 2 could not be mutated in place of Sadhu who was a scheduled caste on the basis of a Will.

5. The appellate authority was of the view that a land belonging to scheduled caste can be transferred only after taking due permission of the competent authority. The respondent No. 2 being aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority dated 23.12.2024 preferred a revision before the Dy. Director of Consolidation and contested the condonation of delay made by the Settlement Officer Consolidation. The Revisional Authority was of the view that the appeal preferred by the petitioners hopelessly barred by time.

6. Another issue which persuaded the Dy. Director of Consolidation to reject the revision was the ground of res- judicata taken by respondent No. 2. It was placed before the revisional authority that against the order dated 25.02.1985 appeals were filed by one Jageshwar, Munnu and Raj Kumar S/o Bhikha who claimed themselves to be legal heirs of Sadhu and also stated that Sadhu died issue-less. They had moved an application for recall before the Consolidation Officer who rejected their application by order dated 27.12.2014 subsequently they filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation which was also rejected by order dated 25.04.2016 and even the revisions preferred before the Dy. Director of Consolidation were rejected on 13.12.2018.

7. Accordingly while deciding the revision preferred by the petitioners the Dy. Director of Consolidation was of the view that he was bound by the judgment and order dated 13.12.2018 in revision preferred by Jageshwar, Munnu and Raj Kumar who had also challenged the order dated 25.02.1985 claiming themselves to be the legal heirs of Sadhu and therefore he found himself bound by the previous order and therefore rejected the revision preferred by the petitioners.

8. It has further been informed that against the order dated 13.12.2018, Jageshwar, Munnu and Raj Kumar had preferred a writ petition before this Court being Writ B No. 1485 of 2019 which this Court has been informed has been withdrawn by them on 08.07.2025. Accordingly, it seems that after loosing from all the three courts i.e. consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer consolidation and Dy. Director of Consolidation, they have withdrawn from the litigation and they had preferred an application for withdrawal in the writ petition and now their claims to be substituted in place of Sadhu cannot be considered.

9. In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the Settlement Officer Consolidation had considered all the relevant facts necessary for considering application for condonation of delay including the fact that one of the disputed properties was mutated in the name of mother of the petitioners who was daughter of the Sadhu and consequently they were of the view that remaining property also would be duly mutated during the course of time and also submitted that they were not aware of the order dated 25.02.1985 wherein the disputed land had been mutated in favour of respondent No. 2 and therefore they did not initiate any proceedings assailing the validity of the order dated 25.02.1985. 10 The law unequivocally provides that, in cases where a suit is barred by limitation, the adjudicating authority must examine whether the delay is attributable to a sufficient cause. Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly stated its view on condonation of delay in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan, (2008) 14 SCC 582: "11. "8. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary discretion vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay, but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123 : AIR 1998 SC 3222] it was held by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case as sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels.

9. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard-and-fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840] this Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram [ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 (PC)] it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.

10. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [(1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996] which is a case of negligence of the counsel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy, the default in delay was condoned. In Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770] this Court had held that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. In that case it was held that the mistake committed by the counsel was bona fide and it was not tainted by any mala fide motive.

11. In State of Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe [1981 Supp SCC 72] it was held that whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a question of fact dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath [(1982) 3 SCC 366] it was held that the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. This Court under Article 136 can reassess the ground and in appropriate case set aside the order made by the High Court or the tribunal and remit the matter for hearing on merits. It was accordingly allowed, delay was condoned and the case was remitted for decision on merits.

12. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh [(1984) 4 SCC 66] a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107] a Bench of two Judges considered the question of limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression 'sufficient cause' is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice— that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression 'every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense, pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.

13. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note- making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay was accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra [1987 Supp SCC 339] this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law.

14. In G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer [(1988) 2 SCC 142] it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression 'sufficient cause' must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts, omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have 'a little play at the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning—of course, within reasonable limits—is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned. ***

15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay—intentional or otherwise—is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression 'sufficient cause' should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice- oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants." in State of The above position was highlighted Nagaland v. Lipok Ao [(2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906] (SCC pp. 757-760, paras 8 to 15); Spl. Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma [(1996) 10 SCC 634] and State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132] . It was noted that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protract public justice, and it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal."

11. Accordingly, in the aforesaid circumstances, this Court finds that once due satisfaction was recorded by the Settlement Officer Consolidation then on an appeal preferred by respondent No. 2, the Dy. Director of Consolidation should have proceeded to decide the case on merits. Instead of doing so, he has rejected the claim of the petitioners on the ground of limitation and on the grounds of res-judicata.

12. As this Court has already discussed, the Dy. Director of Consolidation need not be bound by the previous order of Dy. Director of Consolidation dated 13.12.2018 inasmuch as the said order was passed in proceedings initiated at the behest of certain other persons claiming themselves to be the legal heirs of Sadhu and who have subsequently withdrawn their claim when they have withdrawn the writ petition filed before this Court on 08.07.2025.

13. Accordingly, in the aforesaid circumstances, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 27.05.2025 is quashed. The matter is remanded to the Dy. Director of Consolidation who shall consider the entire matter and decide the revision on merits. Considering that much time has lapsed, it is expected that the Dy. Director of Consolidation shall proceed and decide the matter with expedition, say, within a period of four months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him. The parties before this Court undertake to cooperate in the proceedings before the Dy. Director of Consolidation.

14. It is made clear that Dy. Director of Consolidation shall proceed to consider and decide the claim on merits without being influenced by any of the observations made by this Court in the present case. The parties agree to appear before the Dy. Director of Consolidation on 24.07.2025. Order Date :- 9.7.2025/Ravi/ (Alok Mathur, J.) RAVI SHANKAR SRIVASTAV High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench