Dist. Inspector Of Schools Ambedkar Nagar vs Counsel for Appellant(s)

for the appellant, Sri Onkar Nath Tiwari, counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 and Sri Shachindra Pratap Singh, counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 to 6.

2. This special appeal has been filed by the District Inspector of Schools, Ambedkar Nagar, challenging the judgment and order dated 02.08.2024, which was corrected on 23.08.2024 passed in Writ-A No. 6697 of 1993.

3. The appeal has been filed on 30.05.2025. As per report, there is delay of 270 days, limitation for which is 30 days vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

4. An affidavit has been filed in support of application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and subsequently another affidavit has been filed explaining the same. Neither of the said affidavits satisfies us on the question of delay.

5. Counsel for the appellant submits that the second affidavit may be read in support of application for condonation of delay. When we read the same, the affidavit does not throw any light whatsoever on whether the Office of the Chief Standing Counsel of the State of U.P. at Allahabad High Court at Lucknow communicated the impugned judgment and order to the concerned 2 SPLAD No. 264 of 2025 Officials or not, and if not, the reasons therefor. The affidavit states straightaway that the copy of the impugned judgment was received on

02.09.2024 when a representation was submitted by the respondent- petitioner. Even thereafter, as per the affidavit, it is only on 28.10.2024 i.e. almost more than one and a half month from receipt of the said judgment, that the appellant requested the Manager of the concerned Institution to send para-wise report. This hardly shows any urgency on his part to file this appeal; rather, it demonstrates lack of due diligence, sincerity and also negligence on its part.

6. Most importantly, even after writing a letter on 28.10.2024, other steps taken by him were on 19.12.2024 and then on 01.03.2025 again requesting the said Manager to send a para-wise reply. The affidavit does not throw any light as to what effort, if any, was made by the D.I.O.S. to procure the said information from the Manager of the concerned Institution in the interregnum. This is hardly an explanation for the inordinate delay in filing the appeal. In fact, the affidavit does not disclose when this information was actually provided by the Manager.

7. In Para 7 of the affidavit, it is mentioned that on 03.02.2025 a request was made to the Chief Standing Counsel for legal opinion. There is no explanation for the intervening period. The legal opinion was provided on

25.02.2025. Thereafter, a request was made to the Director of Education through letter dated 01.03.2025 to obtain departmental permission for filing a special appeal and a letter in this regard was sent to the Government on

05.03.2025. On 16.04.2025, the Government issued a direction for obtaining a clear legal opinion from Chief Standing Counsel and thereafter submit a proposal to the Government alongwith grounds for filing the appeal. The subsequent paragraphs of the affidavit only narrate how the file kept moving from one desk to another or one department to another, which is hardly an explanation for the inordinate delay in this case. Appeal was ultimately filed on 30.05.2025. Both the affidavits do not reflect any urgency on the part of the appellant in filing the appeal.

8. We have gone through the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 wherein law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) 3 SPLAD No. 264 of 2025 (supra) that the expression 'sufficient cause' is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression 'sufficient cause' must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

9. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether 'sufficient cause' has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of 'sufficient cause' cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of 4 SPLAD No. 264 of 2025 delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

10. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is 5 SPLAD No. 264 of 2025 equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a 'sufficient cause' for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

11. Considering the facts of this case, we are of the opinion, as already expressed, firstly that the delay is inordinate, secondly, the explanation offered in this regard is certainly not an acceptable one and is not satisfactory as there is no sufficient cause shown by the appellant for entertaining the appeal which has been filed with such delay.

12. In view of the above, we cannot help but reject the application for condonation of delay.

13. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 5, 2025 Vinay/- (Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) VINAY KUMAR VINAY KUMAR VINAY KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Lucknow Bench Lucknow Bench

for the appellant, Sri Onkar Nath Tiwari, counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 and Sri Shachindra Pratap Singh, counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 to 6.

2. This special appeal has been filed by the District Inspector of Schools, Ambedkar Nagar, challenging the judgment and order dated 02.08.2024, which was corrected on 23.08.2024 passed in Writ-A No. 6697 of 1993.

3. The appeal has been filed on 30.05.2025. As per report, there is delay of 270 days, limitation for which is 30 days vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

4. An affidavit has been filed in support of application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and subsequently another affidavit has been filed explaining the same. Neither of the said affidavits satisfies us on the question of delay.

5. Counsel for the appellant submits that the second affidavit may be read in support of application for condonation of delay. When we read the same, the affidavit does not throw any light whatsoever on whether the Office of the Chief Standing Counsel of the State of U.P. at Allahabad High Court at Lucknow communicated the impugned judgment and order to the concerned 2 SPLAD No. 264 of 2025 Officials or not, and if not, the reasons therefor. The affidavit states straightaway that the copy of the impugned judgment was received on

02.09.2024 when a representation was submitted by the respondent- petitioner. Even thereafter, as per the affidavit, it is only on 28.10.2024 i.e. almost more than one and a half month from receipt of the said judgment, that the appellant requested the Manager of the concerned Institution to send para-wise report. This hardly shows any urgency on his part to file this appeal; rather, it demonstrates lack of due diligence, sincerity and also negligence on its part.

6. Most importantly, even after writing a letter on 28.10.2024, other steps taken by him were on 19.12.2024 and then on 01.03.2025 again requesting the said Manager to send a para-wise reply. The affidavit does not throw any light as to what effort, if any, was made by the D.I.O.S. to procure the said information from the Manager of the concerned Institution in the interregnum. This is hardly an explanation for the inordinate delay in filing the appeal. In fact, the affidavit does not disclose when this information was actually provided by the Manager.

7. In Para 7 of the affidavit, it is mentioned that on 03.02.2025 a request was made to the Chief Standing Counsel for legal opinion. There is no explanation for the intervening period. The legal opinion was provided on

25.02.2025. Thereafter, a request was made to the Director of Education through letter dated 01.03.2025 to obtain departmental permission for filing a special appeal and a letter in this regard was sent to the Government on

05.03.2025. On 16.04.2025, the Government issued a direction for obtaining a clear legal opinion from Chief Standing Counsel and thereafter submit a proposal to the Government alongwith grounds for filing the appeal. The subsequent paragraphs of the affidavit only narrate how the file kept moving from one desk to another or one department to another, which is hardly an explanation for the inordinate delay in this case. Appeal was ultimately filed on 30.05.2025. Both the affidavits do not reflect any urgency on the part of the appellant in filing the appeal.

8. We have gone through the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 wherein law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) 3 SPLAD No. 264 of 2025 (supra) that the expression 'sufficient cause' is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression 'sufficient cause' must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

9. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether 'sufficient cause' has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of 'sufficient cause' cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of 4 SPLAD No. 264 of 2025 delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

10. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is 5 SPLAD No. 264 of 2025 equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a 'sufficient cause' for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

11. Considering the facts of this case, we are of the opinion, as already expressed, firstly that the delay is inordinate, secondly, the explanation offered in this regard is certainly not an acceptable one and is not satisfactory as there is no sufficient cause shown by the appellant for entertaining the appeal which has been filed with such delay.

12. In view of the above, we cannot help but reject the application for condonation of delay.

13. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 5, 2025 Vinay/- (Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) VINAY KUMAR VINAY KUMAR VINAY KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Lucknow Bench Lucknow Bench