High Court · 2025

Heard learned counsel for the appellants. The instant second appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution by means of order dated 16.11.2023 whereafter the appellants had moved an application for recall under Order 41 Rule 19 CPC. While the said application was pending, the appellant nos.9, 10, 11 namely Gufran Beg, Mukhtar Beg and Iktiyar Beg expired on 09.03.2018, 28.10.2023 and 07.09.2020 respectively and in order to bring the legal heirs on record the appellants had filed application bearing no.IA/09/2024. Considering the grounds shown in the affidavit supporting the said application, the cause appears to be sufficient, accordingly, the application for condonation of delay in moving the application for recall is allowed, the appeal shall stand restored to its original number. In so far as the application for substitution relating to the death of appellant nos.9, 10 and 11 is concerned, they are also allowed. Learned counsel for the appellants shall carry out the necessary amendment during course of the day. Thereafter, the Court has proceeded to hear learned counsel for the appellants and the learned Standing counsel Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey for the State respondent on admission. Submission of learned counsel for the appellants is that they are the lessees in possession of the disputed property. The registered lease deed were executed by the predecessors in interest namely Satya Prakash Jain, Nirmal Kumar and Shyam Pyari. It is urged that in pursuance of those lease deeds, the appellants have been in possession. Since the defendants were interfering in the possession of the plaintiffs, accordingly, a suit for injunction was filed before the trial court registered as R.S. No.229 of 1990. It is urged that the said land in question was exempt from U.P.Z.A. & L.R Act and as such the Zamindars had the rights to execute the lease deed which was done in the year, 1979 and since the State who does not have any right, title or authority could not interfere in the possession and despite bringing the aforesaid facts as well as lease deeds on record which were duly proved by the leading evidence yet the suit of the plaintiffs for permanent injunction was dismissed by the trial court by means of the judgement and decree dated 26.07.2010. It is further urged that the plaintiffs being aggrieved preferred a Regular Civil Appeal under Section 96 CPC which also came to be dismissed by means of the judgment and decree dated 21.10.2010 passed by Additional District Judge, Court no.1 Sitapur in Civil Appeal no.117 of 2010. Submission is that once the plaintiffs was in possession of disputed property in question and the defendant having no right over the property, hence, could not interfere in the possession and moreover the plaintiffs could not be dispossessed without due process of law and the redeeming feature of the matter was that in commission which was executed it was noticed therein that the appellants were in possession and on the strength of possession they could resist the unlawful attempt of the defendant State and in such circumstances, the suit ought to have been decreed and for the said reasons, both trial court as well as first appellate court have incorrectly passed judgments and decrees which deserves to be set aside. Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey learned Standing counsel for the State respondent had submitted that the plaintiffs have to stand on his own legs. It is not open for the plaintiffs to seek benefit of any weakness in the defense. Since the plaintiffs had filed a suit for injunction claiming rights on the basis of two lease deeds said to have been executed by Satya Prakash Jain, Nirmal Kumar and Shyam Pyari, however, they were never the recorded owner and in absence of any right available with the lessors, no better rights could have been transferred in favour of lessee. Hence, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to have established not only his own right but also right of his predecessor which they failed miserably and in such circumstances the land which otherwise belongs to the State, an injunction could not have been granted against the true owner and on this premise, the findings have been returned both by the trial court as well as the first appellate court which are concurrent findings of fact which require no interference from the Court in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC. The Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the material on record. Apparently, the issue before the Court which is canvased by the learned counsel for the appellants is regarding his right to seek injunction. It could not be disputed by learned counsel for the appellants that the disputed property in question has been recorded as Police Chauki from much prior from the date the names of lessors namely Satya Prakash Jain, Nirmal Kumar, and Shyam Pyari was entered into revenue record. There is no material on record either before the trial court or the first appellate court which could indicate the manner in which the lessors could have been acquired title to the property. It is now too well settled that a stray mutation entry does not confer title. Since, there was no evidence to indicate as to how the lessors could have acquired title and the continuity of their names being recorded in the revenue records, one stray entry cannot confer title and on the basis thereof merely getting a lease from a person who himself did not have a title cannot be countenanced. It is also to be considered that the land in question otherwise would vest with the State. In case, if the plaintiffs had raised a plea regarding the rights in the land and that too on the basis of a lease then it was his duty of the plaintiff to have established the same but in the instant case neither the rights of the lessors have been established and the possession of the plaintiffs is only on the basis of the lease deeds. It is not as if the plaintiffs have any separate and independent right on the property. In these circumstances, once the plaintiffs could not establish the right of his predecessor he also cannot get any better right and in absence of any right as pleaded the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to urge or seek injunction against the true owner. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, where the plaintiffs have been unable to establish their right, apparently a suit for simplicitor injunction also was not maintainable as the right of the plaintiffs were dependent on the right of their predecessor which had been denied by the defendant State nor the right of origin of the plaintiff was established. (See: Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by Lrs and Ors (2008) 4 SCC 594. In view of the aforesaid, this Court does not find that there is any error in the findings returned by the two courts which are pure findings of fact based on the material on record. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal stands dismissed at the admission stage itself. The judgment and decree passed by trial Court dated 26.07.2010 in Regular Suit no.229 of 1990 and judgment and decree dated 21.10.2010 in Regular Civil Appeal no.117 of 2010 are affirmed. Order Date :- 14.8.2025/Harshita HARSHITA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Heard learned counsel for the appellants. The instant second appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution by means of order dated 16.11.2023 whereafter the appellants had moved an application for recall under Order 41 Rule 19 CPC. While the said application was pending, the appellant nos.9, 10, 11 namely Gufran Beg, Mukhtar Beg and Iktiyar Beg expired on 09.03.2018, 28.10.2023 and 07.09.2020 respectively and in order to bring the legal heirs on record the appellants had filed application bearing no.IA/09/2024. Considering the grounds shown in the affidavit supporting the said application, the cause appears to be sufficient, accordingly, the application for condonation of delay in moving the application for recall is allowed, the appeal shall stand restored to its original number. In so far as the application for substitution relating to the death of appellant nos.9, 10 and 11 is concerned, they are also allowed. Learned counsel for the appellants shall carry out the necessary amendment during course of the day. Thereafter, the Court has proceeded to hear learned counsel for the appellants and the learned Standing counsel Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey for the State respondent on admission. Submission of learned counsel for the appellants is that they are the lessees in possession of the disputed property. The registered lease deed were executed by the predecessors in interest namely Satya Prakash Jain, Nirmal Kumar and Shyam Pyari. It is urged that in pursuance of those lease deeds, the appellants have been in possession. Since the defendants were interfering in the possession of the plaintiffs, accordingly, a suit for injunction was filed before the trial court registered as R.S. No.229 of 1990. It is urged that the said land in question was exempt from U.P.Z.A. & L.R Act and as such the Zamindars had the rights to execute the lease deed which was done in the year, 1979 and since the State who does not have any right, title or authority could not interfere in the possession and despite bringing the aforesaid facts as well as lease deeds on record which were duly proved by the leading evidence yet the suit of the plaintiffs for permanent injunction was dismissed by the trial court by means of the judgement and decree dated 26.07.2010. It is further urged that the plaintiffs being aggrieved preferred a Regular Civil Appeal under Section 96 CPC which also came to be dismissed by means of the judgment and decree dated 21.10.2010 passed by Additional District Judge, Court no.1 Sitapur in Civil Appeal no.117 of 2010. Submission is that once the plaintiffs was in possession of disputed property in question and the defendant having no right over the property, hence, could not interfere in the possession and moreover the plaintiffs could not be dispossessed without due process of law and the redeeming feature of the matter was that in commission which was executed it was noticed therein that the appellants were in possession and on the strength of possession they could resist the unlawful attempt of the defendant State and in such circumstances, the suit ought to have been decreed and for the said reasons, both trial court as well as first appellate court have incorrectly passed judgments and decrees which deserves to be set aside. Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey learned Standing counsel for the State respondent had submitted that the plaintiffs have to stand on his own legs. It is not open for the plaintiffs to seek benefit of any weakness in the defense. Since the plaintiffs had filed a suit for injunction claiming rights on the basis of two lease deeds said to have been executed by Satya Prakash Jain, Nirmal Kumar and Shyam Pyari, however, they were never the recorded owner and in absence of any right available with the lessors, no better rights could have been transferred in favour of lessee. Hence, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to have established not only his own right but also right of his predecessor which they failed miserably and in such circumstances the land which otherwise belongs to the State, an injunction could not have been granted against the true owner and on this premise, the findings have been returned both by the trial court as well as the first appellate court which are concurrent findings of fact which require no interference from the Court in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC. The Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the material on record. Apparently, the issue before the Court which is canvased by the learned counsel for the appellants is regarding his right to seek injunction. It could not be disputed by learned counsel for the appellants that the disputed property in question has been recorded as Police Chauki from much prior from the date the names of lessors namely Satya Prakash Jain, Nirmal Kumar, and Shyam Pyari was entered into revenue record. There is no material on record either before the trial court or the first appellate court which could indicate the manner in which the lessors could have been acquired title to the property. It is now too well settled that a stray mutation entry does not confer title. Since, there was no evidence to indicate as to how the lessors could have acquired title and the continuity of their names being recorded in the revenue records, one stray entry cannot confer title and on the basis thereof merely getting a lease from a person who himself did not have a title cannot be countenanced. It is also to be considered that the land in question otherwise would vest with the State. In case, if the plaintiffs had raised a plea regarding the rights in the land and that too on the basis of a lease then it was his duty of the plaintiff to have established the same but in the instant case neither the rights of the lessors have been established and the possession of the plaintiffs is only on the basis of the lease deeds. It is not as if the plaintiffs have any separate and independent right on the property. In these circumstances, once the plaintiffs could not establish the right of his predecessor he also cannot get any better right and in absence of any right as pleaded the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to urge or seek injunction against the true owner. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, where the plaintiffs have been unable to establish their right, apparently a suit for simplicitor injunction also was not maintainable as the right of the plaintiffs were dependent on the right of their predecessor which had been denied by the defendant State nor the right of origin of the plaintiff was established. (See: Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by Lrs and Ors (2008) 4 SCC 594. In view of the aforesaid, this Court does not find that there is any error in the findings returned by the two courts which are pure findings of fact based on the material on record. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal stands dismissed at the admission stage itself. The judgment and decree passed by trial Court dated 26.07.2010 in Regular Suit no.229 of 1990 and judgment and decree dated 21.10.2010 in Regular Civil Appeal no.117 of 2010 are affirmed. Order Date :- 14.8.2025/Harshita HARSHITA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench