High Court · 2025

10. Shri Rahul Shukla, Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the respondent State has refuted the submissions advanced by learned senior counsel and has submitted that in the lease deed, it was indicated that it was for a period commencing in August, 2012 and terminating in August, 2042 and therefore this apparently is a period beyond 30 years rather it appears for a period of 30 years and one month and in such circumstances, the stamp duty payable would be as per Article 35(vi) of the Indian Stamp Act which attracts stamp duty not on the basis of average annual rent but as per the market value and in such circumstances, the stamp authorities have appropriately noticed the deficiency and since the petitioner had not appropriately disclosed the facts in the lease deed hence, the authorities were justified in imposing 100% penalty and for the aforesaid reasons, the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be sustained and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

11. The Court has considered the rival submissions and also perused the material on record.

12. The record indicates that the lease deed has been brought on record as Annexure No.4. The lease deed clearly indicates that it was executed on 9.8.2012. The lease clearly states that it was for a period of 30 years. In clause 12, it was indicated that since the period of lease is 30 years, hence in accordance with Article 35(v) of the Indian Stamp Act, the stamp duty was paid on six times of the average annual rent and stamp duty of 1440/- has been paid.

13. It would be relevant to notice that there is no dispute that the annual rent reserved in the deed is Rs.1200/-. It is also well settled that the stamp duty is a fiscal statute and by virtue of its nature, it has to be construed strictly. It is also well settled that stamp authorities do not have the power to read something into an instrument which is not present. The averments made in the deed have to be taken the way it is and is not to be made a subject matter of interpretation. From the reading of the lease deed, it has been clearly stated that the lease period is 30 years. There is nothing in the lease deed which would indicate that the parties surreptitiously had enhanced the lease period.

14. It is also relevant to notice that the instrument in question is to be seen and read as it is that is without taking recourse to any other external aid to determine the applicability and the incidence of payment of stamp duty. Clause 2 of the lease deed also indicates that the lease was for a period of 30 years commencing in August, 2012 and upto August, 2042 and it also had a lock in period of 30 years. This perhaps is the reason why the stamp authorities attempted to expand the scope of the aforesaid clause to indicate that since no particular date in the month of August had been mentioned either for the date of commencement or for the date of termination of the lease, hence the period is to be beyond 30 years.

15. This Court finds that such an interpretation is mischievous. The lease deed in question in more than one clause has clearly indicated the period of lease is 30 years. Even reading of clause 2, will not give right to any implication that the period of lease extends more than 30 years because in the same clause itself, it states that the lock in period is 30 years. Mere non mentioning of the date of commencement of the lease, would not mean that the lease would commence on 1st of August, 2012 specially when it has clearly been stated that the lease will commence and is executed on 9th of August, 2012. Similarly, in absence of any date of termination, it cannot be assumed that the lease would come to an end after the 8th of August, 2042 or at the end of the month of August, 2042.

16. Coming to such a conclusion, apparently amounts to reading something into the instrument of lease, which is not present and as already noticed above, that the stamp authorities do not have such power to add or delete any words in any clause of the instrument in question. The lease deed has to be taken the way it is. Hence, the interpretation sought to be projected by the stamp authorities is per se bad. This is the sole reason and the ground upon which the stamp authorities have noticed a deficiency which cannot be sustained and is also liable to be set aside. Since there is no indication as to a deliberate attempt on the petitioner to suppress the payment of stamp duty. Consequently, the imposition of 100% penalty was also not justified. Since the basic premise upon which the deficiency in payment of stamp duty and registration charges have been found to be erroneous, consequently the present imposition of penalty also suffers from the same vice.

17. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the view that the impugned order dated 22.9.2014 passed by respondent no.3 and order dated

15.2.2018 passed by respondent no.2 are not sustainable in law hence are liable to be set aside.

18. Accordingly, a writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order dated

22.9.2014 passed by respondent no.3 and order dated 15.2.2018 passed by respondent no.2 are hereby quashed.

19. It is further provided that any amount paid by the petitioner in terms of the impugned orders as well as in terms of the interim order granted by this Court vide dated 15.5.2018 shall be released in favour of the petitioner, within a period of eight weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the authority concerned.

20. In case if the amount is not released within the aforesaid period, the petitioner shall be entitled to interest @ 9 % per annum from the end of two months from the date of this order till the date of its actual payment.

21. With the aforesaid, the petition stands allowed. Costs are made easy. Order Date :- 3.4.2025 Shukla ASHUTOSH KUMAR SHUKLA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

10. Shri Rahul Shukla, Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the respondent State has refuted the submissions advanced by learned senior counsel and has submitted that in the lease deed, it was indicated that it was for a period commencing in August, 2012 and terminating in August, 2042 and therefore this apparently is a period beyond 30 years rather it appears for a period of 30 years and one month and in such circumstances, the stamp duty payable would be as per Article 35(vi) of the Indian Stamp Act which attracts stamp duty not on the basis of average annual rent but as per the market value and in such circumstances, the stamp authorities have appropriately noticed the deficiency and since the petitioner had not appropriately disclosed the facts in the lease deed hence, the authorities were justified in imposing 100% penalty and for the aforesaid reasons, the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be sustained and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

11. The Court has considered the rival submissions and also perused the material on record.

12. The record indicates that the lease deed has been brought on record as Annexure No.4. The lease deed clearly indicates that it was executed on 9.8.2012. The lease clearly states that it was for a period of 30 years. In clause 12, it was indicated that since the period of lease is 30 years, hence in accordance with Article 35(v) of the Indian Stamp Act, the stamp duty was paid on six times of the average annual rent and stamp duty of 1440/- has been paid.

13. It would be relevant to notice that there is no dispute that the annual rent reserved in the deed is Rs.1200/-. It is also well settled that the stamp duty is a fiscal statute and by virtue of its nature, it has to be construed strictly. It is also well settled that stamp authorities do not have the power to read something into an instrument which is not present. The averments made in the deed have to be taken the way it is and is not to be made a subject matter of interpretation. From the reading of the lease deed, it has been clearly stated that the lease period is 30 years. There is nothing in the lease deed which would indicate that the parties surreptitiously had enhanced the lease period.

14. It is also relevant to notice that the instrument in question is to be seen and read as it is that is without taking recourse to any other external aid to determine the applicability and the incidence of payment of stamp duty. Clause 2 of the lease deed also indicates that the lease was for a period of 30 years commencing in August, 2012 and upto August, 2042 and it also had a lock in period of 30 years. This perhaps is the reason why the stamp authorities attempted to expand the scope of the aforesaid clause to indicate that since no particular date in the month of August had been mentioned either for the date of commencement or for the date of termination of the lease, hence the period is to be beyond 30 years.

15. This Court finds that such an interpretation is mischievous. The lease deed in question in more than one clause has clearly indicated the period of lease is 30 years. Even reading of clause 2, will not give right to any implication that the period of lease extends more than 30 years because in the same clause itself, it states that the lock in period is 30 years. Mere non mentioning of the date of commencement of the lease, would not mean that the lease would commence on 1st of August, 2012 specially when it has clearly been stated that the lease will commence and is executed on 9th of August, 2012. Similarly, in absence of any date of termination, it cannot be assumed that the lease would come to an end after the 8th of August, 2042 or at the end of the month of August, 2042.

16. Coming to such a conclusion, apparently amounts to reading something into the instrument of lease, which is not present and as already noticed above, that the stamp authorities do not have such power to add or delete any words in any clause of the instrument in question. The lease deed has to be taken the way it is. Hence, the interpretation sought to be projected by the stamp authorities is per se bad. This is the sole reason and the ground upon which the stamp authorities have noticed a deficiency which cannot be sustained and is also liable to be set aside. Since there is no indication as to a deliberate attempt on the petitioner to suppress the payment of stamp duty. Consequently, the imposition of 100% penalty was also not justified. Since the basic premise upon which the deficiency in payment of stamp duty and registration charges have been found to be erroneous, consequently the present imposition of penalty also suffers from the same vice.

17. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the view that the impugned order dated 22.9.2014 passed by respondent no.3 and order dated

15.2.2018 passed by respondent no.2 are not sustainable in law hence are liable to be set aside.

18. Accordingly, a writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order dated

22.9.2014 passed by respondent no.3 and order dated 15.2.2018 passed by respondent no.2 are hereby quashed.

19. It is further provided that any amount paid by the petitioner in terms of the impugned orders as well as in terms of the interim order granted by this Court vide dated 15.5.2018 shall be released in favour of the petitioner, within a period of eight weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the authority concerned.

20. In case if the amount is not released within the aforesaid period, the petitioner shall be entitled to interest @ 9 % per annum from the end of two months from the date of this order till the date of its actual payment.

21. With the aforesaid, the petition stands allowed. Costs are made easy. Order Date :- 3.4.2025 Shukla ASHUTOSH KUMAR SHUKLA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench