Shatrohan Lal And Another v. State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home. Lko And Others

1. Heard Shri Sandeep Singh, learned counsel for the applicants, Shri Ashok Srivastava, learned A.G.A. for the State as well as Shri R. A. Khan, learned counsel for the informant-opposite party No. 3 and perused the material brought on record.

2. Applicants, namely, Shatrohan Lal and Smt. Vaijantimala, by invoking inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.') have challenged the order dated 02.11.2019, whereby learned Judicial Magistrate, Bahraich has taken cognizance and summoned the applicants under Sections 323, 504, 324 I.P.C. in Case No. 13963 of 2019 (State Vs. Shatrohan Lal and another), arising out of Case Crime No. 0291 of 2019, relating to Police Station Fakharpur, District Bahraich as well as the impugned charge sheet No. 0238 of 2019 dated 24.07.2019 along with the entire proceedings of the above mentioned case.

3. Briefly stated, the prosecution story is that on 06.01.2012 the opposite party No. 3 has lodged a report against the applicants bearing N.C.R. No. 0194/18, under Sections 323, 504 I.P.C. at Police Station Fakharpur, District Bahraich alleging therein that applicants had beaten him in front of the house. After lodging of the said N.C.R. the opposite party No. 3 moved an application under Section 155(2) Cr.P.C. before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bahraich, who vide its order dated 07.06.2013 directed the concerned Station House Officer-opposite party No. 3 to investigate the matter as a state case. After passing of the said order the police has not started investigation timely and the statement of the informant was recorded on 27.06.2019 during the course of investigation. Thereafter, the said N.C.R. was converted into F.I.R. on 19.07.2019 and police completed investigation on 24.07.2019 and filed charge sheet against the applicants under Sections 323, 504, 324 I.P.C., whereupon cognizance has been taken by the court concerned vide order dated 02.11.2019 after seven years of the alleged incident, whereas, 2 A482 No. 2543 of 2021 provisions under which applicants have been implicated in the case prescribe minimum punishment of three years. Thus, according to him, the said cognizance is clearly barred by limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C. and the present impugned cognizance/ summoning order as well as the entire proceedings initiated against the applicants is bad in law specially when there is no compliance or application of Section 473 Cr.P.C. relating to explanation for condoning the delay.

4. Learned Additional Government Advocate as well as learned counsel for the opposite party No. 3 (informant), on the other hand, opposed the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicants.

5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record available before this Court, this Court finds that charge-sheet in N.C.R. No. 0194/18 has been filed by the Investigating Officer under Sections 323, 504, 324 I.P.C. So far as the offence under Section 324 I.P.C. is concerned, maximum punishment that could be awarded for the offence is three years, whereas for the offence under Sections 323 and 504 I.P.C. is concerned, the maximum punishment awarded is of one and two years, respectively.

6. First & foremost, it has to be understood that cognizance indicates the point when a Court takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating process in respect of the offence. Cognizance is entirely different from initiation of proceedings, rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Court. Cognizance is taken of the case and not of a person. Under Section 190 of Cr.P.C., it is the application of mind to the averments in the complaint that constitute cognizance. The stage of process is not relevant for the purpose of computing limitation under Section 468 of Cr.P.C.

7. It is not disputed that the offences under Sections 323, 504 and 324 I.P.C. are non-cognizable, hence in view of the Explanation to Section 2 (d) of Cr.P.C. a case could not proceed as a State case and it has to proceed as a complaint case. That Explanation of 2(d) of Cr.P.C. reads as under :- "Explanation.-A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non- cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint, and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant."

8. Thus, in view of the said explanation, charge-sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer, after investigation, disclosing commission of non- cognizable offence is to be deemed to be a complaint and a police officer, who submitted the report, has to be deemed to be a complainant. In other words, the charge sheet submitted by the police in a non-cognizable offence shall be treated to be a complaint and the procedure prescribed for claiming a complaint case shall be applicable to the case.

9. In the present case, the learned Magistrate, instead of treated the charge sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer as a complaint, took cognizance of it as a State case by the impugned cognizance/ summoning order dated 02.11.2019, which is not permissible under law. 3 A482 No. 2543 of 2021

10. Further issuance of process of summons is not an empty formality. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr vs Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. : 1998 (5) SCC 749 has held that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set in motion as a matter of course for alleged offence. It would be apt to take note of para 28 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads as thus :- "28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. it is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused."

11. In the present case, this Court finds that the learned Magistrate did not even care to note that as to whether the offences, for which the charge sheet has been filed by the police, is as to whether cognizable or not, so to expect that there had been any application of mind would be a misnomer. Apparently, the cognizance/ summoning order dated 02.11.2019 seems to have been issued in a routine manner, which cannot withstand the parameters of Sections 203/204 of Cr.P.C. and is liable to be set aside.

12. Further, there is another aspect of the matter. At this stage, it would be apt to refer to the provisions of Sections 468, 469 and 473 Cr.P.C., which read thus:- "468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.- (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be- (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; offences,

1. Provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to certain economic Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act, 1974 (12 of 1974), s. 2 and Sch. 191(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three 4 A482 No. 2543 of 2021 years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. [(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.]

469. Commencement of the period of limitation.-(1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence- (a) on the date of the offence; or (b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or (c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier. (2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded;

473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases- foregoing Notwithstanding anything contained provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice."

13. Section 468 Cr.P.C. clearly mandates that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence after the period of limitation of three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but not exceeding three years. Further, Section 469 Cr.P.C. also makes it amply clear that the period of limitation, in relation to an offender shall commence on the date of the offence.

14. In the present case, the date of offence of reporting of N.C.R. is of 06.01.2012 and the impugned charge sheet has been filed on 24.07.2019 and the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance and summoned the applicants on 02.11.2019. Apparently, the charge sheet itself has been filed after more than seven years from the date of lodging of the N.C.R. and since the said charge sheet ought to have been construed as a complaint and the investigating officer to be a complainant in view of Explanation of Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C., therefore, taking a cognizance of offence after seven years by the learned Magistrate is barred by limitation as per Section 468 (2)(c) of Cr.P.C. Further, it is neither case of the parties that any application under Section 473 Cr.P.C. has been filed or that the learned Magistrate has passed any order under Section 473 Cr.P.C., justifying the issuance of the impugned cognizance/ summoning order dated 02.11.2019.

15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarah Mathew Vs. Inst., 5 A482 No. 2543 of 2021 Cardio Vascular Diseases & Ors., 2014 (1) SCC 721 had an occasion to consider the scope and ambit of Sections 468 and 473 Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :- "In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that Bharat Kale which is followed in Japani Sahoo lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C."

16. A similar view has been take by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Choudhury Vs. Commander, 48 Brtf (Gref), 2008 SCC Online SC 510. The relevant paragraph of the decision reads as under :- "As an option to get the appellant tried in a ordinary criminal court had been exercised by the respondent, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that all the pre-requisites therefor in regard to the period of limitation as also the necessity to obtain the order of sanction were required to be complied with. A Court of law cannot take cognizance of an offence, if it is barred by limitation. Delay in filing a complaint petition therefore has to be condoned. If the delay is not condoned, the court will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance. Similarly unless it is held that a sanction was not required to be obtained, the court's jurisdiction will be barred."

17. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken a similar view in the case of Ghanshyam Soni Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi). The relevant paragraphs-15 to 19 of the said judgment reads as under:

15. It is a settled position of law that for the computation of the limitation period under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.7 The dicta laid down in the case of Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2003] 8 SCC 559 makes it unequivocally clear that the Magistrate is well within his powers to take cognizance of a complaint filed within a period of three years from the date of the commission of offence as mandated under section 468 CrPC. The relevant portion is reproduced as under: “50. The Code imposes an obligation on the aggrieved party to take recourse to appropriate forum within the period provided by law and once he takes such action, it would be wholly unreasonable and inequitable if he is told that his grievance would not be ventilated as the court had not taken an action within the period 6 A482 No. 2543 of 2021 of limitation. Such interpretation of law, instead of promoting justice would lead to perpetuate injustice and defeat the primary object of procedural law. law,

51. The matter can be looked at from different angle also. Once it is accepted (and there is no dispute about it) that it is not within the domain of the complainant or prosecuting agency to take cognizance of an offence or to issue process and the only thing the former can do is to file a complaint or initiate proceedings in accordance initiation of that action of proceedings has been taken within the period of limitation, the complainant is not responsible for any delay on the part of the court or Magistrate in issuing process or taking cognizance of an offence. Now, if he is sought to be penalized because of the omission, default or inaction on the part of the court or Magistrate, the provision of law may have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a provision is totally arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable. It is settled law that a court of law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather vulnerable and unconstitutional by adopting rule of litera legis. Connecting the provision of limitation in Section 468 of the Code with issuing of process or taking of cognizance by unsustainable and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. 52. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date must be considered as the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of process by a court. We, therefore, overrule all decisions in which it has been held that the the period of for computing crucial date limitation taking of cognizance by Magistrate/court and not of filing of complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings. the court may make than making

53. In the instant case, the complaint was filed within a period of three days from the date of alleged offence. The complaint, therefore, must be held to be filed within the period of limitation even though cognizance was taken by the learned Magistrate after a period of one year. Since the criminal proceedings have been quashed by the High Court, the order deserves to be set aside and is accordingly set aside by 7 A482 No. 2543 of 2021 directing the Magistrate to proceed with the case and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible.”

16. The following observation in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan : [2022] 15 SCC 50 also re-iterates the said position, and further holds cognizance is taken at a later stage, but the Complaint was filed within the specified period from the commission of the offence, the Complainant cannot be put to prejudice and her Complaint cannot be discarded as time-barred. that simply because invoking “It is, thus, clear that though Section 468 of the Code mandates that ‘cognizance’ ought to be taken within the specified period from the commission of offence, by principles of purposive construction, this Court ruled that a complainant should not be put to prejudice, if for reasons beyond the control of the prosecuting agency or the complainant, the cognizance was the period of taken after limitation. It was observed by the Constitution Bench that if the filing of the complaint or initiation of proceedings was within prescribed period from the date of commission of an offence, the Court would be entitled to take cognizance even after the prescribed period was over.” limitation period

17. The observations made by the High Court in respect of computation of the correct appreciation of facts, and it is right in holding that “considering the date of commission of offence as 08.09.1999 and the dale of filing of complaint as 03.07.2002, this Court finds that the Complaint was lodged by the Petitioner within a period of two years and ten months from the date of commission of alleged offence, which is within. the period of limitation of three years as per Section 468 of CrPC.”

18. Therefore, this is certainly not a case where the Complaint or the issuance of process is ex-facie barred by limitation, that the question of condonation of delay would arise. It is therefore clarified that the Magistrate had rightly taken cognizance of the offence under section 498A and the question of applicability or exercise of powers under section 473 CrPC as erroneously observed by the Sessions Court, does not even arise and need not be delved into at this stage.

19. In the interest of justice, and in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we deem it fit and appropriate to quash and set aside the FIR No. 1098/2002 dt. 19.12.2002 registered with PS Malviya Nagar and the Chargesheet dt. 27.07.2004."

18. Even in the case of Rakesh Kumar Sharma Vs. State of U.P. and 8 A482 No. 2543 of 2021 another, 2007 ADJ 478 specifically para nos.5 and 6, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has considered the matter wherein FIR was lodged under Section 307 I.P.C., but subsequently charge sheet was submitted under Section 504 I.P.C. The Court concluded that it should not be proceeded as a police case which is barred under the Explanation of Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C. The relevant para nos. 5 and 6 are reproduced hereinafter :- "5. He submitted that in the present case originally the F.I.R. was lodged under Section 307 I.P.C., but after investigation the Investigating Officer came to the conclusion that no offence under Section 307 I.P.C. was made out and only a case under Section 504 I.P.C. was made out against the applicant and so a charge-sheet under Section 504 I.P.C. was submitted against the applicant. He contended that in view of the aforesaid Explanation to Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. the case could not proceed as a police case in respect of an offence punishable under Section 504 I.P.C. because the offence under Section 504 I.P.C. is non-cognizable and so the case could proceed only as a complaint case in view of the aforesaid Explanation.

6. The above contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant is correct. I, therefore, allow this application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to this extent that the cognizance taken by the Magistrate in the case on the basis of the report of the police for the offence punishable under Section 504 I.P.C. and the orders passed by him for issuing warrant against the applicant are hereby quashed. The Magistrate shall not proceed with the case as a State case but he shall proceed with it as a complaint case as provided in the Explanation to Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. and he shall follow the procedure prescribed for hearing of a complaint case."

19. In view of the settled law, the learned Magistrate, Bahraich ought to had not proceeded on the police report without applying judicial mind inasmuch as all the offences as mentioned in the N.C.R. as non- cognizable and proper course of the action for the Magistrate was to treat the matter as complaint under the provisions as enshrined under Explanation to Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. Further the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offence after seven years from the date of offence as the offences alleged under Sections 323, 504, 324 I.P.C. are punishable with maximum sentence of one year, two years and three years respectively. Further perusal of the impugned order shows that the learned Judicial Magistrate had no occasion to condone the delay in terms of Section 473 Cr.P.C. before taking cognizance, therefore, the impugned order is without jurisdiction.

20. This being the position, this Court is of the considered view that the instant application deserves to be allowed.

21. Consequently, the cognizance/ summoning order dated 02.11.2019 passed by Judicial Magistrate, Bahraich in Case No. 13963 of 2019 (State Vs. Shatrohan Lal and another), under Sections 323, 504, 324 I.P.C., Police Station Fakharpur, District Bahraich and all other consequential proceedings emanating therefrom are quashed. 9 A482 No. 2543 of 2021

22. Accordingly, the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed. December 10, 2025 Mustaqeem (Dr. Gautam Chowdhary,J.) MOHD MUSTAQEEM KHAN High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

1. Heard Shri Sandeep Singh, learned counsel for the applicants, Shri Ashok Srivastava, learned A.G.A. for the State as well as Shri R. A. Khan, learned counsel for the informant-opposite party No. 3 and perused the material brought on record.

2. Applicants, namely, Shatrohan Lal and Smt. Vaijantimala, by invoking inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.') have challenged the order dated 02.11.2019, whereby learned Judicial Magistrate, Bahraich has taken cognizance and summoned the applicants under Sections 323, 504, 324 I.P.C. in Case No. 13963 of 2019 (State Vs. Shatrohan Lal and another), arising out of Case Crime No. 0291 of 2019, relating to Police Station Fakharpur, District Bahraich as well as the impugned charge sheet No. 0238 of 2019 dated 24.07.2019 along with the entire proceedings of the above mentioned case.

3. Briefly stated, the prosecution story is that on 06.01.2012 the opposite party No. 3 has lodged a report against the applicants bearing N.C.R. No. 0194/18, under Sections 323, 504 I.P.C. at Police Station Fakharpur, District Bahraich alleging therein that applicants had beaten him in front of the house. After lodging of the said N.C.R. the opposite party No. 3 moved an application under Section 155(2) Cr.P.C. before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bahraich, who vide its order dated 07.06.2013 directed the concerned Station House Officer-opposite party No. 3 to investigate the matter as a state case. After passing of the said order the police has not started investigation timely and the statement of the informant was recorded on 27.06.2019 during the course of investigation. Thereafter, the said N.C.R. was converted into F.I.R. on 19.07.2019 and police completed investigation on 24.07.2019 and filed charge sheet against the applicants under Sections 323, 504, 324 I.P.C., whereupon cognizance has been taken by the court concerned vide order dated 02.11.2019 after seven years of the alleged incident, whereas, 2 A482 No. 2543 of 2021 provisions under which applicants have been implicated in the case prescribe minimum punishment of three years. Thus, according to him, the said cognizance is clearly barred by limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C. and the present impugned cognizance/ summoning order as well as the entire proceedings initiated against the applicants is bad in law specially when there is no compliance or application of Section 473 Cr.P.C. relating to explanation for condoning the delay.

4. Learned Additional Government Advocate as well as learned counsel for the opposite party No. 3 (informant), on the other hand, opposed the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicants.

5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record available before this Court, this Court finds that charge-sheet in N.C.R. No. 0194/18 has been filed by the Investigating Officer under Sections 323, 504, 324 I.P.C. So far as the offence under Section 324 I.P.C. is concerned, maximum punishment that could be awarded for the offence is three years, whereas for the offence under Sections 323 and 504 I.P.C. is concerned, the maximum punishment awarded is of one and two years, respectively.

6. First & foremost, it has to be understood that cognizance indicates the point when a Court takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating process in respect of the offence. Cognizance is entirely different from initiation of proceedings, rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Court. Cognizance is taken of the case and not of a person. Under Section 190 of Cr.P.C., it is the application of mind to the averments in the complaint that constitute cognizance. The stage of process is not relevant for the purpose of computing limitation under Section 468 of Cr.P.C.

7. It is not disputed that the offences under Sections 323, 504 and 324 I.P.C. are non-cognizable, hence in view of the Explanation to Section 2 (d) of Cr.P.C. a case could not proceed as a State case and it has to proceed as a complaint case. That Explanation of 2(d) of Cr.P.C. reads as under :- "Explanation.-A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non- cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint, and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant."

8. Thus, in view of the said explanation, charge-sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer, after investigation, disclosing commission of non- cognizable offence is to be deemed to be a complaint and a police officer, who submitted the report, has to be deemed to be a complainant. In other words, the charge sheet submitted by the police in a non-cognizable offence shall be treated to be a complaint and the procedure prescribed for claiming a complaint case shall be applicable to the case.

9. In the present case, the learned Magistrate, instead of treated the charge sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer as a complaint, took cognizance of it as a State case by the impugned cognizance/ summoning order dated 02.11.2019, which is not permissible under law. 3 A482 No. 2543 of 2021

10. Further issuance of process of summons is not an empty formality. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr vs Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. : 1998 (5) SCC 749 has held that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set in motion as a matter of course for alleged offence. It would be apt to take note of para 28 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads as thus :- "28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. it is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused."

11. In the present case, this Court finds that the learned Magistrate did not even care to note that as to whether the offences, for which the charge sheet has been filed by the police, is as to whether cognizable or not, so to expect that there had been any application of mind would be a misnomer. Apparently, the cognizance/ summoning order dated 02.11.2019 seems to have been issued in a routine manner, which cannot withstand the parameters of Sections 203/204 of Cr.P.C. and is liable to be set aside.

12. Further, there is another aspect of the matter. At this stage, it would be apt to refer to the provisions of Sections 468, 469 and 473 Cr.P.C., which read thus:- "468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.- (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be- (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; offences,

1. Provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to certain economic Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act, 1974 (12 of 1974), s. 2 and Sch. 191(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three 4 A482 No. 2543 of 2021 years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. [(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.]

469. Commencement of the period of limitation.-(1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence- (a) on the date of the offence; or (b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or (c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier. (2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded;

473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases- foregoing Notwithstanding anything contained provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice."

13. Section 468 Cr.P.C. clearly mandates that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence after the period of limitation of three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but not exceeding three years. Further, Section 469 Cr.P.C. also makes it amply clear that the period of limitation, in relation to an offender shall commence on the date of the offence.

14. In the present case, the date of offence of reporting of N.C.R. is of 06.01.2012 and the impugned charge sheet has been filed on 24.07.2019 and the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance and summoned the applicants on 02.11.2019. Apparently, the charge sheet itself has been filed after more than seven years from the date of lodging of the N.C.R. and since the said charge sheet ought to have been construed as a complaint and the investigating officer to be a complainant in view of Explanation of Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C., therefore, taking a cognizance of offence after seven years by the learned Magistrate is barred by limitation as per Section 468 (2)(c) of Cr.P.C. Further, it is neither case of the parties that any application under Section 473 Cr.P.C. has been filed or that the learned Magistrate has passed any order under Section 473 Cr.P.C., justifying the issuance of the impugned cognizance/ summoning order dated 02.11.2019.

15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarah Mathew Vs. Inst., 5 A482 No. 2543 of 2021 Cardio Vascular Diseases & Ors., 2014 (1) SCC 721 had an occasion to consider the scope and ambit of Sections 468 and 473 Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :- "In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that Bharat Kale which is followed in Japani Sahoo lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C."

16. A similar view has been take by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Choudhury Vs. Commander, 48 Brtf (Gref), 2008 SCC Online SC 510. The relevant paragraph of the decision reads as under :- "As an option to get the appellant tried in a ordinary criminal court had been exercised by the respondent, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that all the pre-requisites therefor in regard to the period of limitation as also the necessity to obtain the order of sanction were required to be complied with. A Court of law cannot take cognizance of an offence, if it is barred by limitation. Delay in filing a complaint petition therefore has to be condoned. If the delay is not condoned, the court will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance. Similarly unless it is held that a sanction was not required to be obtained, the court's jurisdiction will be barred."

17. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken a similar view in the case of Ghanshyam Soni Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi). The relevant paragraphs-15 to 19 of the said judgment reads as under:

15. It is a settled position of law that for the computation of the limitation period under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.7 The dicta laid down in the case of Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2003] 8 SCC 559 makes it unequivocally clear that the Magistrate is well within his powers to take cognizance of a complaint filed within a period of three years from the date of the commission of offence as mandated under section 468 CrPC. The relevant portion is reproduced as under: “50. The Code imposes an obligation on the aggrieved party to take recourse to appropriate forum within the period provided by law and once he takes such action, it would be wholly unreasonable and inequitable if he is told that his grievance would not be ventilated as the court had not taken an action within the period 6 A482 No. 2543 of 2021 of limitation. Such interpretation of law, instead of promoting justice would lead to perpetuate injustice and defeat the primary object of procedural law. law,

51. The matter can be looked at from different angle also. Once it is accepted (and there is no dispute about it) that it is not within the domain of the complainant or prosecuting agency to take cognizance of an offence or to issue process and the only thing the former can do is to file a complaint or initiate proceedings in accordance initiation of that action of proceedings has been taken within the period of limitation, the complainant is not responsible for any delay on the part of the court or Magistrate in issuing process or taking cognizance of an offence. Now, if he is sought to be penalized because of the omission, default or inaction on the part of the court or Magistrate, the provision of law may have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a provision is totally arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable. It is settled law that a court of law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather vulnerable and unconstitutional by adopting rule of litera legis. Connecting the provision of limitation in Section 468 of the Code with issuing of process or taking of cognizance by unsustainable and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. 52. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date must be considered as the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of process by a court. We, therefore, overrule all decisions in which it has been held that the the period of for computing crucial date limitation taking of cognizance by Magistrate/court and not of filing of complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings. the court may make than making

53. In the instant case, the complaint was filed within a period of three days from the date of alleged offence. The complaint, therefore, must be held to be filed within the period of limitation even though cognizance was taken by the learned Magistrate after a period of one year. Since the criminal proceedings have been quashed by the High Court, the order deserves to be set aside and is accordingly set aside by 7 A482 No. 2543 of 2021 directing the Magistrate to proceed with the case and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible.”

16. The following observation in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan : [2022] 15 SCC 50 also re-iterates the said position, and further holds cognizance is taken at a later stage, but the Complaint was filed within the specified period from the commission of the offence, the Complainant cannot be put to prejudice and her Complaint cannot be discarded as time-barred. that simply because invoking “It is, thus, clear that though Section 468 of the Code mandates that ‘cognizance’ ought to be taken within the specified period from the commission of offence, by principles of purposive construction, this Court ruled that a complainant should not be put to prejudice, if for reasons beyond the control of the prosecuting agency or the complainant, the cognizance was the period of taken after limitation. It was observed by the Constitution Bench that if the filing of the complaint or initiation of proceedings was within prescribed period from the date of commission of an offence, the Court would be entitled to take cognizance even after the prescribed period was over.” limitation period

17. The observations made by the High Court in respect of computation of the correct appreciation of facts, and it is right in holding that “considering the date of commission of offence as 08.09.1999 and the dale of filing of complaint as 03.07.2002, this Court finds that the Complaint was lodged by the Petitioner within a period of two years and ten months from the date of commission of alleged offence, which is within. the period of limitation of three years as per Section 468 of CrPC.”

18. Therefore, this is certainly not a case where the Complaint or the issuance of process is ex-facie barred by limitation, that the question of condonation of delay would arise. It is therefore clarified that the Magistrate had rightly taken cognizance of the offence under section 498A and the question of applicability or exercise of powers under section 473 CrPC as erroneously observed by the Sessions Court, does not even arise and need not be delved into at this stage.

19. In the interest of justice, and in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we deem it fit and appropriate to quash and set aside the FIR No. 1098/2002 dt. 19.12.2002 registered with PS Malviya Nagar and the Chargesheet dt. 27.07.2004."

18. Even in the case of Rakesh Kumar Sharma Vs. State of U.P. and 8 A482 No. 2543 of 2021 another, 2007 ADJ 478 specifically para nos.5 and 6, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has considered the matter wherein FIR was lodged under Section 307 I.P.C., but subsequently charge sheet was submitted under Section 504 I.P.C. The Court concluded that it should not be proceeded as a police case which is barred under the Explanation of Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C. The relevant para nos. 5 and 6 are reproduced hereinafter :- "5. He submitted that in the present case originally the F.I.R. was lodged under Section 307 I.P.C., but after investigation the Investigating Officer came to the conclusion that no offence under Section 307 I.P.C. was made out and only a case under Section 504 I.P.C. was made out against the applicant and so a charge-sheet under Section 504 I.P.C. was submitted against the applicant. He contended that in view of the aforesaid Explanation to Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. the case could not proceed as a police case in respect of an offence punishable under Section 504 I.P.C. because the offence under Section 504 I.P.C. is non-cognizable and so the case could proceed only as a complaint case in view of the aforesaid Explanation.

6. The above contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant is correct. I, therefore, allow this application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to this extent that the cognizance taken by the Magistrate in the case on the basis of the report of the police for the offence punishable under Section 504 I.P.C. and the orders passed by him for issuing warrant against the applicant are hereby quashed. The Magistrate shall not proceed with the case as a State case but he shall proceed with it as a complaint case as provided in the Explanation to Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. and he shall follow the procedure prescribed for hearing of a complaint case."

19. In view of the settled law, the learned Magistrate, Bahraich ought to had not proceeded on the police report without applying judicial mind inasmuch as all the offences as mentioned in the N.C.R. as non- cognizable and proper course of the action for the Magistrate was to treat the matter as complaint under the provisions as enshrined under Explanation to Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. Further the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offence after seven years from the date of offence as the offences alleged under Sections 323, 504, 324 I.P.C. are punishable with maximum sentence of one year, two years and three years respectively. Further perusal of the impugned order shows that the learned Judicial Magistrate had no occasion to condone the delay in terms of Section 473 Cr.P.C. before taking cognizance, therefore, the impugned order is without jurisdiction.

20. This being the position, this Court is of the considered view that the instant application deserves to be allowed.

21. Consequently, the cognizance/ summoning order dated 02.11.2019 passed by Judicial Magistrate, Bahraich in Case No. 13963 of 2019 (State Vs. Shatrohan Lal and another), under Sections 323, 504, 324 I.P.C., Police Station Fakharpur, District Bahraich and all other consequential proceedings emanating therefrom are quashed. 9 A482 No. 2543 of 2021

22. Accordingly, the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed. December 10, 2025 Mustaqeem (Dr. Gautam Chowdhary,J.) MOHD MUSTAQEEM KHAN High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench