(Krishna Kumar & Ors. v. State of U.P.). The relevant portion of the judgment under review, extracted & Ors.

(ix) It would be apt to indicate at this stage that the order dated 28.09.2024, whereby the Deputy Director of Consolidation has affirmed the order dated 12.03.2023, in the case instituted under Section 42-A of the Act of 1953 has not been challenged till date. (x) It would also be relevant to indicate that according to the settled principles of law, after publication of Section 52 of the Act of 1953 the application under Section 42-A can be preferred for correcting clerical or arithmetical errors. (xi) After the order dated 12.07.2023, passed in the case instituted under Section 42-A of the Act of 1953, the petitioner challenged the order passed by the Consolidation Officer dated 28.12.1998 before the Deputy Director of Consolidation by means of Revision No.0954 of 2023. (xii) From the aforesaid facts it is apparent that the revision challenging the order dated 28.12.1998 passed by the Consolidation Officer was preferred after delay of about 25 years. (xiii) At this stage, on being asked, learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the application seeking condonation of delay 5 filed along with the revision is not on record. He further stated that the said application contains the same averments as has been indicated in paragraph 6 of the application under Section 42-A of the Act of 1953, which is on record at page 26 to 29. Referred paragraph 6 of the application, relevant for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion as to whether the delay of about 25 years has been properly explained and therefore the same is extracted herein under :- "6. यह निक प्राथqगण बराबर जा(cid:8)ते रहे निक जब चकबंदी अधिधकारी द्वारा निद(cid:8)ांक 28.12.1998 को गाटा सं० 19 निम० रकवा 0.089हे० शनिमल जोत रास्ता दज2 कर(cid:8)े का आदेश पारिरत कर निदया है, तो उक्त गाटा दौरा(cid:8) चकबंदी, चकबंदी प्राधिधकारिरयों द्वारा चकबंदी पृथक रखा होगा, लेनिक(cid:8) जब प्राथqगणों को गांव में निद 14-2-2023 को अफवाह(cid:8) जा(cid:8)कारी निमली निक गाटा हे 0 की चकबंदी में मालिलयत लगकर दूसरे स्था(cid:8) पर पहुंच गया है , सं० 19 निम० का रकवा 30 और जहां पर प्राथqगणों के चाचा की दुका(cid:8)ें ब(cid:8)ी है वहां पर गाटा सं० बंजर खाते में दज2 है। तब प्राथqगण हरदोई कचेहरी आकर श्री सधिच्चदा(cid:8)ंद धितवारी एडवोकेट को 19 का (cid:8)या गाटा सं०

0.089 अप(cid:8)ा अधिधवक्ता नि(cid:8)युक्त कर राजस्व अभिभलेखागार हरदोई में नि(cid:8)रीक्षण कराया और नि(cid:8)रीक्षण में उक्त त्रुनिट का पता लगा तदपरान्त सम्बंधिधत अभिभलेखों की प्रमाभिणत प्रधितयां प्राप्त कर आज , क्योंनिक धारा श्रीमा(cid:8) जी के न्यायालय में उक्त वाद प्राथqगण प्रस्तुत कर रहे हैं। प्राथqगणों (cid:8)े जा(cid:8)बूझ कर कोई 42 क के वाद की कोई समय सीमा नि(cid:8)धा2रिरत (cid:8)ही है निफर भी देरी (cid:8)ही की है का(cid:8)ू(cid:8)ी त्रुनिट से बच(cid:8)े हेतु प्राथqगण उक्त कथ(cid:8) कर रहे हैं। उक्त वाद में यनिद कोई देरी हुई हो तो उसे क्षमा निकया जावे।" (xiv) Before proceeding further, it would also be relevant to state following facts :- (a) In regard to Gata No.19M/0.089 Hectare the petitioners are claiming rights which were provided by executing "Patta" to Ram Dayal way back on 04.02.1976 and during the consolidation proceedings vide order dated 28.12.1998 passed by Consolidation Officer the Chak (s) were provided over Gata No.784 and 548 M after assessing the valuation of his "Mool Gata (s)" i.e. Gata No.19M/0.0890 and Gata No.539/0.066 hectare. (b) The fact that Chak(s) were provided to Ram Dayal has not been disputed. (c) The claim aforesaid was sought after elapse of about 25 years from the date of order dated 28.12.1998 passed by Consolidation Officer. It is for the reason that an application dated 08.05.2023 was moved on 17.05.2023 by the petitioner under Section 42A of the Act of 1953 before the Consolidation Officer, which appears from the copy of the same annexed as Annexure No.4. (d) The application aforesaid was moved after publication of notification under Section 52 of the Act of 1953, which was published way back on 09.03.2005. (xv) From a bare perusal of the explanation given for condonation of delay of 25 years it is clear that the delay has not been explained, as required under the law, which ought to have been explained properly, as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in various 6 pronouncements. (see: Ramji Dass and others Vs. Mohan Singh reported in 1978 ARC 496; N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123; Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Medar Academy and others reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649; Brijesh Kumar and others Vs. State of Haryana and others reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351; Bhivchandra Shankar More Vs. Balu Gangaram More reported in (2019) 6 SCC 387 and Ajay Dabra Versus Pyare Lal and others reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 92)." The grounds for seeking review of judgment dated 11.04.2025

6. taken in the present application, are extracted hereinunder:- "(A) Because, the impugned order dated 11.04.2025 passed by the Hon'ble Court is per se illegal, arbitrary, unjust, and improper. (B) Because, the impugned order has been passed by the Hon'ble Court merely on the ground of delay, without examining the merits of the case. (C) Because, the impugned order has been passed without considering the aspect of matter that the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation as well as the Consolidation Officer failed to consider and discuss any averments made in the objections as well as in the revision. (D) Because, the impugned order has been passed without considering the evidence available on record. (E) Because, the review petitioners were unable to present certain material and relevant points during the hearing, which were essential for the just and proper adjudication of the case. (F) Because, the petition was dismissed by impugned order dated 11.04.2025 merely on the ground that the delay of 25 years had not been adequately explained, as required under the law. However, it is respectfully submitted that Hon'ble Apex Court passed a judgment in the case of D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India (2003) 6 SCC 186, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has held that "date of that order" means "date of knowledge of the order." Unfortunately, counsel of the petitioners was unable to bring this judgment to the notice the Court at the of hearing. (G) Because, the Hon'ble Court did not properly consider the petitioner's submissions and the documentary evidence demonstrating that the Patta of the land in question was allotted to Late Ram Dayal, son of Tanku, on 04.02.1976. Furthermore, the land was duly mutated in his name, and he was subsequently declared the owner with transferable rights pursuant to the Government Order dated 25.05.1995. (H) Because, the Hon'ble Court failed to properly appreciate the grounds urged in the writ petition and erroneously upheld the order 7 passed by the court below, which is perverse and contrary to the material on record. (I) Because, while passing the impugned order the Hon'ble Court has failed to consider this aspect of the matter that order passed by Learned Consolidation Officer as well as Deputy Director of Consolidation is based on conjectures and surmises. (J) Because, it was incumbent upon this Hon'ble Court to consider this aspect of matter that the orders passed by the learned Consolidation Officer and the Deputy Director of Consolidation were made without conducting a spot inspection, which was necessary to rectify the error committed by the consolidation authorities in overlooking the old construction situated on the land in question. (K) Because, Form 2A, forming part of the official record during the initial consolidation proceedings, unequivocally demonstrates that the constructed portion of the land was specifically excluded from the consolidation scheme. (L) Because, certain material aspects of the case were not taken into consideration at the time of the hearing, and the petitioner respectfully seeks a review of the order on merits, in the interest of justice. (M) Because, if the Hon'ble Court does not review its order, the petitioner will suffer irreparable loss and injury, which cannot be adequately compensated by any other means or remedy. (N) Because, the review petitioner humbly believes that this Hon'ble Court will be pleased to do justice after considering the genuine grounds set forth above, and sincerely hopes that the review petition will be allowed in the interest of justice." After discussing a series of decisions on review jurisdiction in 7. Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned case as below :- “20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; 8 (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki17, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius18 to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.25,.

20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:— (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”

8. In Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs v. Vinod Kumar Rawat reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 896, the Hon'ble Supreme Court citing previous decisions and expounding on the scope and ambit of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1, has observed that Section 114 CPC does not lay any conditions precedent for exercising the power of review; and nor does the Section prohibit the Court from exercising its power to review a decision. However, an order can be reviewed by the Court only on the grounds prescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The said power cannot be exercised as an inherent power and nor can 9 appellate power be exercised in the guise of exercising the power of review.

9. Recently the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal vs. State Tax Officer (1) and Another 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1406, observed as under:-

9. In the words of Krishna Iyer J., (as His Lordship then was) “a plea of review, unless the first judicial view is manifestly distorted, is like asking for the Moon. A forensic defeat cannot be avenged by an invitation to have a second look, hopeful of discovery of flaws and reversal of result……… A review in the Counsel's mentation cannot repair the verdict once given. So, the law laid down must rest in peace.”

10. It is also well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.

11. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, this Court made very pivotal observations:— “9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.”

12. Again, in Shanti Conductors Private Limited v. Assam State Electricity Board, a three Judge Bench of this Court following Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (supra) dismissed the review petitions holding that the scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.

13. Recently, in Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) Through Legal Representatives v. Vinod Kumar Rawat, this Court restated the law with regard to the scope of review under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of CPC.

14. In R.P. (C) Nos. 1273-1274 of 2021 in Civil Appeal Nos. 8345- 8346 of 2018 (Arun Dev Upadhyaya v. Integrated Sales Service Limited), this Court reiterated the law and held that:— “15. From the above, it is evident that a power to review cannot be exercised as an appellate power and has to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should 10 strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.”

15. It is very pertinent to note that recently the Constitution Bench in Beghar Foundation v. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retired), held that even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of co-ordinate Bench or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.

16. The gist of the afore-stated decisions is that:— (i) A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. (ii) A judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. (iii) An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review. (iv) In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected.” (v) A Review Petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.” (vi) Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided. (vii) An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long- drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions. (viii) Even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of a co- ordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.

10. In the case of S.Madhusudhan Reddy Vs. V.Narayana Reddy and Others; reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1034, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under :- "As can be seen from the above exposition of law, it has been consistently held by this Court in several judicial pronouncements that the Court's jurisdiction of review, is not the same as that of an appeal. A judgment can be open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by a process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising powers of review, the Court can correct a mistake but not substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking two views in a matter. A judgment may also be open to review when any new or 11 important matter of evidence has emerged after passing of the judgment, subject to the condition that such evidence was not within the knowledge of the party seeking review or could not be produced by it when the order was made despite undertaking an exercise of due diligence. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision as against an error apparent on the face of the record. An erroneous decision can be corrected by the Superior Court, however an error apparent on the face of the record can only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction. Yet another circumstance referred to in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment has been described as “for any other sufficient reason”. The said phrase has been explained to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule” (Refer : Chajju Ram v. Neki Ram and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius)."

11. Upon due consideration of the grounds taken in the instant review application as also the law related to dealing with the review petition, according to which the review is by no means an appeal in disguise and the scope of review is limited as also the judgment dated 11.04.2025, under review, this Court finds no force in the present review application for the reasons that while passing the judgment dated 11.04.2025 this Court considered the relevant law on the issue as also the facts of the case pleaded and submissions advanced by the counsel for the petitioners/applicants and further, in regard to the alleged date of knowledge of order dated 28.12.1998 i.e. 14.02.2023 it is to be indicated that (i) the order dated 28.12.1998 was not challenged by the Ram Dayal to whom the Chak (s) were provided by this order and, (ii) the petitioners were living with the Ram Dayal, as pleaded, and accordingly their claim that they came to know about the order dated 28.12.1998 on 14.02.2023 is not liable to be accepted.

12. Accordingly, the review application is dismissed.

13. No order as to costs. Order Date :- 4.7.2025 ML/-