Neeraj Kumar Rai and Others v. State of U.P & Others and the same was decided on

Heard Mr. Prasiddha Narayan Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the State, Sri Ran Vijay Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 3 and Sri Kumar Ayush, learned counsel for the opposite parties no. 4 & 5. The present writ petition has been filed assailing the order dated 02- 08-2016 passed by the District Basic Education Officer,Shrawasti. The grievance raised by way of present writ petition is that the petitioner's services have wrongly been terminated on account of not being 45% of marks in graduation. Contention put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the controversy in question went up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 14386 of 2015, Neeraj Kumar Rai and Others Vs State of U.P & Others and the same was decided on 25-07-2017 and that has been settled in favour of the appellants therein though case of the present petitioner is ditto identical to the case of those appellants before the Hon'ble Apex Court. Paragraph nos. 7 to 9 of the Judgment and Order dated 25-07-2027 is quoted hereinunder :- "7. Again, similar issue was raised before the High Court of Uttarakhand in 2 WRIA No. 20450 of 2016 Writ Petition No. 772(SS) of 2011 etc. titled Baldev Singh and ors. versus State of Uttarakhand and ors. The High Court in its judgment dated 20th August, 2011, after noticing the observations in the Rajasthan High Court judgment, observed: "Apparently therefore the restriction of a minimum percentage of marks in graduation (45% or 50% as the case might be) is not going to be enforced by NCTE, as it is evident from the above paragraph, as these were the instructionsof the Regional Director, NCTE to its counsel before the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court. The counsel representing NCTE Mr. Sudhir Singh has fairly submitted before this Court that he also gets his instructions from the same Regional Director, NCTE, yet there are no such instructions with him. That being the factual position, we leave it at that. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the above decision of the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court does not help the case of the petitioners, yet this Court is of a considered view, as it has already been discussed in the preceding paragraphs, that such a restriction (of having minimum percentage in graduation) is both unreasonable, unjust and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, this Court declares such condition of asking a minimum percentage of marks in graduation from those candidates who are B.Ed. qualified in NCTE notification dated 23.8.2010 and subsequent State Government Order dated 29.4.2011 as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Further this Court directs the respondents to permit the petitioners to appear in TET examination treating them to be qualified under Clause 3 of the notification dated 23.8.2010 and State Government Order dated 29.4.2011."

8. Mr. AS Nadkarni, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the NCTE fairly stated that the appellants may be treated at par with those covered by the Rajasthan and Uttarakhand High Courts judgments which have been accepted by the NCTE.

9. In view of fair stand of learned Additional Solicitor General and the view of Rajasthan and Uttarakhand High Courts, we do not find any reason to deny similar relief to the appellants. No doubt, as rightly held by the High Court the NCTE ought to have issued a clarification by way of a supplementary notification but the NCTE may now do so within one month from today. Accordingly, we direct that if the appellants or any other similarly placed persons are entitled to any further relief in terms of judgments of Rajasthan 3 WRIA No. 20450 of 2016 and Uttarakhand High Courts, they will be at liberty to put forward their claim before the concerned authorities who may take a decision thereon in accordance with law within one month. We have not examined any such claim in these proceedings except what has been stated hereinabove." Referring the aforesaid, he submitted that the controversy has been settled in the case of the appellants and it is open for the appellants and the other similarly placed persons to approach the department concerned and the department concerned was directed to take a decision in the light of law settled in the Judgment of Rajasthan and Uttrakhand High Courts. He submitted that in pursuant thereof, the government order was issued on 10-01-2020 and therefore, now the order impugned herein dated 02-08-2016, has become redundant. He added that the petitioner is still working on the strength of the interim order passed in the present writ petition. Therefore, submission is that the order dated 02-08-2016 may be quashed and the benefit accorded vide government order dated 10-01-2020, may also be given to the present petitioner. On the other hand, Sri Kumar Ayush, learned counsel appearing for the District Basic Education Officer did not refute the aforesaid contentions. Upon considering the submissions of learned counsels for the parties and after perusal records, it is an admitted fact in between the parties that the services of the petitioner were terminated and thereafter, he approached this court by way of instituting the present writ petition, wherein an interim order was passed and on the strength of the said interim order, the petitioner is still working in the department. The identical controversy has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Neeraj Kumar Rai (Supra) and thereafter, the government order was issued on 10-01-2020. From examining the aforesaid government order, it is apparent that the order dated 02-08-2016 has become nullity and the petitioner is entitled for his continuance in service on the post of Assistant Teacher. 4 WRIA No. 20450 of 2016 Consequently, the order impugned herein dated 02-08-2016, is hereby quashed. Consequences to follow. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. So far as the issue with respect to continuance of services of the petitioner is concerned, needless to say that the same will not be treated as break in the service. December 12, 2025 AKS (Shree Prakash Singh,J.) ANUJ KRISHNA SRIVASTAVA ANUJ KRISHNA SRIVASTAVA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Lucknow Bench

Heard Mr. Prasiddha Narayan Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the State, Sri Ran Vijay Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 3 and Sri Kumar Ayush, learned counsel for the opposite parties no. 4 & 5. The present writ petition has been filed assailing the order dated 02- 08-2016 passed by the District Basic Education Officer,Shrawasti. The grievance raised by way of present writ petition is that the petitioner's services have wrongly been terminated on account of not being 45% of marks in graduation. Contention put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the controversy in question went up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 14386 of 2015, Neeraj Kumar Rai and Others Vs State of U.P & Others and the same was decided on 25-07-2017 and that has been settled in favour of the appellants therein though case of the present petitioner is ditto identical to the case of those appellants before the Hon'ble Apex Court. Paragraph nos. 7 to 9 of the Judgment and Order dated 25-07-2027 is quoted hereinunder :- "7. Again, similar issue was raised before the High Court of Uttarakhand in 2 WRIA No. 20450 of 2016 Writ Petition No. 772(SS) of 2011 etc. titled Baldev Singh and ors. versus State of Uttarakhand and ors. The High Court in its judgment dated 20th August, 2011, after noticing the observations in the Rajasthan High Court judgment, observed: "Apparently therefore the restriction of a minimum percentage of marks in graduation (45% or 50% as the case might be) is not going to be enforced by NCTE, as it is evident from the above paragraph, as these were the instructionsof the Regional Director, NCTE to its counsel before the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court. The counsel representing NCTE Mr. Sudhir Singh has fairly submitted before this Court that he also gets his instructions from the same Regional Director, NCTE, yet there are no such instructions with him. That being the factual position, we leave it at that. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the above decision of the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court does not help the case of the petitioners, yet this Court is of a considered view, as it has already been discussed in the preceding paragraphs, that such a restriction (of having minimum percentage in graduation) is both unreasonable, unjust and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, this Court declares such condition of asking a minimum percentage of marks in graduation from those candidates who are B.Ed. qualified in NCTE notification dated 23.8.2010 and subsequent State Government Order dated 29.4.2011 as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Further this Court directs the respondents to permit the petitioners to appear in TET examination treating them to be qualified under Clause 3 of the notification dated 23.8.2010 and State Government Order dated 29.4.2011."

8. Mr. AS Nadkarni, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the NCTE fairly stated that the appellants may be treated at par with those covered by the Rajasthan and Uttarakhand High Courts judgments which have been accepted by the NCTE.

9. In view of fair stand of learned Additional Solicitor General and the view of Rajasthan and Uttarakhand High Courts, we do not find any reason to deny similar relief to the appellants. No doubt, as rightly held by the High Court the NCTE ought to have issued a clarification by way of a supplementary notification but the NCTE may now do so within one month from today. Accordingly, we direct that if the appellants or any other similarly placed persons are entitled to any further relief in terms of judgments of Rajasthan 3 WRIA No. 20450 of 2016 and Uttarakhand High Courts, they will be at liberty to put forward their claim before the concerned authorities who may take a decision thereon in accordance with law within one month. We have not examined any such claim in these proceedings except what has been stated hereinabove." Referring the aforesaid, he submitted that the controversy has been settled in the case of the appellants and it is open for the appellants and the other similarly placed persons to approach the department concerned and the department concerned was directed to take a decision in the light of law settled in the Judgment of Rajasthan and Uttrakhand High Courts. He submitted that in pursuant thereof, the government order was issued on 10-01-2020 and therefore, now the order impugned herein dated 02-08-2016, has become redundant. He added that the petitioner is still working on the strength of the interim order passed in the present writ petition. Therefore, submission is that the order dated 02-08-2016 may be quashed and the benefit accorded vide government order dated 10-01-2020, may also be given to the present petitioner. On the other hand, Sri Kumar Ayush, learned counsel appearing for the District Basic Education Officer did not refute the aforesaid contentions. Upon considering the submissions of learned counsels for the parties and after perusal records, it is an admitted fact in between the parties that the services of the petitioner were terminated and thereafter, he approached this court by way of instituting the present writ petition, wherein an interim order was passed and on the strength of the said interim order, the petitioner is still working in the department. The identical controversy has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Neeraj Kumar Rai (Supra) and thereafter, the government order was issued on 10-01-2020. From examining the aforesaid government order, it is apparent that the order dated 02-08-2016 has become nullity and the petitioner is entitled for his continuance in service on the post of Assistant Teacher. 4 WRIA No. 20450 of 2016 Consequently, the order impugned herein dated 02-08-2016, is hereby quashed. Consequences to follow. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. So far as the issue with respect to continuance of services of the petitioner is concerned, needless to say that the same will not be treated as break in the service. December 12, 2025 AKS (Shree Prakash Singh,J.) ANUJ KRISHNA SRIVASTAVA ANUJ KRISHNA SRIVASTAVA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Lucknow Bench