Hriday Ram v. Sukai and others), under Section

4. The aforesaid is for the reason that the order dated 12.08.2001 passed by CO was affirmed vide order dated 02.06.2004 passed by Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation (Administration), Faizabad now Ayodhya (in short "ASOC") in Case/Appeal No. 243 (Sukai and others vs. Gaon Sabha), under Section 9-B(3) of the Act of 1953, and the revision filed against the order dated 02.06.2004 passed by ASOC was dismissed as withdrawn by the side opposite. In regard to aforesaid, reference has also been made to Section 11-A of the Act of 1953. "03.09.2004 उतर पददश जदत बकबनदक आस धननयम कक धदरद-48 बनदजवसत अधधकदरक चकबनदक कद आददश नदनदसक 27-1-2004 नबधध नबरद बतदतद हहए उसद ननरसत नकयद जदनद कक यदचनद सनहत पसतसत कक रई हह। कद अनतररत यह तनररदनक ससकई ददरद नवददन नवरद उसद अवहधदननक तथद कद ममनद ननररदनककतदर कक ओर सद पसतसत नकयद रयद तकर कज नवसतदर सद ससनद तथद पनतपकक कक ओर सद पतदवधलत धलधखत तरर कद अवलजकन एवस अधययन नकयद एवस अनभलदखख तथद पतदवधलत सथल- ननरककण आखयद कद भक अवलजकन एवस अधययन नकयद। आर 2003 पसतसत कक रई थक धजसमम मदननकय उचच नयदयदलय ददरद पदररत आददश नदनदसक 23-5- ददरद नववदनदत भभनम कक सथल पर यथदणसथत बनदयद रखनद तथद पकरण कद शकघ ननसतदरण धजसकद अनसकम मम इस ननररदनक पर पदथनमकतद कद आधदर पर ससनवदई कक इस पकरण मम ननररदनककतदर ददरद मदननकय उचच नयदयदलय मम यदनचकद ससखयद-6233 (कनस) 2003 कक अपदकद कक रई थक, रई। ननररदनककतदर कक ओर सद पसतसत नकयद रयद तकर मम मसखय तथद यह कहद रयद हह उसकद मभल रदटद ससखयद -924 हहदररसज सद सदमरक जदनद वदलद मदरर पर णसथत हह तथद वयवसदनयक महतव कद हह धजसमम उसकद दज पदड पसरदनद णसथत हह, एवस यह उसकद एकमदत मभल रदटद हह तथद उसकक आवददक कद ननकट कद मभलयवदन रदटद हह, धजस पर पनतपकक कद उडदन चक पनदष कर नदयद रयद हह। उसकक यदचनद हह नक इस सथदन पर पनतपकक कद उपयजरदथर अनदवशयक रप सद छजडक रई सदमदनय आबददक तथद पनतपकक कद उडदन चक ननरसत करकद उसकद समपभणर मभल रदटद पर चक पनवष नकयद जदय। पनतपकक कक ओर सद ननररदनककतदर। कद कथन कद नवरजध नकयद रयद हह, तथद अपनद चक कद पददशन कज ससतसधलत एवस यसनकससरत बतदतद हहए उसद यथदवत रखनद कद अनसरजध नकयद रयद हह। परककण सद एवस सथल ननरककण आखयद कद अवलजकन सद नवनदत हजतद हह नक वसतसतत खडनजद सडदक सद उक रदटद कस छ दभरक पर हह, तथद रजयढ कद मभलयवदन रदटद हह। उलदखनकय हह नक ननररदनककतदर तथद उसकद सहखदतददरख कद यह एकमदत मभल रदटद हह, जज एक अतयसत छजटद कक षक धजनकद एकमदत उक मभल रदटद हह। चकबनदक नकयदयख कद अनतररत पतयदक चकददर कक नवखरक जजत कक समदनकत करनद कद पदनवधदन हह। इस पकरण मम तज ननररदनककतदर एवस उसकद सहखदतदददरख कक एक हक सथदन पर ससहत कदतरल णसथत हह, धजस अवर नयदयदलय नद पनतपकक कज लदभ ददनद कद उ‌ददशय सद दज सथदन पर कर नदयद हह तथद उनकद दभसरद उडदन चक दभरक पर णसथत हह धजससद उनकद कनत मम हजनद सवदभदनवक हक हह। उतर पददश जज पथम दषटद अननयनमत हह। नयदयनहत मम इनहम ननरसत कर इस रदटद मभल खदतदददरख कद चक चकबनदक यजजनद सद पभवर कक भदसनत यनद ससहत कदत मम इस सथदन पर पनदष कर नदयद जदय, तथद पनतपकक हदयरदम आनद कद चक ररक हज रहक भभनम पर पनदष कर नदयद जदय तज नकसक चकददर कज कजई कनत नहह हजरक एवस ननररदनककतदर कक यसनकससरत कनठनदइयख कद ननरदकरण हज जदयरद तद‌नससदर अवर नयदयदलय कद आददश ससशजधधत हजनद यजगय हह तथद यह ननररदनक इसक रप मम सवककदर हजनद यजगय हह। रकदनससदर सवककदर कक जदतक हह। ससलग ससशजधन उपयस तदधलकद धजस पर मदरद हसतदकर हम तथद जज इस आददश कद असर हह कद अनससदर गदम अनभलदख ससशजधधत हख तथद सथल पर सकमदसकन नकयद जदय। अगदतर कदयरवदहक कद उपरदसत पतदवलक ससगहकत हज।" रक नववदचन कद आधदर पर यह ननररदनक उपयस

5. At this stage, it is to be noted that the order dated 02.06.2004 was assailed by means of a revision registered as Revision No. 1550 (Sukai vs. State and others), which was dismissed by the DDC vide order dated 29.07.2005. The order dated 29.07.2005 reads as under:- " आज पसतसत हहयक। पतदवलक कद अवलजकन नकयद रयद। एवस ननररदनककतदर ससकई कक धलधखत बहस / पदथरनद पत ददकर कहद रयद नक ननररदनक सस० 2313/23 सद उसकक मदसर पहलद हक पभरक हज चसकक हह। नदनदसक 3-9-2004 ननररदनककतदर ददरद इस ननररदनक मम भक वहक नबनदस उठदयद रयद जज पहलक ननररदनक मम थद। सवयस ननररदनककतदर कद यह कहनद हह नक उसकक समसयद कद समदधदन पहलद हक ननररदनक सस०- 2313/23 नदनदसक 3-9-04 हज चसकद हह। ऐसक णसथनत मम ननररदनक ननरसत नकयद जदतद हह। बदद आवशयक कदयरवदहक पतदवलक दद० दफतर हज।"

6. Brief facts of the case in hand are as under:- (i) The land in dispute is the land of Gata No. 924/1-18-10 (0.487 hectare) situated at Village- Sihipur, Pargana- Paschim Rath, Tehsil- Bikapur, District- Faizabad now Ayodhya. (ii) The recorded tenure holders of the land in dispute i.e. Gata No. 924, at the relevant point of time, were Sukai and Sukhdeo (private-respondent Nos. 2 & 3 herein) both sons of Panchu R/o Dahalva (Kewtan Ka Purwa) Sihipur, Pargana- Paschim Rath, Tehsil- Bikapur, District- Faizabad now Ayodhya. (iii) On account of death of Sukai and Sukhdeo, their legal heirs were substituted on 19.01.2024 in the memo of this petition in terms of the order of this Court dated 11.01.2024. (iv) During consolidation proceedings, an objection registered as Case No. 2222 (Hriday Ram vs. Sukai and others), under Section 9 (B) of the Act of 1953 was filed by the petitioner and the same was decided vide order dated 12.08.2001 passed by CO after condoning the delay. (v) By the order dated 12.08.2001, 0.100 hectare land of Gata No. 924, of which Sukai and Sukhdeo were the recorded tenure holders, was reserved/earmarked as 'abadi land'. (vi) The order dated 12.08.2001 passed by the CO was challenged by means of Case/Appeal No. 243 (Sukai and others vs. Gaon Sabha), under Section 9-B(3) of the Act of 1953, which was decided by ASOC vide order dated 02.06.2004. The relevant portion of the order dated 02.06.2004 is extracted hereunder:- " मम 0-100 एयर पसनवदरदक कक ओर सद नवददन अधधवकद ददरद कहद रयद नक उसकद मभल रदटद सस0924 रकबद मनमदनद ततर पर च०अ० नद सदवरजननक आबददक हदतस ससरनकत कर नदयद हह धजसद समदप करकद सदवरजननक आबददक पणशवमक नकनदरद पर पसतदनवत कर नदयद जदयद। यनद ऐसद ससभव न हज तज सदवरजननक आबददक ननरसत कक जदयद। मम -100 नवपकख कक ओर सद इसकद नवरजध करतद हहए कहद रयद नक अवर नयदयदलय ददरद उनचतरप सद रदटद सस0924 एयर रकबद सदवरजननक आबददक हदतस ससरनकत नकयद रयद हह धजसकद ससबसध मम अपकल नयदयदलय नद भक सथल ननरककण मम यह मदनद हह नक रदटद सस0924 कद दनकण। रदटद सस0927 926 मम भक आबददक ससरनकत नकयदरयद हह, इसपकदर पसनवदरद ननरसत नकयद जदयद। मम आबददक हह और इसक कदरण रदटद सस0924 ससबसधधत पकज कक पसतसत बहस कज ससनद रयद तथद गदम कद कदरजदत व चक नकशद कद अवलजकन नकयद रयद एवस पकज ददरद पसतसत सदकयख कद भक अवलजकन नकयद रयद। 21(2) 0 493,496 0 925,926, 927 मम पदररत आददश नदनदसक जज० च०अ० कद असतररत अपदल नस धदरद अवलजकन सद नवनदत हह नक ब०अ०च० नद उक अपकल मम यह मदनद हह नक रदटद सस णसथत हह धजसमम रदटद सस रदटद सस आबददक अवर नयदयदलय मम पसनतससरनकत नकयद हह 48 ननररदनक सस चकबसदक कद समक नवचदरदधकन भक हह। चकबसदक लदखपदल कक आखयद नदनदसक ससलग हह धजससद भक यह तथय पमदनणत हजतद हह नक रदटद सस० हदयरदम कद मकदनदत णसथत हह। इस पकदर मम पदतद हह पसनवदरद बलहकन हह। अत कद कद दनकण मम आबददक हह और इसक कदरण जज नवरद - ससचदलक पतदवलक पर कद दनकण नवपकक रदमअवध व , ह नक अवर नयदलय कद आददश नवधधसममत हह जज०च०अ० ददयर कक जद चसकक हह जज नक उप उसद उनचत मदनद हह। इस आददश कद 0 926,927 , आददश हहआ असतररत धदरद 27-1-04 30-5-04 0 2313 0924 924 : आददश उक नववदचनदपरदनत पसतसत पसनवदरद ननरसत नकयद जदतद हह। पतदवलक बदद अगदतर कदयरवदहक अनभलदखदरदर मम ससगहकत हजवद।" (vii) It would be apt to indicate here that during consolidation proceedings, a chak was also provided to the petitioner over Gata No. 924, original gata of Sukai and Sukhdeo. The area of this chak is 0.099 hectare. (viii) The 0.099 hectare land of Gata No. 924 was provided to the petitioner by the Assistant Consolidation Officer concerned (in short "ACO") and against this allotment, private-respondent/Sukhdeo filed the objection, which was rejected by the CO vide order dated 12.12.2003 passed in Case No. 162/1223 in exercise of power under Section 21(1) of the Act of 1953. (ix) The order dated 12.12.2003 passed by CO was challenged before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, Faizabad now Ayodhya (in short "SOC") by means of two appeals filed by private-respondents i.e. Appeal No. 493 (Sukai vs. Sukhdeo and others) and Appeal No. 496 (Sukhdeo vs. Sukai and others) in terms of Section 21(2) of the Act of 1953, which were decided vide order dated 27.01.2004 passed by SOC. (x) Being aggrieved by the order dated 27.01.2004 passed by SOC, private- respondent/Sukai filed a revision registered as Revision No. 2313/23 (Sukai vs. State and others) in terms of Section 48 of the Act of 1953, which was decided by the DDC vide order impugned dated 03.09.2004, extracted in paragraph No. 3 of this judgment.

7. In the aforesaid background of the case, the instant petition has been filed before this Court challenging the impugned order dated 03.09.2004.

8. The ground on which the impugned order dated 03.09.2004 has been challenged based upon the pleadings and submissions advanced by the petitioner's counsel has already been indicated in preceding paragraph No. 3 of this judgment.

9. Sri Vinod Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the private-respondent(s) opposed the instant petition. He stated that private-respondents namely Sukai and Sukhdeo were the original recorded tenure holders of Gata No. 924/1-18-10 (0.487 hectare land) and indisputedly the petitioner is alien to Gata in issue and upon the report submitted for the purposes of reserving the land as 'abadi land', 0.100 hectare land was reserved vide order dated 12.08.2001 and thereafter, 0.099 hectare land of this Gata was allotted to the petitioner. In other words, chak of 0.099 hectare was provided to the petitioner over the Gata in issue i.e. Gata No. 924.

10. Accordingly, only 0.288 hectare land remained for the purposes of allotment of chak(s) to real brothers namely Sukai and Sukhdeo and therefore, chak(s) to Sukai and Sukhdeo were allotted/provided over their 'mool Gata No. 924' and being so, there is no violation of principles embodied under Section 19 of the Act of 1953, which relates to allotment of chak(s) and by providing chak(s) to Sukai and Sukhdeo, the DDC has done substantial justice, which shall not be interfered by this Court in exercise of power under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

11. He also stated that the Gata in issue is nearer to 'Kharanja Road' and accordingly, the same is a valuable land and being so, the same ought to have been provided to the original tenure holders of land in dispute namely Sukai and Sukhdeo and not to the petitioner and as the same was provided by subordinate authority to DDC and therefore, DDC caused interference vide impugned order dated 03.09.2004.

12. It is further stated the order dated 02.06.2004 was passed after taking note of the observations in the order dated 27.01.2004 passed in Appeal Nos. 493 and 496 by SOC in exercise of power under Section 21(2) of the Act of 1953, which was subjudice in the Revision No. 2313/23 before the DDC, in which, impugned order dated 03.09.2004 was passed and the same is apparent from a bare perusal of the order dated 02.06.2004 passed by ASOC which also indicates that no finding on merits was recorded while dismissing the appeal vide order dated 02.06.2004, wherein, the order dated 12.08.2001 was challenged.

13. He further submitted that in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the order impugned dated 03.09.2004 is not liable to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of power under Section 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the DDC exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering in the order dated 12.08.2001. It is for the reason that by the impugned order dated 03.09.2004, the DDC has done substantial justice between the parties by providing chak(s) to Sukai and Sukhdeo over their mool gata i.e. Gata No. 924/0.487 hectare.

14. Considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

15. This case relates to allotment of chak(s), as such, before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer some judgments of this Court on the issue involved and the relevant provision of the Act of 1953.

16. Section- 19(1)(e) of the Act of 1953 is as follows:- "19. Conditions to be fulfilled by a Consolidation Scheme.-(1) A consolidation scheme shall fulfill the following conditions, namely, (a)...... (b)..... (c)...... (d)...... (e) every tenure-holder is, as far as possible, allotted a compact area at the place where he holds the largest part of his holding : Provided that no tenure-holder may be allotted more chaks than three, except with the approval in writing of the Deputy Director of Consolidation: Provided further that no consolidation made shall be invalid for the reason merely that the number of chaks allotted to a tenure-holder exceeds three."

17. From reading of Section 19(1)(e) and considering the case of the parties, it is clear that consolidation Authorities can not pass arbitrary order. It is no doubt correct that during chak allotment proceedings, the allotment cannot be made in such a manner which may satisfy every tenure holder but the consolidation authorities are required follow the mandate of the Act/Rules, as explained by the judicial pronouncements.

18. In the context of this case, the following observations of the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Asbaran vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gonda; 1986 A.W.C. 1088, are relevant. "This provision contained in Section 19(1)(f) enjoins upon the consolidation authorities to allot plot on which exists his private source of irrigation or any other improvement. Apart from it, no other provisions of Section 19 of the Act enjoins upon the consolidation authorities to make allotment of chak to the tenure-holder on his original plot and the consolidation authorities in view of provisions contained in Section 19(1)(e) of the Act are required to allot, as far as possible, a compact area to the tenure-holder at place where he holds largest part of his holding. The word as far as possible occurring in Section 19(1)(e) of the Act cannot be construed so as to give an unfettered discretion to the consolidation authorities in not making an allotment of a chak of compact area at place where the tenure holder holds his largest part of holding. It while making allotment of a chak to the tenure holder the Consolidation Officer finds it difficult to make allotment of chak to him of a compact area at a place where he held the largest part of his holding, then, he has to assign reasons for not doing so. If no good reasons are shown, the allotment would certainly be held to be irregular and cannot be sustained. The aforesaid provisions contained in Section 19(1)(e) of the Act, however, cannot be construed to make it imperative on the consolidation authorities to allot chak of compact area to a tenure holder be imperatively including therein some plot of his original holding. The requirement of said provision, in my opinion, is that the tenure holder has to be allotted a chak of a compact area at a place where he holds the largest part of his holding and not on the plot of his largest part of holding. In making allotment of chaks equity amongst various tenure holders has got to be adjusted, and, as such, if it is not possible to include some of the original land of the tenure holder in the allotted chak; then the allotment of chak cannot be said to be invalid or without jurisdiction, on the ground that no plot of original holding of the tenure holder has been included in his chak although a chak of compact area has been allotted at a place and in the vicinity where the tenure holder holds the largest part of his holding. The requirement of allotting original plot of the holding to the tenure holder in his chak has been mandated only in Section 19(1)(f), according to which, if there exists private source of irrigation or other improvement on the plot in question, then it has got to be allotted in the chak of the tenure holder. The allotment of chak in violation of the provision contained in Section 19(1)(f) would certainly make allotment illegal being violative of specific provisions. But in my opinion, an allotment of a 'Uran' Chak cannot be taken to be illegal and without jurisdiction if such a chak has been allotted at a place quite near the original land held by the tenure holder in its vicinity and not excessively exceeding the valuation of his original plots in that sector."

19. In the above case, this Court held that in view of the provision of Section 19(1)(e) the consolidation authorities are required to allot as far as possible a compact area to the tenure holder at a place where he holds the largest part of the holding and the judgment also says that the aforesaid provision can be construed to make it imperative on the consolidation authorities to allot chak of compact area to a tenure holder including therein some plot of his original holding.

20. In the judgment passed in the case of Mukut Nathi vs. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur; 1998 R.D. 148, this Court held in paragraph 5 as under:- "The Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer of Consolidation have carved out the chak of the petitioner in such a way that its shape was rectangular and was leading up to the P.W.D. road. The Deputy Director of Consolidation for the first time carved out a chak in rectangular shape running from north to south, with the result that the petitioner was deprived of the land towards P.W.D. road. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has not recorded any finding as to whether under the sale deed any specified portion was sold to the petitioner. In case the petitioner was sold a portion which did not lead up to P.W.D. road, the Deputy Director of Consolidation may be justified not to give such portion to the petitioner but if this portion was not specified or he was given a portion which leads up to the P.W.D. road, the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation will not be valid and justified."

21. In respect to cases where the interference in the allotment of chaks is permissible under Article 226, the issue has been considered by this Court in Writ Petition (Cons.) No. 5001 of 1983 (Ram Udit Vs. D.D.C. & others) decided on 24.09.2014 and in para 29 to 32, this Court has said as under:- "29. It is not in dispute that the allotment of Chaks is to be made taking into consideration principles laid down under Section 19 of Act 1953. These principles have been considered by this Court in Bechan Singh Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others 1985 AWC 604 All. In para 4 thereof, this Court has said that allotment of Chak has to be made consistent with the principles, namely, (i) every tenure holder should be allotted compact area at the place where he holds largest part of his holding (ii) the tenure holder, as far as possible, should be allotted the plot on which exists his private source of irrigation or any other improvement together with the area in the vicinity equal to valuation of the plot originally held by him and (iii) every tenure holder, as far as possible, would be allotted Chak in conformity with the process of rectangulation. The Court further held that the area held by tenture holder prior to start of consolidation proceedings, is relevant only to ascertain whether the area allotted to the tenure holder, varies by more than 25% or not, as contained in the first proviso of Section 19 of the Act, 1953.

30. In Dr. A.N. Srivastava Vs. DDC 1982 LLJ 42 Hon'ble K. N. Misra J. referring to Section 19(1)(e) of Act 1953 said: "The petitioners under the provisions of Section 19 (1) (e) of the Act were entitled to get a chak at a place where they had held largest part of their original holding. The words 'as for as possible' used in the said sub-section do not confer any jurisdiction upon the consolidation authorities to act arbitrarily ignoring the provisions contained therein. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) while altering the chak of the petitioners should have assigned reasons for not making allotment to the petitioners on the aforesaid plots Nos. 1082 and 1087 which were admittedly largest part of their holding. In my opinion the words as far as possible used in Section 19 (1) (e) of the Act require the provisions contained therein to be followed unless their compliance cannot be made for specific reasons to be assigned for it"

31. This was reiterated in Samai Lal Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh and others 1985 LLJ 330 and the Court further said: "In the present case the Assistant Consolidation Officer appears to have acted illegally and in violation of the provisions contained in Section 19 (1) (e) of the Act which lays down that every tenure-holder, as for as possible, should be allotted a Chak at a place where he held his largest holding. The Assistant Consolidation Officer should have proposed a Chak of the petitioners on this very plot No. 1703 in accordance with the aforesaid provisions and in case it is not possible, then the reasons should have been mentioned for not allotting a Chak to the petitioners on their plot. The words "as far as possible" used in the said sub- section do not confer any jurisdiction upon the consolidation authorities to act arbitrarily, ignoring the provisions contained thereunder."

32. In Doodh Nath Vs. DDC and others 1988(6)LCD 453 the Court held, if a tenure holder has his Chak with private source of irrigation, allotment of chak must be weighed so as to keep intact private source of irrigation of such person. The Court said that there cannot be any legal justification for refusing to allot a Chak to a tenure holder at a particular place, where he had held his private source of irrigation on the ground that his sons or other relations may have been allotted a chak in its vicinity. Every tenure holder would be entitled to get allotment of chak at a place where he could be allotted chak, keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 19 of the Act. The tenure holder would be entitled to get near village Abadi so much of land which he originally held at that place and also at the place of his private source of irrigation. The Court also said that undoubtedly, while deciding objection filed by a tenure holder against proposed allotment of chaks, equities are to be adjusted taking into consideration location of original land-holding of the other tenure holders whose chaks are likely to be affected while determining the objection. But while doing so, just and appropriate claim put forth by the tenure holder cannot be rejected merely on the ground that he is a big tenure holder as compared to the opposite parties or that his son or some other relation has been allotted chak near the place where the objector claims an allotment of chak as against his original holding. The Court added a few words of caution for the consolidation authorities, in the following manner: "In the matter of allotment of chaks a care is to be taken by the authorities to allot chak to the tenure holders to which they are entitled as against their original holdings. If appropriate chak is not allotted to a tenure holder, he sustains irreparable loss and injury for all times to come. Thus in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court is not to feel hesitant in interfering with the impugned orders which are found to be unwarranted in law and facts of the case, merely on the ground that the writ petition could not be taken up earlier for disposal. The impugned orders cannot be left to survive merely on the delay in disposal of the writ petition for no fault of the petitioner." (para-11)

22. Further, as per the judgment passed in the case of Raisa Begum vs. D.D.C. and others, reported in 2011 SCC OnLine All 1930, placed before this Court by the learned counsel appearing for the side opposite, the original tenure holder is entitled to road side land. In this case, road side land was provided to the purchaser of land, which was purchased during consolidation proceedings.

23. In the judgment passed in the case of Ram Badan vs. D.D.C. and others, reported in 2019 SCC OnLine All 6344, relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the side opposite, this Court after considering the observations made in the judgment passed in the case of Ram Prasad vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, reported in 2006 SCC OnLine All 1980, Ramadhar Singh vs. Depurty Director of Consolidation, reported in (2009) 106 RD 772, and Sanjay vs. Depurty Director of Consolidation, reported in (2013) 121 RD 561, in para 15 observed as under:- "15. The consensus of principle that emerges from the decisions in Ram Prasad (supra), Ramadhar Singh (supra) and Sanjay (supra) is that valuable roadside land that is the original holding of a tenure holder, is to be declared chak out or allotted to him as part of his Chak, unless it be imperative on account of some compelling circumstances that may require some marginal departure from the Rule. There is no finding recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation or the Settlement Officer that allotment of the entire area of Khasra No. 60/3 (old) to the petitioner, that is part of the petitioner's original holding lies in front of the third respondent's Abadi and would cause the third respondent some great inconvenience or irreparable injury as spoken of in the decision of this Court in Ram Shanker (supra). The remark of the Deputy Director of Consolidation that though it is not appropriate to include any part of this plot in the third respondent's chak as it is not part of his original holding, considering his Abadi, the same may not be disturbed as ordered by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, is flawed. To this, is added a remark that, therefore, it would not be proper to remove the part of the plot in dispute included in the Chak of the third respondent. For one, it is not reason enough to deprive the petitioner of a substantial part of his valuable roadside land in favour of the third respondent. Moreover, a look at the confirmed consolidation map shows that between one part of old Khasra No. 60/3 (now renumbered as 369) and included in the third respondent's chak and the third respondent's Abadi, there is a sector road running through. This confirmed map is on record as part of Annexure No. SRA-1 to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit dated 18th July, 2019 filed on behalf of the petitioner. There is no dispute about this."

24. As per the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of Hansraj v. Mewalal and others, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 682, till holding is divided in accordance with law, every co-sharer of plot has right on the holding and chak(s) should be carved out in a manner so that everyone gets chak on pitch road.

25. For coming to the conclusion on the basis of principles related to allotment of chak(s) as observed in the judgment(s), referred above, this Court considered the facts of the case.

26. Upon due consideration of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that the allotment of chak(s) to the petitioner is justified and proper. Hence, no interference in the order impugned is required by this Court in exercise of power vested under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. It is for the following fact(s)/reason(s):- (i) In view of the admitted position that Gata No. 924/0.487 hectare is the original/mool gata of private-respondents namely Sukai and Sukhdeo, which is valuable land being nearer to 'Kharanja Road', and the same was provided to them by the DDC vide impugned order dated 03.09.2004 and by this order, chak of 0.099 hectare provided to the petitioner has been interfered. (ii) No prejudice would be caused, if reserved land has been interfered with by the impugned order dated 03.09.2004 as over the available vacant land, the chak has been provided to the petitioner. (iii) Thus, substantial justice has been done between the parties and accordingly, this Court is of the firm view that no interference is required by this Court in the impugned order dated 03.09.2004 even on the ground taken by the petitioner, indicated in paragraph No. 3 of this judgement. (iv) Having observed that substantial justice has been done between the parties, this Court is not interfering in the impugned order in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as interference in the impugned order dated 03.09.2004 would revive illegality related to providing chak(s) over mool Gata i.e. Gata No. 924/0.487 hectare, which is nearer to 'Kharanj Road', to recorded tenure holder(s). (v) On the aforesaid aspect of the case, reference can made to various pronouncements including the following judgment(s). a) In the case of A.M. Allison Vs. B. L. Sen, AIR 1957 SC 227, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:- "Proceedings by way of certiorari are "not of course". (Vide Halsbury's 'Laws of England', Hailsham Edition, Vol 9, paras 1480 and 1481, pp. 877-878). The High Court of Assam had the power to refuse the writs if it was satisfied that there was no failure of justice and in these appeals which are directed against the orders of the High Court in applications under Art. 226, we could refuse to interfere unless we are satisfied that the justice of the case requires to. But we are not so satisfied. We are of opinion that, having regard to the merits which have been concurrently found in favour of the respondents both by the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, and the High Court, we should decline to interfere." b) In the case of Grahi Shanker Singh Vs. VIII Addl. District Judge and Others, 1991 RD 10, the Court declined to interfere with the order passed in revision by the District Judge repelling the contention that the revision against the order of the Sub Divisional Officer was not maintainable, on the ground that if substantial justice has been done, the Court under Article 226 is not bound to quash the order passed by any authority relying upon various decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Court. c) In the case of Bux Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation, U.P., Lucknow and others, AIR 1966 All 156, this Court observed as under:- "Where orders impugned are equitable and substantial justice seems to have been done to the parties, the High Court would not be inclined to interfere in its writ jurisdiction merely on the ground that such orders are wrong in law. d) The aforesaid is based on the judgment passed in the case of Parahu Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1964 AWR 155 and Begum A.H. Khan Vs. The Regional Transport Authority Meerut 1963 ALJ 909. e) In the case of Om Prakash Vs. U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission, Allenganj, Allahabad and Others, (1990) UP LBEC 983, this Court has observed as under:- "It is well settled that a decision of an authority, even though without jurisdiction, may not be quashed in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution if by the decision the substantial justice is done between the parties." (Para 9) In the instant case, respondent No. 1 having found that though the inspection was alleged to have been done but the inspection memo being not on the record, he rightly directed for inspection again and thereafter to decide the case afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties. I do not find that it is a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." f) In the case of Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor MANU/PR/0049/1946: AIR 1947 PC 67, the Privy council interpreting Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Privy Council considered the question whether non-compliance of an express provision of law would amount to an irregularity. The Privy Council held that distinction between illegality and irregularity was based on the degree rather than kind, if there was substantial compliance of the procedure prescribed, the defect, if any, would be irregularity but if the noncompliance was of mandatory provision of law, that would result in illegality. g) In the judgment dated 14.07.2014 passed in Writ- C No. 24211 of 2006 (Ram Nihor Versus Additional Commissioner (Administrative), Vindhyachal Div.) at Allahabad, this Court held that the order of allotment of land, if obtained by fraud or collusion cannot be allowed to stand and the court would not intervene in such matters so as to permit squandering of the property of the state which vests in the Gaon Sabha. Protection of the state property from such fraud by initiation of action for cancellation of allotment/lease would however, be independent of the power of cancellation of such allotment envisaged under section 198(4) of the Act. h) In the case of Nohar Lal Verma v. District Co-operative Central Bank Ltd., Jagdalpur, 2008 (14) SCC 445, Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in paragraph - 32 as under : "Now, limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or ap-plication is barred by limitation Court or an adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or author-ity to entertain such a suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits." And has further held after referring to Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that a suit or appeal preferred after the prescribed period has to be dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or defence has been set up at the threshold, by the Court itself. i) The Hon'ble Apex Court has also held if by quashing of illegal order another illegality revives, in that eventuality, the Court should not interfere with such order under writ jurisdiction (See: Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1966 SC - 828, Champalal Binani v. CIT, West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 645, Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1999 SC 3609, Malikarjuna Mudhagal Nagappa and others v. State of Karnataka and others, AIR 2000 SC 2976, Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2003 SC 2889, S.D.S. Shipping Pvt. Ltd. v. Jay Container Ser-vices Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others, 2003(4) Supreme 44, State of Uttaranchal and another v. Ajit Singh Bhola and another, (2004) 6 SCC 800 and State of Orissa and another v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 437). j) In the case of Bharat Singh Versus Additional Commissioner and Others reported in 2017 (5) ADJ 466, this Court observed as under:-

20. This Court is of the considered opinion that as and when it came to the notice of the authority concerned that allotment of land of Gaon Sabha had been made illegally to ineligible person ignoring the rightful claim of several others of the same village who came within the eligibility zone/order of preference given under sub-section (1) of Section 1998 of the Act, the authority concerned was duty bound to set up an inquiry and take action as legally permissible to remedy the wrong. Hence, the allotment order being ex facie illegal, even if the suo motu inquiry was set up by the Revenue Authority and action taken thereafter to correct the wrong could be said to be a bit delayed, this Court would not interfere and set aside such an order as it would revive the illegal allotment made in favour of the petitioner.

21. The allotment of the petitioner was a result of nepotism and corruption amounting to fraud played upon the Statute. Each day passing with 'the allotment of petitioner over the land in question continuing a fresh cause of action would arise. Being a continuing cause of action of which suo motu cognizance was taken by the Additional District Magistrate, it cannot be said to be an illegal or arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction by the Revenue Authorities. As such, I do not think that there is any good ground on which extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should be exercised by me to quash the order impugned. k) In Jodhey vs State, reported as AIR 1952 All 788, this Court considered the discretionary and equitable jurisdiction of the High Court and the manner in which the same ought to be exercised. Relevant portion of the same reads:- "There are no limits, fetters or restrictions placed on this power of superintendence in this Clause and the purpose of this Article seems to be to make the High Court the custodian of all justice within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction and to arm it with a weapon that could be wielded for the purpose of seeing that justice is meted out fairly and properly by the bodies mentioned therein. "(emphasis supplied) l) In the case of Dukh Haran Verma Vs. State of U.P. (2004) 2 AWC 1147, this Court has observed as under:- "4. It must be remembered that writ is discretionary remedy vide Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 6 SCC 545: JT (2003) 6 SC 20. In a writ petition the petitioner has not only to show violation of law, he must also show that equity is in his favour. Thus, to obtain a writ the petitioner must satisfy the Court about both law and equity. If the petitioner has only satisfied the Court that the law has been violated but equity is not in his favour the Court shall not issue a writ.

5. In the present case, admittedly the resolution for no-confidence was passed by 2/3rd of the members of the Board of Directors of the Bank as required by Rule 460. Hence assuming that initiation of the proceedings by means of the notice was bad as the notice was not valid yet the resolution has validly been passed by 2/3rd members of the Board of Directors of the Bank. It must be remembered that if 2/3rd members of the Board are against the petitioner then as provided under the Rules he has to quit his office. m) In the case of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences Vs. Bikartan Das 2023 SCC OnLine SC 99, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:- "52. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be falling in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not."

27. For the foregoing reasons, the instant petition is dismissed. Cost made easy. Order Date :- 16.5.2025 Arun/-

4. The aforesaid is for the reason that the order dated 12.08.2001 passed by CO was affirmed vide order dated 02.06.2004 passed by Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation (Administration), Faizabad now Ayodhya (in short "ASOC") in Case/Appeal No. 243 (Sukai and others vs. Gaon Sabha), under Section 9-B(3) of the Act of 1953, and the revision filed against the order dated 02.06.2004 passed by ASOC was dismissed as withdrawn by the side opposite. In regard to aforesaid, reference has also been made to Section 11-A of the Act of 1953. "03.09.2004 उतर पददश जदत बकबनदक आस धननयम कक धदरद-48 बनदजवसत अधधकदरक चकबनदक कद आददश नदनदसक 27-1-2004 नबधध नबरद बतदतद हहए उसद ननरसत नकयद जदनद कक यदचनद सनहत पसतसत कक रई हह। कद अनतररत यह तनररदनक ससकई ददरद नवददन नवरद उसद अवहधदननक तथद कद ममनद ननररदनककतदर कक ओर सद पसतसत नकयद रयद तकर कज नवसतदर सद ससनद तथद पनतपकक कक ओर सद पतदवधलत धलधखत तरर कद अवलजकन एवस अधययन नकयद एवस अनभलदखख तथद पतदवधलत सथल- ननरककण आखयद कद भक अवलजकन एवस अधययन नकयद। आर 2003 पसतसत कक रई थक धजसमम मदननकय उचच नयदयदलय ददरद पदररत आददश नदनदसक 23-5- ददरद नववदनदत भभनम कक सथल पर यथदणसथत बनदयद रखनद तथद पकरण कद शकघ ननसतदरण धजसकद अनसकम मम इस ननररदनक पर पदथनमकतद कद आधदर पर ससनवदई कक इस पकरण मम ननररदनककतदर ददरद मदननकय उचच नयदयदलय मम यदनचकद ससखयद-6233 (कनस) 2003 कक अपदकद कक रई थक, रई। ननररदनककतदर कक ओर सद पसतसत नकयद रयद तकर मम मसखय तथद यह कहद रयद हह उसकद मभल रदटद ससखयद -924 हहदररसज सद सदमरक जदनद वदलद मदरर पर णसथत हह तथद वयवसदनयक महतव कद हह धजसमम उसकद दज पदड पसरदनद णसथत हह, एवस यह उसकद एकमदत मभल रदटद हह तथद उसकक आवददक कद ननकट कद मभलयवदन रदटद हह, धजस पर पनतपकक कद उडदन चक पनदष कर नदयद रयद हह। उसकक यदचनद हह नक इस सथदन पर पनतपकक कद उपयजरदथर अनदवशयक रप सद छजडक रई सदमदनय आबददक तथद पनतपकक कद उडदन चक ननरसत करकद उसकद समपभणर मभल रदटद पर चक पनवष नकयद जदय। पनतपकक कक ओर सद ननररदनककतदर। कद कथन कद नवरजध नकयद रयद हह, तथद अपनद चक कद पददशन कज ससतसधलत एवस यसनकससरत बतदतद हहए उसद यथदवत रखनद कद अनसरजध नकयद रयद हह। परककण सद एवस सथल ननरककण आखयद कद अवलजकन सद नवनदत हजतद हह नक वसतसतत खडनजद सडदक सद उक रदटद कस छ दभरक पर हह, तथद रजयढ कद मभलयवदन रदटद हह। उलदखनकय हह नक ननररदनककतदर तथद उसकद सहखदतददरख कद यह एकमदत मभल रदटद हह, जज एक अतयसत छजटद कक षक धजनकद एकमदत उक मभल रदटद हह। चकबनदक नकयदयख कद अनतररत पतयदक चकददर कक नवखरक जजत कक समदनकत करनद कद पदनवधदन हह। इस पकरण मम तज ननररदनककतदर एवस उसकद सहखदतदददरख कक एक हक सथदन पर ससहत कदतरल णसथत हह, धजस अवर नयदयदलय नद पनतपकक कज लदभ ददनद कद उ‌ददशय सद दज सथदन पर कर नदयद हह तथद उनकद दभसरद उडदन चक दभरक पर णसथत हह धजससद उनकद कनत मम हजनद सवदभदनवक हक हह। उतर पददश जज पथम दषटद अननयनमत हह। नयदयनहत मम इनहम ननरसत कर इस रदटद मभल खदतदददरख कद चक चकबनदक यजजनद सद पभवर कक भदसनत यनद ससहत कदत मम इस सथदन पर पनदष कर नदयद जदय, तथद पनतपकक हदयरदम आनद कद चक ररक हज रहक भभनम पर पनदष कर नदयद जदय तज नकसक चकददर कज कजई कनत नहह हजरक एवस ननररदनककतदर कक यसनकससरत कनठनदइयख कद ननरदकरण हज जदयरद तद‌नससदर अवर नयदयदलय कद आददश ससशजधधत हजनद यजगय हह तथद यह ननररदनक इसक रप मम सवककदर हजनद यजगय हह। रकदनससदर सवककदर कक जदतक हह। ससलग ससशजधन उपयस तदधलकद धजस पर मदरद हसतदकर हम तथद जज इस आददश कद असर हह कद अनससदर गदम अनभलदख ससशजधधत हख तथद सथल पर सकमदसकन नकयद जदय। अगदतर कदयरवदहक कद उपरदसत पतदवलक ससगहकत हज।" रक नववदचन कद आधदर पर यह ननररदनक उपयस

5. At this stage, it is to be noted that the order dated 02.06.2004 was assailed by means of a revision registered as Revision No. 1550 (Sukai vs. State and others), which was dismissed by the DDC vide order dated 29.07.2005. The order dated 29.07.2005 reads as under:- " आज पसतसत हहयक। पतदवलक कद अवलजकन नकयद रयद। एवस ननररदनककतदर ससकई कक धलधखत बहस / पदथरनद पत ददकर कहद रयद नक ननररदनक सस० 2313/23 सद उसकक मदसर पहलद हक पभरक हज चसकक हह। नदनदसक 3-9-2004 ननररदनककतदर ददरद इस ननररदनक मम भक वहक नबनदस उठदयद रयद जज पहलक ननररदनक मम थद। सवयस ननररदनककतदर कद यह कहनद हह नक उसकक समसयद कद समदधदन पहलद हक ननररदनक सस०- 2313/23 नदनदसक 3-9-04 हज चसकद हह। ऐसक णसथनत मम ननररदनक ननरसत नकयद जदतद हह। बदद आवशयक कदयरवदहक पतदवलक दद० दफतर हज।"

6. Brief facts of the case in hand are as under:- (i) The land in dispute is the land of Gata No. 924/1-18-10 (0.487 hectare) situated at Village- Sihipur, Pargana- Paschim Rath, Tehsil- Bikapur, District- Faizabad now Ayodhya. (ii) The recorded tenure holders of the land in dispute i.e. Gata No. 924, at the relevant point of time, were Sukai and Sukhdeo (private-respondent Nos. 2 & 3 herein) both sons of Panchu R/o Dahalva (Kewtan Ka Purwa) Sihipur, Pargana- Paschim Rath, Tehsil- Bikapur, District- Faizabad now Ayodhya. (iii) On account of death of Sukai and Sukhdeo, their legal heirs were substituted on 19.01.2024 in the memo of this petition in terms of the order of this Court dated 11.01.2024. (iv) During consolidation proceedings, an objection registered as Case No. 2222 (Hriday Ram vs. Sukai and others), under Section 9 (B) of the Act of 1953 was filed by the petitioner and the same was decided vide order dated 12.08.2001 passed by CO after condoning the delay. (v) By the order dated 12.08.2001, 0.100 hectare land of Gata No. 924, of which Sukai and Sukhdeo were the recorded tenure holders, was reserved/earmarked as 'abadi land'. (vi) The order dated 12.08.2001 passed by the CO was challenged by means of Case/Appeal No. 243 (Sukai and others vs. Gaon Sabha), under Section 9-B(3) of the Act of 1953, which was decided by ASOC vide order dated 02.06.2004. The relevant portion of the order dated 02.06.2004 is extracted hereunder:- " मम 0-100 एयर पसनवदरदक कक ओर सद नवददन अधधवकद ददरद कहद रयद नक उसकद मभल रदटद सस0924 रकबद मनमदनद ततर पर च०अ० नद सदवरजननक आबददक हदतस ससरनकत कर नदयद हह धजसद समदप करकद सदवरजननक आबददक पणशवमक नकनदरद पर पसतदनवत कर नदयद जदयद। यनद ऐसद ससभव न हज तज सदवरजननक आबददक ननरसत कक जदयद। मम -100 नवपकख कक ओर सद इसकद नवरजध करतद हहए कहद रयद नक अवर नयदयदलय ददरद उनचतरप सद रदटद सस0924 एयर रकबद सदवरजननक आबददक हदतस ससरनकत नकयद रयद हह धजसकद ससबसध मम अपकल नयदयदलय नद भक सथल ननरककण मम यह मदनद हह नक रदटद सस0924 कद दनकण। रदटद सस0927 926 मम भक आबददक ससरनकत नकयदरयद हह, इसपकदर पसनवदरद ननरसत नकयद जदयद। मम आबददक हह और इसक कदरण रदटद सस0924 ससबसधधत पकज कक पसतसत बहस कज ससनद रयद तथद गदम कद कदरजदत व चक नकशद कद अवलजकन नकयद रयद एवस पकज ददरद पसतसत सदकयख कद भक अवलजकन नकयद रयद। 21(2) 0 493,496 0 925,926, 927 मम पदररत आददश नदनदसक जज० च०अ० कद असतररत अपदल नस धदरद अवलजकन सद नवनदत हह नक ब०अ०च० नद उक अपकल मम यह मदनद हह नक रदटद सस णसथत हह धजसमम रदटद सस रदटद सस आबददक अवर नयदयदलय मम पसनतससरनकत नकयद हह 48 ननररदनक सस चकबसदक कद समक नवचदरदधकन भक हह। चकबसदक लदखपदल कक आखयद नदनदसक ससलग हह धजससद भक यह तथय पमदनणत हजतद हह नक रदटद सस० हदयरदम कद मकदनदत णसथत हह। इस पकदर मम पदतद हह पसनवदरद बलहकन हह। अत कद कद दनकण मम आबददक हह और इसक कदरण जज नवरद - ससचदलक पतदवलक पर कद दनकण नवपकक रदमअवध व , ह नक अवर नयदलय कद आददश नवधधसममत हह जज०च०अ० ददयर कक जद चसकक हह जज नक उप उसद उनचत मदनद हह। इस आददश कद 0 926,927 , आददश हहआ असतररत धदरद 27-1-04 30-5-04 0 2313 0924 924 : आददश उक नववदचनदपरदनत पसतसत पसनवदरद ननरसत नकयद जदतद हह। पतदवलक बदद अगदतर कदयरवदहक अनभलदखदरदर मम ससगहकत हजवद।" (vii) It would be apt to indicate here that during consolidation proceedings, a chak was also provided to the petitioner over Gata No. 924, original gata of Sukai and Sukhdeo. The area of this chak is 0.099 hectare. (viii) The 0.099 hectare land of Gata No. 924 was provided to the petitioner by the Assistant Consolidation Officer concerned (in short "ACO") and against this allotment, private-respondent/Sukhdeo filed the objection, which was rejected by the CO vide order dated 12.12.2003 passed in Case No. 162/1223 in exercise of power under Section 21(1) of the Act of 1953. (ix) The order dated 12.12.2003 passed by CO was challenged before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, Faizabad now Ayodhya (in short "SOC") by means of two appeals filed by private-respondents i.e. Appeal No. 493 (Sukai vs. Sukhdeo and others) and Appeal No. 496 (Sukhdeo vs. Sukai and others) in terms of Section 21(2) of the Act of 1953, which were decided vide order dated 27.01.2004 passed by SOC. (x) Being aggrieved by the order dated 27.01.2004 passed by SOC, private- respondent/Sukai filed a revision registered as Revision No. 2313/23 (Sukai vs. State and others) in terms of Section 48 of the Act of 1953, which was decided by the DDC vide order impugned dated 03.09.2004, extracted in paragraph No. 3 of this judgment.

7. In the aforesaid background of the case, the instant petition has been filed before this Court challenging the impugned order dated 03.09.2004.

8. The ground on which the impugned order dated 03.09.2004 has been challenged based upon the pleadings and submissions advanced by the petitioner's counsel has already been indicated in preceding paragraph No. 3 of this judgment.

9. Sri Vinod Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the private-respondent(s) opposed the instant petition. He stated that private-respondents namely Sukai and Sukhdeo were the original recorded tenure holders of Gata No. 924/1-18-10 (0.487 hectare land) and indisputedly the petitioner is alien to Gata in issue and upon the report submitted for the purposes of reserving the land as 'abadi land', 0.100 hectare land was reserved vide order dated 12.08.2001 and thereafter, 0.099 hectare land of this Gata was allotted to the petitioner. In other words, chak of 0.099 hectare was provided to the petitioner over the Gata in issue i.e. Gata No. 924.

10. Accordingly, only 0.288 hectare land remained for the purposes of allotment of chak(s) to real brothers namely Sukai and Sukhdeo and therefore, chak(s) to Sukai and Sukhdeo were allotted/provided over their 'mool Gata No. 924' and being so, there is no violation of principles embodied under Section 19 of the Act of 1953, which relates to allotment of chak(s) and by providing chak(s) to Sukai and Sukhdeo, the DDC has done substantial justice, which shall not be interfered by this Court in exercise of power under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

11. He also stated that the Gata in issue is nearer to 'Kharanja Road' and accordingly, the same is a valuable land and being so, the same ought to have been provided to the original tenure holders of land in dispute namely Sukai and Sukhdeo and not to the petitioner and as the same was provided by subordinate authority to DDC and therefore, DDC caused interference vide impugned order dated 03.09.2004.

12. It is further stated the order dated 02.06.2004 was passed after taking note of the observations in the order dated 27.01.2004 passed in Appeal Nos. 493 and 496 by SOC in exercise of power under Section 21(2) of the Act of 1953, which was subjudice in the Revision No. 2313/23 before the DDC, in which, impugned order dated 03.09.2004 was passed and the same is apparent from a bare perusal of the order dated 02.06.2004 passed by ASOC which also indicates that no finding on merits was recorded while dismissing the appeal vide order dated 02.06.2004, wherein, the order dated 12.08.2001 was challenged.

13. He further submitted that in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the order impugned dated 03.09.2004 is not liable to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of power under Section 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the DDC exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering in the order dated 12.08.2001. It is for the reason that by the impugned order dated 03.09.2004, the DDC has done substantial justice between the parties by providing chak(s) to Sukai and Sukhdeo over their mool gata i.e. Gata No. 924/0.487 hectare.

14. Considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

15. This case relates to allotment of chak(s), as such, before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer some judgments of this Court on the issue involved and the relevant provision of the Act of 1953.

16. Section- 19(1)(e) of the Act of 1953 is as follows:- "19. Conditions to be fulfilled by a Consolidation Scheme.-(1) A consolidation scheme shall fulfill the following conditions, namely, (a)...... (b)..... (c)...... (d)...... (e) every tenure-holder is, as far as possible, allotted a compact area at the place where he holds the largest part of his holding : Provided that no tenure-holder may be allotted more chaks than three, except with the approval in writing of the Deputy Director of Consolidation: Provided further that no consolidation made shall be invalid for the reason merely that the number of chaks allotted to a tenure-holder exceeds three."

17. From reading of Section 19(1)(e) and considering the case of the parties, it is clear that consolidation Authorities can not pass arbitrary order. It is no doubt correct that during chak allotment proceedings, the allotment cannot be made in such a manner which may satisfy every tenure holder but the consolidation authorities are required follow the mandate of the Act/Rules, as explained by the judicial pronouncements.

18. In the context of this case, the following observations of the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Asbaran vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gonda; 1986 A.W.C. 1088, are relevant. "This provision contained in Section 19(1)(f) enjoins upon the consolidation authorities to allot plot on which exists his private source of irrigation or any other improvement. Apart from it, no other provisions of Section 19 of the Act enjoins upon the consolidation authorities to make allotment of chak to the tenure-holder on his original plot and the consolidation authorities in view of provisions contained in Section 19(1)(e) of the Act are required to allot, as far as possible, a compact area to the tenure-holder at place where he holds largest part of his holding. The word as far as possible occurring in Section 19(1)(e) of the Act cannot be construed so as to give an unfettered discretion to the consolidation authorities in not making an allotment of a chak of compact area at place where the tenure holder holds his largest part of holding. It while making allotment of a chak to the tenure holder the Consolidation Officer finds it difficult to make allotment of chak to him of a compact area at a place where he held the largest part of his holding, then, he has to assign reasons for not doing so. If no good reasons are shown, the allotment would certainly be held to be irregular and cannot be sustained. The aforesaid provisions contained in Section 19(1)(e) of the Act, however, cannot be construed to make it imperative on the consolidation authorities to allot chak of compact area to a tenure holder be imperatively including therein some plot of his original holding. The requirement of said provision, in my opinion, is that the tenure holder has to be allotted a chak of a compact area at a place where he holds the largest part of his holding and not on the plot of his largest part of holding. In making allotment of chaks equity amongst various tenure holders has got to be adjusted, and, as such, if it is not possible to include some of the original land of the tenure holder in the allotted chak; then the allotment of chak cannot be said to be invalid or without jurisdiction, on the ground that no plot of original holding of the tenure holder has been included in his chak although a chak of compact area has been allotted at a place and in the vicinity where the tenure holder holds the largest part of his holding. The requirement of allotting original plot of the holding to the tenure holder in his chak has been mandated only in Section 19(1)(f), according to which, if there exists private source of irrigation or other improvement on the plot in question, then it has got to be allotted in the chak of the tenure holder. The allotment of chak in violation of the provision contained in Section 19(1)(f) would certainly make allotment illegal being violative of specific provisions. But in my opinion, an allotment of a 'Uran' Chak cannot be taken to be illegal and without jurisdiction if such a chak has been allotted at a place quite near the original land held by the tenure holder in its vicinity and not excessively exceeding the valuation of his original plots in that sector."

19. In the above case, this Court held that in view of the provision of Section 19(1)(e) the consolidation authorities are required to allot as far as possible a compact area to the tenure holder at a place where he holds the largest part of the holding and the judgment also says that the aforesaid provision can be construed to make it imperative on the consolidation authorities to allot chak of compact area to a tenure holder including therein some plot of his original holding.

20. In the judgment passed in the case of Mukut Nathi vs. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur; 1998 R.D. 148, this Court held in paragraph 5 as under:- "The Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer of Consolidation have carved out the chak of the petitioner in such a way that its shape was rectangular and was leading up to the P.W.D. road. The Deputy Director of Consolidation for the first time carved out a chak in rectangular shape running from north to south, with the result that the petitioner was deprived of the land towards P.W.D. road. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has not recorded any finding as to whether under the sale deed any specified portion was sold to the petitioner. In case the petitioner was sold a portion which did not lead up to P.W.D. road, the Deputy Director of Consolidation may be justified not to give such portion to the petitioner but if this portion was not specified or he was given a portion which leads up to the P.W.D. road, the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation will not be valid and justified."

21. In respect to cases where the interference in the allotment of chaks is permissible under Article 226, the issue has been considered by this Court in Writ Petition (Cons.) No. 5001 of 1983 (Ram Udit Vs. D.D.C. & others) decided on 24.09.2014 and in para 29 to 32, this Court has said as under:- "29. It is not in dispute that the allotment of Chaks is to be made taking into consideration principles laid down under Section 19 of Act 1953. These principles have been considered by this Court in Bechan Singh Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others 1985 AWC 604 All. In para 4 thereof, this Court has said that allotment of Chak has to be made consistent with the principles, namely, (i) every tenure holder should be allotted compact area at the place where he holds largest part of his holding (ii) the tenure holder, as far as possible, should be allotted the plot on which exists his private source of irrigation or any other improvement together with the area in the vicinity equal to valuation of the plot originally held by him and (iii) every tenure holder, as far as possible, would be allotted Chak in conformity with the process of rectangulation. The Court further held that the area held by tenture holder prior to start of consolidation proceedings, is relevant only to ascertain whether the area allotted to the tenure holder, varies by more than 25% or not, as contained in the first proviso of Section 19 of the Act, 1953.

30. In Dr. A.N. Srivastava Vs. DDC 1982 LLJ 42 Hon'ble K. N. Misra J. referring to Section 19(1)(e) of Act 1953 said: "The petitioners under the provisions of Section 19 (1) (e) of the Act were entitled to get a chak at a place where they had held largest part of their original holding. The words 'as for as possible' used in the said sub-section do not confer any jurisdiction upon the consolidation authorities to act arbitrarily ignoring the provisions contained therein. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) while altering the chak of the petitioners should have assigned reasons for not making allotment to the petitioners on the aforesaid plots Nos. 1082 and 1087 which were admittedly largest part of their holding. In my opinion the words as far as possible used in Section 19 (1) (e) of the Act require the provisions contained therein to be followed unless their compliance cannot be made for specific reasons to be assigned for it"

31. This was reiterated in Samai Lal Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh and others 1985 LLJ 330 and the Court further said: "In the present case the Assistant Consolidation Officer appears to have acted illegally and in violation of the provisions contained in Section 19 (1) (e) of the Act which lays down that every tenure-holder, as for as possible, should be allotted a Chak at a place where he held his largest holding. The Assistant Consolidation Officer should have proposed a Chak of the petitioners on this very plot No. 1703 in accordance with the aforesaid provisions and in case it is not possible, then the reasons should have been mentioned for not allotting a Chak to the petitioners on their plot. The words "as far as possible" used in the said sub- section do not confer any jurisdiction upon the consolidation authorities to act arbitrarily, ignoring the provisions contained thereunder."

32. In Doodh Nath Vs. DDC and others 1988(6)LCD 453 the Court held, if a tenure holder has his Chak with private source of irrigation, allotment of chak must be weighed so as to keep intact private source of irrigation of such person. The Court said that there cannot be any legal justification for refusing to allot a Chak to a tenure holder at a particular place, where he had held his private source of irrigation on the ground that his sons or other relations may have been allotted a chak in its vicinity. Every tenure holder would be entitled to get allotment of chak at a place where he could be allotted chak, keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 19 of the Act. The tenure holder would be entitled to get near village Abadi so much of land which he originally held at that place and also at the place of his private source of irrigation. The Court also said that undoubtedly, while deciding objection filed by a tenure holder against proposed allotment of chaks, equities are to be adjusted taking into consideration location of original land-holding of the other tenure holders whose chaks are likely to be affected while determining the objection. But while doing so, just and appropriate claim put forth by the tenure holder cannot be rejected merely on the ground that he is a big tenure holder as compared to the opposite parties or that his son or some other relation has been allotted chak near the place where the objector claims an allotment of chak as against his original holding. The Court added a few words of caution for the consolidation authorities, in the following manner: "In the matter of allotment of chaks a care is to be taken by the authorities to allot chak to the tenure holders to which they are entitled as against their original holdings. If appropriate chak is not allotted to a tenure holder, he sustains irreparable loss and injury for all times to come. Thus in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court is not to feel hesitant in interfering with the impugned orders which are found to be unwarranted in law and facts of the case, merely on the ground that the writ petition could not be taken up earlier for disposal. The impugned orders cannot be left to survive merely on the delay in disposal of the writ petition for no fault of the petitioner." (para-11)

22. Further, as per the judgment passed in the case of Raisa Begum vs. D.D.C. and others, reported in 2011 SCC OnLine All 1930, placed before this Court by the learned counsel appearing for the side opposite, the original tenure holder is entitled to road side land. In this case, road side land was provided to the purchaser of land, which was purchased during consolidation proceedings.

23. In the judgment passed in the case of Ram Badan vs. D.D.C. and others, reported in 2019 SCC OnLine All 6344, relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the side opposite, this Court after considering the observations made in the judgment passed in the case of Ram Prasad vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, reported in 2006 SCC OnLine All 1980, Ramadhar Singh vs. Depurty Director of Consolidation, reported in (2009) 106 RD 772, and Sanjay vs. Depurty Director of Consolidation, reported in (2013) 121 RD 561, in para 15 observed as under:- "15. The consensus of principle that emerges from the decisions in Ram Prasad (supra), Ramadhar Singh (supra) and Sanjay (supra) is that valuable roadside land that is the original holding of a tenure holder, is to be declared chak out or allotted to him as part of his Chak, unless it be imperative on account of some compelling circumstances that may require some marginal departure from the Rule. There is no finding recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation or the Settlement Officer that allotment of the entire area of Khasra No. 60/3 (old) to the petitioner, that is part of the petitioner's original holding lies in front of the third respondent's Abadi and would cause the third respondent some great inconvenience or irreparable injury as spoken of in the decision of this Court in Ram Shanker (supra). The remark of the Deputy Director of Consolidation that though it is not appropriate to include any part of this plot in the third respondent's chak as it is not part of his original holding, considering his Abadi, the same may not be disturbed as ordered by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, is flawed. To this, is added a remark that, therefore, it would not be proper to remove the part of the plot in dispute included in the Chak of the third respondent. For one, it is not reason enough to deprive the petitioner of a substantial part of his valuable roadside land in favour of the third respondent. Moreover, a look at the confirmed consolidation map shows that between one part of old Khasra No. 60/3 (now renumbered as 369) and included in the third respondent's chak and the third respondent's Abadi, there is a sector road running through. This confirmed map is on record as part of Annexure No. SRA-1 to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit dated 18th July, 2019 filed on behalf of the petitioner. There is no dispute about this."

24. As per the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of Hansraj v. Mewalal and others, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 682, till holding is divided in accordance with law, every co-sharer of plot has right on the holding and chak(s) should be carved out in a manner so that everyone gets chak on pitch road.

25. For coming to the conclusion on the basis of principles related to allotment of chak(s) as observed in the judgment(s), referred above, this Court considered the facts of the case.

26. Upon due consideration of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that the allotment of chak(s) to the petitioner is justified and proper. Hence, no interference in the order impugned is required by this Court in exercise of power vested under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. It is for the following fact(s)/reason(s):- (i) In view of the admitted position that Gata No. 924/0.487 hectare is the original/mool gata of private-respondents namely Sukai and Sukhdeo, which is valuable land being nearer to 'Kharanja Road', and the same was provided to them by the DDC vide impugned order dated 03.09.2004 and by this order, chak of 0.099 hectare provided to the petitioner has been interfered. (ii) No prejudice would be caused, if reserved land has been interfered with by the impugned order dated 03.09.2004 as over the available vacant land, the chak has been provided to the petitioner. (iii) Thus, substantial justice has been done between the parties and accordingly, this Court is of the firm view that no interference is required by this Court in the impugned order dated 03.09.2004 even on the ground taken by the petitioner, indicated in paragraph No. 3 of this judgement. (iv) Having observed that substantial justice has been done between the parties, this Court is not interfering in the impugned order in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as interference in the impugned order dated 03.09.2004 would revive illegality related to providing chak(s) over mool Gata i.e. Gata No. 924/0.487 hectare, which is nearer to 'Kharanj Road', to recorded tenure holder(s). (v) On the aforesaid aspect of the case, reference can made to various pronouncements including the following judgment(s). a) In the case of A.M. Allison Vs. B. L. Sen, AIR 1957 SC 227, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:- "Proceedings by way of certiorari are "not of course". (Vide Halsbury's 'Laws of England', Hailsham Edition, Vol 9, paras 1480 and 1481, pp. 877-878). The High Court of Assam had the power to refuse the writs if it was satisfied that there was no failure of justice and in these appeals which are directed against the orders of the High Court in applications under Art. 226, we could refuse to interfere unless we are satisfied that the justice of the case requires to. But we are not so satisfied. We are of opinion that, having regard to the merits which have been concurrently found in favour of the respondents both by the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, and the High Court, we should decline to interfere." b) In the case of Grahi Shanker Singh Vs. VIII Addl. District Judge and Others, 1991 RD 10, the Court declined to interfere with the order passed in revision by the District Judge repelling the contention that the revision against the order of the Sub Divisional Officer was not maintainable, on the ground that if substantial justice has been done, the Court under Article 226 is not bound to quash the order passed by any authority relying upon various decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Court. c) In the case of Bux Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation, U.P., Lucknow and others, AIR 1966 All 156, this Court observed as under:- "Where orders impugned are equitable and substantial justice seems to have been done to the parties, the High Court would not be inclined to interfere in its writ jurisdiction merely on the ground that such orders are wrong in law. d) The aforesaid is based on the judgment passed in the case of Parahu Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1964 AWR 155 and Begum A.H. Khan Vs. The Regional Transport Authority Meerut 1963 ALJ 909. e) In the case of Om Prakash Vs. U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission, Allenganj, Allahabad and Others, (1990) UP LBEC 983, this Court has observed as under:- "It is well settled that a decision of an authority, even though without jurisdiction, may not be quashed in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution if by the decision the substantial justice is done between the parties." (Para 9) In the instant case, respondent No. 1 having found that though the inspection was alleged to have been done but the inspection memo being not on the record, he rightly directed for inspection again and thereafter to decide the case afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties. I do not find that it is a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." f) In the case of Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor MANU/PR/0049/1946: AIR 1947 PC 67, the Privy council interpreting Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Privy Council considered the question whether non-compliance of an express provision of law would amount to an irregularity. The Privy Council held that distinction between illegality and irregularity was based on the degree rather than kind, if there was substantial compliance of the procedure prescribed, the defect, if any, would be irregularity but if the noncompliance was of mandatory provision of law, that would result in illegality. g) In the judgment dated 14.07.2014 passed in Writ- C No. 24211 of 2006 (Ram Nihor Versus Additional Commissioner (Administrative), Vindhyachal Div.) at Allahabad, this Court held that the order of allotment of land, if obtained by fraud or collusion cannot be allowed to stand and the court would not intervene in such matters so as to permit squandering of the property of the state which vests in the Gaon Sabha. Protection of the state property from such fraud by initiation of action for cancellation of allotment/lease would however, be independent of the power of cancellation of such allotment envisaged under section 198(4) of the Act. h) In the case of Nohar Lal Verma v. District Co-operative Central Bank Ltd., Jagdalpur, 2008 (14) SCC 445, Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in paragraph - 32 as under : "Now, limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or ap-plication is barred by limitation Court or an adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or author-ity to entertain such a suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits." And has further held after referring to Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that a suit or appeal preferred after the prescribed period has to be dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or defence has been set up at the threshold, by the Court itself. i) The Hon'ble Apex Court has also held if by quashing of illegal order another illegality revives, in that eventuality, the Court should not interfere with such order under writ jurisdiction (See: Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1966 SC - 828, Champalal Binani v. CIT, West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 645, Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1999 SC 3609, Malikarjuna Mudhagal Nagappa and others v. State of Karnataka and others, AIR 2000 SC 2976, Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2003 SC 2889, S.D.S. Shipping Pvt. Ltd. v. Jay Container Ser-vices Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others, 2003(4) Supreme 44, State of Uttaranchal and another v. Ajit Singh Bhola and another, (2004) 6 SCC 800 and State of Orissa and another v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 437). j) In the case of Bharat Singh Versus Additional Commissioner and Others reported in 2017 (5) ADJ 466, this Court observed as under:-

20. This Court is of the considered opinion that as and when it came to the notice of the authority concerned that allotment of land of Gaon Sabha had been made illegally to ineligible person ignoring the rightful claim of several others of the same village who came within the eligibility zone/order of preference given under sub-section (1) of Section 1998 of the Act, the authority concerned was duty bound to set up an inquiry and take action as legally permissible to remedy the wrong. Hence, the allotment order being ex facie illegal, even if the suo motu inquiry was set up by the Revenue Authority and action taken thereafter to correct the wrong could be said to be a bit delayed, this Court would not interfere and set aside such an order as it would revive the illegal allotment made in favour of the petitioner.

21. The allotment of the petitioner was a result of nepotism and corruption amounting to fraud played upon the Statute. Each day passing with 'the allotment of petitioner over the land in question continuing a fresh cause of action would arise. Being a continuing cause of action of which suo motu cognizance was taken by the Additional District Magistrate, it cannot be said to be an illegal or arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction by the Revenue Authorities. As such, I do not think that there is any good ground on which extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should be exercised by me to quash the order impugned. k) In Jodhey vs State, reported as AIR 1952 All 788, this Court considered the discretionary and equitable jurisdiction of the High Court and the manner in which the same ought to be exercised. Relevant portion of the same reads:- "There are no limits, fetters or restrictions placed on this power of superintendence in this Clause and the purpose of this Article seems to be to make the High Court the custodian of all justice within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction and to arm it with a weapon that could be wielded for the purpose of seeing that justice is meted out fairly and properly by the bodies mentioned therein. "(emphasis supplied) l) In the case of Dukh Haran Verma Vs. State of U.P. (2004) 2 AWC 1147, this Court has observed as under:- "4. It must be remembered that writ is discretionary remedy vide Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 6 SCC 545: JT (2003) 6 SC 20. In a writ petition the petitioner has not only to show violation of law, he must also show that equity is in his favour. Thus, to obtain a writ the petitioner must satisfy the Court about both law and equity. If the petitioner has only satisfied the Court that the law has been violated but equity is not in his favour the Court shall not issue a writ.

5. In the present case, admittedly the resolution for no-confidence was passed by 2/3rd of the members of the Board of Directors of the Bank as required by Rule 460. Hence assuming that initiation of the proceedings by means of the notice was bad as the notice was not valid yet the resolution has validly been passed by 2/3rd members of the Board of Directors of the Bank. It must be remembered that if 2/3rd members of the Board are against the petitioner then as provided under the Rules he has to quit his office. m) In the case of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences Vs. Bikartan Das 2023 SCC OnLine SC 99, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:- "52. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be falling in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not."

27. For the foregoing reasons, the instant petition is dismissed. Cost made easy. Order Date :- 16.5.2025 Arun/-