State Of U.P.Thr.Joint Secy.Animal Husbandry Wp 1323/Ss/10 v. Shamima Bano And Others

under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 is 30 days as prescribed vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

4. As informed, the impugned judgment and order dated 06.09.2011 had been complied with. Infact against similar orders passed by this Court at Allahabad special appeals have been dismissed way back on

08.03.2016. One such special appeal was Special Appeal (Defective) No.1306 of 2009. Nevertheless considering the delay in filing the 2 SPLAD No. 177 of 2012 appeal we have first of all to consider the explanation offered in the affidavit filed in support of application for condonation of delay in the light of the recent judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on

12.09.2025, wherein the law on the subject has been elucidated and clarified after considering the earlier decisions extensively. When we peruse the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, we find that no explanation has been offered by the appellants as to when they received information about the decision in the writ petition which is impugned herein after the order has been passed on 06.09.2011 from their counsel in the office of the Chief Standing Counsel of this Court at Lucknow as, after all, there is a battery of lawyers appearing on behalf of the State Government and it is unthinkable that they would not inform the appellants about the passing of the impugned order, but the affidavit is silent on this point. Instead what it states is that the appellants came to know only on receipt of the copy of the impugned judgement on 21.10.2011 along with a representation of respondent/ petitioner. The Principal Secretary, Animal Husbandry, Govt. of U.P. vide its letter dated

04.11.2011 directed the Director, Animal Husbandry, U.P., Lucknow to send a detailed report in respect of the judgment impugned, which was sent on 26.12.2011, that is almost one and a half months after it was requisitioned. Infact the report of the Deputy Director, Animal Husbandry, Allahabad was to comply the impugned judgment and order dated 06.09.2011, whereupon the Director, Animal Husbandry sought guidance from the Joint Secretary, Animal Husbandry on

13.01.2012. The latter in turn asked the Director to file an appeal in the light of the permission granted by the Law Department on

06.02.2012. There is no explanation whatsoever for the intervening period, that is from 14.01.2012 to 06.02.2012, as to why so much time was consumed in issuing the permission and communicating it 3 SPLAD No. 177 of 2012 to the concerned by the State Government.

5. The affidavit thereafter merely states that on 29.02.2012 the Pairokar of the appellants met the Chief Standing Counsel along with letter of Deputy Director, Animal Husbandry dated 25.02.2012 and the case was allotted to the State Counsel on the same day itself. It is only thereafter that a certified copy of the judgment was applied on

29.02.2012, which indicates a casual and negligent manner in which the appellants proceed. The appeal was prepared on 29.02.2012 itself. Thereafter the affidavit does not offer any other explanation except that the court was closed from 05.03.2011 to 11.03.2012. At this point appellants' counsel states that there is a typographical error as the Court was closed from 05.03.2011 to 11.03.2011 and not

11.03.2012. The appeal was filed on 11.04.2012 and there is no explanation for the intervening period.

6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been 4 SPLAD No. 177 of 2012 refused. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein- above.

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether ‘sufficient cause’ has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits 5 SPLAD No. 177 of 2012 prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the 6 SPLAD No. 177 of 2012 ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a ‘sufficient cause’ for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

9. In view of the above discussion, as, not only the delay is inordinate, but the same has not been satisfactorily explained, we see no reason to condone the delay. No promptness or diligence was shown by the appellants in filing the appeal. Mere movement of file from one office to another is hardly an explanation. The application for condonation of delay is rejected.

10. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 15, 2025 Arnima (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) ARNIMA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 is 30 days as prescribed vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

4. As informed, the impugned judgment and order dated 06.09.2011 had been complied with. Infact against similar orders passed by this Court at Allahabad special appeals have been dismissed way back on

08.03.2016. One such special appeal was Special Appeal (Defective) No.1306 of 2009. Nevertheless considering the delay in filing the 2 SPLAD No. 177 of 2012 appeal we have first of all to consider the explanation offered in the affidavit filed in support of application for condonation of delay in the light of the recent judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on

12.09.2025, wherein the law on the subject has been elucidated and clarified after considering the earlier decisions extensively. When we peruse the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, we find that no explanation has been offered by the appellants as to when they received information about the decision in the writ petition which is impugned herein after the order has been passed on 06.09.2011 from their counsel in the office of the Chief Standing Counsel of this Court at Lucknow as, after all, there is a battery of lawyers appearing on behalf of the State Government and it is unthinkable that they would not inform the appellants about the passing of the impugned order, but the affidavit is silent on this point. Instead what it states is that the appellants came to know only on receipt of the copy of the impugned judgement on 21.10.2011 along with a representation of respondent/ petitioner. The Principal Secretary, Animal Husbandry, Govt. of U.P. vide its letter dated

04.11.2011 directed the Director, Animal Husbandry, U.P., Lucknow to send a detailed report in respect of the judgment impugned, which was sent on 26.12.2011, that is almost one and a half months after it was requisitioned. Infact the report of the Deputy Director, Animal Husbandry, Allahabad was to comply the impugned judgment and order dated 06.09.2011, whereupon the Director, Animal Husbandry sought guidance from the Joint Secretary, Animal Husbandry on

13.01.2012. The latter in turn asked the Director to file an appeal in the light of the permission granted by the Law Department on

06.02.2012. There is no explanation whatsoever for the intervening period, that is from 14.01.2012 to 06.02.2012, as to why so much time was consumed in issuing the permission and communicating it 3 SPLAD No. 177 of 2012 to the concerned by the State Government.

5. The affidavit thereafter merely states that on 29.02.2012 the Pairokar of the appellants met the Chief Standing Counsel along with letter of Deputy Director, Animal Husbandry dated 25.02.2012 and the case was allotted to the State Counsel on the same day itself. It is only thereafter that a certified copy of the judgment was applied on

29.02.2012, which indicates a casual and negligent manner in which the appellants proceed. The appeal was prepared on 29.02.2012 itself. Thereafter the affidavit does not offer any other explanation except that the court was closed from 05.03.2011 to 11.03.2012. At this point appellants' counsel states that there is a typographical error as the Court was closed from 05.03.2011 to 11.03.2011 and not

11.03.2012. The appeal was filed on 11.04.2012 and there is no explanation for the intervening period.

6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been 4 SPLAD No. 177 of 2012 refused. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein- above.

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether ‘sufficient cause’ has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits 5 SPLAD No. 177 of 2012 prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the 6 SPLAD No. 177 of 2012 ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a ‘sufficient cause’ for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

9. In view of the above discussion, as, not only the delay is inordinate, but the same has not been satisfactorily explained, we see no reason to condone the delay. No promptness or diligence was shown by the appellants in filing the appeal. Mere movement of file from one office to another is hardly an explanation. The application for condonation of delay is rejected.

10. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 15, 2025 Arnima (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) ARNIMA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench