The Secy. Basic Edu. Deptt. Lko.And Ors. 6258s/S2008 v. Banshi Lal

VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 is 30 days as prescribed vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

4. Before filing of the appeal, as informed by learned counsel for the appellants, the impugned judgment and order dated 26.08.2011 had been complied with on 30.04.2012 albeit after initiation of contempt 2 SPLAD No. 137 of 2012 proceedings and the respondent/ petitioner must be about 86-87 years of age, if alive.

5. We have perused the affidavit filed in support of application for condonation of delay and we do not find the explanation offered therein to be neither sufficient nor satisfactory, when tested on the anvil of the recent judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on

12.09.2025, wherein the principles enunciated earlier in the decisions relied upon by the appellants' counsel in paragraph 12 have been considered and the law has been elucidated/ clarified. The affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay does not throw any light as to when the Standing Counsel for the State of U.P. in the High Court informed the appellants about the passing of the impugned judgment and order dated 26.08.2011 as after all there is a battery of lawyers appearing on behalf of the State Government and it is incomprehensible that they would not inform the appellants about the passing of the impugned order, especially as the order was not reserved but was passed in open court.

6. The affidavit merely speaks of the receipt of the copy of the impugned judgement on 19.09.2011 when it was served by the respondent/ petitioner, which is hardly an explanation for the intervening period. On 19.09.2011 the District Basic Education Officer, Faizabad wrote to the Khand Shiksha Adhikari, Mawai, Faizabad requisitioning the records pertaining to the case which was supplied by the latter on 23.09.2011. The concerned file was sent to the Finance and Accounts Officer, Faizabad on 29.09.2011, who sent back the file to the Basic Education Officer, Faizabad on 17.10.2011. Nothing has been explained as to what transpired in the office of the Finance and Accounts Officer and why it took so long to send the file back and what was the purpose behind this movement of the file 3 SPLAD No. 137 of 2012 from one desk to another in the same office as the Finance and Accounts officer sits in the same office as of the District Basic Education Officer, Faizabad. The District Basic Education Officer, Faizabad sent a letter dated 19.11.2011 and a reminder dated

21.11.2011 to the Administrative Department, Govt. of U.P. requesting for grant of permission to file the appeal. Now these letters were sent almost a month after receipt of the file from the desk of the Finance and Accounts Officer and there is no explanation whatsoever as to why it took more than a month to request the Government for permission to file the appeal. The permission itself was granted on 27.12.2011, that is more than a month after it being requested. The District Basic Education Officer, Faizabad then authorized the Khand Shiksha Adkhikari concerned for filing the appeal on 02.02.2012, who contacted the Chief Standing Counsel on

14.02.2012. The latter allotted the case to the State Counsel on

15.02.2012. The affidavit thereafter merely states that the Pairokar of the appellants met the State Counsel and arranged for the records to file the affidavit along with a certified copy of the judgment dated

26.08.2011 and the narrative for filing the appeal. The date on which the Pairokar met the Standing Counsel has mischievously not been mentioned in paragraph 10 of the affidavit. Paragraph 11 states that the Pairokar met the State Counsel in the last week of February, 2012 along with relevant records. Thereafter no further explanation is offered. The record reveals that the appeal has been filed on

19.03.2012 and is no explanation whatsoever for intervening period. The affidavit discloses a lackadaisical and casual approach on the part of the appellants in preferring the appeal. It does not disclose promptness, diligence or sincerity on their part in this regard. Not only the delay is inordinate running into more than 150 days but the explanation offered is also not sufficient.

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma 4 SPLAD No. 137 of 2012 (Dead) (supra) that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein- above.

8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether ‘sufficient cause’ has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of 5 SPLAD No. 137 of 2012 judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

9. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' 6 SPLAD No. 137 of 2012 reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a ‘sufficient cause’ for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards. 7 SPLAD No. 137 of 2012

10. In view of the above discussion, as, not only the delay is inordinate, but the same has not been satisfactorily explained, we see no reason to condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is rejected. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 15, 2025 Arnima (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) ARNIMA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 is 30 days as prescribed vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

4. Before filing of the appeal, as informed by learned counsel for the appellants, the impugned judgment and order dated 26.08.2011 had been complied with on 30.04.2012 albeit after initiation of contempt 2 SPLAD No. 137 of 2012 proceedings and the respondent/ petitioner must be about 86-87 years of age, if alive.

5. We have perused the affidavit filed in support of application for condonation of delay and we do not find the explanation offered therein to be neither sufficient nor satisfactory, when tested on the anvil of the recent judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on

12.09.2025, wherein the principles enunciated earlier in the decisions relied upon by the appellants' counsel in paragraph 12 have been considered and the law has been elucidated/ clarified. The affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay does not throw any light as to when the Standing Counsel for the State of U.P. in the High Court informed the appellants about the passing of the impugned judgment and order dated 26.08.2011 as after all there is a battery of lawyers appearing on behalf of the State Government and it is incomprehensible that they would not inform the appellants about the passing of the impugned order, especially as the order was not reserved but was passed in open court.

6. The affidavit merely speaks of the receipt of the copy of the impugned judgement on 19.09.2011 when it was served by the respondent/ petitioner, which is hardly an explanation for the intervening period. On 19.09.2011 the District Basic Education Officer, Faizabad wrote to the Khand Shiksha Adhikari, Mawai, Faizabad requisitioning the records pertaining to the case which was supplied by the latter on 23.09.2011. The concerned file was sent to the Finance and Accounts Officer, Faizabad on 29.09.2011, who sent back the file to the Basic Education Officer, Faizabad on 17.10.2011. Nothing has been explained as to what transpired in the office of the Finance and Accounts Officer and why it took so long to send the file back and what was the purpose behind this movement of the file 3 SPLAD No. 137 of 2012 from one desk to another in the same office as the Finance and Accounts officer sits in the same office as of the District Basic Education Officer, Faizabad. The District Basic Education Officer, Faizabad sent a letter dated 19.11.2011 and a reminder dated

21.11.2011 to the Administrative Department, Govt. of U.P. requesting for grant of permission to file the appeal. Now these letters were sent almost a month after receipt of the file from the desk of the Finance and Accounts Officer and there is no explanation whatsoever as to why it took more than a month to request the Government for permission to file the appeal. The permission itself was granted on 27.12.2011, that is more than a month after it being requested. The District Basic Education Officer, Faizabad then authorized the Khand Shiksha Adkhikari concerned for filing the appeal on 02.02.2012, who contacted the Chief Standing Counsel on

14.02.2012. The latter allotted the case to the State Counsel on

15.02.2012. The affidavit thereafter merely states that the Pairokar of the appellants met the State Counsel and arranged for the records to file the affidavit along with a certified copy of the judgment dated

26.08.2011 and the narrative for filing the appeal. The date on which the Pairokar met the Standing Counsel has mischievously not been mentioned in paragraph 10 of the affidavit. Paragraph 11 states that the Pairokar met the State Counsel in the last week of February, 2012 along with relevant records. Thereafter no further explanation is offered. The record reveals that the appeal has been filed on

19.03.2012 and is no explanation whatsoever for intervening period. The affidavit discloses a lackadaisical and casual approach on the part of the appellants in preferring the appeal. It does not disclose promptness, diligence or sincerity on their part in this regard. Not only the delay is inordinate running into more than 150 days but the explanation offered is also not sufficient.

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma 4 SPLAD No. 137 of 2012 (Dead) (supra) that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein- above.

8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether ‘sufficient cause’ has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of 5 SPLAD No. 137 of 2012 judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

9. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' 6 SPLAD No. 137 of 2012 reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a ‘sufficient cause’ for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards. 7 SPLAD No. 137 of 2012

10. In view of the above discussion, as, not only the delay is inordinate, but the same has not been satisfactorily explained, we see no reason to condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is rejected. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 15, 2025 Arnima (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) ARNIMA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench