Others v. Ram Prakash

as per the affidavit for the first time a letter was written by the District Horticulture Officer, Sitapur to the Chief Standing Counsel office at Lucknow on 08.08.2024 seeking legal opinion. There is no explanation in the affidavit as to the intervening period of almost three months. There is battery of lawyers appearing for the State in the High Court, who are expected to inform the officials of the concerned department about disposal of the writ petition, especially when the judgement impugned is not a reserved judgement but was dictated in open court. The affidavit does not throw any light as to whether any such information was given by Chief Standing Counsel office to the concerned officials or not. Paragraph no.3 of the affidavit shows that the Chief Standing Counsel gave his opinion for filing the appeal on 21.08.2024. Paragraph nos.4 & 5 refers to the matter being forwarded to the State Government for its permission, which in turn forwarded the matter to the law department without disclosing the dates when this was done. No documentary proof in support of this averment has been annexed with the affidavit. Paragraph no.6 mentions about the Government Order dated 03.01.2025 being issued by the law department 2 SPLAD No. 184 of 2025 granting permission for filing the appeal. Now this consent to challenge by the law department itself is highly belated especially when the legal opinion was given by Chief Standing Counsel on 21.08.2024. There is no acceptable explanation for the intervening period except that the file was sent to the law department and then the State Government without disclosing the dates when this was done. This shows the casual manner in which the appellants have proceeded to get the appeal prepared and filed belatedly. It highly demonstrated any urgency on their part. Paragraph no.6 of the affidavit goes on to state that the permission dated 03.01.2025 was received along with the letter of the State Government dated 09.01.2025 in the Directorate of Horticulture without disclosing as to when it was received. The Directorate in turn directed the District Horticulture Officer to immediately ensure filing of the appeal vide letter dated 15.01.2025. The District Horticulture Officer in turn referred the matter to the Chief Standing Counsel vide letter dated 17.02.2025 that is a good one month after the letter dated 15.01.2025 about which there is no explanation as to why this delay. Paragraph no.7 merely states that the pairokar of the department contacted the Chief Standing Counsel on 25.02.2025, thereafter, the appeal was drafted and it was ultimately filed on 30.04.2025. If the appeal had been prepared by

18.03.2025 then there is no reason as to why it should have been filed on

30.04.2025.

3. On a bare reading of the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, we find absence of sufficient explanation for inordinate delay of 304 days, when tested on the anvil of the recent decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Shivomma (Dead) by LRS Vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on 12.09.2025.

4. We have gone through the decision of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression sufficient cause is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, 3 SPLAD No. 184 of 2025 or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression, sufficient cause, must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide , plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

5. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether ?sufficient cause? has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ?sufficient cause? cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would 4 SPLAD No. 184 of 2025 lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under 5 SPLAD No. 184 of 2025 Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a sufficient cause for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

7. Considering the facts of this case, we are of the opinion, as already expressed, firstly that the delay is inordinate, secondly, the explanation offered in this regard is certainly not an acceptable one and is not satisfactory as there is no sufficient cause shown by the appellants for entertaining the appeal which has been filed with such delay.

8. In view of the above discussion, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed.

9. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 10, 2025 S.P. (Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) SANJAY PURI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

as per the affidavit for the first time a letter was written by the District Horticulture Officer, Sitapur to the Chief Standing Counsel office at Lucknow on 08.08.2024 seeking legal opinion. There is no explanation in the affidavit as to the intervening period of almost three months. There is battery of lawyers appearing for the State in the High Court, who are expected to inform the officials of the concerned department about disposal of the writ petition, especially when the judgement impugned is not a reserved judgement but was dictated in open court. The affidavit does not throw any light as to whether any such information was given by Chief Standing Counsel office to the concerned officials or not. Paragraph no.3 of the affidavit shows that the Chief Standing Counsel gave his opinion for filing the appeal on 21.08.2024. Paragraph nos.4 & 5 refers to the matter being forwarded to the State Government for its permission, which in turn forwarded the matter to the law department without disclosing the dates when this was done. No documentary proof in support of this averment has been annexed with the affidavit. Paragraph no.6 mentions about the Government Order dated 03.01.2025 being issued by the law department 2 SPLAD No. 184 of 2025 granting permission for filing the appeal. Now this consent to challenge by the law department itself is highly belated especially when the legal opinion was given by Chief Standing Counsel on 21.08.2024. There is no acceptable explanation for the intervening period except that the file was sent to the law department and then the State Government without disclosing the dates when this was done. This shows the casual manner in which the appellants have proceeded to get the appeal prepared and filed belatedly. It highly demonstrated any urgency on their part. Paragraph no.6 of the affidavit goes on to state that the permission dated 03.01.2025 was received along with the letter of the State Government dated 09.01.2025 in the Directorate of Horticulture without disclosing as to when it was received. The Directorate in turn directed the District Horticulture Officer to immediately ensure filing of the appeal vide letter dated 15.01.2025. The District Horticulture Officer in turn referred the matter to the Chief Standing Counsel vide letter dated 17.02.2025 that is a good one month after the letter dated 15.01.2025 about which there is no explanation as to why this delay. Paragraph no.7 merely states that the pairokar of the department contacted the Chief Standing Counsel on 25.02.2025, thereafter, the appeal was drafted and it was ultimately filed on 30.04.2025. If the appeal had been prepared by

18.03.2025 then there is no reason as to why it should have been filed on

30.04.2025.

3. On a bare reading of the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, we find absence of sufficient explanation for inordinate delay of 304 days, when tested on the anvil of the recent decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Shivomma (Dead) by LRS Vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on 12.09.2025.

4. We have gone through the decision of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression sufficient cause is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, 3 SPLAD No. 184 of 2025 or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression, sufficient cause, must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide , plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).

5. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether ?sufficient cause? has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ?sufficient cause? cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would 4 SPLAD No. 184 of 2025 lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under 5 SPLAD No. 184 of 2025 Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a sufficient cause for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

7. Considering the facts of this case, we are of the opinion, as already expressed, firstly that the delay is inordinate, secondly, the explanation offered in this regard is certainly not an acceptable one and is not satisfactory as there is no sufficient cause shown by the appellants for entertaining the appeal which has been filed with such delay.

8. In view of the above discussion, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed.

9. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 10, 2025 S.P. (Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) SANJAY PURI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench