High Court · 2025

1. Heard Sri Amrendra Nath Tripathi, Sri Sant Prasad Singh and Ms. Minakshi Chowdhary, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners as well as learned Standing Counsel and Sri Aviral Singh holding brief of Sri Shobhit Mohan Shukla, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party no.2.

2. The present application under Article 227 has been filed challenging the order dated 14.10.2019, whereby, an additional issue was framed to be decided with regard to the ownership of the land in question as well as the order dated 06.01.2020, whereby the application for recall of the order dated 14.10.2019 was rejected.

3. The submission of the Counsel for the petitioners in brief is that the respondents authorities with an intent to acquire the land issued notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and thereafter under Section and an award was also passed in favour of the petitioners. The amount of award was accepted under protest and as the petitioners were unhappy of the quantum of award, they moved an application for enhancement of compensation. On the application so made, the matter was referred vide order dated 04.03.2013 before the District Judge for determining the amount. The reference was under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

4. It is argued by the Counsel for the petitioners that the matter was heard on various dates and an order was also reserved, however, instead of delivering the judgment on the quantum of the amount awarded, which was the sole reference, an order came to be passed on 14.10.2019 framing an additional issue with regard to the ownership of the land in question. The petitioner aggrieved against the said order moved an application for recall of the order dated 14.10.2019, which was dismissed by means of the order dated 06.01.2020.

5. The neat contention of the Counsel for the petitioners is that in terms of the mandate of Section 18, the reference court is a tribunal empowered to decide the issue with regard to the quantum of compensation and does not have any other power. He further argues that the reference court cannot be akin to an appellate court and in the absence of any specific jurisdiction conferred upon the reference court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, it could not have framed an additional issue for determination of the ownership of the land in question. He further argues that in any case, the possession was taken from the petitioners and the amount was also awarded to them, thus, a belated challenge to the ownership was not maintainable especially before a reference court and could not have decided the issue in exercise of power under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Sreekantan and others vs P. Shreekumaran Nair and others; (2006) 13 SCC 574. The relevant paragraphs reads as under: "11. The reference court derives jurisdiction from the reference made. References under Section 18 and Section 30 are conceptually different from each other. The decree in terms of Section 18 is different from the one in terms of Section 30. Remedy available in terms of Section 55 of the Act is against a decree. The question whether reference court can deal with the question covered by Section 30 of the Act in a reference made under Section 18 of the Act and vice versa has been the subject matter of judicial determination. In (Rai) Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur v. Secry. of State (AIR 1930 PC 64) it was held that the jurisdiction of the courts under the Act is a special one and strictly limited to the terms of Section 18, 20 and 21. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector's Award and it is confined to a consideration of that objection. Therefore, it is certain that when the only objection taken is to the amount of compensation that alone is the matter referred and the Court has no jurisdiction to determine or consider anything beyond it.

12. In Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran and Anr. (2003 (5) SCC 561) the question related to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Act vis-a-vis Section 18. Determination in terms of Section 30 has settings of a decision in the partition suit. In Ajjam Linganna v. Land Acquisition Officer [2002 (9) SCC 426] it was held that the Reference Court has no power to convert the reference under Section 30 into one in Section 18 of the Act at the instance of those who did not apply for reference earlier.

15. Above being the position, the High Court's view that it was impermissible to deal with the matter covered under Section 30 of the Act while dealing with a reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act is irreversible."

6. Reliance is also placed on the judgement of Ho'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharda Devi vs State of Bihar and another; (2003) 3 SCC 128. The relevant paragraphs are as under: "27. We have entered into examining the scheme of the Act and exploring the difference between reference under Section 18 and the one under Section 30 of the Act as it was necessary for finding out answer to the core question staring before us. The power to acquire by the State the land owned by its subjects hails from the right of eminent domain vesting in the State which is essentially an attribute of sovereign power of the State. So long as the public purpose subsists, the exercise of the power by the State to acquire the land of its subjects without regard to the wishes or willingness of the owner or person interested in the land cannot be questioned. (See Scindia Employees' Union v. State of Maharashtra [(1996) 10 SCC 150] , SCC para 4 and State of Maharashtra v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh [1995 Supp (2) SCC 475] , SCC para 7.) The State does not acquire its own land for it is futile to exercise the power of eminent domain for acquiring rights in the land, which already vests in the State. It would be absurdity to comprehend the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act being applicable to such land wherein the ownership or the entirety of rights already vests in the State. In other words, the land owned by the State on which there are no private rights or encumbrances is beyond the purview of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The position of law is so clear as does not stand in need of any authority for support. Still a few decided cases in point may be referred since available.

33. The Collector acts as a representative of the State whilst holding proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In fact, he conducts the proceedings on behalf of the State. The award of the Collector is not the source of the right to compensation; it is the pre-existing right which is recognized by the Collector and guided by the findings arrived at in determining the objections, if any, the Collector quantifies the amount of compensation to be placed as an offer of the appropriate Government to the owner recognized by the State. The offeree may accept or decline the offer. If he accepts the offer and the Government takes possession over the land, the title of the offeree is extinguished and vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. The power to make an award under Section 11 and to make a reference under Section 18 or 30 of the Act is a statutory power. The sweep of jurisdiction of the court to determine the disputes is also statutory and is controlled by the bounds created by Section 17 or 30 whereunder the reference has been made to the court. The power has to be exercised to the extent to which it has been conferred by the statute and on availability of pre-existing conditions on the availability of which and which alone the power can be exercised.

34. The award made by the Collector is final and conclusive as between the Collector and the "persons interested", whether they have appeared before the Collector or not, on two issues : (i) as to true area i.e. measurement of land acquired, (ii) as to value of the land i.e. the amount of compensation, and (iii) as to the apportionment of the compensation among the "persons interested" — again, between the Collector and the "persons interested" and not as amongst the "persons interested" inter se. In the event of a reference having been sought for under Section 18, the Collector's award on these issues, if varied by the civil court, shall stand superseded to that extent. The scheme of the Act does not attach a similar finality to the award of the Collector on the issue as to the person to whom compensation is payable; in spite of the award by the Collector and even on failure to seek reference, such issue has been left available to be adjudicated upon by any competent forum.

36. To sum up, the State is not a "person interested" as defined in Section 3(b) of the Act. It is not a party to the proceedings before the Collector in the sense, which the expression "parties to the litigation" carries. The Collector holds the proceedings and makes an award as a representative of the State Government. Land or an interest in land pre-owned by the State cannot be the subject-matter of acquisition by the State. The question of deciding the ownership of the State or holding of any interest by the State Government in proceedings before the Collector cannot arise in the proceedings before the Collector [as defined in Section 3(c) of the Act]. If it was government land there was no question of initiating the proceedings for acquisition at all. The Government would not acquire the land, which already vests in it. A dispute as to the pre-existing right or interest of the State Government in the property sought to be acquired is not a dispute capable of being adjudicated upon or referred to the civil court for determination either under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act. The reference made by the Collector to the court was wholly without jurisdiction and the civil court ought to have refused to entertain the reference and ought to have rejected the same. All the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act beginning from the reference and adjudication thereon by the civil court suffer from lack of inherent jurisdiction and are therefore a nullity liable to be declared so."

7. In the light of the aforesaid, it is argued by the Counsel for the petitioners that the impugned orders are bad in law and are liable to be quashed.

8. The Counsel for the respondent appearing on behalf of the respondent no.2 states that on the basis of an application filed, wherein a cloud was cast on the title of the petitioner, the reference court has rightly framed the issue and thus, the order impugned requires no interference.

9. Considering the submissions made at the bar, prima facie, in terms of the mandate of Section 18, the power of the reference court are very limited. The scope of powers of the reference court were dealt with in the case of Sharda Devi (Supra) and P.K. Sreekantan (Supra).

10. In view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharda Devi (Supra), I have no reason to take a view different from the view already taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to the power of the reference court.

11. The issue as framed by the reference court vide order dated

14.10.2019 being the Issue No.4 was clearly beyond the scope of powers conferred under Section 18 to the reference court, as such, the same cannot be sustained and the orders dated 14.10.2019 and 06.01.2020 are quashed. The writ petition is allowed.

12. The matter is remanded back for deciding the reference in accordance with law preferably within a period of four months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. Order Date :- 29.1.2025 akverma ASHOK KUMAR VERMA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

1. Heard Sri Amrendra Nath Tripathi, Sri Sant Prasad Singh and Ms. Minakshi Chowdhary, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners as well as learned Standing Counsel and Sri Aviral Singh holding brief of Sri Shobhit Mohan Shukla, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party no.2.

2. The present application under Article 227 has been filed challenging the order dated 14.10.2019, whereby, an additional issue was framed to be decided with regard to the ownership of the land in question as well as the order dated 06.01.2020, whereby the application for recall of the order dated 14.10.2019 was rejected.

3. The submission of the Counsel for the petitioners in brief is that the respondents authorities with an intent to acquire the land issued notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and thereafter under Section and an award was also passed in favour of the petitioners. The amount of award was accepted under protest and as the petitioners were unhappy of the quantum of award, they moved an application for enhancement of compensation. On the application so made, the matter was referred vide order dated 04.03.2013 before the District Judge for determining the amount. The reference was under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

4. It is argued by the Counsel for the petitioners that the matter was heard on various dates and an order was also reserved, however, instead of delivering the judgment on the quantum of the amount awarded, which was the sole reference, an order came to be passed on 14.10.2019 framing an additional issue with regard to the ownership of the land in question. The petitioner aggrieved against the said order moved an application for recall of the order dated 14.10.2019, which was dismissed by means of the order dated 06.01.2020.

5. The neat contention of the Counsel for the petitioners is that in terms of the mandate of Section 18, the reference court is a tribunal empowered to decide the issue with regard to the quantum of compensation and does not have any other power. He further argues that the reference court cannot be akin to an appellate court and in the absence of any specific jurisdiction conferred upon the reference court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, it could not have framed an additional issue for determination of the ownership of the land in question. He further argues that in any case, the possession was taken from the petitioners and the amount was also awarded to them, thus, a belated challenge to the ownership was not maintainable especially before a reference court and could not have decided the issue in exercise of power under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Sreekantan and others vs P. Shreekumaran Nair and others; (2006) 13 SCC 574. The relevant paragraphs reads as under: "11. The reference court derives jurisdiction from the reference made. References under Section 18 and Section 30 are conceptually different from each other. The decree in terms of Section 18 is different from the one in terms of Section 30. Remedy available in terms of Section 55 of the Act is against a decree. The question whether reference court can deal with the question covered by Section 30 of the Act in a reference made under Section 18 of the Act and vice versa has been the subject matter of judicial determination. In (Rai) Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur v. Secry. of State (AIR 1930 PC 64) it was held that the jurisdiction of the courts under the Act is a special one and strictly limited to the terms of Section 18, 20 and 21. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector's Award and it is confined to a consideration of that objection. Therefore, it is certain that when the only objection taken is to the amount of compensation that alone is the matter referred and the Court has no jurisdiction to determine or consider anything beyond it.

12. In Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran and Anr. (2003 (5) SCC 561) the question related to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Act vis-a-vis Section 18. Determination in terms of Section 30 has settings of a decision in the partition suit. In Ajjam Linganna v. Land Acquisition Officer [2002 (9) SCC 426] it was held that the Reference Court has no power to convert the reference under Section 30 into one in Section 18 of the Act at the instance of those who did not apply for reference earlier.

15. Above being the position, the High Court's view that it was impermissible to deal with the matter covered under Section 30 of the Act while dealing with a reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act is irreversible."

6. Reliance is also placed on the judgement of Ho'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharda Devi vs State of Bihar and another; (2003) 3 SCC 128. The relevant paragraphs are as under: "27. We have entered into examining the scheme of the Act and exploring the difference between reference under Section 18 and the one under Section 30 of the Act as it was necessary for finding out answer to the core question staring before us. The power to acquire by the State the land owned by its subjects hails from the right of eminent domain vesting in the State which is essentially an attribute of sovereign power of the State. So long as the public purpose subsists, the exercise of the power by the State to acquire the land of its subjects without regard to the wishes or willingness of the owner or person interested in the land cannot be questioned. (See Scindia Employees' Union v. State of Maharashtra [(1996) 10 SCC 150] , SCC para 4 and State of Maharashtra v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh [1995 Supp (2) SCC 475] , SCC para 7.) The State does not acquire its own land for it is futile to exercise the power of eminent domain for acquiring rights in the land, which already vests in the State. It would be absurdity to comprehend the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act being applicable to such land wherein the ownership or the entirety of rights already vests in the State. In other words, the land owned by the State on which there are no private rights or encumbrances is beyond the purview of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The position of law is so clear as does not stand in need of any authority for support. Still a few decided cases in point may be referred since available.

33. The Collector acts as a representative of the State whilst holding proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In fact, he conducts the proceedings on behalf of the State. The award of the Collector is not the source of the right to compensation; it is the pre-existing right which is recognized by the Collector and guided by the findings arrived at in determining the objections, if any, the Collector quantifies the amount of compensation to be placed as an offer of the appropriate Government to the owner recognized by the State. The offeree may accept or decline the offer. If he accepts the offer and the Government takes possession over the land, the title of the offeree is extinguished and vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. The power to make an award under Section 11 and to make a reference under Section 18 or 30 of the Act is a statutory power. The sweep of jurisdiction of the court to determine the disputes is also statutory and is controlled by the bounds created by Section 17 or 30 whereunder the reference has been made to the court. The power has to be exercised to the extent to which it has been conferred by the statute and on availability of pre-existing conditions on the availability of which and which alone the power can be exercised.

34. The award made by the Collector is final and conclusive as between the Collector and the "persons interested", whether they have appeared before the Collector or not, on two issues : (i) as to true area i.e. measurement of land acquired, (ii) as to value of the land i.e. the amount of compensation, and (iii) as to the apportionment of the compensation among the "persons interested" — again, between the Collector and the "persons interested" and not as amongst the "persons interested" inter se. In the event of a reference having been sought for under Section 18, the Collector's award on these issues, if varied by the civil court, shall stand superseded to that extent. The scheme of the Act does not attach a similar finality to the award of the Collector on the issue as to the person to whom compensation is payable; in spite of the award by the Collector and even on failure to seek reference, such issue has been left available to be adjudicated upon by any competent forum.

36. To sum up, the State is not a "person interested" as defined in Section 3(b) of the Act. It is not a party to the proceedings before the Collector in the sense, which the expression "parties to the litigation" carries. The Collector holds the proceedings and makes an award as a representative of the State Government. Land or an interest in land pre-owned by the State cannot be the subject-matter of acquisition by the State. The question of deciding the ownership of the State or holding of any interest by the State Government in proceedings before the Collector cannot arise in the proceedings before the Collector [as defined in Section 3(c) of the Act]. If it was government land there was no question of initiating the proceedings for acquisition at all. The Government would not acquire the land, which already vests in it. A dispute as to the pre-existing right or interest of the State Government in the property sought to be acquired is not a dispute capable of being adjudicated upon or referred to the civil court for determination either under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act. The reference made by the Collector to the court was wholly without jurisdiction and the civil court ought to have refused to entertain the reference and ought to have rejected the same. All the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act beginning from the reference and adjudication thereon by the civil court suffer from lack of inherent jurisdiction and are therefore a nullity liable to be declared so."

7. In the light of the aforesaid, it is argued by the Counsel for the petitioners that the impugned orders are bad in law and are liable to be quashed.

8. The Counsel for the respondent appearing on behalf of the respondent no.2 states that on the basis of an application filed, wherein a cloud was cast on the title of the petitioner, the reference court has rightly framed the issue and thus, the order impugned requires no interference.

9. Considering the submissions made at the bar, prima facie, in terms of the mandate of Section 18, the power of the reference court are very limited. The scope of powers of the reference court were dealt with in the case of Sharda Devi (Supra) and P.K. Sreekantan (Supra).

10. In view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharda Devi (Supra), I have no reason to take a view different from the view already taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to the power of the reference court.

11. The issue as framed by the reference court vide order dated

14.10.2019 being the Issue No.4 was clearly beyond the scope of powers conferred under Section 18 to the reference court, as such, the same cannot be sustained and the orders dated 14.10.2019 and 06.01.2020 are quashed. The writ petition is allowed.

12. The matter is remanded back for deciding the reference in accordance with law preferably within a period of four months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. Order Date :- 29.1.2025 akverma ASHOK KUMAR VERMA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench