Dinesh Singh Sachan v. State Of U.P. Thru. Addi. Chief Secy. Irrigation And Water Resources Deptt.Lko. A

6. Learned Counsel for petitioner has also adverted to the impugned order to submit that earlier petitioner had challenged the inquiry proceedings in Writ Petition No. 6700 (SS) of 2021 which was disposed of vide order dated 22.03.2021 directing the concerned authorities to conclude disciplinary proceedings within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of the order.

7. It is submitted that despite the aforesaid time-frame having expired when the disciplinary proceedings were not concluded, he filed Contempt Petition No.903 (C) of 2021 which was disposed of vide order dated 21.10.2021 recording the statement of learned Standing Counsel for the answering opposite party that the final orders in the aforesaid disciplinary proceedings would be passed within one month. It is submitted that even when the aforesaid undertaking was not complied with, petitioner filed another Contempt Petition bearing No.25 (C) of 2022 in which vide order dated 11.01.2022, notices were issued to the opposite parties but thereafter the impugned order has been passed.

8.Learned counsel for petitioner therefore places reliance on Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthy v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [2013 SCC OnLine All 14267] as well as judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh [(2025) 2 UPLBEC 883] to submit that since the inquiry proceedings were not concluded within the time-frame stipulated by this Court nor was any application for extension of time-frame allowed, entire proceedings themselves are liable to be quashed, particularly since the petitioner has superannuated in the meantime.

9. Learned State Counsel, on the basis of counter affidavit, has refuted submissions advanced by learned counsel for petitioner with submission that with regard to charges levelled against the petitioner, the same were examined and it was discovered that the works were executed without awarding any contract and expenditure was incurred beyond permissible limits and therefore, the petitioner had committed financial irregularities in works resulting into revenue loss 4 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022 to the government. It is submitted that after consideration of the first Inquiry Report, the Inquiry Officer was directed to submit a revised Inquiry Report mainly on three points indicated in the letter dated

01.04.2021. It is submitted that adequate and ample opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner who participated in the inquiry proceedings. It is submitted that since the work which was conducted by the petitioner was against the financial rules, the second inquiry was directed. It is also submitted that the show cause notice issued to the petitioner on 31.08.2021 has in fact taken care to record reasons for disagreement with the Inquiry Reports. It is submitted that same will clearly indicate an application of mind by the authorities concerned to the aspect of disagreement.

10. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, the facts as indicated here-in-above are undisputed. The only questions requiring adjudication would be : (a) Whether the show cause notice dated 31.08.2021 is in terms of Rule 9(4) of Rules, 1999 as well as judgments on the point? (b) Whether the inquiry proceedings are vitiated for not being completed within the time-frame stipulated by this Court?

11. With regard to question (a), judgment rendered by Supreme Court on the point in the case of Csha University and another v. B. D. Goyal [(2010) 15 SCC 776] enunciates the law as follows:- "7. It is no doubt true that the punishing authority or any higher authority could have disagreed with the finding of the the authority enquiring officer, but in such a case concerned is duty-bound to record reasons in writing and not on ipse dixit can alter the finding of an enquiring officer. The order of the Vice-Chancellor, which was produced before us does not satisfy the requirements of law in the matter of differing with the findings of an enquiring officer. In that view of the matter, we do not find any infirmity with the impugned judgment so as to be interfered with by this 5 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022 Court. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed."

12. In the present facts and circumstances of the case, a perusal of Inquiry Reports dated 12.10.2020 and 05.08.2021 clearly indicates the aspect that charges levelled against petitioner were examined in the light of various Government Orders as well as provisions of Financial Handbook and a finding has been recorded that a limited time period of 15 days was made available to petitioner to conduct dredging and rejuvenation activity of the aforesaid ponds which such time-frame has been indicated by the State Government itself. The inquiry report thereafter indicates the fact that in pursuance of directions issued by the Chief Secretary of the State vide letter dated 21.05.2016 appropriate directions were issued by the Chief Engineer concerned and it is only thereafter that the aforesaid works were undertaken by the petitioner. The Inquiry Report also places reliance on paragraph - 351 of the Financial Handbook Volume - VI to indicate that in such circumstances, works can be conducted without entering into contract on the basis of 'piece work'. The Inquiry letters to various Reports also referred the State Government as well as Chief Engineer concerned indicating the sanctioned cost of the works and the actual cost incurred and have thereafter reached a conclusion that the amount spent in the aforesaid works was within revised financial sanction. issued by

13. However, a perusal of the show cause notice dated 31.08.2021 clearly indicates that aspect that the aforesaid Government Orders, order issued by the Chief Secretary, directions of the Chief Engineer concerned and provisions of Financial Handbook which have been relied upon in both the inquiry reports has not been considered at all. The points of disagreement in fact are a reiteration of charges levelled against petitioner in the charge-sheet.

14. Upon applicability of judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of B.D. Goyal (supra) it was incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to have adverted to the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officers in both the inquiry reports, to have referred to the Government Orders and provisions of Financial Handbook and then to have expressed disagreement with the same on the basis of such provisions. 6 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022

15. The said aspect is also required to be considered in the light of provisions of Rule 9 of Rules, 1999 which are as follows:- "9. Action on Inquiry Report. - (1) The disciplinary authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, remit the case for re-inquiry to the same or any other Inquiry Officer under intimation the charged Government servant. The Inquiry Officer shall thereupon proceed to hold the inquiry from such stage as directed by the disciplinary authority, according to the provisions of Rule 7. (2) The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer on any charge, record its own findings thereon for reasons to be recorded. (3) In case the charges are not proved, the charged Government servant shall be exonerated by the disciplinary authority of the charges and inform him accordingly. (4) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of charges is of the opinion that any penalty specified in Rule 3 should be imposed on the charged Government servant, he shall give a copy of the inquiry report and his findings recorded under sub-rule (2) to the charged Government servant and require him to submit his representation if he so desires, within a reasonable specified time. The disciplinary authority shall, having regard to all the relevant records relating to the inquiry and representation of the charged Government servant, if any, and subject to the provisions of Rule 16 of these rules, pass a reasoned order imposing one or more penalties mentioned in Rule 3 of these rules and communicate the same to the charged Government servant."

16. It is thus evident upon a perusal of Rule 9 (4) of the Rules, 1999 that while disagreeing with the inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority is required to have regard to all relevant records relating to the inquiry and representation of charged Government servant. For the said purpose, the Disciplinary Authority will have to advert not only to the relevant records but also with regard to reasoning 7 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022 recorded by the Inquiry Officer.

17. However, a perusal of the show cause notice clearly indicates that no such procedure has been followed and that none of the Government Orders or provisions of the Financial Handbook have been considered by the Disciplinary Authority who has merely reiterated the charges levelled in the charge-sheet.

18. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances as well as law enunciated, it is evident that the show cause notice dated 31.08.2021 was not in accordance with law.

19. In view thereof, in answer to question (a), it is held that the show cause notice dated 31.08.2021 was not in accordance with either rules or law enunciated. The answer is therefore in favour of the petitioner.

20. With regard to question (b), a perusal of the impugned order particularly paragraph - 10 thereof clearly is indicative of the fact that despite time period of three months having been provided to the opposite parties to conclude the inquiry proceedings, the said proceedings were in fact not concluded within the time-frame stipulated. It is also evident from the impugned that no application for extension of the time period stipulated was ever filed by the opposite parties.

21. The said aspect has been considered by Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra) in the following manner:- "61. The fourth issue requires us to consider Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra), a decision of the Full Bench of the High Court. Being a Full Bench decision, obviously the Tribunal as well as the Division Bench of the High Court was bound thereby. The Full Bench rendered such decision upon considering, inter alia, the decision of this Court in Union of India and Others v. Satyendra Kumar Sahai and Another, (2005) 12 SCC 355. We may only notice the answers to the questions referred to the Full Bench, reading as follows: “(A) Question No. (a): We hold that if an enquiry 8 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022 is not concluded within the time which has been fixed by the Court, it is open to the employer to seek an extension of time by making an appropriate application to the Court setting out the reasons for the delay in the conclusion of the enquiry. In such an event, it is for the Court to consider whether time should be extended, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. However, where there is a stipulation of time by the Court, it will not be open to the employer to disregard that stipulation and an extension of time must be sought; (B) Question No. (b): The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra (supra) as well as the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satyendra Kumar Sahai (supra) clearly indicate that a mere delay on the part of the employer in concluding a disciplinary enquiry will not ipso facto nullify the entire proceedings in every case. The Court which has time has fixed a stipulation of jurisdiction to extend the time and it is open to the Court, while exercising consider whether satisfactorily explained. The Court can suitably extend time for conclusion of the enquiry either in the employee instituted by a proceeding challenging the enquiry on the ground that it was not completed within the stipulated period or even upon an independent application moved by inherent the employer. The Court has jurisdiction, jurisdiction to grant an extension of time, the original stipulation of time having been fixed by the Court itself. Such an extension of time has to be considered in the interests of justice balancing both the need for expeditious conclusion of the enquiry in the interests of fairness and an honest 9 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022 administration. In an appropriate case, it would be open to the Court to extend time suo motu in to ensure that a serious charge of misconduct does not go unpunished leading to a serious detriment to the public interest. The Court has sufficient powers to grant an extension of time both before and after the period stipulated by the Court has come to an end”.

62. While affirming the aforesaid view of the Full Bench, we would like to provide clarification on certain points not touched by such bench. First, in view of unseen institutional hurdles that can slow down swift (2005) 12 SCC 355 action, it may not always be possible for the disciplinary authority in each such case where a fixed time has been stipulated by a tribunal/court to conclude the proceedings to apply and seek extension of time before expiry of such time although there can be no gainsaying that applying and obtaining an extension before expiry is eminently desirable. In exceptional cases, even after expiry of the stipulated time, such an application can be moved; and, depending on the cause shown for inability or failure to conclude the proceedings within the time stipulated and also for not applying for extension before expiry, the tribunal/court may, in its discretion, allow or reject the prayer for extension. If the application is rejected, the proceedings cannot be carried forward unless a superior court, reversing the order of rejection, permits the disciplinary authority to so proceed. Secondly, continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated, the disciplinary authority without proceeding further ought to apply for extension of time and may not go ahead till such the delinquent employee objects time its prayer for extension is granted on such application. Proceeding despite objection and without there being an extension could give rise to apprehensions of bias. Therefore, applying for extension upon halting proceedings awaiting order on the application would be an advisable course of action to balance the interests of both 10 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022 the employer and the employee. Thirdly, even if the delinquent employee has not objected to continuation of proceedings beyond stipulated by tribunal/court but before the final order is passed in the proceedings, the disciplinary authority would be bound to seek and obtain extension of time. This is for the simple reason that the sanctity of the orders of tribunals/courts cannot be disrespected by errant parties. The dignity of the judicial process would be seriously eroded and there would be nothing left of the rule of law if orders of tribunals/courts, validly made, are disobeyed and the disobedience is encouraged by being indulgent. Finally, we hasten to add that if a tribunal/court stipulates a fixed time by which an enquiry or proceedings for disciplinary action ought to be concluded coupled with a rider that, in default, the enquiry/proceedings will stand lapsed, the disciplinary authority in such a case would cease to have the jurisdiction to proceed further unless, of course, citing genuine grounds, a recall of such default clause is sought and obtained to proceed further in accordance with law.

63. We also hold that continuation of disciplinary proceedings beyond the time stipulated by a tribunal/court could invite interdiction if no bona fide attempt is shown to have been made to seek an extension of time. However, much would depend on the facts of each case and it may not be possible to lay down a common formula applicable to each case. In an exceptional case, the tribunal/court would have the discretion to overlook the laxity and make such direction as it deems fit in the circumstances.

64. The answer to the fourth issue, in view of our discussion, has to be in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. Without an extension of time, no order of punishment could have been validly made and the grievance of the respondent in this behalf is absolutely legitimate."

22. Upon applicability of aforesaid judgment in the present facts and 11 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022 circumstances of the case, it being evident inquiry proceedings were neither concluded within time-frame stipulated nor was any application for extension ever filed, the inquiry proceedings therefore are vitiated on that account as well.

23. In view of discussion made here-in-above, the answer to question (b) is also in favour of petitioner.

24. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances and discussion, the impugned order dated 25.02.2022 being vitiated is hereby quashed by issuance of a Writ in the nature of Certiorari. Consequences to follow.

25. Resultantly, Writ-A No. 3506 of 2022 is allowed. Order on Writ-A No. 8231 of 2024

26. Heard Mr. Ajey Shanker Tewari, learned counsel for petitioner and Mr. Ashwani Kumar Singh Rathore, learned State Counsel for opposite parties.

27. Petition has been filed seeking a direction to opposite parties to consider petitioner's candidature for promotion to the post of Chief Engineer Level - I from the date when juniors were granted such promotion. Further prayer for a direction to opposite parties to declare petitioner entitled for all consequential benefits after his promotion on the post of Chief Engineer Level - I has also been sought.

28. In view of the fact that punishment order dated 25.02.2022 has already been quashed by this Court, opposite parties are directed to consider the aforesaid two claims of petitioner, expeditiously, within a period of eight weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is served upon the authorities concerned.

29. With the aforesaid direction(s), Writ-A No. 8231 of 2024 stands disposed of. December 9, 2025 lakshman (Manish Mathur,J.) LAKSHMANA KUMAR TAMMANA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

6. Learned Counsel for petitioner has also adverted to the impugned order to submit that earlier petitioner had challenged the inquiry proceedings in Writ Petition No. 6700 (SS) of 2021 which was disposed of vide order dated 22.03.2021 directing the concerned authorities to conclude disciplinary proceedings within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of the order.

7. It is submitted that despite the aforesaid time-frame having expired when the disciplinary proceedings were not concluded, he filed Contempt Petition No.903 (C) of 2021 which was disposed of vide order dated 21.10.2021 recording the statement of learned Standing Counsel for the answering opposite party that the final orders in the aforesaid disciplinary proceedings would be passed within one month. It is submitted that even when the aforesaid undertaking was not complied with, petitioner filed another Contempt Petition bearing No.25 (C) of 2022 in which vide order dated 11.01.2022, notices were issued to the opposite parties but thereafter the impugned order has been passed.

8.Learned counsel for petitioner therefore places reliance on Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthy v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [2013 SCC OnLine All 14267] as well as judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh [(2025) 2 UPLBEC 883] to submit that since the inquiry proceedings were not concluded within the time-frame stipulated by this Court nor was any application for extension of time-frame allowed, entire proceedings themselves are liable to be quashed, particularly since the petitioner has superannuated in the meantime.

9. Learned State Counsel, on the basis of counter affidavit, has refuted submissions advanced by learned counsel for petitioner with submission that with regard to charges levelled against the petitioner, the same were examined and it was discovered that the works were executed without awarding any contract and expenditure was incurred beyond permissible limits and therefore, the petitioner had committed financial irregularities in works resulting into revenue loss 4 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022 to the government. It is submitted that after consideration of the first Inquiry Report, the Inquiry Officer was directed to submit a revised Inquiry Report mainly on three points indicated in the letter dated

01.04.2021. It is submitted that adequate and ample opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner who participated in the inquiry proceedings. It is submitted that since the work which was conducted by the petitioner was against the financial rules, the second inquiry was directed. It is also submitted that the show cause notice issued to the petitioner on 31.08.2021 has in fact taken care to record reasons for disagreement with the Inquiry Reports. It is submitted that same will clearly indicate an application of mind by the authorities concerned to the aspect of disagreement.

10. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, the facts as indicated here-in-above are undisputed. The only questions requiring adjudication would be : (a) Whether the show cause notice dated 31.08.2021 is in terms of Rule 9(4) of Rules, 1999 as well as judgments on the point? (b) Whether the inquiry proceedings are vitiated for not being completed within the time-frame stipulated by this Court?

11. With regard to question (a), judgment rendered by Supreme Court on the point in the case of Csha University and another v. B. D. Goyal [(2010) 15 SCC 776] enunciates the law as follows:- "7. It is no doubt true that the punishing authority or any higher authority could have disagreed with the finding of the the authority enquiring officer, but in such a case concerned is duty-bound to record reasons in writing and not on ipse dixit can alter the finding of an enquiring officer. The order of the Vice-Chancellor, which was produced before us does not satisfy the requirements of law in the matter of differing with the findings of an enquiring officer. In that view of the matter, we do not find any infirmity with the impugned judgment so as to be interfered with by this 5 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022 Court. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed."

12. In the present facts and circumstances of the case, a perusal of Inquiry Reports dated 12.10.2020 and 05.08.2021 clearly indicates the aspect that charges levelled against petitioner were examined in the light of various Government Orders as well as provisions of Financial Handbook and a finding has been recorded that a limited time period of 15 days was made available to petitioner to conduct dredging and rejuvenation activity of the aforesaid ponds which such time-frame has been indicated by the State Government itself. The inquiry report thereafter indicates the fact that in pursuance of directions issued by the Chief Secretary of the State vide letter dated 21.05.2016 appropriate directions were issued by the Chief Engineer concerned and it is only thereafter that the aforesaid works were undertaken by the petitioner. The Inquiry Report also places reliance on paragraph - 351 of the Financial Handbook Volume - VI to indicate that in such circumstances, works can be conducted without entering into contract on the basis of 'piece work'. The Inquiry letters to various Reports also referred the State Government as well as Chief Engineer concerned indicating the sanctioned cost of the works and the actual cost incurred and have thereafter reached a conclusion that the amount spent in the aforesaid works was within revised financial sanction. issued by

13. However, a perusal of the show cause notice dated 31.08.2021 clearly indicates that aspect that the aforesaid Government Orders, order issued by the Chief Secretary, directions of the Chief Engineer concerned and provisions of Financial Handbook which have been relied upon in both the inquiry reports has not been considered at all. The points of disagreement in fact are a reiteration of charges levelled against petitioner in the charge-sheet.

14. Upon applicability of judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of B.D. Goyal (supra) it was incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to have adverted to the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officers in both the inquiry reports, to have referred to the Government Orders and provisions of Financial Handbook and then to have expressed disagreement with the same on the basis of such provisions. 6 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022

15. The said aspect is also required to be considered in the light of provisions of Rule 9 of Rules, 1999 which are as follows:- "9. Action on Inquiry Report. - (1) The disciplinary authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, remit the case for re-inquiry to the same or any other Inquiry Officer under intimation the charged Government servant. The Inquiry Officer shall thereupon proceed to hold the inquiry from such stage as directed by the disciplinary authority, according to the provisions of Rule 7. (2) The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer on any charge, record its own findings thereon for reasons to be recorded. (3) In case the charges are not proved, the charged Government servant shall be exonerated by the disciplinary authority of the charges and inform him accordingly. (4) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of charges is of the opinion that any penalty specified in Rule 3 should be imposed on the charged Government servant, he shall give a copy of the inquiry report and his findings recorded under sub-rule (2) to the charged Government servant and require him to submit his representation if he so desires, within a reasonable specified time. The disciplinary authority shall, having regard to all the relevant records relating to the inquiry and representation of the charged Government servant, if any, and subject to the provisions of Rule 16 of these rules, pass a reasoned order imposing one or more penalties mentioned in Rule 3 of these rules and communicate the same to the charged Government servant."

16. It is thus evident upon a perusal of Rule 9 (4) of the Rules, 1999 that while disagreeing with the inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority is required to have regard to all relevant records relating to the inquiry and representation of charged Government servant. For the said purpose, the Disciplinary Authority will have to advert not only to the relevant records but also with regard to reasoning 7 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022 recorded by the Inquiry Officer.

17. However, a perusal of the show cause notice clearly indicates that no such procedure has been followed and that none of the Government Orders or provisions of the Financial Handbook have been considered by the Disciplinary Authority who has merely reiterated the charges levelled in the charge-sheet.

18. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances as well as law enunciated, it is evident that the show cause notice dated 31.08.2021 was not in accordance with law.

19. In view thereof, in answer to question (a), it is held that the show cause notice dated 31.08.2021 was not in accordance with either rules or law enunciated. The answer is therefore in favour of the petitioner.

20. With regard to question (b), a perusal of the impugned order particularly paragraph - 10 thereof clearly is indicative of the fact that despite time period of three months having been provided to the opposite parties to conclude the inquiry proceedings, the said proceedings were in fact not concluded within the time-frame stipulated. It is also evident from the impugned that no application for extension of the time period stipulated was ever filed by the opposite parties.

21. The said aspect has been considered by Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra) in the following manner:- "61. The fourth issue requires us to consider Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra), a decision of the Full Bench of the High Court. Being a Full Bench decision, obviously the Tribunal as well as the Division Bench of the High Court was bound thereby. The Full Bench rendered such decision upon considering, inter alia, the decision of this Court in Union of India and Others v. Satyendra Kumar Sahai and Another, (2005) 12 SCC 355. We may only notice the answers to the questions referred to the Full Bench, reading as follows: “(A) Question No. (a): We hold that if an enquiry 8 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022 is not concluded within the time which has been fixed by the Court, it is open to the employer to seek an extension of time by making an appropriate application to the Court setting out the reasons for the delay in the conclusion of the enquiry. In such an event, it is for the Court to consider whether time should be extended, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. However, where there is a stipulation of time by the Court, it will not be open to the employer to disregard that stipulation and an extension of time must be sought; (B) Question No. (b): The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra (supra) as well as the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satyendra Kumar Sahai (supra) clearly indicate that a mere delay on the part of the employer in concluding a disciplinary enquiry will not ipso facto nullify the entire proceedings in every case. The Court which has time has fixed a stipulation of jurisdiction to extend the time and it is open to the Court, while exercising consider whether satisfactorily explained. The Court can suitably extend time for conclusion of the enquiry either in the employee instituted by a proceeding challenging the enquiry on the ground that it was not completed within the stipulated period or even upon an independent application moved by inherent the employer. The Court has jurisdiction, jurisdiction to grant an extension of time, the original stipulation of time having been fixed by the Court itself. Such an extension of time has to be considered in the interests of justice balancing both the need for expeditious conclusion of the enquiry in the interests of fairness and an honest 9 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022 administration. In an appropriate case, it would be open to the Court to extend time suo motu in to ensure that a serious charge of misconduct does not go unpunished leading to a serious detriment to the public interest. The Court has sufficient powers to grant an extension of time both before and after the period stipulated by the Court has come to an end”.

62. While affirming the aforesaid view of the Full Bench, we would like to provide clarification on certain points not touched by such bench. First, in view of unseen institutional hurdles that can slow down swift (2005) 12 SCC 355 action, it may not always be possible for the disciplinary authority in each such case where a fixed time has been stipulated by a tribunal/court to conclude the proceedings to apply and seek extension of time before expiry of such time although there can be no gainsaying that applying and obtaining an extension before expiry is eminently desirable. In exceptional cases, even after expiry of the stipulated time, such an application can be moved; and, depending on the cause shown for inability or failure to conclude the proceedings within the time stipulated and also for not applying for extension before expiry, the tribunal/court may, in its discretion, allow or reject the prayer for extension. If the application is rejected, the proceedings cannot be carried forward unless a superior court, reversing the order of rejection, permits the disciplinary authority to so proceed. Secondly, continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated, the disciplinary authority without proceeding further ought to apply for extension of time and may not go ahead till such the delinquent employee objects time its prayer for extension is granted on such application. Proceeding despite objection and without there being an extension could give rise to apprehensions of bias. Therefore, applying for extension upon halting proceedings awaiting order on the application would be an advisable course of action to balance the interests of both 10 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022 the employer and the employee. Thirdly, even if the delinquent employee has not objected to continuation of proceedings beyond stipulated by tribunal/court but before the final order is passed in the proceedings, the disciplinary authority would be bound to seek and obtain extension of time. This is for the simple reason that the sanctity of the orders of tribunals/courts cannot be disrespected by errant parties. The dignity of the judicial process would be seriously eroded and there would be nothing left of the rule of law if orders of tribunals/courts, validly made, are disobeyed and the disobedience is encouraged by being indulgent. Finally, we hasten to add that if a tribunal/court stipulates a fixed time by which an enquiry or proceedings for disciplinary action ought to be concluded coupled with a rider that, in default, the enquiry/proceedings will stand lapsed, the disciplinary authority in such a case would cease to have the jurisdiction to proceed further unless, of course, citing genuine grounds, a recall of such default clause is sought and obtained to proceed further in accordance with law.

63. We also hold that continuation of disciplinary proceedings beyond the time stipulated by a tribunal/court could invite interdiction if no bona fide attempt is shown to have been made to seek an extension of time. However, much would depend on the facts of each case and it may not be possible to lay down a common formula applicable to each case. In an exceptional case, the tribunal/court would have the discretion to overlook the laxity and make such direction as it deems fit in the circumstances.

64. The answer to the fourth issue, in view of our discussion, has to be in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. Without an extension of time, no order of punishment could have been validly made and the grievance of the respondent in this behalf is absolutely legitimate."

22. Upon applicability of aforesaid judgment in the present facts and 11 WRIA No. 3506 of 2022 circumstances of the case, it being evident inquiry proceedings were neither concluded within time-frame stipulated nor was any application for extension ever filed, the inquiry proceedings therefore are vitiated on that account as well.

23. In view of discussion made here-in-above, the answer to question (b) is also in favour of petitioner.

24. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances and discussion, the impugned order dated 25.02.2022 being vitiated is hereby quashed by issuance of a Writ in the nature of Certiorari. Consequences to follow.

25. Resultantly, Writ-A No. 3506 of 2022 is allowed. Order on Writ-A No. 8231 of 2024

26. Heard Mr. Ajey Shanker Tewari, learned counsel for petitioner and Mr. Ashwani Kumar Singh Rathore, learned State Counsel for opposite parties.

27. Petition has been filed seeking a direction to opposite parties to consider petitioner's candidature for promotion to the post of Chief Engineer Level - I from the date when juniors were granted such promotion. Further prayer for a direction to opposite parties to declare petitioner entitled for all consequential benefits after his promotion on the post of Chief Engineer Level - I has also been sought.

28. In view of the fact that punishment order dated 25.02.2022 has already been quashed by this Court, opposite parties are directed to consider the aforesaid two claims of petitioner, expeditiously, within a period of eight weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is served upon the authorities concerned.

29. With the aforesaid direction(s), Writ-A No. 8231 of 2024 stands disposed of. December 9, 2025 lakshman (Manish Mathur,J.) LAKSHMANA KUMAR TAMMANA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench