High Court · 2025

Advocate – First, assisted by Sri Piyush Kumar Singh, the learned AGA for the State.

2. This is a belated revision filed against the judgment and order dated

18.06.2024 passed by the Sessions Judge, Court No. 1, Lakhimpur Kheri whereby the Additional Sessions Judge has allowed Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2023.

3. Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2023 was filed against a judgment and order dated 06.10.2023 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur Kheri in Complaint No. 6407 of 2009 which was filed with allegation that the respondents had made encroachment on certain lands forming a part of Dudhwa National Park, had constructed shops and houses thereon and were utilizing it since the year 1986. The trial court had held the respondent guilty of offences under Section 28 & 35 of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1973 and punished him with simple imprisonment for a period of one year and fine of Rs. 10,000/- In case of failure to pay fine, the respondent would have to undergo additional imprisonment of one year. The respondent has been convicted for the offence under section 26(1)(d) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- an to undergo additional imprisonment of five days in case of failure to pay fine.

4. Three criminal appeals No. 53 of2023, 56 of 2023 and 57 of 2023 have been decided by a common judgment dated 18.06.2024 and the revisionist has challenged the judgment dated 18.06.2024 only in so far as it decides Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2023 and no revision has been filed against Criminal Appeals No. 56 of 2023 and 57 of 2023.

5. The appellate court came to conclusion that the trial court had held the respondent guilty without proper scrutiny of the evidence and, therefore, the judgment dated 06.10.2023 is not sustainable in law.

6. The appellate court held that the prosecution could not produce any documentary evidence to establish that the respondent has encroached upon the land of the Forest Department. No record was produced mentioning khasra number or gata number of the land in dispute. No report of revenue department was produced. The site plan also does not mention as to which of the accused person had taken possession of which portion of the land. Even this has not been mentioned as to on which gata number shops are constructed and on which gata number house is constructed. No notice issued by the Forest Department for vacating the land in question has been brought on record. PW4 has stated during his cross-examination that he remained posted as Forest Range Officer in Dudhwa Forest for the period of two months and during this period he did not give any notice to the respondent and he did not ask him to vacate the land. The witness said that he did not know as to how many shops are constructed and how many houses are constructed and as to who had constructed the shops and houses. He had not made any inspection of the land in question.

7. In view of the aforesaid facts, the appellate court court came to a conclusion that the trial court has held the respondent guilty without proper appreciation of evidence and accordingly the appellate court set aside the order passed by the trial court.

8. The revision has been filed with a delay of 209 days.

9. In the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, it has been stated that no undue delay has been caused in filing the application. Whatsoever delay has been caused, the same is due to Corona Pandemic and other government works which deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice.

10. The affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay mentions administrative actions as the cause for delay in filing the revision. It is stated in the affidavit that an application for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment dated 18.06.2024 was moved on 16.07.2024. The information of preparation of the certified copy was put up on the notice baoard on 19.07.2024, but the copy was received on 28.07.2024. The Government granted sanction for filing the revision on 17.09.2024. After preparation, the revision was filed on 16.04.2025, i.e. after seven months.

11. The aforesaid averment made in the application for condonation of delay is patently false as the country became free from Corona Pandemic long ago. The reasons mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay also do not give any explanation for the delay of seven months from 17.09.2024 to

16.04.2025.

12. In Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer: (2013) 14 SCC 81, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the principles of law relating to condonation of delay by stating that: - “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

13.The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn.[(2005) 7 SCC 510], Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225]. 15.The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (Emphasis added)

13. In Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (2013) 12 SCC 649, the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed the law regarding condonation of delay as explained in various precedents and summarized the same as follows: “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”

14. In Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India: (2023) 10 SCC 531, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: - (Emphasis added) “30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial. 31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An “explanation” is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an “explanation” from an “excuse”. Although people tend to see “explanation” and “excuse” as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. 32. An “excuse” is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an “excuse” would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.” (Emphasis added) 15. The reason stated in the application for condonation of delay, that it occurred due to corona pandemic, is a patently false excuse. The reasons mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay also do not give any explanation for the delay of seven months from 17.09.2024 to 16.04.2025. Therefore, the application for condonation of delay is rejected without issuing notice to the opposite party.

16. Consequent to rejection of the application for condonation of delay, let the belated revision be consigned to records. Order Date: 21.04.2025 Pradeep/- (Subhash Vidyarthi J) PRADEEP SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Advocate – First, assisted by Sri Piyush Kumar Singh, the learned AGA for the State.

2. This is a belated revision filed against the judgment and order dated

18.06.2024 passed by the Sessions Judge, Court No. 1, Lakhimpur Kheri whereby the Additional Sessions Judge has allowed Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2023.

3. Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2023 was filed against a judgment and order dated 06.10.2023 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur Kheri in Complaint No. 6407 of 2009 which was filed with allegation that the respondents had made encroachment on certain lands forming a part of Dudhwa National Park, had constructed shops and houses thereon and were utilizing it since the year 1986. The trial court had held the respondent guilty of offences under Section 28 & 35 of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1973 and punished him with simple imprisonment for a period of one year and fine of Rs. 10,000/- In case of failure to pay fine, the respondent would have to undergo additional imprisonment of one year. The respondent has been convicted for the offence under section 26(1)(d) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- an to undergo additional imprisonment of five days in case of failure to pay fine.

4. Three criminal appeals No. 53 of2023, 56 of 2023 and 57 of 2023 have been decided by a common judgment dated 18.06.2024 and the revisionist has challenged the judgment dated 18.06.2024 only in so far as it decides Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2023 and no revision has been filed against Criminal Appeals No. 56 of 2023 and 57 of 2023.

5. The appellate court came to conclusion that the trial court had held the respondent guilty without proper scrutiny of the evidence and, therefore, the judgment dated 06.10.2023 is not sustainable in law.

6. The appellate court held that the prosecution could not produce any documentary evidence to establish that the respondent has encroached upon the land of the Forest Department. No record was produced mentioning khasra number or gata number of the land in dispute. No report of revenue department was produced. The site plan also does not mention as to which of the accused person had taken possession of which portion of the land. Even this has not been mentioned as to on which gata number shops are constructed and on which gata number house is constructed. No notice issued by the Forest Department for vacating the land in question has been brought on record. PW4 has stated during his cross-examination that he remained posted as Forest Range Officer in Dudhwa Forest for the period of two months and during this period he did not give any notice to the respondent and he did not ask him to vacate the land. The witness said that he did not know as to how many shops are constructed and how many houses are constructed and as to who had constructed the shops and houses. He had not made any inspection of the land in question.

7. In view of the aforesaid facts, the appellate court court came to a conclusion that the trial court has held the respondent guilty without proper appreciation of evidence and accordingly the appellate court set aside the order passed by the trial court.

8. The revision has been filed with a delay of 209 days.

9. In the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, it has been stated that no undue delay has been caused in filing the application. Whatsoever delay has been caused, the same is due to Corona Pandemic and other government works which deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice.

10. The affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay mentions administrative actions as the cause for delay in filing the revision. It is stated in the affidavit that an application for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment dated 18.06.2024 was moved on 16.07.2024. The information of preparation of the certified copy was put up on the notice baoard on 19.07.2024, but the copy was received on 28.07.2024. The Government granted sanction for filing the revision on 17.09.2024. After preparation, the revision was filed on 16.04.2025, i.e. after seven months.

11. The aforesaid averment made in the application for condonation of delay is patently false as the country became free from Corona Pandemic long ago. The reasons mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay also do not give any explanation for the delay of seven months from 17.09.2024 to

16.04.2025.

12. In Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer: (2013) 14 SCC 81, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the principles of law relating to condonation of delay by stating that: - “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

13.The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn.[(2005) 7 SCC 510], Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225]. 15.The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (Emphasis added)

13. In Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (2013) 12 SCC 649, the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed the law regarding condonation of delay as explained in various precedents and summarized the same as follows: “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”

14. In Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India: (2023) 10 SCC 531, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: - (Emphasis added) “30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial. 31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An “explanation” is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an “explanation” from an “excuse”. Although people tend to see “explanation” and “excuse” as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. 32. An “excuse” is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an “excuse” would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.” (Emphasis added) 15. The reason stated in the application for condonation of delay, that it occurred due to corona pandemic, is a patently false excuse. The reasons mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay also do not give any explanation for the delay of seven months from 17.09.2024 to 16.04.2025. Therefore, the application for condonation of delay is rejected without issuing notice to the opposite party.

16. Consequent to rejection of the application for condonation of delay, let the belated revision be consigned to records. Order Date: 21.04.2025 Pradeep/- (Subhash Vidyarthi J) PRADEEP SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench