Ghanshyam … v. … on 15 Nov 2025

Judgment

1. Heard Sri Atul Kumar Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri P.K. Sinha, learned counsel for U.P. State Sugar Corporation.

2. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the dismissal order dated

23.01.1999, passed by the General Manager of U.P. Sugar Corporation Ltd., Amroha Unit. The Amroha Unit of U.P. Sugar Corporation Ltd. was purchased by Wave 2 Writ A No.753 of 1999 Industries Private Limited through a sale deed dated

04.10.2010 executed during the pendency of the present writ petition. A copy of the said sale deed is annexed with the amendment application filed on behalf of Wave Industries Private Limited, which has been impleaded as respondent no. 3 in this writ petition by an order dated

24.08.2012.

3. Though the said impleadment application was allowed way back in July, 2012 and the amendment was allowed vide order dated 24.08.2012 and the same was duly incorporated in the memo of the writ petition, till date, Wave Industries Private Limited has not filed any counter affidavit in response to the averments made in the writ petition. In paragraph 3 of the impleadment application, it has been specifically stated that Wave Industries Private Limited has taken over all the liabilities of pending matters in which the U.P. Sugar Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Corporation”) is a party. However, a counter affidavit on behalf of respondent nos.1 and 2 was already filed in May 1999, giving a para- wise reply to the averments made in the writ petition. In response, the petitioner also filed a rejoinder affidavit.

When the case was taken up for hearing, Sri Atul Kumar Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri P.K. Sinha, learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 and 2, were present. However, none appeared on behalf of Wave Industries Private Limited, though the name of Sri Gaurav Gunjan, Advocate, was shown in the cause list. No request for adjournment was made on his behalf; accordingly, as this is an old matter of 1999, the writ 3 Writ A No.753 of 1999 petition was heard to be decided finally on the basis of pleadings on record and the arguments advanced by the counsels for the parties present during the course of hearing.

5. The facts emerging out of the pleadings of the writ petition indicate that the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of ‘Helper’ in the Amroha Unit of the Corporation on 04.03.1982. He was subsequently engaged on a seasonal basis as ‘Waterman’ for Boiler with effect from 01.03.1988 and was finally promoted to the post of ‘Instrument Mechanic’ on 01.02.1997.

6. The petitioner was suspended vide order dated

18.12.1998 on the charges mentioned therein, which included a specific allegation that on 15.12.1998, when the petitioner was on duty, at about 2:45 P.M., the Cane Carrier Dyno Drive Motor got burnt, due to which the factory came to a halt. After changing the Carrier Dyno Drive Motor when efforts were made to restart the factory again at about 4:00 P.M., it was found that the temperature of Lipi Boiler No.2 started rising unexpectedly and the coil of the super heater became red hot. The boiler was therefore immediately stopped.

7. At that point of time, upon inspection, it was found that 7 waffels at the top and 5 waffels at the bottom stood broken and 100 boiler tubes were leaked. On examining the graph of the feed water level, it transpired that at about 2:00 P.M., the water level in Lipi Boiler No.2 had reduced to a very low level, resulting in hammering in boiler, due to which the waffels broke and 4 Writ A No.753 of 1999 the boiler tubes leaked. It was also found on examination of graph of drum (indicating the water level) that between 2:00 P.M. and 2:45 P.M. there was no indication of water level in graph which points out that the petitioner either purposely damaged the instrument or manipulated graph so that the correct facts could not be ascertained so as to conceal the cause of accident with the aid of Boiler Attendant and Waterman.

8. It was alleged in the order dated 18.12.1998 that the petitioner was assigned duty at the relevant time and place where the accident took place at 2:45 P.M. on

15.12.1998, but due to his negligence and carelessness, the incident occurred, causing heavy loss to the factory unit. The petitioner was also required to give his reply to the show cause notice for the charges levelled against him, to which he replied vide letter dated 24.12.1998. The reply of the petitioner was not found satisfactory, hence a decision was taken to conduct a departmental inquiry and a letter dated 26.12.1998 was issued appointing Sri U.S. Upadhyay, Chief Chemist, as Inquiry Officer and Sri D.K. Tyagi as the representative of the Board of Directors.

9. The Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry and submitted his report vide letter dated 09.01.1999. In the inquiry proceedings, the petitioner appeared before the Inquiry Officer on 30.12.1998 as well as on 02.01.1999, along with the representative of the Union, namely Jaikiran Singh and Sri Valabh Krishna and in his support produced witnesses Sri Samar Pal Singh and Sri Lakshmi 5 Writ A No.753 of 1999 Narayan, who were also posted along with the petitioner in the factory as Boiler Attendant and Waterman.

10. The Inquiry Officer, after giving petitioner opportunity of hearing and recording statements of witnesses produced by both sides, found the charges proved against the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer specifically dealt with the petitioner’s contention that he had informed the Chief Engineer regarding the defect in the reading meter in the morning itself before two of his witnesses; the Chief Engineer, however, on his examination refuted this and stated that the defect was informed only after the accident at 4:00 P.M. The Service Engineer of A.B.S. Calcutta, Sri Arvind Shah, was also produced by the petitioner in support of his defence. In his statement, he admitted that he was a service engineer working with A.B.S. Instruments and had been called for servicing the boiler instruments and related machinery. He stated that the instrument was working perfectly but the relay orifice was choked, due to which the output was not displaying properly. He also stated that even if the Drum Level Indicator got damaged, the Waterman was still required to monitor the gauge glass manually; hence, the malfunction of the indicator had no bearing on the control of the water flow in the boiler.

11. The main thrust of the defence of the petitioner was that he had informed the Chief Engineer, in the presence of Sri Samar Pal and Sri Lakshmi Narayan, at 8:30 A.M. on the same day, regarding non-functioning of the drum level indicator, but no attention was paid to his complaint. He argued that it was the Chief Engineer who 6 Writ A No.753 of 1999 should have taken necessary steps and therefore the petitioner could not be held responsible for the accident that took place on 15.12.1998.

12. The Inquiry Officer, after considering all relevant material and witness statements, submitted enquiry report dated 9.1.1999 in which the petitioner was held responsible for the accident dated 15.12.1998 and the charge was found to be proved as levelled against him in the charge-sheet dated 18.12.1998 by which the petitioner was also suspended. The Inquiry Officer concluded that since at 2:00 P.M. the drum level indicator was working and clearly showed that the water level is very low and as such the petitioner should have immediately informed about it to the Chief Engineer and other officials, but he failed to do so. This gross negligence resulted in the accident. The factory remained closed from 15.12.1998 to 21.12.1998, causing heavy loss to the unit in crushing season.

13. The petitioner was thereafter issued show cause notices dated 10.01.1999 and 11.01.1999, calling upon him to appear before the disciplinary authority for personal hearing and to show cause in reference to the charges proved in the inquiry report dated 09.01.1999. The petitioner failed to respond, whereupon further letters dated 12.01.1999, 13.01.1999 and 14.01.1999 were issued to his residence, but the petitioner was not available and his family informed that he had gone elsewhere. The disciplinary authority thereafter issued a letter dated 15.01.1999, along with the inquiry report dated 09.01.1999, giving petitioner a final opportunity to 7 Writ A No.753 of 1999 appear before him on 16.01.1999 at 11:00 A.M. The notice was pasted on the residence of the petitioner in the presence of Security Guard, Chandra Pal, but petitioner again failed to appear. Meanwhile, a letter seeking medical leave from 09.01.1999 to 17.01.1999 was received from the petitioner. The disciplinary authority, noting that the petitioner was attempting to delay the proceedings, published a public notice in the Hindi newspaper Amar Ujala, calling upon him to appear on 21.01.1999 at 11:00 A.M. In response, petitioner appeared on that date and requested four to five days additional time to file his reply. Since, the petitioner had earlier been directed to personally appear before the Medical Officer of the factory for medical examination to ascertain whether his claim of illness was genuine, but he failed to do so, the Disciplinary Authority declined to grant any further time and directed him to submit his reply after perusing the records. In compliance, petitioner submitted his written reply on the same date, i.e.,

21.01.1999, stating that the graph of 12.12.1998 correctly reflected the position, whereas the graphs of

14.12.1998 and 15.12.1998 were defective and that the decision should be taken keeping in view the aforesaid factual position. After considering the entire material facts and circumstances, the disciplinary authority held that the charges levelled against the petitioner in the charge-sheet dated 18.12.1998 stand proved and accordingly passed the order dated 23.01.1999 terminating his services. 8 Writ A No.753 of 1999

14. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant writ petition. In the present writ petition, an order dated

26.02.1999 was passed by the Court, calling for a counter affidavit and directing that the petitioner’s representation against the dismissal order dated

23.01.1999 be decided. In compliance of the same, the petitioner’s representation dated 11.03.1999 was treated as an appeal and decided by the Managing Director of the Corporation vide order dated 24.04.1999.

15. Before passing the order dated 24.04.1999, the Managing Director called for para-wise comments from the Amroha Unit and after considering the fact that the petitioner failure to point out that the water level in the boiler had dropped to low level at about 2:00 P.M. on

15.12.1998, held that the petitioner’s negligence had caused the accident. Accordingly, the appeal was rejected. The said appellate order was challenged by the petitioner through an amendment application, which was allowed by the Court vide order dated 24.08.2012.

16. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the inquiry proceedings were defective, inasmuch as no separate charge-sheet was given to the petitioner and hence the charges levelled against the petitioner are vague. It was also contended that neither the Inquiry Officer nor the disciplinary authority properly considered the defence of the petitioner as the statements of his witnesses were not duly evaluated. Further, the allegations not alleged in the order dated 18.12.1998 were also taken into consideration while terminating the petitioner from service. It was also argued that the 9 Writ A No.753 of 1999 petitioner had been discriminated as no action was taken against the Boiler Attendant and Waterman who were equally responsible for the accident occurred on

15.12.1998. Lastly, it was submitted that the appellate order was a non-speaking order as it contained no discussion with regard to the grounds stated by the petitioner in his representation / appeal.

17. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contentions has relied upon the judgment of this Court passed in the case of P.N. Srivastava vs. State of U.P. : 1999 (17) LCD-24 and Sri Nath Upadhya vs. State of U.P. : 1996 (14) LCD-25 as well as judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in cases of State of U.P. and Others vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha : (2010) 2 SCC 772, Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and others : (2009) 2 SCC 570, Union of India & others Versus Gyan Chandra Chattar: (2009) 2 SCC 570. The aforesaid judgments referred by the petitioner relates to procedural aspect of disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner also referred to the judgment in the case of Chandra Kumar Chopra Versus Union of India & others: (2012) 6 SCC 369 & V. Ramanna Versus A.P.S.R.T.C. : (2005) 7 SCC 338 to argue that the punishment imposed by disciplinary authority is disproportionate.

18. Sri P.K. Sinha, learned counsel for respondent nos.1 and 2, on the other hand, contended that the Standing Orders governing the conditions of employment of workmen in vacuum pan sugar factories in Uttar Pradesh apply to employees of the Amroha Unit of the Corporation. He referred to Clause ‘M’ of the Standing 10 Writ A No.753 of 1999 Orders, notified vide Notification No.5692(III)/XXXV12- 110(III)-77 dated Lucknow, September 27, 1988, which prescribes the procedure for suspension or dismissal for misconduct pending inquiry into alleged misconduct and acts or omissions constituting misconduct.

19. Sub-clause (1) of Clause ‘M’ defines acts or omissions constituting misconduct, while sub-clause (2) provides for dismissal of any workman found guilty of misconduct by the Manager or Management after proper enquiry. Sub-clauses (3), (4) & (5) of Clause ‘M’ read as under:

3. The order of suspension pending enquiry shall be in writing and may take effect immediately on communication thereof to the workman concluded. Such order shall set out in detail the alleged misconduct and the workman shall be an opportunity of explaining the change levelled against him. If on an enquiry, a workman is found guilty of the charge levelled against him, he shall be made payment for the suspension period as per clause M-12 provided he has not been dismissed.

4. No order of dismissal or suspension or withholding of increment shall be made unless the workman concerned is informed of the alleged misconduct and is given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him and a proper enquiry has been made by the manager or any other officer of the factory authorised by him. The workman concerned may require an officer of the union/Federation to represent his case in such enquiry. 11 Writ A No.753 of 1999

5. In awarding punishment under this standing order, the Manager shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct and the previous record, if any, of the workman and any other extenuating or aggrevating circumstances that may exist.

20. On the basis of the aforesaid provisions, learned counsel for respondent nos.1 and 2 contended that the Standing Orders do not require issuance of a separate charge-sheet, rather the charges have to be specifically indicated in the suspension order itself. As per sub-clause (4), a workman may be dismissed after a proper inquiry after being given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him. It was therefore contended that the inquiry proceedings against the petitioner were held in accordance with law and there is no infirmity or illegality in the inquiry proceedings.

21. Before adverting to the arguments that have been raised by the parties as indicated hereinabove, it would be proper to analyse the scope of writ jurisdiction while dealing with the issues relating to the disciplinary proceedings.

22. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao : AIR 1963 SC 1723, a three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental inquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the inquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. 12 Writ A No.753 of 1999

23. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80, a three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence.

24. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil : (2000) 1 SCC 416, Supreme Court held that interference with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

25. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya : (2011) 4 SCC 584, Supreme Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental Inquiries. 13 Writ A No.753 of 1999

26. In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran : (2015) 2 SCC 610, Supreme Court held that while re-appreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings : (SCC p. 617, para 13) “13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”

27. In view of the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as discussed hereinabove, and after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case in hand and the rival submissions of the parties this Court is of view that there is no infirmity or illegality in the procedural aspect of the disciplinary proceedings conducted against the petitioner, 14 Writ A No.753 of 1999 inasmuch as adequate opportunity was afforded to him by the Inquiry Officer. The statements of witnesses produced by the petitioner, as well as those produced by the Management, were duly examined and it cannot be said that the Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry in violation of the principles of natural justice or without following the due procedure of law.

28. The Standing Order itself provide that specific charges shall be mentioned in the suspension order and therefore, the contention of the petitioner that no separate charge-sheet was issued and that the charges were vague is misconceived. The charges mentioned in the suspension order were specific and clear, particularly the allegation that the petitioner is responsible for the accident that happened on 15.12.1998 resulting in factory to be closed down for seven days. A bare perusal of the letter dated 18.12.1998 reveals that it is a composite order containing charge as well as suspension of the petitioner and the contents indicate that it is charge-sheet calling upon the petitioner to submit reply within 48 hours of the receiving of the order. Thus, the claim of the petitioner that the disciplinary proceeding has been conducted without any charge-sheet is factually incorrect.

29. During the inquiry proceedings, it was conclusively established that the drum level indicator was functioning at 02:00 P.M. on 15.12.1998, and its graph showed that the water level in the drum of Boiler No. 2 was very low. At that time, the drum level indicator was working properly. The Instrument Service Engineer, 15 Writ A No.753 of 1999 produced as a defence witness by the petitioner, also stated that even if the drum level indicator was damaged, it was required to monitor the gauge glass manually and the petitioner being Instrument Mechanic, if would have been vigilant, more so when he was aware of the fact that drum level indicator is not working properly as per his own version before the enquiry officer, then the accident that occurred on 15.12.1998 at 02:45 P.M. could have been avoided. As per the statement of the Service Engineer in enquiry proceedings, in case of non-working of the Drum Level Indicator, if the gauge glass would have been monitored manually; then also the accident could have been averted as the malfunction of the indicator had no bearing on the control of the water flow in the boiler. Thus, the petitioner contention that he is not responsible for the accident that happened on

15.12.1998 cannot be appreciated and accepted.

30. The plea of discrimination raised by the petitioner in this writ petition is also untenable. The petitioner, being an Instrument Mechanic, was senior officer to the Boiler Attendant and Waterman, who were his subordinates. Therefore, the plea of discrimination is also misconceived. In this regard, it is worth to mention the case of State of U.P. v. Rajit Singh, (2022) 15 SCC 254, in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the ‘Doctrine of Equality’ could not be applied in case charges are found to be proved against the delinquent employee as the role of each individual officer even with respect to the same misconduct is required to be considered in the 16 Writ A No.753 of 1999 light of their duties of office. Paragraph no.10 of the said judgment is reproduced herein below:-

10. Now, so far as the quashing and setting aside the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority applying the doctrine of equality on the ground that other officers involved in the incident have been exonerated and/or no action has been taken against them, is concerned, we are of the firm view that on the aforesaid ground, the order of punishment could not have been set aside by the Tribunal and the High Court. The doctrine of equality ought not to have been applied when the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority held the charges proved against the delinquent officer. The role of each individual officer even with respect to the same misconduct is required to be considered in light of their duties of office. Even otherwise, merely because some other officers involved in the incident are exonerated and/or no action is taken against other officers cannot be a ground to set aside the order of punishment when the charges against the individual concerned — delinquent officer are held to be proved in a departmental enquiry. There cannot be any claim of negative equality in such cases. Therefore, both the Tribunal as well as the High Court have committed a grave error in quashing and setting aside the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority by applying the doctrine of equality.

31. The petitioner, being an Instrument Mechanic, was responsible to monitor and keep watch over the functioning of the drum level indicator and the water level in the drum of Boiler No.2. His failure to do so amounts to negligence and carelessness, which resulted in the 17 Writ A No.753 of 1999 accident of 15.12.1998 at 02:45 P.M., causing the factory to remain closed for about seven days during the crushing season. No action against ‘Waterman’ and ‘Boiler Attendant’ cannot be a ground to absolve petitioner for his misconduct which stood proved in disciplinary proceedings.

32. The case laws referred to by the petitioner in support of his arguments are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case as in the case of P.N. Srivastava (Supra), the issue pertained to continuation of disciplinary proceedings even after lapse of the period prescribed under the statutory rules or by the Supreme Court or High Court, which is not the issue involved in the present case. In the instant case, the disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with the due procedure of law, after providing petitioner adequate opportunity of hearing by fixing date and time and after due examination of the witnesses produced by him.

33. The other judgments relied upon by the petitioner, namely State of U.P. and Others vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha: (2010) 2 SCC 772, Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and others: (2009) 2 SCC 570, Union of India & others Versus Gyan Chandra Chattar: (2009) 2 SCC 570 & Sri Nath Upadhya vs. State of U.P. : 1996 (14) LCD-25 relate to the manner in which disciplinary proceedings are to be conducted. This court is of the view that there is no dispute regarding the procedure and manner to be followed for holding disciplinary proceedings as referred in the judgments 18 Writ A No.753 of 1999 above. However, the Court on due consideration of entire facts and circumstances of the present case finds that the Inquiry Officer conducted the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with the provisions contained in the Standing Orders and it cannot be said that there was any error or procedural irregularity in the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer, during the course of the inquiry proceedings, afforded ample opportunity to the petitioner to defend his case. The witnesses produced by the petitioner were duly examined and their statements were recorded on the date fixed for personal appearance. Thus, it cannot be said that there was any flaw in the inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer. The Disciplinary Authority, while passing the dismissal order dated 23.01.1999, thoroughly deliberated upon each and every aspect of the case and passed a reasoned and speaking order. The Appellate Authority also after seeking comments from the Chief Manager of Amroha Unit on the pleas raised by the petitioner in his representation and after taking into consideration all the relevant material facts recorded his satisfaction over the action taken against the petitioner in disciplinary proceedings. In this regard, judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Harendra Kumar, (2004) 13 SCC 117, is worth mentioning. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the said judgment are reproduced herein below:

6. We must notice that the respondent did not challenge the findings of the Tribunal, it was only the appellants who questioned the validity and correctness of the order of the Tribunal. The only contention that survives 19 Writ A No.753 of 1999 for our consideration is: whether the disciplinary authority did not apply its mind in considering the case of the respondent while passing the order of dismissal. We think it is appropriate to extract the relevant portion of the order of dismissal which reads: “That while you were posted as constable a report was received by me about your having had consumed liquor and abused Constable Driver Omparkash Pall while you were on terrorist duty in Kasimpur Garhi PS Afzalgarh, District Bijnor and hence indiscipline. I had thereon ordered a preliminary inquiry on 15-3-1994 and the same was conducted by one Shri Girish Chandra Dhyani, Dal Nayak. Shri Girish Chandra Dhyani had submitted a report in this context on 2-4-1994 wherein you were found guilty in the above incident and departmental action against you was recommended under Rule 14(1) of the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991. As I found myself agreeing with the above report, the departmental action against you was decided to be taken by Shri Ram Bodh, Assistant Commandant on 9-5- 1994. The departmental proceedings against you were held by Shri Ram Bodh under the provision of Rule 14(1) of the above rules while rendering you reasonable opportunity to defend yourself. In his report submitted on 27-7-1994 he recommended your dismissal from service as the charges were fully established. After receiving the above conclusions I closely studied the entire case and I found myself in consent with the inference dated 27-7-1994 of Shri Ram Bodh, Assistant Commandant, 20 Writ A No.753 of 1999 47th Battalion, PAC. I issued a show- cause notice to you on 8-8-1994 wherein it was clearly mentioned that you were required to submit your reply within 8 days of show-cause notice's receipt otherwise it shall be presumed that you have nothing to offer in defence and it was also clarified that in case your reply is received within the prescribed time then the final decision will be taken considering your only after explanation sympathetically. * * * After you returned from leave you did not file any explanation till date. When your statement was being recorded you were specifically asked as to if you have to say anything in reply to the show-cause notice but you had refused to.”

7. It is clear from the portion of the order extracted above that there has been proper application of mind by the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has also stated in the order that after receiving the conclusions from the enquiry officer he closely studied the entire case and found himself in agreement with the report of the enquiry officer. It is clear from the same order that a show-cause notice was given to the respondent to make any written submission by way of explanation.

34. The Supreme Court in the case of Harendra Kumar (supra) above held that the disciplinary authority after receiving the conclusions from the inquiry officer, closely studied the entire case and found himself in agreement with the report of the inquiry officer which is indicative of proper application of mind. In the present case, the Appellate Authority recorded its satisfaction 21 Writ A No.753 of 1999 after examining the entire record of the case. As such, it cannot be said that the Appellate Authority passed the appellate order dated 24.04.1999 without application of mind. In the opinion of this Court, the appellate order dated 24.04.1999 passed by the Managing Director of the Corporation is in accordance with law and suffers from no infirmity or illegality.

35. The reliance placed by the counsel for petitioner on judgments in the case of Chandra Kumar Chopra Versus Union of India & others: (2012) 6 SCC 369 & V. Ramanna Versus A.P.S.R.T.C. : (2005) 7 SCC 338 with regard to disproportionate punishment is also misconceived. The charges were grave enough as the consequence of misconduct was closure of the factory for seven days in crushing season and as such the decision by the disciplinary authority to terminate the services of petitioner cannot be faulted upon as award of punishment falls in realm and domain of the disciplinary authority.

36. Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of merit is dismissed. No order as to cost. November 15, 2025 Ashish Dewal (Amitabh Kumar Rai, J) ASHISH DEWAL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench