A.F.R. 4th Battalion Sashastra Seema Bal Having Office Mohanlalganj Lko Thru. Commandant v. State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Distt. Magistrate

10. It is further informed by learned counsel for the respondents that 3 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 the enhanced amount of compensation has still not been paid by the appellant and the entire endeavour of filing of the instant appeals is just to hold the entire enhanced compensation. Analysis and conclusions:

11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

12. There is a delay of 242 days in filing the instant appeal.

13. Before proceeding with the matter, the Court would delve into the relevant provisions of the Act. The provision of Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is as follows: "74. Appeal to High Court.(1) The Requiring Body or any person aggrieved by the Award passed by an Authority under section 69 may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of Award: Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. (2) Every appeal referred to under sub-section (1) shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of such appeal within six months from the date on which the appeal is presented to the High Court. Explanation. For the purposes of this section, "High Court" means the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the land acquired or proposed to be acquired is situated."

14. The proviso of Section 74 of the Act, 2013 is clear that an appeal may be filed within sixty days and thereafter the delay of further sixty days can be condoned if the High Court is satisfied with the reason given for the delay.

15. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of CCE & Customs v. 4 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 Hongo India (P) Ltd., (2009) 5 SCC 791 : (2009) 315 ITR 449 : (2010) 2 GSTR 305 : (2009) 24 VST 298 : 2009 SCC OnLine SC 647 at page 802 has stated that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent. The relevant extract of the judgement is quoted herein-below: "36. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 35-H(1) to make a reference to the High Court is absolute and unextendable by a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well-settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act." (emphasis added)

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, had held that the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. It is the duty of the court to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, procrastination is the greatest thief of time and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

17. Further this Court has to see the sufficient 'explanation' for condonation of delay and not the 'excuses' for condoning the delay as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Others Vs. Union of India and Another; (2023) 10 SCC 531. The relevant paragraphs 31 and 32 are extracted here-in-below:- "

31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being 5 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.

32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication." (emphasis added).

18. Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654, wherein the appellant- State was seeking a condonation of delay of 663 days. The Hon'ble Supreme Court sternly noted that it will not let the courts to be forums wherein the Government can walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the period of limitation, and buttress reliance on cases 6 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 wherein it allowed condonation, employing its discretionary powers, on merits or modalities of peculiarities of those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [...] ***

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible." (Emphasis added)

19. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Another V. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy(D) Through His Lr; Civil Appeal No. of 2024 (arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 21096 of 2019); 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 has held as under :- "27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ?Sword of Damocles? hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this 7 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 case." (emphasis added)

20. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board; MANU/SC/1262/2025, categorically stated that the State or its instrumentality cannot claim special treatment or preferrential handling in litigation. The State must be treated equally with private litigants and follow the same rules and regulations. The delay by the State must not be condoned unless justified, promoting accountability and diligence in public litigation. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "

189. This was followed by Indian Oil Corpn (supra) wherein this Court sowed the seeds for the shift in approach of the courts in matters where condonation of delay was sought by the State or its instrumentalities, inasmuch as it held that the Government and its various functionaries cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than any ordinary litigants, and held that the pragmatic and justice-oriented approach of the courts should be confined only to cases where there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction on part of the State. ***

210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a significant shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence to the State, premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia, the law has now evolved to insist upon parity between the government and private litigants. The rationale is that public interest is better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation. FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 8 ***

249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within administration." (emphasis added)

21. In conclusion, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs (supra) held that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close judgment, we deem appropriate to make it abundantly administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to 9 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 such callous attitude of State authorities or instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.

263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law." (emphasis added)

22. The appellant being a department is equipped with a dedicated legal set-up, trained law officers, and panel advocates who are fully conversant with statutory requirements, procedural steps and limitation periods applicable to such claim petitions. Such an entity is expected to act with due diligence and within the time prescribed by law. Internal administrative procedures, movement of files, or 10 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 departmental processing cannot constitute "sufficient cause" for delay.

23. Institutional inefficiency, red-tapism, or routine procedural delays are not valid grounds for condonation of delay. Accordingly, when any department fails to act within limitation despite having adequate infrastructure and professional legal assistance, the plea of departmental delay does not justify condonation. The burden lies heavily on such institutional or departmental litigants to show bonafide and unavoidable circumstances otherwise delay cannot be condoned.

24. Considering the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgements passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, the delay can only be condoned if sufficient ground is shown for condonation of delay. However, the appellant has failed to show any sufficient cause for condonation of such a long delay.

25. The appellant while filing the instant appeals has miserably failed to disclose sufficient cause. The appellant being the department has proper machinery to deal with court cases, therefore, the grounds shown by the appellant are nothing but seems to be a concocted story, only to get the delay condoned in the matter of such claims.

26. In the matter of CCE & Customs (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the court has to respect the legislative intent and the same is duty of the court. Here the time limit prescribed in the Statute is absolute and the court cannot extend the further period when there is no sufficient ground except an excuse. On interpreting the above provision, this Court is also required to consider whether sufficient grounds exist to condone the delay even for further sixty days. Here, this Court is not satisfied with the reasons/excuses given by the appellant i.e. 4th Battalion, Sashastra Seema Bal, Lucknow through its Commandant, who has adequate departmental machinery to handle court cases.

27. Further the provision of Section 74 of the Act, 2013 clearly lays down that an appeal has to be filed within 60 days and the court may 11 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 condone the delay of further period of sixty days, if sufficient cause for filing the appeal with delay is made out. However, the Statute is very clear that the power to condone the delay with High Court is only upto sixty days beyond the period of limitation, but in these appeals, all the appeals have been filed beyond sixty days. Hence the delay in these appeals cannot be condoned. Therefore, the applications for condonation of delay filed in all the appeals are sans merit and are liable to be rejected.

28. Accordingly, the aforesaid application for condonation of delay is rejected.

29. In view of the above, the instant appeal suffer from delay and laches and consequently, the appeal is dismissed. December 10, 2025 Arjun/- (Prashant Kumar,J.) ARJUN PRASAD High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

10. It is further informed by learned counsel for the respondents that 3 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 the enhanced amount of compensation has still not been paid by the appellant and the entire endeavour of filing of the instant appeals is just to hold the entire enhanced compensation. Analysis and conclusions:

11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

12. There is a delay of 242 days in filing the instant appeal.

13. Before proceeding with the matter, the Court would delve into the relevant provisions of the Act. The provision of Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is as follows: "74. Appeal to High Court.(1) The Requiring Body or any person aggrieved by the Award passed by an Authority under section 69 may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of Award: Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. (2) Every appeal referred to under sub-section (1) shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of such appeal within six months from the date on which the appeal is presented to the High Court. Explanation. For the purposes of this section, "High Court" means the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the land acquired or proposed to be acquired is situated."

14. The proviso of Section 74 of the Act, 2013 is clear that an appeal may be filed within sixty days and thereafter the delay of further sixty days can be condoned if the High Court is satisfied with the reason given for the delay.

15. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of CCE & Customs v. 4 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 Hongo India (P) Ltd., (2009) 5 SCC 791 : (2009) 315 ITR 449 : (2010) 2 GSTR 305 : (2009) 24 VST 298 : 2009 SCC OnLine SC 647 at page 802 has stated that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent. The relevant extract of the judgement is quoted herein-below: "36. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 35-H(1) to make a reference to the High Court is absolute and unextendable by a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well-settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act." (emphasis added)

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, had held that the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. It is the duty of the court to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, procrastination is the greatest thief of time and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

17. Further this Court has to see the sufficient 'explanation' for condonation of delay and not the 'excuses' for condoning the delay as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Others Vs. Union of India and Another; (2023) 10 SCC 531. The relevant paragraphs 31 and 32 are extracted here-in-below:- "

31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being 5 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.

32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication." (emphasis added).

18. Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654, wherein the appellant- State was seeking a condonation of delay of 663 days. The Hon'ble Supreme Court sternly noted that it will not let the courts to be forums wherein the Government can walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the period of limitation, and buttress reliance on cases 6 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 wherein it allowed condonation, employing its discretionary powers, on merits or modalities of peculiarities of those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [...] ***

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible." (Emphasis added)

19. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Another V. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy(D) Through His Lr; Civil Appeal No. of 2024 (arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 21096 of 2019); 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 has held as under :- "27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ?Sword of Damocles? hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this 7 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 case." (emphasis added)

20. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board; MANU/SC/1262/2025, categorically stated that the State or its instrumentality cannot claim special treatment or preferrential handling in litigation. The State must be treated equally with private litigants and follow the same rules and regulations. The delay by the State must not be condoned unless justified, promoting accountability and diligence in public litigation. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "

189. This was followed by Indian Oil Corpn (supra) wherein this Court sowed the seeds for the shift in approach of the courts in matters where condonation of delay was sought by the State or its instrumentalities, inasmuch as it held that the Government and its various functionaries cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than any ordinary litigants, and held that the pragmatic and justice-oriented approach of the courts should be confined only to cases where there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction on part of the State. ***

210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a significant shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence to the State, premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia, the law has now evolved to insist upon parity between the government and private litigants. The rationale is that public interest is better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation. FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 8 ***

249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within administration." (emphasis added)

21. In conclusion, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs (supra) held that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close judgment, we deem appropriate to make it abundantly administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to 9 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 such callous attitude of State authorities or instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.

263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law." (emphasis added)

22. The appellant being a department is equipped with a dedicated legal set-up, trained law officers, and panel advocates who are fully conversant with statutory requirements, procedural steps and limitation periods applicable to such claim petitions. Such an entity is expected to act with due diligence and within the time prescribed by law. Internal administrative procedures, movement of files, or 10 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 departmental processing cannot constitute "sufficient cause" for delay.

23. Institutional inefficiency, red-tapism, or routine procedural delays are not valid grounds for condonation of delay. Accordingly, when any department fails to act within limitation despite having adequate infrastructure and professional legal assistance, the plea of departmental delay does not justify condonation. The burden lies heavily on such institutional or departmental litigants to show bonafide and unavoidable circumstances otherwise delay cannot be condoned.

24. Considering the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgements passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, the delay can only be condoned if sufficient ground is shown for condonation of delay. However, the appellant has failed to show any sufficient cause for condonation of such a long delay.

25. The appellant while filing the instant appeals has miserably failed to disclose sufficient cause. The appellant being the department has proper machinery to deal with court cases, therefore, the grounds shown by the appellant are nothing but seems to be a concocted story, only to get the delay condoned in the matter of such claims.

26. In the matter of CCE & Customs (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the court has to respect the legislative intent and the same is duty of the court. Here the time limit prescribed in the Statute is absolute and the court cannot extend the further period when there is no sufficient ground except an excuse. On interpreting the above provision, this Court is also required to consider whether sufficient grounds exist to condone the delay even for further sixty days. Here, this Court is not satisfied with the reasons/excuses given by the appellant i.e. 4th Battalion, Sashastra Seema Bal, Lucknow through its Commandant, who has adequate departmental machinery to handle court cases.

27. Further the provision of Section 74 of the Act, 2013 clearly lays down that an appeal has to be filed within 60 days and the court may 11 FAPLD No. 69 of 2025 condone the delay of further period of sixty days, if sufficient cause for filing the appeal with delay is made out. However, the Statute is very clear that the power to condone the delay with High Court is only upto sixty days beyond the period of limitation, but in these appeals, all the appeals have been filed beyond sixty days. Hence the delay in these appeals cannot be condoned. Therefore, the applications for condonation of delay filed in all the appeals are sans merit and are liable to be rejected.

28. Accordingly, the aforesaid application for condonation of delay is rejected.

29. In view of the above, the instant appeal suffer from delay and laches and consequently, the appeal is dismissed. December 10, 2025 Arjun/- (Prashant Kumar,J.) ARJUN PRASAD High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench