Anurag Mehrotra vs State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. (Atirikta

1. Heard Shri Anurag Mehrotra, the petitioner-in-person, Shri Surya Bhan Pandey, learned Senior Advocate & DSGI assisted by Shri Devrishi Kumar Arora, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.3 and Shri Nishant Shukla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2.

2. The Director of New and Renewable Energy, Government of India is present in Court and has properly explained both the schemes to us in person. We acknowledged the presence and the assistance provided by Director of New and Renewable for clarifying the entire issue.

3. This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein the petitioner assails the order dated April 18, 2022 passed by the Director, Uttar Pradesh New and Renewable Energy Development Agency (hereinafter referred to as ‘U.P. NEDA’), wherein the U.P. NEDA has rejected the subsidy component to be provided by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Union of India. The reasons for rejection of the same are that the petitioner had installed his solar capacity on September 30th, 2019, a period wherein neither phase-I was in operation nor phase-II was in operation.

4. The petitioner appearing in person has submitted that the petitioner was entitled to the subsidy as per the office memorandum dated September 3, 2019 issued by the Government of India, the Ministry of New and 2 WRIC No. 2351 of 2023 Renewable Energy. He submitted that the Ministry vide this office memorandum had clarified the subsidy for the individual residential household for installation of roof top solar system under phase-II of the grid connected roof top solar program.

5. This submission is countered by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents by stating that the said office memorandum was only a clarification that had been issued with regard to the forthcoming phase-II scheme. They further submitted that paragraph 2 clearly reads to state that the subsidy for individual residential household under phase-II will be available to all eligible households.

6. Learned counsel further submits that this was only a clarification for the phase-II that was to come into operation subsequently. It is to be noted that the said phase-II came into operation in month of December, 2019, by which time the petitioner had already installed his roof top solar system.

7. The petitioner has relied upon a catena of judgments to submit that a right that is already accrued to the petitioner cannot be taken away. Furthermore these judgments highlight the point of legitimate expectation of the petitioner.

8. The petitioner has relied on the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Suresh Kumar v. Union of India reported in 1968 SCC OnLine P&H 62 has held as follows: “(31) Whatever may be the position regarding statutory rules, there appears to me to be absolutely no doubt that Government has no lawful authority to prejudicially affect the civil rights of a Government servant retrospectively by a mere executive fiat otherwise than by his consent unless the Government is authorised to do so by the express provision of some valid law. Rights which have already accrued to a Government servant and the benefits which he might already have enjoyed under or by virtue of a pre- existing executive instruction or administrative direction cannot be taken away with retrospective effect by another executive instruction or a mere administrative direction. If this is the law and 3 WRIC No. 2351 of 2023 indeed I think it is so, the saving in favour of the seniority of the pre-December, 1959 appointees, who had been confirmed before June, 1963, could not be affected by Annexure ‘G’ which was issued in that month (in June, 1963). Each of the appellants was confirmed in March, 1960. The question of refixation of their seniority with retrospective effect by virtue of the change supposed to have been effected in May or June, 1963, could not, therefore, arise.”

9. The petitioner also relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595 and held as follows: “18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the Court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the Court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification, depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either statutory or inherent. The latter is available where the mistake is of the Court. In Administrative Law the scope is still wider. Technicalities apart if the Court is satisfied of the injustice then it is its constitutional and legal obligation to set it right by recalling its order. Here as explained, the Bench of which one of us (Sahai, J.) was a member did commit an error in placing all the stipendiary graduates in the scale of First Division Assistants due to State's failure to bring correct facts on record. But that obviously cannot stand in the way of the Court correcting its mistake. Such inequitable consequences 4 WRIC No. 2351 of 2023 as have surfaced now due to vague affidavit filed by the State cannot be permitted to continue.”

10. The petitioner also relied on a judgment of Allahabad High Court in Committee of Management, Maharajganj Inter College and Maharajganj Higher Secondary School v. Deputy Director of Education, VIIth Region reported in 1987 SCC OnLine All 364 and held as follows: “11. We are of the clear opinion that it cannot be doubted that this order dated 28th July, 1986 recognised right in favour of petitionioner No. 2. Once a right either, created or recognised by means of an order, it cannot be argued that the said order could be withdrawn even without hearing the said person. In such a situation it is incumbent on the said authority before withdrawing the same to give an opportunity to the said person.”

11. The petitioner furthermore relies on the judgment of Allahabad High Court in Raghunath Laxminarain Spices (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of U.P. reported in 2000 SCC OnLine All 467:- “8. Sri Bharatji Agarwal has also invited the attention of this Court to the Supreme Court decision in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority [AIR 1979 SC 1628.] , quoting Justice Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court who observed: “Any executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged……… Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed….. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword.” though generous beyond

12. However, there is a factual controversy in the present case as stated in paragraph 3(i) and 3(ii) of the counter affidavit. Hence while we lay down the law that a circular is binding on the departmental authority and they cannot take the plea that it is not binding on them, the factual controversy whether the truck in question had passed the entry check post Drummondganj with requisite papers prior to detention by Trade Tax Officer, Mobile Squad should be resolved by the 5 WRIC No. 2351 of 2023 Additional Commissioner, Trade Tax (Administration), Head Quarter, Lucknow within a week of production of a certified copy of this order in accordance with law. Consequential order shall be passed immediately thereafter.”

12. Upon perusal of the said judgments, we are of the view that none of these judgments come to the assistance of the petitioner as the same deal with rights that had already accrued to the petitioner. In the present case, no right had accrued to the petitioner and the petitioner had installed his solar system during a particular phase when the scheme of the Government was not prevalent.

13. It is in the light of the same, that the petitioner unfortunately fails to establish his case that any statutory right that had been accrued to him has been denied by the authorities.

14. Upon perusal of the impugned order, we find that the order is unassailable as per the statutes, rules and regulations framed thereunder.

15. In view of the above, we do not find any reason to interfere in the matter.

16. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. November 4, 2025 Ashutosh (Prashant Kumar,J.) (Shekhar B. Saraf,J.) ASHUTOSH PANDEY High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

1. Heard Shri Anurag Mehrotra, the petitioner-in-person, Shri Surya Bhan Pandey, learned Senior Advocate & DSGI assisted by Shri Devrishi Kumar Arora, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.3 and Shri Nishant Shukla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2.

2. The Director of New and Renewable Energy, Government of India is present in Court and has properly explained both the schemes to us in person. We acknowledged the presence and the assistance provided by Director of New and Renewable for clarifying the entire issue.

3. This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein the petitioner assails the order dated April 18, 2022 passed by the Director, Uttar Pradesh New and Renewable Energy Development Agency (hereinafter referred to as ‘U.P. NEDA’), wherein the U.P. NEDA has rejected the subsidy component to be provided by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Union of India. The reasons for rejection of the same are that the petitioner had installed his solar capacity on September 30th, 2019, a period wherein neither phase-I was in operation nor phase-II was in operation.

4. The petitioner appearing in person has submitted that the petitioner was entitled to the subsidy as per the office memorandum dated September 3, 2019 issued by the Government of India, the Ministry of New and 2 WRIC No. 2351 of 2023 Renewable Energy. He submitted that the Ministry vide this office memorandum had clarified the subsidy for the individual residential household for installation of roof top solar system under phase-II of the grid connected roof top solar program.

5. This submission is countered by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents by stating that the said office memorandum was only a clarification that had been issued with regard to the forthcoming phase-II scheme. They further submitted that paragraph 2 clearly reads to state that the subsidy for individual residential household under phase-II will be available to all eligible households.

6. Learned counsel further submits that this was only a clarification for the phase-II that was to come into operation subsequently. It is to be noted that the said phase-II came into operation in month of December, 2019, by which time the petitioner had already installed his roof top solar system.

7. The petitioner has relied upon a catena of judgments to submit that a right that is already accrued to the petitioner cannot be taken away. Furthermore these judgments highlight the point of legitimate expectation of the petitioner.

8. The petitioner has relied on the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Suresh Kumar v. Union of India reported in 1968 SCC OnLine P&H 62 has held as follows: “(31) Whatever may be the position regarding statutory rules, there appears to me to be absolutely no doubt that Government has no lawful authority to prejudicially affect the civil rights of a Government servant retrospectively by a mere executive fiat otherwise than by his consent unless the Government is authorised to do so by the express provision of some valid law. Rights which have already accrued to a Government servant and the benefits which he might already have enjoyed under or by virtue of a pre- existing executive instruction or administrative direction cannot be taken away with retrospective effect by another executive instruction or a mere administrative direction. If this is the law and 3 WRIC No. 2351 of 2023 indeed I think it is so, the saving in favour of the seniority of the pre-December, 1959 appointees, who had been confirmed before June, 1963, could not be affected by Annexure ‘G’ which was issued in that month (in June, 1963). Each of the appellants was confirmed in March, 1960. The question of refixation of their seniority with retrospective effect by virtue of the change supposed to have been effected in May or June, 1963, could not, therefore, arise.”

9. The petitioner also relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595 and held as follows: “18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the Court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the Court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification, depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either statutory or inherent. The latter is available where the mistake is of the Court. In Administrative Law the scope is still wider. Technicalities apart if the Court is satisfied of the injustice then it is its constitutional and legal obligation to set it right by recalling its order. Here as explained, the Bench of which one of us (Sahai, J.) was a member did commit an error in placing all the stipendiary graduates in the scale of First Division Assistants due to State's failure to bring correct facts on record. But that obviously cannot stand in the way of the Court correcting its mistake. Such inequitable consequences 4 WRIC No. 2351 of 2023 as have surfaced now due to vague affidavit filed by the State cannot be permitted to continue.”

10. The petitioner also relied on a judgment of Allahabad High Court in Committee of Management, Maharajganj Inter College and Maharajganj Higher Secondary School v. Deputy Director of Education, VIIth Region reported in 1987 SCC OnLine All 364 and held as follows: “11. We are of the clear opinion that it cannot be doubted that this order dated 28th July, 1986 recognised right in favour of petitionioner No. 2. Once a right either, created or recognised by means of an order, it cannot be argued that the said order could be withdrawn even without hearing the said person. In such a situation it is incumbent on the said authority before withdrawing the same to give an opportunity to the said person.”

11. The petitioner furthermore relies on the judgment of Allahabad High Court in Raghunath Laxminarain Spices (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of U.P. reported in 2000 SCC OnLine All 467:- “8. Sri Bharatji Agarwal has also invited the attention of this Court to the Supreme Court decision in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority [AIR 1979 SC 1628.] , quoting Justice Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court who observed: “Any executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged……… Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed….. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword.” though generous beyond

12. However, there is a factual controversy in the present case as stated in paragraph 3(i) and 3(ii) of the counter affidavit. Hence while we lay down the law that a circular is binding on the departmental authority and they cannot take the plea that it is not binding on them, the factual controversy whether the truck in question had passed the entry check post Drummondganj with requisite papers prior to detention by Trade Tax Officer, Mobile Squad should be resolved by the 5 WRIC No. 2351 of 2023 Additional Commissioner, Trade Tax (Administration), Head Quarter, Lucknow within a week of production of a certified copy of this order in accordance with law. Consequential order shall be passed immediately thereafter.”

12. Upon perusal of the said judgments, we are of the view that none of these judgments come to the assistance of the petitioner as the same deal with rights that had already accrued to the petitioner. In the present case, no right had accrued to the petitioner and the petitioner had installed his solar system during a particular phase when the scheme of the Government was not prevalent.

13. It is in the light of the same, that the petitioner unfortunately fails to establish his case that any statutory right that had been accrued to him has been denied by the authorities.

14. Upon perusal of the impugned order, we find that the order is unassailable as per the statutes, rules and regulations framed thereunder.

15. In view of the above, we do not find any reason to interfere in the matter.

16. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. November 4, 2025 Ashutosh (Prashant Kumar,J.) (Shekhar B. Saraf,J.) ASHUTOSH PANDEY High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench