Bhupendra Singh & others v. U.P. Power Corporation and another)

1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record.

2. The instant second appeal has been filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 13.08.2024 passed by the learned Additional District Judge Court No.2, Lakhimpur-Kheri in Regular Civil Appeal No.97 of 2017 (Bhupendra Singh & others Vs. U.P. Power Corporation and another).

3. The instant appeal has been filed with a delay of 209 days. Notices in this appeal were issued and the service is complete, however no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents.

4. Learned counsel for appellant submits that the reason for the delay as shown in the application for condonation of delay in filing the present appeal is that the impugned order was passed on 13.08.2024 and the copy of the judgment was provided on 15.09.2024. He further submits that there are various approvals and formalities in the department which took some time to complete and thereafter further delay is only due to time taken in preparation of the case.

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

6. It is apparent that the instant appeal has been filed with the delay of 209 days and the reasons shown for the delay are purely bureaucratic set up at the end of the appellants. 2 SAPLD No. 74 of 2025

7. Before further proceeding in the matter, this Court would like to deal with various judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on this issue.

8. This Court has to see the sufficient 'explanation' for condonation of delay and not the 'excuses' for condoning the delay as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Others Vs. Union of India and Another; (2023) 10 SCC 531. The relevant paragraphs 31 and 32 are extracted here-in-below:- "31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.

32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication." (emphasis added)

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654, wherein the appellant-State was seeking a condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court sternly noted that it will not let the courts to be forums wherein the Government can walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the period of limitation, and buttress reliance on cases wherein it allowed condonation, employing its discretionary powers, on merits or modalities of peculiarities of those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [...] 3 SAPLD No. 74 of 2025 *** 7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible." (Emphasis added)

10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Another V. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy(D) Through His Lr; Civil Appeal No. of 2024 (arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 21096 of 2019); 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 has held as under :- "27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. ***

35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case." (Emphasis added)

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board; MANU/SC/1262/2025, categorically stated that the State or its instrumentality cannot claim special treatment or preferential handling in litigation. The State must be treated equally with private litigants and follow the same rules and regulations. The delay by the State must not be condoned unless justified, promoting accountability and diligence in public litigation. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "189. This was followed by Indian Oil Corpn (supra) wherein this Court sowed the seeds for the shift in approach of the courts in matters where condonation of delay was sought by the State or its instrumentalities, inasmuch as it held that the Government and its various functionaries cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than any ordinary litigants, and held that the pragmatic and justice-oriented approach of the courts should be confined only to cases where there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction on part of the State. ***

210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where the State or any of 4 SAPLD No. 74 of 2025 instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a significant shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence to the State, premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia, the law has now evolved to insist upon parity between the government and private litigants. The rationale is that public interest is better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation. *** 249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration." (Emphasis added) 12. In conclusion, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs (supra) held that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law. 263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope 5 SAPLD No. 74 of 2025 for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law." (Emphasis added)

13. The appellant being a department is equipped with a dedicated legal set- up, trained law officers, and panel advocates who are fully conversant with statutory requirements, procedural steps and limitation periods applicable to such claim petitions. Such an entity is expected to act with due diligence and within the time prescribed by law. Internal administrative procedures, movement of files, or departmental processing cannot constitute "sufficient cause" for delay.

14. Institutional inefficiency, red-tapism, or routine procedural delays are not valid grounds for condonation of delay. Accordingly, when any department fails to act within limitation despite having adequate infrastructure and professional legal assistance, the plea of departmental delay does not justify condonation. The burden lies heavily on such institutional or departmental litigants to show bonafide and unavoidable circumstances otherwise delay cannot be condoned.

15. Considering the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgements passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, the delay can only be condoned if sufficient ground is shown for condonation of delay. However, the appellant filed the present appeal on 10.03.2025 without providing the day-to-day explanation for the delay in the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application.

16. The appellant while filing the instant appeal has miserably failed to disclose sufficient cause. The appellant being the Government Department has proper machinery to deal with court cases, therefore, the grounds shown by the appellant are nothing but seems to be a concocted story, only to get the delay condoned in the present matter.

17. Accordingly, the aforesaid application for condonation of delay has no force and the same is rejected. Order on the appeal

1. In view of the aforesaid the instant appeal suffer from delay and laches. 6 SAPLD No. 74 of 2025 Consequently, the instant appeal is dismissed. December 8, 2025 Arjun/- (Prashant Kumar,J.) ARJUN PRASAD ARJUN PRASAD High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Lucknow Bench

1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record.

2. The instant second appeal has been filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 13.08.2024 passed by the learned Additional District Judge Court No.2, Lakhimpur-Kheri in Regular Civil Appeal No.97 of 2017 (Bhupendra Singh & others Vs. U.P. Power Corporation and another).

3. The instant appeal has been filed with a delay of 209 days. Notices in this appeal were issued and the service is complete, however no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents.

4. Learned counsel for appellant submits that the reason for the delay as shown in the application for condonation of delay in filing the present appeal is that the impugned order was passed on 13.08.2024 and the copy of the judgment was provided on 15.09.2024. He further submits that there are various approvals and formalities in the department which took some time to complete and thereafter further delay is only due to time taken in preparation of the case.

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

6. It is apparent that the instant appeal has been filed with the delay of 209 days and the reasons shown for the delay are purely bureaucratic set up at the end of the appellants. 2 SAPLD No. 74 of 2025

7. Before further proceeding in the matter, this Court would like to deal with various judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on this issue.

8. This Court has to see the sufficient 'explanation' for condonation of delay and not the 'excuses' for condoning the delay as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Others Vs. Union of India and Another; (2023) 10 SCC 531. The relevant paragraphs 31 and 32 are extracted here-in-below:- "31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.

32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication." (emphasis added)

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654, wherein the appellant-State was seeking a condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court sternly noted that it will not let the courts to be forums wherein the Government can walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the period of limitation, and buttress reliance on cases wherein it allowed condonation, employing its discretionary powers, on merits or modalities of peculiarities of those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [...] 3 SAPLD No. 74 of 2025 *** 7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible." (Emphasis added)

10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Another V. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy(D) Through His Lr; Civil Appeal No. of 2024 (arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 21096 of 2019); 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 has held as under :- "27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. ***

35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case." (Emphasis added)

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board; MANU/SC/1262/2025, categorically stated that the State or its instrumentality cannot claim special treatment or preferential handling in litigation. The State must be treated equally with private litigants and follow the same rules and regulations. The delay by the State must not be condoned unless justified, promoting accountability and diligence in public litigation. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "189. This was followed by Indian Oil Corpn (supra) wherein this Court sowed the seeds for the shift in approach of the courts in matters where condonation of delay was sought by the State or its instrumentalities, inasmuch as it held that the Government and its various functionaries cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than any ordinary litigants, and held that the pragmatic and justice-oriented approach of the courts should be confined only to cases where there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction on part of the State. ***

210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where the State or any of 4 SAPLD No. 74 of 2025 instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a significant shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence to the State, premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia, the law has now evolved to insist upon parity between the government and private litigants. The rationale is that public interest is better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation. *** 249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration." (Emphasis added) 12. In conclusion, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs (supra) held that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law. 263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope 5 SAPLD No. 74 of 2025 for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law." (Emphasis added)

13. The appellant being a department is equipped with a dedicated legal set- up, trained law officers, and panel advocates who are fully conversant with statutory requirements, procedural steps and limitation periods applicable to such claim petitions. Such an entity is expected to act with due diligence and within the time prescribed by law. Internal administrative procedures, movement of files, or departmental processing cannot constitute "sufficient cause" for delay.

14. Institutional inefficiency, red-tapism, or routine procedural delays are not valid grounds for condonation of delay. Accordingly, when any department fails to act within limitation despite having adequate infrastructure and professional legal assistance, the plea of departmental delay does not justify condonation. The burden lies heavily on such institutional or departmental litigants to show bonafide and unavoidable circumstances otherwise delay cannot be condoned.

15. Considering the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgements passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, the delay can only be condoned if sufficient ground is shown for condonation of delay. However, the appellant filed the present appeal on 10.03.2025 without providing the day-to-day explanation for the delay in the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application.

16. The appellant while filing the instant appeal has miserably failed to disclose sufficient cause. The appellant being the Government Department has proper machinery to deal with court cases, therefore, the grounds shown by the appellant are nothing but seems to be a concocted story, only to get the delay condoned in the present matter.

17. Accordingly, the aforesaid application for condonation of delay has no force and the same is rejected. Order on the appeal

1. In view of the aforesaid the instant appeal suffer from delay and laches. 6 SAPLD No. 74 of 2025 Consequently, the instant appeal is dismissed. December 8, 2025 Arjun/- (Prashant Kumar,J.) ARJUN PRASAD ARJUN PRASAD High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Lucknow Bench