Harish Chandra Varma v. Deputy Director Of Consolidation Faizabad And

1. Heard Sri Aditya Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the review- petitioner.

2. The instant review-petition has been filed by Sri Harish Chandra Verma assailing the judgement and order dated 21.01.2025 passed by this Court in Writ-B No. 50 of 2025.

3. The instant review-petition is also accompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay which is duly supported by an affidavit.

4. At the outset, it may be noticed that in so far as the issue of delay in a writ petition is concerned, the Limitation Act per-se, is not applicable. The writ envisages a concept of latches which is different to the issue of limitation as provided in the Limitation Act, 1963.

5. In the aforesaid backdrop, the Court has considered the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay and this Court finds that though the issue of condonation of delay is not applicable yet the grounds shown explains the latches in filing the review which is accepted, consequently, the application is allowed. Order on merits. 2 CMRAD No. 44 of 2025

6. The sole contention made by learned counsel for the review-petitioner is that the petitioner had purchased the disputed property in question from Sri Hausla. In the impugned order dated 21.01.2025, this Court had observed that Sri Hausla had given his consent for connecting Plot Nos. 525 and 526 by getting a chak marg made on Plot No. 514.

7. It is stated that the alleged affidavit is fraudulent and Sri Hausla did not execute such an affidavit. Thus, the basis premise upon which the order dated 29.11.2012 was passed, was erroneous.

8. Since the petitioner did not get an opportunity of hearing, hence, the same cannot be extended to the petitioner and this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the Court while deciding the writ petition vide judgment and order dated 21.01.2025.

9. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the review-petitioner has referred to a decision of the Apex Court in Yogesh Goyanka v. Govind and Others; 2024 SCC INSC 510.

10. Having considered the aforesaid submissions and from the perusal of the material on record, at the outset it will be noticed that the scope of review is limited as noticed by the Apex Court in Ram Sahu (Dead) Through Lrs. and Ors. v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and others; (2021) 13 SCC 1. This aspect was also considered by the Apex Court in a recent decision in Maleeswari v. K. Suguna, 2025 SCC On Line SC 1927 and the relevant portion reads as under:- "15. It is axiomatic that the right of appeal cannot be assumed unless expressly conferred by the statute or the rules having the force of a statute. The review jurisdiction cannot be assumed unless it is conferred by law on the authority or the Court. Section 114 and Order 47, Rule 1 of CPC deal with the power of review of the courts. The power of review is different from appellate power and is subject to the following limitations to maintain the finality of judicial decisions:

15.1 The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.

15.2 Review is not to be confused with appellate powers, which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court. 3 CMRAD No. 44 of 2025

15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise.

15.4 The power of review can be exercised for the correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits specified in the statute governing the exercise of power.

15.5 The review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors.

16. To wit, through a review application, an apparent error of fact or law is intimated to the court, but no extra reasoning is undertaken to explain the said error. The intimation of error at the first blush enables the court to correct apparent errors instead of the higher court correcting such errors. At both the above stages, detailed reasoning is not warranted.

17. Having noticed the distinction between the power of review and appellate power, we restate the power and scope of review jurisdiction. Review grounds are summed up as follows:

17.1 The ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence is a ground available if it is demonstrated that, despite the exercise of due diligence, this evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced by the party at the time, the original decree or order was passed.

17.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record may be invoked if there is something more than a mere error, and it must be the one which is manifest on the face of the record.8 Such an error is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record.

17.3 Lastly, the phrase for any other sufficient reason? means a reason that is sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the other two categories.

18. Courts ought not mix up or overlap one jurisdiction with another jurisdiction. Having noted the appellate and review jurisdiction of the Court, we will apply these principles to the impugned order to determine whether the High Court was within its power of review jurisdiction or had exceeded it by 4 CMRAD No. 44 of 2025 reversing the findings, as if the High Court were sitting in appeal against the order dated 23.09.2022. We appreciate the above tabulated summary of the view taken in the impugned order while doing so."

11. Keeping the aforesaid principles, as laid down by the Apex Court, in mind, the Court has sifted through the records to evaluate the contention of the learned counsel for the review-petitioner.

12. Apparently, the facts are not disputed, inasmuch as, the petitioner had purchased the property by means of sale deed dated 11.05.2007. It is not disputed that on the said date reference proceedings were already pending before the Deputy Director of Consolidation.

13. It is also not disputed that the petitioner never came forward to get himself impleaded in the proceedings before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. It is also not disputed that the review-petitioner has no knowledge or means to state that the affidavit which was referred to in the order passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation, was not filed by the predecessors-in-interest of the review-petitioner Sri Hausla.

14. Thus, to make a bald statement that the affidavit was forged does not came to the aid of the review-petitioner for the reason that the said affidavit was filed by Sri Hausla and Hausla never came forward to state that the said affidavit was incorrect or forged.

15. Since the review-petitioner is squarely covered by the doctrine of lis pendens and this aspect has also been noticed by the Apex Court in Yogesh Goyanka (supra) and in paragraph 16, hence, the said decision does not come to the aid of the review-petitioner.

16. This Court does not find that there is any error apparent on the face of record, consequently, the review-petition is dismissed. December 11, 2025 Asheesh (Jaspreet Singh,J.) ASHEESH KUMAR ASHEESH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Lucknow Bench

1. Heard Sri Aditya Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the review- petitioner.

2. The instant review-petition has been filed by Sri Harish Chandra Verma assailing the judgement and order dated 21.01.2025 passed by this Court in Writ-B No. 50 of 2025.

3. The instant review-petition is also accompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay which is duly supported by an affidavit.

4. At the outset, it may be noticed that in so far as the issue of delay in a writ petition is concerned, the Limitation Act per-se, is not applicable. The writ envisages a concept of latches which is different to the issue of limitation as provided in the Limitation Act, 1963.

5. In the aforesaid backdrop, the Court has considered the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay and this Court finds that though the issue of condonation of delay is not applicable yet the grounds shown explains the latches in filing the review which is accepted, consequently, the application is allowed. Order on merits. 2 CMRAD No. 44 of 2025

6. The sole contention made by learned counsel for the review-petitioner is that the petitioner had purchased the disputed property in question from Sri Hausla. In the impugned order dated 21.01.2025, this Court had observed that Sri Hausla had given his consent for connecting Plot Nos. 525 and 526 by getting a chak marg made on Plot No. 514.

7. It is stated that the alleged affidavit is fraudulent and Sri Hausla did not execute such an affidavit. Thus, the basis premise upon which the order dated 29.11.2012 was passed, was erroneous.

8. Since the petitioner did not get an opportunity of hearing, hence, the same cannot be extended to the petitioner and this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the Court while deciding the writ petition vide judgment and order dated 21.01.2025.

9. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the review-petitioner has referred to a decision of the Apex Court in Yogesh Goyanka v. Govind and Others; 2024 SCC INSC 510.

10. Having considered the aforesaid submissions and from the perusal of the material on record, at the outset it will be noticed that the scope of review is limited as noticed by the Apex Court in Ram Sahu (Dead) Through Lrs. and Ors. v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and others; (2021) 13 SCC 1. This aspect was also considered by the Apex Court in a recent decision in Maleeswari v. K. Suguna, 2025 SCC On Line SC 1927 and the relevant portion reads as under:- "15. It is axiomatic that the right of appeal cannot be assumed unless expressly conferred by the statute or the rules having the force of a statute. The review jurisdiction cannot be assumed unless it is conferred by law on the authority or the Court. Section 114 and Order 47, Rule 1 of CPC deal with the power of review of the courts. The power of review is different from appellate power and is subject to the following limitations to maintain the finality of judicial decisions:

15.1 The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.

15.2 Review is not to be confused with appellate powers, which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court. 3 CMRAD No. 44 of 2025

15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise.

15.4 The power of review can be exercised for the correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits specified in the statute governing the exercise of power.

15.5 The review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors.

16. To wit, through a review application, an apparent error of fact or law is intimated to the court, but no extra reasoning is undertaken to explain the said error. The intimation of error at the first blush enables the court to correct apparent errors instead of the higher court correcting such errors. At both the above stages, detailed reasoning is not warranted.

17. Having noticed the distinction between the power of review and appellate power, we restate the power and scope of review jurisdiction. Review grounds are summed up as follows:

17.1 The ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence is a ground available if it is demonstrated that, despite the exercise of due diligence, this evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced by the party at the time, the original decree or order was passed.

17.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record may be invoked if there is something more than a mere error, and it must be the one which is manifest on the face of the record.8 Such an error is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record.

17.3 Lastly, the phrase for any other sufficient reason? means a reason that is sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the other two categories.

18. Courts ought not mix up or overlap one jurisdiction with another jurisdiction. Having noted the appellate and review jurisdiction of the Court, we will apply these principles to the impugned order to determine whether the High Court was within its power of review jurisdiction or had exceeded it by 4 CMRAD No. 44 of 2025 reversing the findings, as if the High Court were sitting in appeal against the order dated 23.09.2022. We appreciate the above tabulated summary of the view taken in the impugned order while doing so."

11. Keeping the aforesaid principles, as laid down by the Apex Court, in mind, the Court has sifted through the records to evaluate the contention of the learned counsel for the review-petitioner.

12. Apparently, the facts are not disputed, inasmuch as, the petitioner had purchased the property by means of sale deed dated 11.05.2007. It is not disputed that on the said date reference proceedings were already pending before the Deputy Director of Consolidation.

13. It is also not disputed that the petitioner never came forward to get himself impleaded in the proceedings before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. It is also not disputed that the review-petitioner has no knowledge or means to state that the affidavit which was referred to in the order passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation, was not filed by the predecessors-in-interest of the review-petitioner Sri Hausla.

14. Thus, to make a bald statement that the affidavit was forged does not came to the aid of the review-petitioner for the reason that the said affidavit was filed by Sri Hausla and Hausla never came forward to state that the said affidavit was incorrect or forged.

15. Since the review-petitioner is squarely covered by the doctrine of lis pendens and this aspect has also been noticed by the Apex Court in Yogesh Goyanka (supra) and in paragraph 16, hence, the said decision does not come to the aid of the review-petitioner.

16. This Court does not find that there is any error apparent on the face of record, consequently, the review-petition is dismissed. December 11, 2025 Asheesh (Jaspreet Singh,J.) ASHEESH KUMAR ASHEESH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Lucknow Bench