High Court · 2025

copy of which is annexure 2 to the writ petition, whereby the respondent no. 6 has been given the charge of Chief Executive Officer of the Board.

4. At the very outset, Shri Abhinav N Trivedi, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 points out that a modified order dated

07.03.2025 has been passed whereby the stigma as contained in the order dated 25.02.2025 has been removed. The order dated

07.03.2025 has been passed to the Court and the Court being a court of record takes the same on record. A copy of the same has also been given to learned counsel for the petitioner.

5. From perusal of the order dated 07.03.2025 it emerges that the order dated 25.02.2025 whereby the contractual services of the petitioner was terminated by means of stigmatic order has been modified and the order dated 07.03.2025 modifying the order dated 25.02.2025 indicates that the services of the petitioner have been terminated as his services are no longer required. It is a simpliciter order of termination.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two grounds while raising a challenge to the orders dated 25.02.2025 and

25.02.2025 as indicated above namely (a) that the order dated

25.02.2025 terminating the contractual services of the petitioner is stigmatic and (b) as the appointment of the petitioner has been made on the basis of recommendation of a committee comprising of members as indicated in annexure 5 to the writ petition as such the termination order being passed by the Additional Chief Secretary and the Chairman of the respondent no. 3 is beyond jurisdiction.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contends that subsequent to he having been appointed vide order dated

29.11.2022 his contractual services were extended for a period of six months as emerges from a perusal of the 36th meeting held on 29.10.2024, a copy of which is annexure 5 to the petition, which only gave power to the appointing authority to extend the contractual service for a certain period of time.

8. He thus argues that once the committee was of the view that it is only the contractual term appointment of the petitioner which was to be extended, consequently the impugned order of termination having been passed by the appointing authority could not have been passed and as the said power is only vested with the committee and would only be confined to the extension of the contractual term of the petitioner and the Additional Chief Secretary and the Chairman of the respondent no. 3 would become functus officio thereafter.

9. Responding Shri Abhinav N Trivedi, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 has placed reliance on the modified order dated 07.03.2025 to contend that earlier the contractual services of the petitioner had been terminated by means of a stigmatic order and now by means of the order dated 07.03.2025 it has been provided that as the contractual services of the petitioner are no longer required, consequently his services are being terminated. The order dated 25.02.2025 now stands modified keeping in view the order dated 07.03.2025 and thus the stigma as was contained in the earlier order has been removed.

10. So far as the ground taken by learned counsel for the petitioner that the appointing authority of the petitioner is the committee while his services have been terminated by the Additional Chief Secretary and the Chairman of the respondent no. 3 Shri Trivedi has passed on the copy of the extracts of the resolution dated 25.08.2018 as has been referred to in the order of appointment of the petitioner dated 29.11.2022, a copy of which is annexure 4 to the writ petition. The extract is taken on record.

11. Shri Trivedi contends that clause 26.2 (3) and (4) of the minutes would indicate that on the basis of the recommendations of the selection committee the appointing authority has to issue an appointment order. It is contended that though the approval of the appointment of the petitioner was made on 29.11.2022 which has been made by the said selection committee yet once the minutes of the committee itself indicates that an order is to be issued by the appointing authority as such the appointment order of the petitioner was issued by the Additional Chief Secretary and the Chairman of the respondent no. 3. The said authority has also issued the impugned termination order and as such there is no infirmity in the said order.

12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record it emerges that initially the petitioner had been appointed on contractual basis on 29.11.2022 for a period of two years. The appointment order of the petitioner duly indicates that the appointment order has been issued by the appointing authority keeping in view clause 26.2 of the minutes of meeting dated 25.08.2018. Admittedly the appointment order has been issued by the Additional Chief Secretary and the Chairman of the respondent no. 3 as emerges from perusal of the appointment order. The termination order has also been passed by the same authority. Merely because the selection committee has approved the name of the petitioner which has culminated in the appointment order being issued by the appointing authority, in this case the Additional Chief Secretary and the Chairman of the respondent no. 3, consequently the same would not entail that it is the selection committee which would also recommend the termination of the petitioner more particularly keeping in view the resolution dated 25.08.2018 wherein the power of appointment has been vested on the appointing authority. Thus the aforesaid ground taken by the petitioner is rejected.

13. So far as the impugned order being stigmatic order is concerned, suffice to state that keeping in view the subsequent order dated 07.03.2025 the earlier order dated 25.02.2025 which in fact was containing a stigma against the petitioner has been modified and the contractual services of the petitioner have only been terminated on the ground that his services are no longer required.

14. As regards the argument that in view the meeting dated

29.10.2024 whereby only the extension of the contractual term was to be done suffice to state that once in view of the minutes dated 25.08.2018 the appointing authority is to follow the recommendation of the selection committee and in fact the appointment order was issued by the appointing authority and as per the minutes of the meeting dated 29.10.2024 which had provided for extension of the term of the petitioner the contractual term was also extended it is always open for the appointing authority to pass an order for ending the contractual services of a contractual employee. Thus the said ground is rejected.

15. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, no case for interference is made out. The writ petition is dismissed. Order Date :- 10.3.2025 J. K. Dinkar JESHU KUMAR DINKAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

copy of which is annexure 2 to the writ petition, whereby the respondent no. 6 has been given the charge of Chief Executive Officer of the Board.

4. At the very outset, Shri Abhinav N Trivedi, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 points out that a modified order dated

07.03.2025 has been passed whereby the stigma as contained in the order dated 25.02.2025 has been removed. The order dated

07.03.2025 has been passed to the Court and the Court being a court of record takes the same on record. A copy of the same has also been given to learned counsel for the petitioner.

5. From perusal of the order dated 07.03.2025 it emerges that the order dated 25.02.2025 whereby the contractual services of the petitioner was terminated by means of stigmatic order has been modified and the order dated 07.03.2025 modifying the order dated 25.02.2025 indicates that the services of the petitioner have been terminated as his services are no longer required. It is a simpliciter order of termination.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two grounds while raising a challenge to the orders dated 25.02.2025 and

25.02.2025 as indicated above namely (a) that the order dated

25.02.2025 terminating the contractual services of the petitioner is stigmatic and (b) as the appointment of the petitioner has been made on the basis of recommendation of a committee comprising of members as indicated in annexure 5 to the writ petition as such the termination order being passed by the Additional Chief Secretary and the Chairman of the respondent no. 3 is beyond jurisdiction.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contends that subsequent to he having been appointed vide order dated

29.11.2022 his contractual services were extended for a period of six months as emerges from a perusal of the 36th meeting held on 29.10.2024, a copy of which is annexure 5 to the petition, which only gave power to the appointing authority to extend the contractual service for a certain period of time.

8. He thus argues that once the committee was of the view that it is only the contractual term appointment of the petitioner which was to be extended, consequently the impugned order of termination having been passed by the appointing authority could not have been passed and as the said power is only vested with the committee and would only be confined to the extension of the contractual term of the petitioner and the Additional Chief Secretary and the Chairman of the respondent no. 3 would become functus officio thereafter.

9. Responding Shri Abhinav N Trivedi, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 has placed reliance on the modified order dated 07.03.2025 to contend that earlier the contractual services of the petitioner had been terminated by means of a stigmatic order and now by means of the order dated 07.03.2025 it has been provided that as the contractual services of the petitioner are no longer required, consequently his services are being terminated. The order dated 25.02.2025 now stands modified keeping in view the order dated 07.03.2025 and thus the stigma as was contained in the earlier order has been removed.

10. So far as the ground taken by learned counsel for the petitioner that the appointing authority of the petitioner is the committee while his services have been terminated by the Additional Chief Secretary and the Chairman of the respondent no. 3 Shri Trivedi has passed on the copy of the extracts of the resolution dated 25.08.2018 as has been referred to in the order of appointment of the petitioner dated 29.11.2022, a copy of which is annexure 4 to the writ petition. The extract is taken on record.

11. Shri Trivedi contends that clause 26.2 (3) and (4) of the minutes would indicate that on the basis of the recommendations of the selection committee the appointing authority has to issue an appointment order. It is contended that though the approval of the appointment of the petitioner was made on 29.11.2022 which has been made by the said selection committee yet once the minutes of the committee itself indicates that an order is to be issued by the appointing authority as such the appointment order of the petitioner was issued by the Additional Chief Secretary and the Chairman of the respondent no. 3. The said authority has also issued the impugned termination order and as such there is no infirmity in the said order.

12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record it emerges that initially the petitioner had been appointed on contractual basis on 29.11.2022 for a period of two years. The appointment order of the petitioner duly indicates that the appointment order has been issued by the appointing authority keeping in view clause 26.2 of the minutes of meeting dated 25.08.2018. Admittedly the appointment order has been issued by the Additional Chief Secretary and the Chairman of the respondent no. 3 as emerges from perusal of the appointment order. The termination order has also been passed by the same authority. Merely because the selection committee has approved the name of the petitioner which has culminated in the appointment order being issued by the appointing authority, in this case the Additional Chief Secretary and the Chairman of the respondent no. 3, consequently the same would not entail that it is the selection committee which would also recommend the termination of the petitioner more particularly keeping in view the resolution dated 25.08.2018 wherein the power of appointment has been vested on the appointing authority. Thus the aforesaid ground taken by the petitioner is rejected.

13. So far as the impugned order being stigmatic order is concerned, suffice to state that keeping in view the subsequent order dated 07.03.2025 the earlier order dated 25.02.2025 which in fact was containing a stigma against the petitioner has been modified and the contractual services of the petitioner have only been terminated on the ground that his services are no longer required.

14. As regards the argument that in view the meeting dated

29.10.2024 whereby only the extension of the contractual term was to be done suffice to state that once in view of the minutes dated 25.08.2018 the appointing authority is to follow the recommendation of the selection committee and in fact the appointment order was issued by the appointing authority and as per the minutes of the meeting dated 29.10.2024 which had provided for extension of the term of the petitioner the contractual term was also extended it is always open for the appointing authority to pass an order for ending the contractual services of a contractual employee. Thus the said ground is rejected.

15. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, no case for interference is made out. The writ petition is dismissed. Order Date :- 10.3.2025 J. K. Dinkar JESHU KUMAR DINKAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench