Reena Sharma And 42 Others … v. State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Housing And Urban Planning Lko. And 3 on 24 Nov 2025

Judgment

1. Heard Shri Brijesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Ratnesh Chandra, learned counsel for Lucknow Development Authority as well as learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent nos.1 to 3.

2. The instant writ petition has been filed seeking relief for quashing notification dated 25.07.2012 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 1894”) as well as notification dated 02.09.2013 issued under Section 6(1) of the Act, 1894 with respect to land comprising 127.18 hectares in Village Kaliya Kheda and 143.14 hectares in Village Pyarepur acquired for the Scheme of Lucknow Development Authority known as Mohan Road Housing Scheme, Part-I. Further relief has been sought for issuing a direction commanding the respondents to exempt the petitioners’ houses/plots from the land acquisition proceedings and not to demolish the petitioners’ houses/ boundary walls/ tin sheds. 2 WRIT – C No. - 1977 of 2025

3. The facts as indicated in the memo of writ petition reveal that the petitioners, who are 43 in number, purchased plots of different land areas from the erstwhile owners between the period 30.07.2011 and

23.07.2015 by way of registered sale deeds. Some of the petitioners constructed residential houses on the plots purchased by them and obtained electricity connections, whereas others encircled their plots by boundary walls and made temporary constructions. In paragraph no. 53

of the writ petition, it has been indicated the different dates on which the plots were purchased, the names mutated in the revenue records as well as the electricity connections obtained by some of the petitioners.

4. From the short counter affidavit filed by the Lucknow Development Authority, it transpires that the award in respect of the acquired land including the lands of the petitioners was declared on

08.09.2015.

5. The petitioners have challenged the acquisition proceedings on various grounds, which are as follows: (i) The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act, 2013’) came into force w.e.f. 01.01.2014. Hence, the acquisition proceedings vide notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act, 1894 issued on 25.07.2012 and notification dated 02.09.2013 under Section 6 (1) of the Act, 1894, stood lapsed as the award was declared on

08.09.2015, i.e., after the coming into force of the Act, 2013. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and Others, reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129. (ii) The procedure prescribed under the Act, 2013 has not been followed, inasmuch as the authority failed to conduct the Social Impact Assessment as required under the said Act. (iii) The petitioners had already constructed their houses between 2011 and 2015, hence, as per the provisions of the Act, 2013, they 3 WRIT – C No. - 1977 of 2025 cannot be dispossessed from the plots in question and the houses constructed by them cannot be demolished. (iv) The Environmental Impact Study, which is required under the relevant provisions of the Act, 2013, was also not undertaken prior to acquiring the land in question.

6. The Lucknow Development Authority in short counter affidavit has indicated after the declaration of the award on 08.09.2015, a subsequent award was made on 03.02.2025 in respect of the assets (Parisampattis) existing on the acquired land, i.e., trees, boundary walls, temporary as well as pucca constructions etc.

7. It has further been stated in the counter affidavit that the possession of the land in question was taken on different dates between

06.06.2016 and 30.01.2019 and the possession certificates have been collectively annexed as Annexure No. SCA-2 to the counter affidavit.

8. It has also been stated in the counter affidavit that at the time of the survey conducted on 12.05.2013, no construction was found in some areas of the acquired land, whereas constructions were found on some parts of the acquired land. The survey report dated 12.05.2013 indicating the aforesaid fact has been annexed as Annexure No. SCA-3 to the counter affidavit.

9. Shri Ratnesh Chandra, learned counsel appearing for Lucknow Development Authority while opposing the writ petition submits that Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 will not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. According to him, rather Section 24 (1) (a) of the Act, 2013 will apply and determination of the payment of compensation have to be made as per provisions of the Act, 2013 for the land acquired.

10. It has been contended by Shri Ratnesh Chandra, learned counsel for the L.D.A. that the challenge to the acquisition proceedings after inordinate delay of 12 years from the date of notification under section 4 (1) of the Act 1894 is untenable in the eyes of law and on that ground alone the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. It has been further 4 WRIT – C No. - 1977 of 2025 argued that many of the petitioners purchased land after notification dated 25.7.2012 issued under section 4 (1) of the Act, 1894 and as such the writ petition on their behalf challenging the acquisition proceedings is not maintainable, being subsequent purchasers.

11. The learned counsel for the Lucknow Development Authority further informed that necessary environmental clearance has already been issued for the project, i.e., “Township and Area Development under Mohan Road Scheme-I, Village Pyarepur & Kaliya Khera, District Lucknow.” As such, the claim of the petitioners that no environmental clearance has been obtained for the project is incorrect and without any basis.

12. Learned counsel for the Lucknow Development Authority has further contended that most of the lands were purchased by the petitioners after notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 either from the original tenure holders or from the vendors who had purchased the land from the original tenure holders on resale prior to the notification dated 25.07.2012 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894, and even in some cases, the lands were purchased by the petitioners after notification dated 02.09.2013 issued under section 6(1) of the Act, 1894.

13. After hearing the parties, the following issues arise for consideration:- (i) Whether the writ petition challenging the notification dated

25.07.2012 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894 and notification dated 02.09.2013 issued under Section 6(1) of the Act, 1894 after delay of 12 years is maintainable. (ii) Whether the writ petition filed on behalf of a subsequent purchasers is tenable in the eyes of law. (iii) Whether the land acquisition proceedings initiated vide notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act, 1894 issued on 25.07.2012 and notification under Section 6 (1) of the Act, 1894, issued on

02.09.2013, stood lapsed in view of Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013, as the award was declared on 08.09.2015 after the coming into force of the 5 WRIT – C No. - 1977 of 2025 Act, 2013, in the light of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra). (iv) Whether the failure to conduct a Social Impact Assessment as well as an Environmental Impact Study as required under the Act, 2013 renders the acquisition proceedings under the Old Act i.e. the Act, 1894, stood vitiated.

14. In the present case, notification dated 25.07.2012 issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act, 1894 and notification dated 02.09.2013 issued under Section 6 (1) of the Act, 1894 were issued long ago and the award for the acquired land was also declared on 08.09.2015. However, the petitioners did not challenge the acquisition proceedings and now after a lapse of more than 12 years from the issuance of the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act, 1894, petitioners have filed the present writ petition. The law in this regard is well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments and it has been held that when a person intends to challenge a notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act, 1894, such challenge must be made within a reasonable time.

15. In the case of Hari Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1984) 2 SCC 624, the Apex Court held that where a large area of land is acquired and the plots, which are subject to acquisition, belong to large number of persons, even if other persons have not challenged the acquisition proceedings, it is difficult to believe that appellant was not aware of the initiation of the acquisition proceedings as the acquisition of the said land would be the talk of the town in a short time and if the person interested failed to approach the writ Court within reasonable period, the petition should fail only on the ground of delay.

16. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in the case of Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 2077, has observed as under : “...to have sat on the fence and allowed the government to complete the acquisition on the basis that notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on the grounds which 6 WRIT – C No. - 1977 of 2025 were available to them at the time when the notification was published, would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioner.”

17. The same view has been taken by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Mysore vs. V. K. Kangan, (1976) 2 SCC 895.

18. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu vs. L. Krishnan, (1996) 1 SCC 250, Hon’ble Apex Court held that "the delay in challenging the notification was fatal and the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only” and exercise of power under Article 226, after the award had been made, was held to be unjustified.

19. Similarly, in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Digambar, AIR 1995 SC 1991 and State of Orissa vs. Dhobei Sethi, (1995) 5 SCC 583, Hon’ble apex Court held that if the land acquisition proceedings stood finalised, interference by the writ Court, quashing notification and declaration under sections 4 and 6 of the Act, 1894, was unwarranted and uncalled for. Exercise of jurisdiction in such a case cannot be said to be judicious and reasonable.

20. In the case of Ganpatibai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2006) 7 SCC 508, Hon’ble Apex Court examined a case where the land owner filed a suit challenging the acquisition proceedings and it was dismissed as not maintainable and then he challenged the proceedings by filing a writ petition. The petition was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The Apex Court upheld the judgment observing that since long years ago the Apex Court had held that a suit challenging land acquisition notifications was not maintainable and pendency of such suit could not be basis for explanation of the delay.

21. Acquisition cannot be challenged at a belated stage as held by Hon’ble the Apex Court in Parag Construction vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 47; Tika Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 10 SCC 689; Sawaran Lata v. State of Haryana, AIR 2010 SC 1664; May George v. Special Tahsildar, (2010) 13 SCC 98 7 WRIT – C No. - 1977 of 2025 and NOIDA v. Harkishan (Dead) Through Legal Representatives and others, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 77.

22. Thus, challenge to the acquisition proceedings by the petitioners after long delay of 12 years is fatal and since petitioners have not approached the Court within reasonable time and allowed the completion of the acquisition proceedings, the present writ petition is liable to be rejected only on the ground of delay.

23. With regard to second issue, we find that uncontroverted facts emerging from the pleadings of the present writ petition as well as in the counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit, indicate that apart from petitioner nos. 2, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 29, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, and 43, all other petitioners purchased their plots after issuance of notification dated 25.07.2012 under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that the challenge by those petitioners who have purchased the land after issuance of the said notification is not maintainable, as they are subsequent purchasers.

24. In the case of Pt. Lila Ram vs. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2112, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that any one who deals with the land subsequent to Section 4 notification issued under Act, 1894, would do so at his own peril.

25. In the case of Sneh Prabha vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1996) 7 SCC 426, Hob’ble Apex Court has also held that Section 4 notification gives a notice to the public that the land is needed for public purpose and it further points out "an impediment to any one to encumber the land acquired thereunder." The alienation thereafter does not bind the State or the beneficiary under the acquisition. The purchaser is entitled only to receive compensation. While deciding the said case, reliance had been placed on the earlier judgment in Union of India v. Shiv Kumar Bhargava, AIR 1995 SC 812.

26. Similarly, in U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow, AIR 1996 SC 1170, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held 8 WRIT – C No. - 1977 of 2025 that purchase after publication of Section 4 notification is void against the State and at the most the purchaser may step into the shoes of the original tenure holder and claim compensation.

27. In the case of Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and others, (2008) 9 SCC 177, Hon’ble Apex Court held that a purchase subsequent to section 4 notification does not confer a right to challenge the acquisition proceedings.

28. In the case of Bangalore Development Authority vs. N. Jayamma, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 229, Hon’ble Apex Court held that purchases made after issue of preliminary notification are non est in the eyes of law.

29. Thus, this Court is of the considered view that the writ petition filed by the petitioners, who are subsequent purchasers i.e. those who purchased the land in question after issuance of the notification dated

25.07.2012 under Section 4 (1) of the Act, 1894 is not tenable in the eyes of law and the writ petition on their behalf is liable to be dismissed for this reason alone.

30. The third issue with regard to contention of counsel for the petitioners that the acquisition proceedings initiated in the present case under the Act, 1894 stood lapsed, as the award was declared on

08.09.2015 i.e. after the coming into force of the Act, 2013, by relying upon Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013, is also misconceived.

31. Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 reads as under : “(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: 9 WRIT – C No. - 1977 of 2025 Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries. Then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

32. A bare perusal of Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 reveals that the condition precedent for the applicability of sub-section (2) is that the award should have been made under Section 11 of the Act, 1894, five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act. Admittedly, in the present case, the award was declared on 08.09.2015, i.e., after coming into force of the Act, 2013. In such situation, section 24 (2) would not apply, rather Section 24 (1) (a) of the Act, 2013 comes into play and the determination and payment of compensation have to be made as per the provisions of the Act, 2013.

33. It has been not disputed that the award dated 08.09.2015 has been prepared in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act, 2013 and there is no procedural defect in the award dated 08.09.2015.

34. The reliance placed by the petitioners on the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) is also misconceived and the said judgment is of no help to the petitioners. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) has concluded the issues in paragraph nos.365 to 366.9, which are reproduced herein below: “365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corpn. is hereby overruled and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corpn. vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 has been followed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. vs. State of T. N. (2015) 3 SCC 353 cannot be said to be laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions following the same are also overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra, the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether "or" has to be read as "nor" or as "and" was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present judgment. 10 WRIT – C No. - 1977 of 2025

366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under:

366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.

366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act, under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed.

366.3. The word "or" used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as "nor" or as "and". The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression "paid" in the main part of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid to the "landowners" as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation 11 WRIT – C No. - 1977 of 2025 to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).

366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the Act 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allows landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.”

35. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) has held in paragraph no.366.1 that when an award under the old Act, 1894 has been made after 1st January 2014, which is the date of commencement of the Act, 2013, there is no lapse of the earlier proceedings. However, the compensation has to be determined in accordance with the provisions of Act, 2013. Hence, it cannot be said that the acquisition proceedings initiated vide notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894 issued on 25.07.2012 and notification under 12 WRIT – C No. - 1977 of 2025 Section 6(1) of the Act, 1894, issued on 02.09.2013, stood lapsed in view of Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013. Therefore, the argument advanced by counsel for the petitioners, to that extent, is misconceived and liable to be rejected.

36. Once it has been held as indicated hereinabove that the acquisition proceedings under the old Act, 1894 continued even after the coming into force of the Act, 2013, the argument advanced by counsel for the petitioners that the Social Impact Assessment and Environmental Impact Study were not conducted prior to the Act, 2013 is misconceived, inasmuch as the land acquisition proceedings continued under the old Act, 1894 and the provisions of old Act, 1894 shall apply in the present case except with respect to the provisions relating to determination of compensation. Thus, the argument of the counsel of the petitioners with respect to fourth issue is also misconceived.

37. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that even otherwise, there is a requirement of obtaining a No Objection Certificate from the Department of Environment in light of the judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Apex Court in Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board vs. C. Kenchappa and Others, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 371. In this regard, learned counsel for the Lucknow Development Authority submits that necessary environmental clearance has already been issued for the project, i.e., “Township and Area Development under Mohan Road Scheme-I, Village Pyarepur & Kaliya Khera, District Lucknow” vide order dated 29.02.2024 issued by the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority, Uttar Pradesh. As such, the claim of the petitioners that no environmental clearance has been obtained for the project is factually incorrect and without any basis.

38. Finally, learned counsel for the petitioners contention that since most of the petitioners have constructed residential houses, and the scheme launched by the Lucknow Development Authority is also for the purpose of construction of residential houses for the planned 13 WRIT – C No. - 1977 of 2025 development of the city, the plots of the petitioners may be adjusted in the scheme after charging the prescribed development fees.

39. This Court is of the considered view that it is for the Lucknow Development Authority to consider the request of the petitioners. The petitioners are always at liberty to make a representation to the Lucknow Development Authority for adjustment of their plots under the scheme. If such a representation is made, it is always open to the Lucknow Development Authority to consider and take an appropriate decision thereon in accordance with law and the applicable Government Orders on the subject matter.

40. In view of above discussions, the writ petition is dismissed.

41. No order as to costs. November 24, 2025 Mahesh (Amitabh Kumar Rai,J.) ( Mrs. Sangeeta Chandra,J.) MAHESH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench