Mahendra Kumar Tiwari vs Counsel for Appellant(s)

1. Heard Shri Anuj Kudesia, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Shri Anand Singh, learned Standing Chief Standing Counsel for the State-appellants on the question of delay in filing the appeals.

2. These are two appeals and both of them have been filed on the same date i.e. 17.02.2025 challenging the judgment and order dated 27.05.2024 in Writ A No.2001467 of 2012 and Writ A No.34844 of 2019. There is a delay of 232 days in filing the appeals. The limitation for filing special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 is thirty days vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

3. Learned State Counsel has taken us through the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay in Special Appeal 2 SPLAD No. 75 of 2025 Defective No.75 of 2025. We have also perused the same. Explanations offered for the delay is similar in Special Appeal Defective No.77 of 2025.

4. The explanation offered in the said affidavit is that the judgment dated 27.05.2024 was served in the office of the Directorate of Technical Education, Uttar Pradesh, Kanpur on 31.05.2024. On

07.06.2024, the matter was referred by the Directorate to the Chief Standing Counsel of this Court at Lucknow for providing legal opinion in the matter. The State Government vide letter dated 12.06.2024 and

16.08.2024 requested the Chief Standing Counsel to provide legal opinion which was ultimately provided on 30.08.2024, thus, there was a clear delay of more than two months in providing the legal opinion. Whether any efforts were made to get the legal opinion at the earliest has not been mentioned. It seems they kept sitting over the matter awaiting legal opinion instead of showing any urgency. None of the letters whether it be dated 07.06.2024, 12.06.2024 or 16.08.2024 have been annexed with the affidavit.

5. The Directorate of Technical Education, Uttar Pradesh, Kanpur vide letter dated 05.09.2024 referred the matter to the State Government alongwith the legal opinion dated 30.08.2024 which hardly demonstrates any urgency on the part of the State Authorities. If the matter was already delayed then some promptness should have been shown.

6. The State Government then referred the matter to the Law Department, Government of U.P. which issued the Government Order dated 19.09.2024 granting permission for filing special appeals. It has not been disclosed as to on what date the State Government referred the matter to the Law Department. Apparently, there is a delay even from the date of issuance of letter dated 05.09.2024 which has not been explained.

7. Ultimately, the permission granted by the Law Department was received in the Directorate on 20.09.2024. The Director, Technical Education referred the matter to the Chief Standing Counsel after almost ten days on 30.09.2024 which hardly demonstrates any urgency, promptness or diligence for that matter, on the part of the 3 SPLAD No. 75 of 2025 said officer.

8. Learned Chief Standing Counsel allotted the paper book to one of the Standing Counsel and it has not been disclosed as to when this was done.

9. The affidavit further goes on to state that the Pairokar of the concerned department contacted the concerned Standing Counsel on

10.10.2024 i.e. after another ten days from issuance of the letter dated 30.09.2024.

10. On 10.010.2024, the special appeal was drafted in part and the Pairokar was advised to make available certain relevant documents which he provided only on 05.11.2024 i.e. almost twenty five days after the drafting started.

11. Two further sittings were held on 10.11.2024 and 15.11.2024 when the special appeal and the application for interim relief were drafted, however, Pairokar as stated in the affidavit was advised to provide explanation for the delay in filing the appeal. Prior to it no attention was paid to the limitation prescribed for filing the appeal.

12. The Pairokar as stated provided the explanation on 16.12.2024 i.e. with a delay of almost a month about which there is no explanation. One fails to understand as to why one month was taken to collect and provide the explanation for the delay especially when no documents have been annexed with the affidavit in support of application for condonation of delay and there is no such fact mentioned in the affidavit which required so much time. This only goes to show apathy and negligence on the part of the State Authorities.

13. Ultimately on 16.12.2024 it is stated that the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was drafted and then the affidavit straightway goes on to state that after such drafting it is being filed before the Court. What it does not says is that in fact it the appeal was filed on 17.02.2025 i.e. a good two months after the date of drafting of the appeal. There is no explanation whatsoever for this intervening period.This demonstrates a thoroughly casual and negligent approach and absence of due diligence and promptness in 4 SPLAD No. 75 of 2025 filing the appeal.

14. Apart from the above, all that has been stated is that the delay was caused on account of administrative formalities by following certain norms and procedure of discipline and systematic performance of officials functions which includes preparation of notes etc., after scrutinizing various records. Movement of files step by step to different sections and to different officers and lastly to the Head of Department and thereafter forwarding the matter to the Administrative Department in the State Government for appropriate decision. The aforesaid process takes some time as it depends upon so many factors as referred hereinabove such as preparation of office notes etc., non availability of necessary information, non availability of concerned officials, holidays in between and certain unavoidable and unspoken circumstances. This is nothing but a lame excuse for bureaucratic redtapism. In spite of plethora of decisions on the subject demanding the State Authorities to be prompt in preferring such appeals, they have gone unheeded.

15. We have gone through the recent decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court dated 12.09.2025 rendered in Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025 'Shivamma (Dead) By LRS vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors' wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bonafide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards 5 SPLAD No. 75 of 2025 condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed hereinabove.

16. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. 6 SPLAD No. 75 of 2025 Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

17. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterised by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P.' reported in (2011) SCC Online SC 403 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. It has held that law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) is unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very 7 SPLAD No. 75 of 2025 discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

18. Counsel for the State-appellants has relied upon a decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1984 SC 1744 (O.P. Kathpalia vs. Lakhmir Singh) to contend that if there is miscarriage of justice then delay should be condoned, however, we find that the said decision is based on its own facts as discussed therein especially interpolated order passed in appeal etc., but there is no such foundation laid in the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay in this case. There is no allegation of fraud in the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay as a ground for condonation of delay. In the recent decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) (supra) it is clearly stated that the merits of the matter cannot be considered at this stage when the application for condonation of delay is being considered.

19. Taking into consideration the aforesaid facts and the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court we are constrained to observe that the delay is inordinate and the explanation offered in this regard is not at all sufficient. As already stated hereinabove, the explanation offered does not show any diligence, promptness on the part of the State Authorities nor any bonafide effort to file the appeal within the limitation prescribed. Only lame excuses have been put forth and there are several periods which have been left unexplained. No documents have been annexed with the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay. The State has filed these appeals at leisure.

20. For all these reasons, we do not find any ground to condone the delay in filing the appeals bearing Special Appeal Defective No.75 of 2025 and 77 of 2025, the applications for condonation of delay are accordingly, rejected, consequently, the appeals are also dismissed . November 4, 2025 -Piyush- (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) PIYUSH YADAV High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

1. Heard Shri Anuj Kudesia, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Shri Anand Singh, learned Standing Chief Standing Counsel for the State-appellants on the question of delay in filing the appeals.

2. These are two appeals and both of them have been filed on the same date i.e. 17.02.2025 challenging the judgment and order dated 27.05.2024 in Writ A No.2001467 of 2012 and Writ A No.34844 of 2019. There is a delay of 232 days in filing the appeals. The limitation for filing special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 is thirty days vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

3. Learned State Counsel has taken us through the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay in Special Appeal 2 SPLAD No. 75 of 2025 Defective No.75 of 2025. We have also perused the same. Explanations offered for the delay is similar in Special Appeal Defective No.77 of 2025.

4. The explanation offered in the said affidavit is that the judgment dated 27.05.2024 was served in the office of the Directorate of Technical Education, Uttar Pradesh, Kanpur on 31.05.2024. On

07.06.2024, the matter was referred by the Directorate to the Chief Standing Counsel of this Court at Lucknow for providing legal opinion in the matter. The State Government vide letter dated 12.06.2024 and

16.08.2024 requested the Chief Standing Counsel to provide legal opinion which was ultimately provided on 30.08.2024, thus, there was a clear delay of more than two months in providing the legal opinion. Whether any efforts were made to get the legal opinion at the earliest has not been mentioned. It seems they kept sitting over the matter awaiting legal opinion instead of showing any urgency. None of the letters whether it be dated 07.06.2024, 12.06.2024 or 16.08.2024 have been annexed with the affidavit.

5. The Directorate of Technical Education, Uttar Pradesh, Kanpur vide letter dated 05.09.2024 referred the matter to the State Government alongwith the legal opinion dated 30.08.2024 which hardly demonstrates any urgency on the part of the State Authorities. If the matter was already delayed then some promptness should have been shown.

6. The State Government then referred the matter to the Law Department, Government of U.P. which issued the Government Order dated 19.09.2024 granting permission for filing special appeals. It has not been disclosed as to on what date the State Government referred the matter to the Law Department. Apparently, there is a delay even from the date of issuance of letter dated 05.09.2024 which has not been explained.

7. Ultimately, the permission granted by the Law Department was received in the Directorate on 20.09.2024. The Director, Technical Education referred the matter to the Chief Standing Counsel after almost ten days on 30.09.2024 which hardly demonstrates any urgency, promptness or diligence for that matter, on the part of the 3 SPLAD No. 75 of 2025 said officer.

8. Learned Chief Standing Counsel allotted the paper book to one of the Standing Counsel and it has not been disclosed as to when this was done.

9. The affidavit further goes on to state that the Pairokar of the concerned department contacted the concerned Standing Counsel on

10.10.2024 i.e. after another ten days from issuance of the letter dated 30.09.2024.

10. On 10.010.2024, the special appeal was drafted in part and the Pairokar was advised to make available certain relevant documents which he provided only on 05.11.2024 i.e. almost twenty five days after the drafting started.

11. Two further sittings were held on 10.11.2024 and 15.11.2024 when the special appeal and the application for interim relief were drafted, however, Pairokar as stated in the affidavit was advised to provide explanation for the delay in filing the appeal. Prior to it no attention was paid to the limitation prescribed for filing the appeal.

12. The Pairokar as stated provided the explanation on 16.12.2024 i.e. with a delay of almost a month about which there is no explanation. One fails to understand as to why one month was taken to collect and provide the explanation for the delay especially when no documents have been annexed with the affidavit in support of application for condonation of delay and there is no such fact mentioned in the affidavit which required so much time. This only goes to show apathy and negligence on the part of the State Authorities.

13. Ultimately on 16.12.2024 it is stated that the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was drafted and then the affidavit straightway goes on to state that after such drafting it is being filed before the Court. What it does not says is that in fact it the appeal was filed on 17.02.2025 i.e. a good two months after the date of drafting of the appeal. There is no explanation whatsoever for this intervening period.This demonstrates a thoroughly casual and negligent approach and absence of due diligence and promptness in 4 SPLAD No. 75 of 2025 filing the appeal.

14. Apart from the above, all that has been stated is that the delay was caused on account of administrative formalities by following certain norms and procedure of discipline and systematic performance of officials functions which includes preparation of notes etc., after scrutinizing various records. Movement of files step by step to different sections and to different officers and lastly to the Head of Department and thereafter forwarding the matter to the Administrative Department in the State Government for appropriate decision. The aforesaid process takes some time as it depends upon so many factors as referred hereinabove such as preparation of office notes etc., non availability of necessary information, non availability of concerned officials, holidays in between and certain unavoidable and unspoken circumstances. This is nothing but a lame excuse for bureaucratic redtapism. In spite of plethora of decisions on the subject demanding the State Authorities to be prompt in preferring such appeals, they have gone unheeded.

15. We have gone through the recent decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court dated 12.09.2025 rendered in Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025 'Shivamma (Dead) By LRS vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors' wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bonafide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards 5 SPLAD No. 75 of 2025 condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed hereinabove.

16. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. 6 SPLAD No. 75 of 2025 Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.

17. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterised by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P.' reported in (2011) SCC Online SC 403 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. It has held that law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) is unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very 7 SPLAD No. 75 of 2025 discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

18. Counsel for the State-appellants has relied upon a decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1984 SC 1744 (O.P. Kathpalia vs. Lakhmir Singh) to contend that if there is miscarriage of justice then delay should be condoned, however, we find that the said decision is based on its own facts as discussed therein especially interpolated order passed in appeal etc., but there is no such foundation laid in the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay in this case. There is no allegation of fraud in the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay as a ground for condonation of delay. In the recent decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) (supra) it is clearly stated that the merits of the matter cannot be considered at this stage when the application for condonation of delay is being considered.

19. Taking into consideration the aforesaid facts and the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court we are constrained to observe that the delay is inordinate and the explanation offered in this regard is not at all sufficient. As already stated hereinabove, the explanation offered does not show any diligence, promptness on the part of the State Authorities nor any bonafide effort to file the appeal within the limitation prescribed. Only lame excuses have been put forth and there are several periods which have been left unexplained. No documents have been annexed with the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay. The State has filed these appeals at leisure.

20. For all these reasons, we do not find any ground to condone the delay in filing the appeals bearing Special Appeal Defective No.75 of 2025 and 77 of 2025, the applications for condonation of delay are accordingly, rejected, consequently, the appeals are also dismissed . November 4, 2025 -Piyush- (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) PIYUSH YADAV High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench